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

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ESSAY

Towards the

THEORY

OF THE

Ideal or Intelligible WORLD.

Design'd for Two Parts.

The First considering it Absolutely in it self, and the Second in Relation to Human Understanding.

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL of the PACIFIC LIBRARY

PART I.

By JOHN NORRIS, Rector of *Bemerton*, near *Sarum*.

Tu cuncta superno
Ducis ab Exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similiq; ab imagine formans.
Boethius. 3 de Consol. Met. 9.

LONDON:
Printed for *S. Manship*, at the *Ship* in *Cornhill*, near the *Royal-Exchange*; and *W. Hawes*, at the *Rose* in *Ludgate-street*, near the *West-End* of St. *Paul's* Church, MDCCI.

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TO

The Right Worſhipful

Sir *THOMAS COOKES*,

Of *Bently*, in the County of

WORSTER,

Baronet.

SIR,

I Know no Perſon to whom the Addreſs of this Work can be more due, or from whom it may expect a more Favourable Acceptance, than your worthy ſelf, whoſe generous Bounty to the Publick, and therefore truly Great, becauſe *Living* Cha-

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rity, proclaims you ſo good a Friend to the Intereſt of Learning and Religion. Thoſe ſlow Benefactors, who give only what they cannot keep, and ſo rather cut out a Channel for their flowing Wealth than cauſe it to flow, determining only the courſe and directing the flight of their Riches when they make themſelves Wings, may indeed do a great deal of good to the World, but are thought to deſerve little Acknowledgment from it for their late, and as it were *Poſthumous* Works of Mercy. For tho' they do what is materially Good, they do it not *well*, this being but little better than the ſordid Practiſe of thoſe who heap up their Riches together (not underſtanding the much great-

er

er Pleaſure of doing good with them) for Moths and Ruſt, or for the worſe Corruption of a looſe and Libertine Heir. But there is another value to be ſet upon the Works of Charity which are not extorted by the Arreſts of Death, but are the free and kindly Productions of Life and Health. When a Man gives before he is ſummon'd to ſurrender, and has a Heart to part with the World while he may poſſeſs and enjoy it. This is the Excellency and Commendation of Charity, and while the other only *Profits*, this *Obliges* the World, and calls for the moſt juſt Acknowledgments of Eſteem and Gratitude.

This, Sir, you have a very eminent Right to, and I hope the

Publick will be as *juſt*, as you have been Good and Charitable. Concerning which I have a fair occaſion to ſay great Things, but ſince your Modeſty will not bear what your Generoſity deſerves, give me leave inſtead of a Rhetorical *Panegyrick*, to erect this Philoſophick Monument at leaſt to the Memory of your noble and perpetual Bounty, and to inſcribe your Name to a Work which may as much commemorate your Goodneſs as it is like perhaps to exerciſe it. For indeed it would be Happineſs beyond what the Senſe of my Infirmity permits me to promiſe my ſelf, if there ſhould not be things that will need Indulgence in the *Preſent* which is here humbly addreſs'd to you. Which yet if

you

you pleaſe to accept with all its Defects, you will yet farther commend your Goodneſs to the World, by ſhewing your *forgiving* to hold proportion with your *giving* Charity. Which that God would bleſs to the beſt Advantages of the publick here, and doubly reward upon the Head of its pious Author hereafter, is what ought to be the *Prayer* of all, and ſhall be ſaid with a particular Devotion, by,

SIR,

Your moſt Humble,

and Reſpectful Servant,

J. NORRIS.

THE

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

I Have ſo long ſince promiſed what is here at length in part perform'd, that this Metaphyſical Syſtem which is now offer'd to thy View, may not perhaps be altogether unexpected by thee. But that thou maiſt not upon that account expect to find it a more labour'd and correct Piece than it is, meaſuring the Perfection of the Birth by the preſumed time of the Geſtation, I think it convenient to let thee know, that tho' it has been a long while promiſed, it was but of late begun and finiſh'd, in the Form wherein it now appears.

'Tis true indeed, that ſome Years ago when I had the Honour to be one of the Fellows of All-Souls *College in* Oxford *(which God for ever bleſs and proſper) I began a Treatiſe upon this Subject in Latin, whereof I there finiſh'd two Chapters, with a good part of a third. But whether diſcouraged by the Difficulty of the Undertaking, or diverted from it by other Avocations, ſo it was that I went no farther, but laid it, and almoſt the*

Thoughts

Thoughts of it, quite aſide, without medling with it for many Years. And when very lately I reſumed this Work into my Hands, I found I could like neither the Form *nor the* Matter *of my former Performance, ſo that I was forc'd to begin the Edifice upon a new Foundation, and to build as it were from the very Ground, employing only here and there a ſtroke of the old Materials.*

That which after ſo long a Diſcontinuance of this Work induced me at length to reſume the thoughts of it, beſides the moment and importance of the Subject, as containing things in it of the niceſt Conſideration, and very neceſſary to be conſider'd in a rational Theory, *was the frequent Intimation that I had occaſionally given of theſe Things in my Writings, wherein are ſeveral Paſſages diſſeminated up and down that glance at the Notion here undertaken to be diſplaid, which lighter touches without a more explicit Account of the thing, would have ſerv'd only as ſo many* Amuſements *to the common ſort of Readers, to whom I ſhould have been little better than a* Barbarian. *And as for thoſe whoſe better diſcernment would let them into ſome View and Apprehenſion of what I would have underſtood by thoſe Hints* En Paſſant, *ſuch a ſlight, broken and tranſient Repreſentation of my Meaning, would with them ſerve only to expoſe it as Viſionary and Fantaſtick. Tho' whether the Preſentialneſs of an* Ideal World *to our Minds be really ſuch* Platonick Gibberiſh, *there is a certain Perſon that may now be concern'd to conſider, and whether the Notion may not as little deſerve his* Cenſure,

as

as the maintainer of it does his Compliments.

That therefore those Structures and Prelibations which I had given of these things might not appear altogether unintelligible to some, and be understood by halves, and accordingly vilified and ridiculed by others, I thought it might be convenient to treat of them more at large, to set out the Notion more in the Light, and to digest what thoughts I had upon it into a just and regular System. Not but that I should perhaps have been content to have lain under the Imputation of an unintelligible or visionary *Writer, if I had not thought the Subject of considerable Consequence, and that my farther Silence upon it would have been a Prejudice to an important and concerning Truth. For so indeed I take the Subject of this Treatise to be, and whatever my Performance may be upon it, yet I cannot but think the* Theory *in it self to be most worthy of Consideration, not only for the clearing of our Notions of things, but also for the Advantage and Improvement of* Morality, *as containing certain Principles that lay the firmest Foundation for the Being of God, and for our Dependence upon him in our Intellectual Operations, and consequently for all those Duties of Humility, Love, and the most rais'd Devotion that arise from that Dependence: As will in great measure appear to the Reader by this Present, but more fully under the other part of this Essay, if my Health serve me, and the Kindness of the World incourage me ever to undertake it.*

In

In the mean while as to the preſent Performance, I hope the Difficulty of my Subject (not at all inferiour to the Importance of it) which has been ſo great a Diſadvantage to me in all other Reſpects, will at leaſt in this ſingle one befriend me, by procuring a more favourable Cenſure from all Candid and Equitable Readers, who becauſe alſo the moſt Judicious, *cannot but be ſenſible what Difficulties I muſt ingage, in directing and carrying on my Travels, I might ſay* making my way, *through ſo many wild and untrodden Coaſts, and what Allowances are reaſonably due to a leading Eſſay upon ſo nice and delicate a Subject. Such indeed as my Infirmity is more excuſable for ill managing, than my Boldneſs for undertaking.*

Tho' indeed a like Allowance may be made for that alſo, when 'tis conſider'd what an Advantage it is even to Men of ordinary Underſtandings (among whom I am content to rank my ſelf) when they treat of what they have applied themſelves to with more than ordinary Thought and Conſideration, eſpecially if they join with it the great Help of imploring the Divine aid and aſſiſtance, as I have frequently done in this Affair, beſeeching God that if this Work were for his Glory, and the Illuſtration of his Truth, he would aſſiſt me in it, or if otherwiſe, that he would divert me from it. Upon which Foundations I have proceeded with the greater Confidence, notwithſtanding the great Infirmity of my Underſtanding, of which I thank God I have a more juſt and recollected Senſe than ever. And therefore if at any time I expreſs my ſelf with ſome

Aſ-

Assurance when I differ from other Men, I hope it is not that I prefer my rational Abilities before theirs, but because I think I may have been more conversant in some sort of Studies, or have possibly bestow'd more Consideration upon the matter before me than they have done, and therefore may sometimes think I see things in a better Light *than they do, tho' not with better* Eyes. *For which Reason, tho' I would not have any thing implicitly taken upon the Authority of my Judgment, yet neither would I have my Reader so hasty and impatient a Critick, as to Censure without Consideration, what has been written with so Much.*

And yet as much as I have thought, and as well as I seem to have consider'd of these things, yet being not unmindful of Human Infirmity in general, and my own in particular, as also of the Sublimity and Singularity of my Argument, I would not (however through Imprudence I may happen to express my self) be understood to be so positive in any thing, but that where I deliver my Sense with most assurance 'tis always Salva meliori disquisitione, *not barring my self the Liberty and Advantage of after Thoughts, or the Information of better Judgments, which I shall always be ready to receive with a thankful Submission, even to the Retracting of the most Fundamental Notion here maintain'd upon due Conviction of its Falshood, as designing only to find that Truth which I inquire after, and not to establish any Notion or Opinion of my own, purely as such.*

Only

Only were I to adviſe him that ſhall go about to pull down this Syſtem, it ſhould be that he would firſt bethink himſelf of providing a better, or elſe I think he were as good let the old one ſtand. But if he be indeed able to exhibit a better (that is a Righter, *for I pretend not to have treated of theſe things in the beſt* manner) *and ſuch as can give a more intelligible Account of the Exiſtence of the Natural World, Eternal Truths, Science,* &c. *upon other than* Ideal *Principles, I ſhall be as forward as any to Congratulate the Succeſs of his* Performance. *For indeed I ſhould be glad to ſee theſe things rightly accounted for, if they are not already, as imagining that they deſerve more Conſideration than has been yet beſtowed upon them. Which if this Eſſay of mine ſhall prove an occaſion of, I ſhall think that even upon this ſingle Account it was worth my while to write it, as imperfect as it is. And yet as imperfect as it is too, perhaps here may be ſome things that may deſerve my Reader's Conſideration, tho' I doubt, more that will need his Pardon.*

This Work being of a Philoſophical Nature, I have not occaſion to make uſe of much Scripture. One of the moſt conſiderable Allegations of that kind, is that of the Evangeliſt St. John *concern-the Eternal* Word, All things were made by him, *&c. This my Learned Friend Mr.* Penton *ſets down, and with good Reaſon, among the difficult Texts. But if the* Word *by whom all things are ſaid to be made, be taken not according to his Perſonal Diſtinction, but Eſſential Com-*

Apparat. ad Theol. P. 132.

Community, not as he is distinct from, but as he is One with God the Father, and if made by him *be also accordingly taken in the Sense of the most proper Efficiency, then where is the peculiar Difficulty? For what great Difficulty is there in conceiving it to be said, that God should make the World, or what has this Text less accountable than that of* Genesis, In the Beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth? *But indeed there seems to be something more in the Matter, and that* by him *is to be taken in the Sense of* Exemplarity *rather than that of a rigid Efficiency, according to the Account given of it in the* *Theory. *Which however surprising to some Readers, will perhaps appear not to be altogether without Ground to those who shall consider,* 1. *That the Exemplary Sense seems best to agree to the Word or Wisdom of God as Personally consider'd, according to his Precise Character as distinct from the other Persons in the God-head, in which Sense it seems also most reasonable to suppose that he is taken by St.* John, *because he says that the* Word *was with God, and was God, as also that the Word was made Flesh, calling his Glory the Glory as of the only begotten of the Father, by which Expressions he seems plainly to consider the Word, not Essentially, but Personally, meaning by it the second Person of the Trinity, that Word which was incarnate.* 2. *That the Expression of all things being made by him ought not to be taken as Equivalent to this, that* he made all things,

* P. 264. Which account the Reader is desired to compare with, and judge of by this.

things, *but rather to this, that* God made all things by him, *it being ſo expreſs'd in other Scriptures, with which it is moſt reaſonable to ſuppoſe this to be Conſonant. But then if* All things were made by him *be equivalent to this, that* God *made all things by him, then (beſides that this alſo argues the* Word *to be taken here not Eſſentially, but Perſonally) God himſelf is ſuppoſed to be the proper Efficient. And indeed if he were not, why might not the Son be ſaid to make all things by the Father, as well as the Father by the Son? The Efficiency is then aſcribed to God, only he is ſaid to make all things* by *his Son or Word. Which ſeems alſo to be the Senſe of the* Nicene *Creed, wherein the Character of the Father is that of maker of Heaven and Earth, as that of the Son that by him all things were made, which latter Character not being in reaſon to be ſuppoſed the ſame with the firſt, the moſt reaſonable Conſtruction ſeems to be, not that the Son made all things, but that the Father made all things by the Son. But how? That indeed is not ſaid. But it muſt however really be either in the Senſe of a ſtrict Efficiency, or in the Senſe of Exemplarity. If in the Senſe of a ſtrict Efficiency, then either as by a Principal Efficient, or as by an Inſtrument. The latter I preſume no conſidering Perſon will ſay. Nor indeed do I well ſee how he can ſay the former. For beſides that according to the ſuppoſed Form of the Expreſſion the Efficiency is expreſly aſcribed to God the Father, if the Son as ſuch be conſider'd in the Work of Creation as a Principal Efficient,*

I ſee

I see no reason why the Son might not be as well said to make all things by the Father, as the Father by the Son. But this is against the Language of the Scripture, which still represents the Father as making all things by the Son, and never, that I know of, the Son as making all things by the Father, which yet it might as well do as the other, if the Son as such were consider'd as a Principal, or Coefficient, in the Work of the Creation. I say as well one as the other, tho' indeed neither of them would upon this Supposition be proper. For to say that an Efficient Cause of any effect makes it by *another Efficient of the same order with it self, is neither a usual, nor yet a correct way of Speaking. He may be said indeed to make it* with *it (as denoting a Coefficiency) but not* by *it, that implying always some difference either in the Dignity of the Cause, or in the manner of the Causality, and importing either* Instrumentality *or* Exemplarity. *And hither 'twill all come at last. And indeed could we consider the Eternal* Word *of the Father as an Instrument used or imploy'd by him in the Creation of the World, it would be very proper to say that God made all things* by *him. But then with the Propriety of the Expression we should admit a most absurd and unworthy Notion, it being impossible without running into the* Arian *Heresy, or something worse, to suppose that God made all things by the* Word, *as by an Instrument. But how then did he make all things* by him, *if not as by an Exemplar or Intelligible Measure. Which tho' a particular way of Speaking ought not to raise any*

Prejudice againſt the thing intended by it, ſince it amounts to no other, than that God made all things according to the Ideas of his Eternal Wiſdom, which Wiſdom was his Coeſſential Son.

Accordingly it may be remarkable that St. John *does not only ſay that all things were made by him, but alſo adds this other Expletory Clauſe, and without him was not any thing made that was made. For which there ſeems to have been no great occaſion, unleſs by not any things being made without him were intended (at leaſt in the groſs) to ſpecify how all things were made by him, that latter Clauſe being but a cold way of expreſſing an Efficiency, ſince to be ſure nothing can be made* without *its Efficient; beſides that if* that *had been the thing deſign'd, it would have been ſufficiently expreſs'd before.*

The Context is alſo conſiderable, both Antecedent and Conſequent. In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. *Here he diſtinguiſhes the Perſonality from the Nature, and ſhews that he takes* λόγος *in the former Senſe, conſider'd as a diſtinct Subſiſtence, by ſaying that the* Word was with God. *And then when he ſays of the ſame Word that it* was God, *'tis plain again that* Word *muſt be taken Perſonally, tho'* God *be taken Eſſentially, for the Divine Being or Nature, ſince he affirms* that *Nature of* this *Perſon, by ſaying that the* Word was God. *But then leſt by ſaying the Word was God, it may ſeem as if the* Word *were conſider'd according to the Community of his Nature rather than the diſtinction*

ſtinction of his Perſonality, before he comes to ſay that all things were made by him, 'tis conſiderable that he interpoſes what was ſaid before, reinculcating that the ſame was in the Beginning with God. *Upon which he forthwith adds, that* All things were made by him, *and that* without him was not any thing made that was made, *that is, by that Word that was in the Beginning with God, and therefore ſeems to be here conſider'd preciſely under his Perſonal Character and Diſtinction, as he is the Wiſdom of the Father, to which Efficiency does not ſeem ſo properly to belong, as is noted in the Theory. Then follow thoſe high and myſtical Words, almoſt* Ἀ῾ῤῥήτα ῥήματα, In him was the Life, and the Life was the Light of Men. *Which emphatick Clauſe St.* Auſtin *makes uſe of as a Key to unlock the former, when to this Queſtion of his,* How were all things made by him, *he returns this as the general Anſwer,* that which was made *(for ſo he chuſes to diſpoſe the Order of the Words, tranſferring the end of one Verſe to the beginning of the next)* is Life in him, *inſtead of in him was the Life. Which way of reading, as it ſeems to determine the Formation of Things by the* λόγος *to the Ideal or Exemplary Senſe, ſo it caſts a moſt favourable Aſpect upon the Ideal Hypotheſis in general; for how can thoſe Things which are made be ſaid to be Life in him, any otherwiſe than as in him they are Ideas, which Ideas are very* Spirit *and* Life: *And ſo St.* Auſtin *explains it,* viz. *by the Divine* Ideality, *or that Intelligible Rea-*

See his Expoſition upon St. John. Tract. 1.

ſon in the Wiſdom of God whereby things were made, telling us, that, tho' the things that are made (he inſtances in the Earth) *are not all Life, yet there is Spiritually in the Divine Wiſdom a certain Reaſon whereby they are made, and that this Reaſon is Life or the Life. And that therefore the things that are made are Life in him. Which is as much as to ſay, that the Things that are made are therefore Life in him, becauſe the Ideas of them whereby they were made are ſo. Which reſolves into this more Formal Diſcourſe,*

The Ideas whereby things were made are in him Life,
But the things that are made are in him no other than thoſe Ideas,
Therefore the things that are made are in him Life.

This ſeems to be a fair Repreſentation of St. Auſtin's *Senſe, and ſince this is given as an Anſwer to the Queſtion,* how all things were made by him, *what this ſeems to inſinuate I leave my Reader upon a juſt Collation of things to conſider. And when he has done that, let him take this farther Remark with him, that if the* Life *of the Text be underſtood to reſpect the Ideal Reaſons of things in the Living Word and Wiſdom of God (as St.* Auſtin *ſeems to apply it there and elſewhere, particularly when he ſays, that in this* Life God *ſaw all things when he made them) there is too great a Congruity in what follows that it ſhould*

De Gen. ad lit. Lib. 5 Cap. 15.

be

be matter of Wonder to any that this Life *is ſaid alſo to be* the Light of Men, *who indeed will be found to ſee in the Light of this All-ſhining Ideal Life. And therefore ſays the Father upon the whole,* Ex ipſa vita Homines illuminantur, Pecora non illuminantur, quia Pecora non habent rationales mentes quæ poſſint videre ſapientiam. Homo autem factus ad imaginem Dei habet rationalem mentem per quam poſſit percipere ſapientiam. Ergo illa vita per quam facta ſunt omnia, ipſa vita lux eſt, & non quorumcunq; Animalium, ſed lux Hominum. *To which ſeems to agree what he ſays elſewhere upon the ſame Occaſion, when he gives this Reaſon why the Life is the Light of Men, becauſe Rational Minds have no other true Light, but that very Word of God by whom all things were made. But the fuller Conſideration of this laſt will fall under the ſecond part of this Theory, where we ſhall have St.* Auſtin *for our Guide and Companion as well as in the former, ſince he is no leſs expreſs in aſſerting the* Word *to be our* Light, *than he is in the Doctrin of his* Ideality.

Expoſ. on St. *John* Tract. 1.

De Gen. ad lit. L. 5. C. 13.

But had St. John *then a diſtinct and explicit Conſideration of the Ideality or Exemplarity of the* λογος, *when he ſaid all things were made by him? That I cannot ſay, tho' why might he not as well as of his* Divinity, *ſince he lay in the Boſom of that* Word *who lay in the Boſom of his Father? But there may be no Neceſſity of ſuppoſing that. Perhaps he might only expreſly and directly*

directly intend to say in general that God made all things by his Word (as St. Paul *does,* that he created all things by Jesus Christ, *Ephes.* 3. 9.) *without entring into any distinct thought concerning the* Modes *of it. But however that be, when the manner of this comes to be rationally consider'd (as to be sure every Revelation of God will bear a Rational Sense and Interpretation) whether this can be understood or intelligibly explain'd any other way than in the way of* Exemplarity, *viz. that God made all things by the Ideas of his Eternal Word or Wisdom, is the Question. I say the Question, because having a great Tenderness upon me of misinterpreting Scripture, I would not be understood positively to affirm any thing by what I have said either here, or in the following Discourse concerning this Matter, but to offer these few Hints rather by way of* Inquiry, *than by way of* Doctrinal Assertion, *as being more willing to learn, than to teach in a Point of so nice and sublime a Consideration.*

I think fit farther to acquaint my Reader (tho' 'tis no more than what the Title and Course of the Work may inform him) that what is premised in these Papers is in order to a following Account concerning the manner of Humane Understanding, *which is to be erected upon the Principles here laid down. Which if they lead me to an Account of that great Abstrusity, something different from what has been some while since publish'd to the World, I hope the very Ingenious Author of it will pardon me, since tho' I cannot in all things think with him, yet I mean in nothing to detract*

from

from him, or from that juſt Reputation which his celebrated and very valuable Performance ſtands poſſeſs'd of.

In the mean time 'tis a great Diſadvantage to this Theory, that the firſt Part of it appears without the ſecond, which would have contributed very much to the Light, Strength and Beauty of it. And it might alſo have been much more Perfect and Correct than it is (from the Preſs as well as from my Hand) if with all the Interruptions and Impediments that have accompanied the Compoſure of it, I could but have born the Fatigue of Tranſcribing *it. But that I could not well do, which no doubt has been a great Prejudice to it, eſpecially as to the* Stile, *which cannot have all the fineneſs and exactneſs of Things that have been long dwelt upon, gone through many Transfuſions, again and again drawn off and refined from the Lees, poliſh'd over and over, and turn'd every way for the beſt Advantage. But that I hope will be excuſed in a Work of this Nature. I hope my Notions are for the main Right, and that I have expreſs'd them Intelligibly, and if the Muſick be true and according to the Rules of Proportion, one may diſpenſe with the want of a few* Graces. *And as to the Rightneſs of the Notional Part, I am inclined to have the more Confidence of that, becauſe tho' I am not every where Conſiſtent with the Doctrin of the Schools, yet I follow the Authority of St.* Auſtin, *which is ſo greatly and juſtly reverenc'd by them; as I ſhall do alſo in the remaining Part of this Theory, which is that*

Scene

Scene of the Intelligible World which M. Malebranche *has moſt open'd, and where I expect from him the greateſt Aſſiſtance.*

And now my good Reader I have no more than, having wearied thee with the Preface, to preſent thee with the Book, and to beg thy Candid as well as Conſiderate peruſal of it. Aſſuring thee in the Language of the Father, whom I love to ſpeak after, that where I ſtick I ſhall not be uneaſy to ſeek, nor where I err aſhamed to learn. And therefore whoever reads this, where he is alike certain, let him proceed with me. Where he alike heſitates, let him enquire with me. Where he acknowledges his own Errour, let him return to me. Where mine, let him recal me. *And ſo we ſhall go both together at leaſt in the way of* Charity, *that more Excellent way, which is of greater Conſequence than the greateſt* Knowledge *we can pretend to in this Life, and which ſhall remain, when the other ſhall vaniſh away.*

De Trin. Lib. 1. Cap. 2 & 3.

AN

THE THEORY OF THE Ideal World, &c.

PART I.

Being the Abſolute Part.

CHAP. I.

The State of things Diſtinguiſh'd into Natural and Ideal.

1. SINCE the Ideal State of things is the Ground and Foundation, not only of all Sciences, but even of *Truth* it ſelf, the ſole and adequate Object of it, (as ſhall be ſhewn in its due place) and ſince Ideas of one ſort or other, either of a Nature diſtinct from us, or elſe Modifications of our own, are generally acknowledg'd to be the immediate Objects of Human Thought and Underſtand-

ing, which is ſuppoſed to be immediately terminated, not in the *Objects* that are without us, and ſometimes vaſtly diſtant from us, but in the *Ideas* of them which are within us, one would think the *Theory* before us ſhould hold one of the firſt ranks in Contemplation, and that the *Ideal Philoſophy* ſhould be ſo far from being ſo neglected as it is, that it ſhould rather be the great Study and Enquiry of all Rational and Inquiſitive Minds, at leaſt ſince the late improvements of Reaſon and Speculation, the ſtrange *Awakenings* of Thought and Reflection, and the Modern Inlargement of the World out of the ſervile ſtraitneſſes of Authority and common placing, into the Liberty of Meditation and good Senſe.

2. Thus I ſay, Conſidering the Nature and Dignity of things, one would think it ſhould be; for I muſt profeſs that I do not know of any Subject within the Circle of Rational and Philoſophical Diſquiſition of higher Importance, or that better deſerves the Application of Human Underſtanding than the Preſent. And yet (however it come to paſs) I know not whether there be any more Diſregarded and Unconſider'd, whether any one Tract in the whole *Field* of Natural or Metaphyſical Knowledg has lain more Neglected and *Uncultivated*. The Material and Viſible World has had its *Syſtems*, as well as particular Countries their Maps and Deſcriptions, and the *Planetary* Regions begin now to have theirs too. Nature has been unravel'd into her Principles, Effects perſued into their Cauſes,

Cauſes, Appearances that uſed to be explain'd by Forms and Qualities, clearly and diſtinctly accounted for by the reaſons of *Mechaniſm*, and natural Science ſo improved and wrought up to ſuch a pitch of Perfection, that Men ſeem to think they have Studied their own World long enough, and are now for making Viſits into the Celeſtial ones that move about them. Only the *Ideal* World which is within us, (if we may not rather be ſaid to be in it) and to which our Souls are intimately United, in which we contemplate all things, which we continually have before us, and which we alwaies think of (becauſe 'tis that which really terminates all our Thoughts whenever we think) this great and capacious World, I ſay of Light and Truth, of eſſential Order, Beauty and Proportion, is yet in a manner unthought of and forgotten by us, remains a kind of *Terra Incognita*, a more *Intellectual America*.

3. 'Tis true indeed that *Plato*, *Philo Judæus*; *Plotinus*, St. *Auſtin*, *Aquinas*, *Marſilius Ficinus* and others have ſcatter'd up and down in their Writings ſome ſuperficial Strokes, confuſed Glances, and incidental Strictures of it, but I know of no one that has profeſſedly enter'd into the *Detail* of this matter, or ſo much as offer'd to give a full, juſt and diſtinct Account of it. Enough indeed has been ſaid to ſhew that the Mind of Man is Conſcious of ſuch a thing, and has a Natural *Parturiency* towards it, but ſo far from enough to repreſent it in its due Light, that one of the greateſt uſes of what has been done

in this kind by former Ages, ſeems to be to excite the Curioſity of the ſucceeding one's to a farther enquiry. And that one would think it ſhould not fail to do. It might be reaſonably expected, that the Monuments of *Platonic Antiquity* relating to the *Ideal* World, ſhould have awaken'd ſome inquiſitive Genius or other to a more through Conſideration and Diſcovery of it, in like manner as the Fragments of the Antients concerning the *Geneſis* of things ſeems to have given Birth to a very ſingular Theory concerning the *Natural* World. But the Age I find, as Curious as it is, is not very forward to take the hint, and tho' covetous and inquiſitive after *imported* Truth, is not for making a Voiage into the *Native* Country and Region of it. Mr. *Malebranch* has ventured the fartheſt of any that I know of upon this Diſcovery. He is indeed the great *Gallileo* of the Intellectual World. He has given us the *Point* of *View*, and what ever farther Detections are made, it muſt be through his *Teleſcope*. He has ſearch'd after Truth in the proper and genuin Seat and Region of it, has open'd a great many noble Scenes of the World we are now Contemplating; and would perhaps have been the fitteſt Perſon of the Age to have given a juſt and complete Theory of its Syſtems. But even this great *Apelles* has drawn this Celeſtial Beauty but half way, and I am affraid the excellent Piece will Suffer, whatever other hand has the finiſhing of it.

4. But that is not ſo ſtrange, as that the otherwiſe curious World ſhould be ſo indiſpoſed

to

to this Theory. How comes so sublime and noble a piece of Speculation to have had so few Considerers? Why, besides that general Prejudice that most Men are under against very Abstract and Metaphysical Arguments, there may be these two more particular Reasons assign'd. The first is the great Disorder of Original Corruption, and that Body of Sin to which we are so closely ally'd, which fortifies our Union with the *Sensible*, and weakens that Union which we have with the *Intelligible* World, which estranges us from the Divine *Light*, and indispose us from being willing to have any Communion or Fellowship with it. This may be supposed to be the great leading Principle of Aversion that turns off our Weak and Feeble Eyes from the direct and intent View of the Bright Sun of our Minds, tho' we cannot wholely avoid it neither, as seeing all things by its Light, and makes us withdraw and absent our selves from the World of essential Truth, tho' that be alwaies present to us, and in it we Live, Move and have our Being. According to that of St. *Austin*, *Ecce intus eras, & ego foris. Mecum eras, & tecum non eram.* And again, *Nusquam recedis, & vix redimus ad te.* Or as St *John* expresses the Paradox, The *Light Shineth in Darkness, and the Darkness Comprehended it not.* *Confes.* l. 10. c. 27. l. 8. c. 3.

5. Another Reason may be the exceeding great Difficulty of the Argument, there being not any one Subject perhaps of a more refined and elevated Nature, or that will carry a Wri-

ter through a larger Sea of matter of the moſt Abſtract, Sublime and Metaphyſical Conſideration. The application of our Thoughts to other Subjects is like looking upon the Rays of the Sun as it ſhines to us from a Wall, or upon the Image of it as it returns from a Watry Mirrour, but this is looking up directly againſt the *Fons veri lucidus*, the bright Source of Intellectual Light and Truth, and ſtaring, with a full-levell'd Eye, the great Luminary of Spirits in the very Face. And tho' Truth be the Food of the Soul, and the reliſh of it be very Delicious and Savoury to its Taſt, and tho' even in this Senſe alſo *Light be ſweet, and a pleaſant thing it is to the Eye to behold the Sun*, yet it is painful and troubleſom to behold it *So*, and Men Love Shade and Darkneſs, rather than ſo ſtrong and ſo high a Tide of Light.

6. In this I ſpeak my *Experience* as well as Sence, having been along while diſcouraged from this Undertaking by the meer Difficulty of it. And tho' it continues at preſent a juſt Reaſon of Diſcouragement to me, whenever I compare my ſlender Abilities with the Weight of this important Work, and conſider the Diſproportion of the one to the other, yet however having thought very much about this matter, perhaps more than moſt Men have done, and Conſidering withal the great uſefulneſs of it to the intereſt of Chriſtian Morality, as well as the Illuſtration of Truth and the Improvement of Reaſon and Science, together with the little hopes of ſeeing it undertaken by any other

other Hand, I thought it might be adviſeable to begin an Eſſay (for I pretend to no more) upon this Auguſt and Noble Theme, tho' it were only to place it nigh a more publick Light, and engage the Eye of the rational World upon it.

7. I Conſider therefore that there is a twofold State of things, *Natural* and *Ideal*. By the *Natural* State of things, I mean that State which they have in *rerum Naturâ* as we ſpeak, that is, as they exiſt according to thoſe Natures or Eſſences which were in time Created or Produced out of nothing by the Free and Arbitrary Will of their Almighty Cauſe. The Collection of which Beings is what we call the *Natural World*, or Univerſe, which is not a ſelf Exiſtent, Eternal, Immutable Natutre, no nor yet an effect neceſſarily produced, but a contingent temporary Thing, which once was not, and for any ſelf Stability, Aſeity, or Eſſential Immutability of its own, may again ceaſe to be. It does indeed *de facto* actually exiſt, and perhaps, as to the Subſtance of it, always ſhall, but Exiſtence is not Eſſential to it, and ſo in it ſelf Conſidered it may now as well not be, as it once was not. It cannot indeed *Annihilate* it ſelf any more than it could make it ſelf, Being and not Being tho' equally in its *Capacity*, are equally out of its *Power*, but the cauſe that made it may unmake it again, and if he does not, its only becauſe the Reaſons that firſt induced him to give it Being, are ſtill Reaſons with him why he ſhould Continue it.

8. By the *Ideal* State of things, I mean that State of them which is neceſſary, permanent and immutable, not only Antecedent and Præexiſtent to this, but alſo Exemplary and Repreſentative of it, as containing in it Eminently and after an intelligible Manner, all that is in this Natural World, according to which it was made, and in Conformity to which all the Truth, Reality, Order, Beauty and Perfection of its Nature does Conſiſt, and is to be Meaſured. The Syſtem of things exiſting after this manner, is what we call the *Ideal World*, which is not a Contingent, Temporary, Mutable thing, as this, but a ſelf Exiſting, Eternal, Neceſſary and Immutable Nature, really Simple and One, but yet vertually and eminently Multiform and Various, and by its Multiform Variety having in it the Reaſons, Eſſences and Specific Natures of all things, that is, ſuch degrees of Being and Perfection as anſwer to them, and are intelligibly expreſſive of them, and whereof all things in the Natural World are but as the Prints and Impreſſions, I might ſay, the *Shadows*. In ſhort by the Ideal World I underſtand that World which is *Intelligibly* what this is *Senſibly*, the eternal Model and exemplar of all Created Eſſence, diſtinctly exhibitive of all that is or can ever be, and ſo the Meaſure and Standard, not only of what actually is, but of the whole poſſibility of Being.

9. This is our Ideal World, the ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *νοητὸς* ſo much celebrated by *Plotinus* and *Philo* in his *Coſmopœa*, the firſt intelligible World, the World that

that truly is, and the World of Truth, the great Type and Mould of external Nature, and the measure of the things that are. The only Eternal, Stable and Immutable World, that existed before the Almighty *Fiat* was Issued forth for the Production of this, and would remain unshaken if it were Reduced to nothing, that was before the Foundations of the Earth were laid, nay even before there were any Morning Stars that might Sing together, or any Sons of God to Shout for Joy, *Job.* 38. This is the World that was *possess'd by the Lord in the beginning of his way, before his works of Old, which was set up from Everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the Earth was. When there were no Depths it was brought forth, when there were no Fountains abounding with Waters. Before the Mountains were settled, before the Hills was it brought forth. While as yet he had not made the Earth, nor the Fields, nor the highest part of the Dust of the World. When he prepared the Heavens it was there, when he set a Compass upon the Face of the Depth. When he establish'd the Clouds above, when he Strengthen'd the Fountains of the Deep. When he gave to the Sea his Decree, that the Waters should not pass his Commandment, when he appointed the Foundations of the Earth. Then was it by him, as one brought up with him, and was daily his Delight, Rejoycing alwaies be-fore him, Prov.* 8. This is the World of Original and Essential Beauty, where Order it self, and very Reason and Proportion dwell, that never had a Chaos, and knows no black intervals of

Night,

Night, but where tis ever Light and Day, and where Truth ſhines pure and without a Cloud. A World Simple in its Variety, and Various in its Simplicity, Infinite in its ſtore and fullneſs, and ſtored with incorruptible and unfading Treaſures, univerſal in its Preſence, and uncircumſcribed by any limit of Time or Place. the genuin Country of Truth, and its proper native Soil, the Place of Spirits, the Living and ever Springing Fountain of Intelligence, and the great Academy of all Arts and Sciences. Where thoſe ſolid Realities, and Subſtantial Entities perpetually Flouriſh and Shine, whereof we have here only the Faint Reflections, and in Compariſon of which this Material World is but a Phantom or a Shadow. Where all is Youth and Pleaſure, Life and Joy, Eſſence and Flower, where Happy Spirits Drink of the Wine that Wiſdom it ſelf has Mingled, and are Fed with Immortal Truth. *Whoſo is Simple, let him turn in hither, Prov.* 9.

10. But tho' very great and glorious Things may be Spoken of thee, O thou City of God! yet how little art thou known, and how much leſs art thou in the Thoughts and Minds of Men! Plunged as they are in a Life of Senſe they are Ignorant of thee, Thou firſt and only Intelligible, and Immers'd as they are in a Body of Fleſh, they ſeldom think of thee who art all *Spirit* and *Truth*, and that tho' thou Shineſt into their very Eyes, and they See continually by thy Light. Thou makeſt their Day, and thou thy ſelf art the only thing that

that is not Seen by it. They take the Shadows of this Natural World for moſt Real and Solid things, and thy moſt Subſtantial Realities they look upon as Shadows and *Viſionary* Chimera's, and all Diſcourſe about thee, (tho' never ſo Rational) as but extravagant and delirous Talking, or at beſt but as National Romancing, pure Metaphyſical *Reverie*, a Subtiliſing upon a fine nothing. They are indeed United to thee by their Souls, but by their Bodies to this Senſible World, and as their Bodies are to them their principal Selves, this latter Alliance makes them Inſenſible of the Former. Thou art nearer to them than this World is, nay than their very Bodies are, and yet they are far Diſtant from thee, meer Aliens to thee, and ſo utterly Inſenſible of thee, that they will hardly beleive that thou *art*. If any mention be made of thy Name the amazed Vulgar *Stare*, and the Learned gravely *Smile*, and if the Diſcourſe be any whit long, they *Sleep*. But if they continue Awake, they Sleep however to *thee*. Tho' they were Caſt in thy Mould, and Form'd upon thy Model, yet (ungrateful Stupidity) they ſeldom or never mind their Original, nor look up to the *Rock* from whence they were *Hewn*. But had Men but one clear and diſtinct View of thy Rich Intellectual Scene, could we but Draw the Curtain of our Mortality ſo far, as but once to ſee thee as thou art, we ſhould be ſo Tranſported and Raviſh'd with thy Divine Beauty, ſo Enamour'd of thy glorious Syſtem, all Shining with the very Eſſence of Being, and

full

full of *Grace* and *Truth*, that we ſhould loſe not only all Value for this Senſible World, but even *Senſe* it ſelf too, and paſs along in the croud and throng of Creatures without any notice or perception of them, all fix'd and intent upon thy more ingaging Views, not minding the Bodies we ſee, nor feeling thoſe we touch. We ſhould in a manner be Dead to this Senſible World, and Alive only to thee.

11. This great Intellectual Syſtem is by ſome term'd the Ideal, by ſome the Intelligible, and by ſome the Archetypal World, which are but ſo many relative Appellations for the ſame thing, to diſtinguiſh it according to ſo many different reſpects it carries to the Syſtem of Created Beings, which accordingly is ſometimes call'd the *Natural*, ſometimes the *Senſible*, and ſometimes the *Ectypal* World. It ought to be farther obſerv'd here, that when we ſay the *Intelligible* World, the meaning is not as if it did exiſt only in our Conception, and had no real being out of it, after the manner of an *Ens Rationis*, but tis therefore ſo call'd, partly becauſe tis the firſt and only proper *Intelligible*, the ſole and immediate object of all our Intellectual Views, and that which exactly Speaking is the very thing we alwaies underſtand and Reaſon about. And partly becauſe tis a Word of a nature purely Spiritual and Intellectual, and ſuch as is not Senſible, but *Intelligible* only, And partly again becauſe tis a World of a conceivable Being and Exiſtence, and ſuch indeed as we cannot but conceive to be, not Subjected indeed

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to the perusal and examination of our Bodily Senses, but as certain and as really and truly present to our Understanding, as this Natural World is to our Sense. But chiefly is it so call'd because it is the *Idea* of this Sensible World, as being truly representative and expressive of it to the Understanding. For the Idea of a thing is Intelligibly that thing, and as the Idea of a Circle is call'd an Intelligible Circle, or the Idea of a Square an Intelligible Square, because they express these things to our Thoughts, so in like manner the Idea of the World, or if you will, those Ideas which answer to the several beings whereof it consists, may very reasonably and fitly be call'd the *Intelligible World*. Of the real existence of which the following Account is to give Satisfaction.

12. In the mean while I have only one Remark to interpose, which is, that this Distinction of a twofold World or state of things, Sensible and Intelligible is very Antient, and is even under these very terms (not to mention remoter hints and intimations) formally and expressly taken notice of by St *Austin*, as held and maintained by *Plato*. *Sat est enim ad id quod volo, Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos, unum Intelligibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitaret, istum autem Sensibilem, quem Manifestum est nos visu tactuq; sentire. Itaq; illum verum, hunc verisimilem, & ad illius imaginem factum.* As also by *Plotinus* before him in as formal and express terms, who besides abundance of passages relating to this mat-

Contra Academ. Lib. 3. Ch. 17.

matter, (for 'tis the very burthen of his Philosophy) makes distinct mention of a twofold Nature, one *Sensible* and the other *Intelligible*. Διπῆς δὲ φύσεως ταύτης ὔσης, τῆς μὲν νοητῆς, τῆς δὲ αἰσθητῆς, &c. which Distinction is also frequently inculcated by *Philo* in his *Cosmopoea*. This I thought Convenient in the entrance to touch upon, for the prevention of Prejudice, that might otherwise arise against the Subject of our Theory as a modern Fancy, by the removal of which the Minds of some Readers (with whom the Imputation of Novelty is an invincible objection against the most rational Proposal) may be the better disposed for the Consideration of the following Argument, so as not either superciliously to lay it aside, or to come to it as a Metaphysical Novel or Romance.

Ennead. 4. Lib. 9. Chap. 7.

CHAP. II.

The Reality of the Distinction justified, by shewing that this is not the only State of things, but that they have an Ideal as well as a Natural State.

1. THere are some things whereof Men have Naturally, that is, I mean by the ordinary use of their rational Faculties, a Confuse Notion and Conception, and if let alone to themselves do in great measure assent to, as being

ing ſecretly Determin'd and Conſtrain'd ſo to do by the prevailing Force of Truth, and accordingly you ſhall have them ever and anon glancing at theſe things in their common Diſcourſe, and in their Writings, wherein they ſhall occaſionally drop ſeveral Expreſſions which directly Point and Allude to theſe things, turn upon them, and neceſſarily ſuppoſe the Truth of them, as without which what they ſay carries in it no conſiſtent Senſe or Meaning, nay is not ſo much as ſimply Intelligible, and yet when theſe very things come to be formally and profeſſedly Proved to them, and a Diſcourſe is addreſs'd directly to that Purpoſe, they preſently retract their Aſſent, and with Zeal and Paſſion ſet themſelves to Oppoſe and Contradict them. Of which ſtrange Procedure, the moſt probable Reaſon I take to be this, that when things are let alone and lie ſtill, Truth appears as ſhe is, and Men's Underſtandings are left to their free Exerciſe and Operation about her, and ſo there being no Prejudice in the Scale, ſhe has Weight enough to turn it. But when once ſuch a ſide of the Queſtion is taken, and Arguments offer'd for the Proof of it, then that Truth which was before lookt upon as a thing in Common and *in Medio*, is now regarded as a *Property* and Incloſure, as the Truth of ſuch or ſuch a Man, and ſo (beſides a kind of Peculiarity and *Alienation* ſhe is then under) becomes alſo intereſſed in thoſe Perſonal prejudices that attend that Man. Truth it ſelf, or Truth as ſuch is indeed no Man's

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Prejudice or Averſion, but Men are apt to be prejudic'd againſt Truth under ſome particular Circumſtances, as if it be a Truth that contradicts their Luſts and Intereſts, or their preconceiv'd Opinions, or if it be a *New* Truth that ſeems to upbraid the Tardineſs of their Underſtandings, or laſtly if it be a Truth whoſe only fault is that 'tis aſſerted and maintain'd by another. They are well enough diſpoſed, it may be, to the thing it ſelf, but they don't care to ſee it proved and made out by another Man, and I have Reaſon to think that there are many things which would paſs unconteſted and never have been diſputed, if ſome Body or other had not ſet himſelf profeſſedly to prove them.

2. The preſent Argument I take to be one remarkable Inſtance of this kind. For how Ordinary a thing is it to have Men talk of the Ideas of things, and of things in Idea, nay of the Divine Ideas, and of the Eternal Reaſons and Ideas of things. And how often ſhall they uſe ſuch Expreſſions as theſe, when the World, or this or that Creature in it, was only *in Idea*, and ſuch a thing is Conformable to its Idea, or comes up to the Perfection of its Idea, and as Fair as a Woman in Idea. *&c.* And how common is it with them to talk of Vertue it ſelf, Juſtice it ſelf, Beauty it ſelf, and Truth it ſelf, and of all theſe likewiſe in Idea, as alſo of a Line in Idea, a Circle in Idea, a Triangle or Square in Idea, *&c.* All which plainly ſhews how connatural and agreeable the Noti-

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on of the *Ideal World* is to the common Principles of Human Reason, and yet let but a set Discourse be thence offer'd for the Proof of it, and even the Men that talk at this rate shall presently start from it as from a Bugbear or Apparition, tho' it may be again if you let them alone, they shall in the very next Breath run into the very same *Theory* themselves, using a great many Expressions (perhaps even while they are talking against the Ideal State of things) which necessarily presuppose and depend upon that *Hypothesis*. As indeed they cannot well do otherwise, especially Considering that 'tis impossible to talk about certain things with any Exactness, but upon the Supposition of their Eternal Measures, Reasons and Standards, the things being not to be found in *Rerum Naturâ* according to that exactness wherewith we speak of them, and ascribe such and such Properties, and Affections to them. Which single Consideration (as I shall farther shew by and by) is of it self a most convincing Demonstration of our Ideal World, the real Existence of which I now proceed more directly to evince.

3. I suppose my self then at a mature Age, and with a competency of Natural Reason and Understanding just come into the World, where after a little Surprize at the Strangeness of my new Condition, and some Recollection of my self thereupon, I begin to cast my wondring *Argument the First.*

Eyes about me, and to take a View of the various Scenes of this ample Theatre. And assoon as I do so, one of the first Thoughts that presens it self to my Mind is concerning, not the *Nature*, but the *Existence* of this great visible System, not whether it truly and really Exists at present or no, (for I am not supposed as yet to have *Metaphysics* enough to raise any nice Questions about that) but only how it came to exist, whether it was alwaies in Being or Eternal, or whether it once was not, but began to be, even as I find I my self did. Which last Consideration fairly inclines me to presume the latter, and upon some farther Observation and Reflection, I find it most Reasonable to think this my Presumption right. Especially when afterwards I find it not only seconded by the common consent of the Learned, (*whose Arguments against the Eternity of the World are sufficiently known, and need not be here re-urged*) but also decicively Confirm'd to me by Divine Authority in the *Mosaic* Account of the Creation.

4. But then if the World be not Eternal, but had a Beginning, (as my own Reason as well as the general Reason of Mankind tells me that it had) I farther think with my self that it must of necessity receive its Being from some other Being that was when it self was not, it being impossible that any thing should give Being to its self, unless I could conceive that not Being could be the cause of Being, (since before it was made, it was not) or that a thing

a thing could Act before it was, which I find I cannot conceive. And here alſo I find Revelation comes in to the Aſſiſtence of my Reaſon, informing me not only that it was made by ſome other Being, but alſo who it was that made it. *In the Beginning God Created the Heaven and the Earth.*

5. But of this latter I come alſo upon a little Reflection to perſuade my ſelf from my own Reaſon, which without Metaphyſical Deduction concludes the Maker of this World to be a Being of infinite and illimited *Power*, ſince if his Power had any limit, or there were any thing it could not do, I ſhould have Reaſon to think that to give Being where there is a total Privation of it, would be the thing it ſhould ſtop at, there being nothing ſo incapable of Being as not Being. He therefore that can do that, I perſuade my ſelf is able to do any things, or every thing, and ſo is truly *Omnipotent* or *Almighty*.

6. The World then is the Effect of an Infinite *Power*. But what do I think, is it not alſo the Effect of infinite *Wiſdom*? Was it not an infinitely Wiſe as well as Powerful Being that made the World? So indeed I find it neceſſary to conclude. For beſides that 'tis not conceivable how a Being ſhould be Infinite in one reſpect and not in another, ſince if he be a Finite Being he cannot be Infinite ſo much as in one, and if an Infinite Being he muſt be ſo in all; and beſides again that it would be alſo a weakening and an abating ſubtraction to Infinite

Power to be without Infinite Wisdom, the latter being Subservient to the former, and indeed partly included in it as a necessary means whereby to direct, execute and effect its Undertakings, in the very Efficiency as well as first Projection of which, Wisdom has its part as well as Power, I say besides all this, when after some while I look again upon the World with a more attentive and observing Eye, and consider the admirable Order, Beauty, Contrivance and Geometry of its System, I see the Marks and Characters of Infinite Wisdom upon it, and that in so fair and legible a Print, that as I was but now Convinc'd of the Infinite *Power* of him that made the World from the simple Consideration of its Being, so now I am no less satisfied of his Infinite *Wisdom*, from the modal Consideration of the same Being. I see in short, that as he had need have an Infinite Power to make a *World*, so he had need have an Infinite Wisdom to make *such* a World.

7. But then is it possible that a Being of Infinite Thought and Understanding should act *Unthoughtfully?* Must not an Infinitely Wise Being, Think and Consider what he does? Yes, my Reason, or rather the *Universal Reason* of all Spirits, Answers without doubt he must, since otherwise he would not act Wisely, nor in a manner Worthy of himself. Because his will would then act Independently of, and separately from his Reason, which is an unreasonable way of Acting, and such as cannot be conceiv'd in a perfect Agent. For however a finite

finite Intelligence (as my ſelf) may ſometimes ſuffer a great *Diverſion* of Thought, and tho' not wholely perhaps without Thinking, may yet through the limitedneſs of his Capacity, think of ſomewhat elſe than what he is doing, ſo as to be ſaid in a manner not to mind what he is about, yet certainly an Infinite Mind, whoſe Capacity can equally attend to all things at once, is not under a poſſibility of being ſo Diverted. Neither indeed can I well conceive how even a Finite one can be capable of ſuch an intire and total *Diverſion* of Thought, as to do a thing abſolutely without Thinking of it. He may indeed not think of it reflectingly and diſtinctly, (as I find by lamentable Experience even in my Religious Addreſſes to the great Author of my Being) but muſt not he think of it *Confuſely*, if not at the very time when he does it, yet at leaſt ſometime before? For what ſhould influence and govern his Action but Thought, if not Actual, yet Habitual, if not in the very Inſtant and Point of Acting, yet at leaſt in the *Principles*? As ſuppoſe when a well-practiſed Muſitian (ſuch as I heard the other Day) takes up an Inſtrument, and with the orderly movement of his Hands forms a beautiful Syſtem of Sounds, and draws as it were a fine Picture in the Air, without Thinking what he does. So indeed we uſually ſay, but in ſtrict reality his regular Performance is the effect of his Former, if not of his preſent Thought and ſo abſolutely and ſimply Speaking, he *does*

* *Quid enim agimus per Corpus, quod non Cogitando præoccupaverit Spiritus?* S. Auſt. *De gen. ad lit.* lib. 12. ch. 16.

* think what he does. And ſo I conceive muſt every Intelligent Being do, and would moſt remarkably be *found* to do, if he were to act immediately upon his firſt entrance upon Being, before the contraction of any Cuſtoms or Habits. Nothing but *actual* Thought would then *appear* to be the Spring that moved, and the meaſure that directed his Action, eſpecially if the Operation were purely Intellectual, and the immediate work of the Mind. He muſt needs then think of what he does, becauſe what he does he is ſuppoſed to do *by Thought*. And if it be thus in the Operations of Finite Being, much leſs can I conceive that an Infinite Intelligence, acting purely by Thought ſhould make a World without thinking what he was making, or would make, and that *Light* it ſelf ſhould thus work in the *Dark*. God in ſhort is a pure Spirit, and therefore muſt make the World by *Thought*, and therefore could not but think of what he made. And indeed it would be as well to have a World made by blind chance, as by a thinking Principle, if I ſhould ſuppoſe he went to work without any Thought or Conſideration of what he was doing. But that he could not, is plain from the Spirituality of his Nature, and that he did not, the thing it ſelf alſo abundantly ſhews, the World appearing to me upon ſome of the firſt Views of it, to be a Conſiderate Syſtem, a very *Thoughtful* Compoſure.

8. It

8. It is then very plain and clear to me that the Great Creator of this World did Think and Conſider what he did when he made it. Not I mean with any Study or Intenſeneſs of Application, (for to think ſo alwaies argues Imperfection in the Thinker, and it's enough for my ſelf and other Rational Creatures, *ſo* to Think and Conſider of it now 'tis made) but in a manner worthy of an Infinite Itelligence. That it was Objectively preſent to him, and in the View of his Mind, that he ſaw it and * knew it, and had it Intellectually before him, or in his Thoughts as we ſay, (as every Artificer has the work which he is about) and did as really and truly View and Contemplate it as I do now, only with an Exactneſs inſtead of my Confuſedneſs, with an intireneſs inſtead of my Partialneſs, and with Infinite Eaſe, Repoſe, and Serenity of Mind, inſtead of my Labour and Study. In one Word, he ſaw the very ſame thing that I do, but in a better Light.

* *Non enim neſcivit quæ fuerat Creaturus. St.* Auſt. *De Trin.* lib. 15. ch. 13. And again, *Quomodo ea faceret quæ ſibi Nota non erant? Non enim quicquam fecit ignorans. De gen. ad lit.* lib. 5. chap. 18.

9. Well, but in what manner was it preſent to him, how or where did he ſee it? Did he view it as it was in it ſelf, or in its Natural State? So perhaps if I hearken to the Prejudices of my Senſe, and the Suggeſtions of my Imagination I may perſuade my ſelf that I behold and Conſider it now. But was it ſo beheld and Conſiderd then? That my Reaſon tells

me could not poſſibly be, becauſe *ſo* it was not. To think of it *ſo* then would be to think of *Nothing*, and that is not to think of it at all, which is contrary to the Suppoſition. Even the Divine Underſtanding as perfect as it is, * cannot ſee that which Abſolutely is not, cannot contemplate a pure Nothing, and that the rather becauſe *Divine*. He that is the very purity of Act and Being, carries no proportion to, and ſo can have no Communication with what is pure not Being. And in this Senſe alſo it appears to me to be moſt emphatically true, what I heard Read the other Day, *what Communion has Light with Darkneſs?* If any Underſtanding could ſee or contemplate nothing, it muſt be my *own* that is ſo near to it. But this I find I cannot do, and I ſee clearly that a thing muſt firſt be ſome way or other before it can be underſtood, (the latter ſuppoſing the former) and that what is not all is not Intelligible by *any*, much leſs by the *moſt perfect* Underſtanding. But while I thus Diſcourſe with my ſelf, the Setting Sun withdraws at once his Light and my fair Proſpect from me, and leaves me in the Dark, that is, without his Light, that being all I can underſtand my ſelf to mean by my being in the Dark. And yet do I not ſee this Darkneſs, and ſo conſequently do I not ſee *Nothing?* Yes I do ſee nothing, as that ſignifies I do not ſee, but I do not ſee nothing, as that ſignifies I ſee that which is not, for then I ſhould ſee *Light* and not Darkneſs, ſince 'tis the

* *Quomodo Deo nota erant quæ non erant?* Ibid.

the Light that now is not. But then becauſe it is not, therefore I do not ſee it, and that is the very thing I ought to Underſtand by my ſeeing Darkneſs, *viz.* my not ſeeing Light, or abſolutely my not Seeing. For of Darkneſs it ſelf there can be no poſitive Viſion, and ſo much I ſee even in the Dark. And as *Darkneſs* is utterly Inviſible, ſo *Nothing* is as utterly Unintelligible, if not more ſo, the latter being the Negation of Being in general, as the former is of Light, and ſo if poſſible the greater *not being* of the two. Since then that which abſolutely is not cannot be the object of Underſtanding, and ſince again the World according to this its preſent, Natural, Senſible State is not as yet (antecedently to the Creation of it) ſuppoſed to Exiſt or have any Being; it appears to me moſt Certain and Evident that God when he made the Word could not ſee or contemplate it in it ſelf, or in its Natural State.

10. But where then did he Contemplate it? In himſelf, or out of himſelf? That indeed is not ſo ſoon Anſwer'd, but requires ſome farther Conſideration. However this in the mean time I clearly and diſtinctly perceive, if I perceive any thing, firſt that he did Contemplate it, (for ſure that Perfect Agent whoſe will is alwaies Conducted by the *beſt* Reaſon and Thought could not act without *any*,) and again *2dly*, that he did not, could not Contemplate it in it ſelf, or in its Natural State, when according to the Suppoſition of the Queſtion it had not ſuch a State to be View'd in. I find it therefore neceſſary, to

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conclude that he must Contemplate it somewhere else. Where I do not yet *precisely* know, but somewhere else I see he must. And consequently it must Exist somewhere else. And hence my Reason warrants me farther to infer that this is not the only State of things which I now behold, and whereof I am a part, but that they have an Ideal as well as a Natural State, in which they had a real Existence according to their essential Reasons and Natures before they had any in this, nay even from all Eternity, (because God Eternally fore knew all the Works of his Hands) and that there is an *Intelligible* as well as a *Sensible* World, truly representative and exhibitive of this, (tho' in it self without doubt infinitely more Excellent and Glorious,) and as truly exemplary to it, wherein the Allwise and Almighty God, as in a fair intelligible Mirrour contemplated the Natural World before he made it, and according to which he Made whatever he Made, and with which he also compared his Works, when upon a Review of them (as I find by the account of the sacred Historian) he pronounc'd them *Good*.

11. And thus you see if a Man does but think and reason on from one thing to another, Step by Step, in a methodical Train, he will be unavoidably led to conclude that the Natural is not the only State of things, and will find an Intelligible World at the end of his Progress. The Notion of which appears to be so Natural and Obvious, that its one of the next Thoughts

that

that reſults to a Man's Mind upon ſome of his firſt views of this ſenſible Frame. The fair Syſtem of which does as loudly beſpeak the *Beauty* of its *Model*, as the *Power* of its *Author*, and remits the conſidering Enquirer to thoſe Eternal Reaſons and Meaſures according to which, as well as to the efficient Cauſe by which it was Form'd. For tho' conſidering the power of its Almighty Author it was made out of *Nothing*, yet conſidering his Wiſdom it muſt be made according to *Something*, and he that raiſed this ſtately Fabric without any Præ-exiſtent *Matter*, could not yet be conceiv'd to do it without any Præ-exiſtent *Form* or *Idea*.

12. For as he could not make it without fore-thinking of it, ſo neither could he think of it without having ſomething to terminate that Thought, which muſt be the Nature or Eſſence of the thing that was to be made. Were there not ſomething to terminate his Thought, he would think upon *nothing*, and were that ſomething not the Nature of the thing made, he would think upon *ſomething elſe*, which would have been to him as little a meaſure in what he was making, as if he had Thought upon nothing, or not Thought at all. The nature therefore of his Work was objectively preſent to his Mind, and ſince it could not be ſo in its Senſible or *Natural ſelf* which then was not, it muſt be ſo in its *Ideal* or *Intelligible ſelf*, in which the whole Reaſon and Eſſence of it was really and ſubſtantially (tho' eminently and intelligibly) contain'd, and in Conformity

formity to which it was actually made, and set forth upon the Stage of Nature. And as this latter was the effect of his *Power*, so the other was the object of his *Knowledg*, wherein according to the stated order of Natural Productions, he first *Conceiv'd*, and then *brought forth*.

13. But to give this Argument another Posture, and by that (if possible) yet more Light, I would Demand, if there be no Ideal State of things contradistinct from the Natural, what was the World made by, according to what Measure was it Form'd? Or was it Form'd according to none? If so, was it not then made blindly, at all adventure, and by chance? No you'l say, not by chance because it had an Intelligent Agent for its Maker. But stay, let the Agent be as Intelligent as you please, yet if he be supposed to make a thing without any Præ-conceiv'd Form or Measure, his Work will be as truely Casual and Fortuitous, as if it had owed its Formation to a thoughtless Principle. But then if so, how comes it to be made so well, to have all that Order, Beauty, Geometry, wise Contrivance and just Arrangement of Parts which we all see in it with so much Pleasure and Wonder? Why is it not still a meer *Chaos?* Such variety of the most excellent Artifice cannot be the effect of Blind chance. It was not therefore Casually or Fortuitously made. And yet it must too if it were not made according to some previous Form or Model. *So* then we must conclude it was made, and all those Arguments

guments which are brought againſt the *Epicurean* Hypotheſis of the Caſual Rencontre of Atoms Clubbing together to the making of a World, are every whit as cogent here, ſince the World might as well have jump'd into this orderly Syſtem caſually and of its own accord, as by the will or power of an Intelligent Agent not acting by any Rule or Meaſure. Some Meaſure then there was according to which the World was made, and of whoſe Reſemblance it did partake, as whoever Builds a Houſe makes it according to and in imitation of a certain Plan or Model. And ſince it could not be its own Meaſure, or a Meaſure to its ſelf, (ſince that which is not, Meaſures nothing) it muſt be made according to ſome other Præexiſtent Nature that was ſo eſſentially exhibitive and repreſentative of it, as to be after the manner of an original Pattern or Model to it, as having all that *Intelligibly* which it ſelf has *Senſibly*, which is no other than that * Ideal World we are Contending for.

* *See this at large repreſented by* Philo *in his* Coſmop. *Where he illuſtrates the formation of the rational World, according to the Pattern of the Intelligible, by a compariſon taken from the Building of a City.*

14. When I ſee but a peice of Wax upon a Letter, carrying upon it a fair Stamp, cleanly and diſtinctly Cut, and conſiſting of a very Various, regular and well order'd Figure, I preſently think of a *Seal* from whence its Print was taken, and which ſerv'd as a Model or Platform to its Contexture. And can we behold ſuch a wonderful Work as this vaſt *Mun-*

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dan Syſtem, ſo manifold in the Number, ſo various in the Kinds, and ſo Regular in the Order and Diſpoſition of its Parts, and ſo every way Auguſt and Beautiful in the whole, and not ſuppoſe it to be made according to ſome original *Form* or *Meaſure* ? And ſince this could not be its ſelf, ſince it could no more be its own *Exemplary* or *Formal*, than *Efficient* Cauſe, this neceſſarily leads us higher to ſome other nature diſtinct from it, according to which it was Form'd and Faſhion'd, and that was as truly a Pattern and a Model to it as the *Seal* was to the Print upon the Wax. That is in other Words it neceſſarily caſt us upon an Ideal World, that was the primary Mould, Form, Model, or (as *Philo* expreſſes it) the *Seal* of this. For ſo that Platonic Writer very emphatically Styles the Intelligible World, calling it ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγὶς the *Archetypal* or *Original Seal.* This he applies afterwards to the Divine λόγος, the reaſon of which will be better underſtood in the ſequel. At preſent I only remark that the Expreſſion is not only very Great and Noble, but alſo very proper, imaging and ſignificant, and ſuch as carries a very pregnant Alluſion with it, implying that the Intelligible World was the true Specific Form of this, which is but a Copy of that Original, a Print or Impreſſion of that *Seal.* And ſuch a *Seal* there muſt be, or we ſhall never be able to give an account of the *Impreſſion.* At leaſt I my ſelf deſpair ever to do it. How acute ſome Men may be I ſhall not

περὶ κοσμοπ. p. 5.

not preſume to define, but for my own part I muſt ingenuouſly profeſs that unleſs it be upon the Hypotheſis of an *Ideal* World, I know not what to make of the *Natural*.

15. As I do neither of the *Hiſtory* of its *Creation*. For I muſt farther Obſerve, that tis no ſmall confirmation to me not only of the Propoſition it ſelf, but alſo of the way of Reaſoning whereby the proof of it has been hitherto attempted, that the Text of *Moſes* ſtrikes in ſo very tuneably with it. For tis remarkable in the account which *Moſes* gives of the Original of things, that he ſometimes ſpeaks of them according to their *ſenſible* State, as already exiſting in *rerum Naturâ*, and ſometimes again according to their *Ideal* or *Intelligible* State, according to which they were to be made, and which is therefore ſuppoſed and implyed as of a Nature Præ-exiſtent and Antecedaneous to the other. Or if you will, he ſometimes ſpeaks of things according to that Nature which was the Temporary effect of God's *Power*, and ſometimes according to that Nature which was, or rather is, the Eternal Object of his *Wiſdom* and knowlege.

16. Of the firſt kind are thoſe Words, *In the Begining God Created the Heaven and the Earth*, wherein the Natural Exiſtence of the Heaven and the Earth is Præ-ſuppoſed as the Subject of the Propoſition, (for tis plain that he ſpeaks of the Viſible Heaven and Earth) and that which is affirm'd concerning them, is that they had this their Exiſtence from God,

God, or were Created by him. Of the second kind are those that follow, *And God said, let there be Light, and there was Light.* Which Expression very much varies from the former. For here, that is in the foregoing part of the Verse, Light is not spoken of as already Existing in Nature, (as in the other instance) but as a thing that was to be so produced, and yet had already an *Intelligible* Nature or Essence according to which it was said, (which otherwise could not be) *let there be Light*, when as yet it was not. Tis plain therefore that Light was and was not in different respects. It was not according to its *Natural* State, for so it was to be produced. * And yet it *was* according to its Ideal or Intelligible State, its Nature being distinctly Præconceiv'd and in actual View, since otherwise it could not be said, *let there be Light.* The proposition would have been about a meer nothing, and so would have signified nothing. Light therefore it seems was an Intelligible, and consequently a real thing before it had any Existence in the Natural World. To which Existence belongs that which follows, *And God saw the Light that it was good*, that is, he saw that the Light which he had made was conformable to the *Ideal* Light, which was the Patern and the Measure of it, and in which he beheld it when he said, *let their be Light.* And

* *According to that of St.* Austin *who speaking of the Works of the Creation says, Antequam fierent & erant & non erant, erant in Dei Scientiâ, non erant in suâ Naturâ. De gen. ad lit.* lib. 5. chap. 18.

I was not a little ſurprized after the making this Obſervation to find St. *Auſtin* concurring with me ſo very expreſly as he does, and that in the very particular Inſtance and Application of it. For, ſays he, upon thoſe Words let there be Light, and there was Light, *Lucis conditio prius eſt in verbo Dei ſecundum rationem quâ Condita eſt, hoc eſt in Coæternâ Patris Sapientiâ; ac deinde in ipſâ lucis Conditione ſecundum Naturam quâ Condita eſt, illic non facta ſed genita, hic vero facta, &c. & Ideo dixit Deus Fiat Lux, & facta eſt lux, ut quod ibi erat in verbo (Dei) hic eſſet in opere.* Wherein he plainly diſtinguiſhes of a twofold State of Light Ideal and Natural, referring let there be Light to the former, and there was Light, to the latter. Again we have him paſſing the like remark upon the ſame Inſtance of Light, *præceſſit Ratio Condendæ Creaturæ in verbo Dei, cum dixit fiat Lux.* But his Obſervation to this purpoſe is more general, and therefore the more remarkable, when from the premiſing of, God ſaid let there be, before the making of things, he notes and concludes the Ideal State of thoſe things as antecedent to their Natural. For ſaies he, *Quia Nihil creati poſſet ſive ante tempora, ſive ab exordio temporum, ſive in aliquo tempore, cujus creandi Ratio non in Dei verbo Patris Coæterno Coæternâ vitâ viveret: Propterea Scriptura priuſquam inſinuet unamquamque Creaturam ex ordine quo conditam dicit, reſpicit ad Dei Verbum, prius ponens, & dixit Deus, Fiat illud. Non*

De gen ad Lit. lib. 2. c. 8.

De gen. ad Lit. lib. 4. c. 32.

De gen. ad Lit. lib. 2. c. 6.

enim invenit ullam Cauſam rei Creandæ, quam in verbo Dei non invenit creari debuiſſe. Non ergo Deus toties dixit, fiat illa vel illa Creatura, quoties in hoc libro repetitur, & dixit Deus. Unum quippe verbum ille genuit, in quo dixit Omnia priuſquam facta ſunt ſingula: Sed eloquium Scribentis deſcendens ad parvulorum Capacitatem, dum inſinuat ſingillatim genera Creaturarum, per ſingula reſpicit uniuscujuſq; generis æternam Rationem in verbo Dei. Nec illâ repetitâ, ille tamen repetit, & dixit Deus. Si enim vellet prius dicere, factum eſt Firmamentum in medio aquarum, ut eſſet diviſio inter aquam & aquam, ſi quis ab eo quæreret, quomodo factum eſſet, recte reſponderet, Dixit Deus fiat: id eſt, in verbo Dei Patris æterno erat ut fieret. Inde ergo incipit Narrare unumquodq; factum, quod etiam poſt facti narrationem quærenti quomodo factum ſit in reddendâ ratione reſpondere deberet. Cum ergo audimus, & dixit Deus, Fiat, intelligimus quod in verbo Dei erat ut fieret. Cum vero audimus, & ſic eſt Factum, intelligimus factam Creaturam non exceſſiſſe præſcriptos in verbo Dei terminos generis Sui. By which plain and expreſs Teſtimonys you may ſee that St. *Auſtin* makes uſe of the Ideal Hypotheſis as a kind of *Clavis Moſaica*, and unlocks by it ſome of the moſt Metaphyſical Abſtruſitys that concern the Hiſtory of the Creation.

17. Other ſuch Inſtances there are wherein the Divine Hiſtorian interchanges his Phraſe ſometimes, ſpeaking of things with reference to the State they have in *Nature*, and ſometimes according to that which they have in *Idea*, but I ſhall conſider only one, as a meaſure to the reſt, and that is that which

which relates to the laſt and nobleſt peice, at leaſt of this lower Creation. *And God ſaid let us make Man, in our Image, after our likeneſs*, &c. Here beſides what is of common Obſervation concerning the Form of Adviſe and Solem Conſultation here uſed, as alſo the * Intimation of Plurality of Perſons in the Divine Nature, *&c.* Ought it not to be farther remark'd that here is a plain implication of an *Intelligible Human Nature*, antecedent to and diſtinct from that Humame Nature which was the Effect of the Divine Creation? There was as yet no ſuch Creature as Man in *rerum Naturâ*, and yet his Nature was however a fix'd and Intelligible thing. For God you ſee is here repreſented as Underſtanding it, as Conceiving it, as having it in his View, as calling it by a certain Name, and Diſtinguiſhing it from all other things whatſoever, and that by as particular and ſpecializing a deſignation as if it had exiſted in Nature. And yet ſo it did not, and therefore it muſt of neceſſity have an exiſtence ſomewhere elſe, in reſpect of which it was as much the Object of the Divine Underſtanding, as it was afterwards the Effect of his Power, it being otherwiſe (as I humbly conceive) utterly Impoſſible to make any Conſiſtent ſenſe of this great and ſolem Suffrage of the Adorable Trinity, *let us make Man.*

* *Vid. St.* Auſtin *de geneſi. ad literam* lib. 3. c. 19.

18. If any one thinks he can let him but Conſider this farther Illuſtration. Suppoſe inſtead of *let us Make Man*, it had been ſaid, *let us Make a Circle or a Triangle*, is it poſſible for the Mind

of Man to conceive ony Intelligible Senſe of this Expreſſion, unleſs the formal Reaſon and Nature of a Circle or a Triangle be Præ-ſuppoſed as an Intelligible Reality to the making of it? For when tis ſaid, let us make a Circle or Triangle, it is not evident that the formal and ſpecific Reaſons and Natures of theſe Figures are diſtinctly and determinately Præ-conceiv'd, and can any thing be Conceiv'd that is not Intelligible, and can any thing be Intelligible that is not at all? Here is therefore plainly and neceſſarily Præ-ſuppoſed an *Ideal Exiſtence* of theſe Figures according to their determinate Natures and Specific Reſons, becauſe here is an expreſs Præ-conception and Præ-deſignation of them according to thoſe their determinate Natures, which could not be unleſs they had ſuch Natures. The ſhort is that as theſe Figures muſt firſt be *Conceiv'd* that they might be *Made*, ſo they muſt firſt *Be*, that they might be *Conceiv'd*, and conſequently muſt exiſt *Ideally* in order to their exiſting *Naturally*. All which is no more than what is ſuppos'd in the very intention and reſolution of making them, when tis ſaid, *let us make a Circle or a Triangle.* And indeed were it not ſo, what ſhall ſecure the Production of theſe very præciſe and determinate Figures, among Millions of other Poſſible one's, or what certainty is there but that inſtead of a *Circle* or a *Triangle*, the natural Product might be an *Eliplis* or a *Square*? Of this I think no conceivable Account is to be given.

19. The ſum then of this firſt Argument reſolves into this. The great Architect of the World Præ-

Præ-conceiv'd and foreknew what he would make, and made all things according to what he foreknew. He had a clear and distinct View of them, and made them according to those Original Forms and Measures wherein he beheld them. And since this could not be the things themselves t hat were to be made, (it being impossible that *nothing* should either terminate a Thought, or be a Measure to any Work) it follows that they were both beheld and made according to some other Præ-existing Nature, which by reason of its *Intelligible Multiformity* was really Exhibitive and Representative of them. Which is what we understand by the *Ideal World*. But now that things were thus Præconceiv'd, and made according to *some* antecedent Measure (which would be the minor Proposition of the Argument were it Syllogistically Disposed) is proved, partly from the Nature of God, and partly from the Nature of the World, from the Nature of God as an *Intelligent Agent*, and from the Nature of the World as a *Thoughtful* and Artfully Composed *Work*.

20. But farther, when I take a View of the particular Bodies whereof this visible System is Composed, I find that they appear most of them even at sight to be of a certain determinate Bulk and Size. Some few indeed there are whose Bounds I do not see, but as to the greatest part of them I see their Limits, can View them on all sides, and go round them with my Eye. And as for those

Argument the second.

whoſe limits I cannot thus travel over with my Sight, I have yet as great reaſon to think them *Limited*, as I have to think them *Created*, Infinity being no poſſible attribute of a Creature. But tis not ſo much their Limitation in general as the *Determinateneſs* of it that I now Conſider. I ſee that Trees and Plants and the Bodies of Animals, &c. have a certain determinate Meaſure and Extent according to their ſeveral reſpective kinds, which they do not ordinarily either much exceed or come ſhort of. Now I would willingly know if I could, whence theſe Creatures have this their Determination; Limited indeed in general they muſt be as Creatures, as was obſerv'd before, but how come they to be Limited after ſuch a determinate manner? You'l ſay by the will and power of their Almighty Cauſe. Tis true indeed it muſt be their Cauſe that muſt ſo limit them, and by the way their Limitation is a good Argument that they had ſuch a Cauſe, ſince if they had given being to themſelves, they would not have limited that Being: But how come their cauſe ſo to limit them, acting by Infinite Will and Power. You'l ſay perhaps becauſe of the Condition of the Subject which being a Creature is not capable of abſolute Infinity, and ſo muſt be limited. Were the Queſtion concerning Limitation abſolutely conſider'd, or in general, this indeed might be a pertinent and proper Anſwer, but this is no reaſon of a certain, preciſe, and determinate Limitation, ſuch as belongs to Creatures of the ſame Order and Species. For notwithſtanding this Argument from the incapacity

of

of the Creature, things might yet run to a moſt prodigious Exceſs, and tis like would, when in the hands of a Cauſe acting only by infinite Will and Power. And why then do they not? What is it that ſtints and retrenches them to a certain Meaſure? Not the Incapacity of the Creature as to Infinity, which infers only Abſolute, not a determinate Limitation; neither is it the pure will and power of their Cauſe. For if things were limited by the pure will and power of their Cauſe, how come Creatures of the ſame Species to have their limits ſo determinately fixed, according to ſuch a general juſtneſs of Meaſure and Proportion? Why not ſometimes vaſtly Beyond, and ſometimes as vaſtly Short? Why is not the Body of one Man as big as the Globe of the Sun, while that of another is too ſmall to be ſeen without a *Microſcope*? Of this I know no account to be given, but that tis not according to the *Idea* of that Creature that he ſhould be either ſo big, or ſo little. This is that which muſt ſo determinately limit the extent of his being by regulating the Power that produced it, ſince without ſuch an Ideal Rule and Meaſure, Will and Power would be Arbitrary, Inconſtant and Exorbitant, and perhaps the more ſo becauſe *Infinite*. I think therefore there is Reaſon to conclude that tho' the Being of Creatures, ſubſtantially Conſider'd, be the effect of an Infinite Will and Power, yet the certain Limitation and Extent of this Being cannot be accounted for by thoſe Principles as ſuch, but muſt be reſolv'd into Infinite Will and Power as Conducted, Govern'd and Directed by

* *To say* as Conducted by Wisdom *alters not the Case, since Wisdom serves not to exclude those Ideal Measures, but only to direct will and power to follow them.*

* certain Ideal Models or Standards according to which they were all form'd in *Number, Weight* and *Measure.*

21. What is said here of the *Specific Limitation* of Creatures is also applicable to their Specific *Forms* and *Figures*, the Uniformity of which must, I conceive, be resolv'd into their respective Measures in the Intelligible World. As there is a determinate *Extent*, so there is also a determinate *Shape* or *Form* belonging to the several Species of Creatures, and indeed more peculiar to them and discriminative of them than the other. There is a Human *Figure* as well as a Human *Size* or *Dimention*, whereof Men naturally partake, and whereby they are distinguish'd. Not I mean from one another, but from Creatures of another kind, for I speak not of the *Individual*, but of their *Specific* Figure, which amidst all the *Personal* variety of Men in the World maintains a constant and settled Uniformity. From which the Deviations are so few and infrequent, that when ever they happen they are lookt upon as particular exceptions from a general Rule, as Irregularities, as Monsters. And we run to them out of Curiosity, and view them with Wonder and Amusement. But now whence should this Specific Uniformity be, if not from ——

22. But here the *Anti-Idealist* may think I have given him a just occasion to interrupt me. For if there are such Irregularities and Monstrosities in Nature how then are things form'd and proportion'd

portion'd according to those Ideal measures we speak of. To which I answer, first, That this Objection is not peculiar to the Ideal Hypothesis. All Hypotheses except the *Epicurean* are equally concern'd in it. He that only holds the Perfection of the World, or that it was made by an Infinitely Wise and Good Being, without the supposition of *Ideas*, is as much concern'd in the Objection taken from *Monsters* as he that goes upon the *Ideal* Principles. But I answer, Secondly, That indeed the Objection presses not with such Weight, but that it may be thrust off; the *Phenomenon* of Monsters being very accountable notwithstanding. I shall not say they contribute to the Perfection of the World, and give a kind of Beauty to the Universe, as Discords do to Music, or Shades to a Picture, *&c.* thereby Insinuating that the great Architect tho' ordinarily Working by Line and Rule, may yet sometimes designedly choose to deviate from his Intelligible Measures for the sake of those little Irregularities, better to grace and set of his more Regular Workmanship. This plea, I say, I shall not offer, tho' if I did, perhaps worse Answers have been accepted. But I chuse rather to suppose (what the Objection does) that they are indeed Faults and Defects in Nature, but yet such as may be accounted for, even upon the Ideal supposition from a double * Principle, 1*st.* from God's acting in the Administration

* *'Tis the same Principles that* Mr. Malebranche *uses up and down in his Works, and particularly in his Disputations with* Mr. Arnauld *only I express illustrate, Dispose, and apply it as I think fit to serve my present Design.*

tion of Nature, not by particular Wills but by general and ſtated Laws of Motion. *2ly.* from the great ſimplicity and fewneſs of thoſe Laws.

23. In the firſt Creation of things God acted by particular Wills, (as indeed it could not be otherwiſe) and accordingly there were then no *Monſters*, even as there would not be now, if he ſhould continue on in the ſame manner of acting. But this way is not ſo worthy of him, as not ſerving ſo well to the Illuſtration of his Wiſdom, nor ſo befitting his Majeſty and Grandeur, and therefore he does not now act by particular Wills, but by general and ſtated Laws, which is what we call the *Courſe* of *Nature*, (as when at the prick of a Pin, he gives me a ſentiment of Pain, which he does not by a particular will, but in conſequence of the general Laws of Union between Soul and Body) unleſs it be in ſome rare junctures when the moment of the thing will compenſate for a leſs perfect way of acting, as in the caſe of *Miracles*. And then indeed the ſame order that otherwiſe requires he ſhould not act by particular Wills, requires in ſuch circumſtances that he ſhould. But ordinarily, and out of theſe ſingular Incidencies, (if I rightly conſult his Idea) his way of procedure in conducting the courſe of the World is to act according to the general and ſtatted Laws of Motion, which by reaſon of their generality, not including every thing, and being ſuſpended upon conditions that may ſometimes fail, are not alwaies abſolutely ſecure of their Effect. As for Inſtance, Tis a general Law that ſuch impreſſions upon the Body ſhall be follow'd with ſuch Sen-

Sentiments in the Soul, provided the Motion be Communicated (as ordinarily it is) to the Brain. But becauſe this condition may ſometimes fail by reaſon of Obſtructions in the Nerves, *&c.* whereby the Courſe of the Spirits that ſhould communicate the Motion may be intercepted, hence it come to paſs that this general Law goes ſometimes without any effect, and the Body has Impreſſions made upon it when the Soul has no ſentiment either of Pain or Pleaſure thereupon, as in Paralytical or Apoplectical caſes.

24. And this is the firſt of thoſe Principles into which the Deficiencies of Nature are reſolvible, *viz.* That the Author of it acts not by particular Wills, but by general Laws. The other is the great *Simplicity* of thoſe Laws. *Deus operatur per vias Simpliciſſimas* as a Propoſition of which there can be no reaſonable doubt, it being the Commendation of any Work to be done by as few means as is poſſible, as well as of the Skill of the Artiſt. So therefore undoubtedly God acts in the *Execution* of his Deſign, not imploying more ways or means when fewer will do. But how does he do in the *Forming* of it? Why, in the Forming of his Deſign, God as a Wiſe Agent compares the Beauty and Grandeur of his Work with the Simplicity of the ways whereby it may be atchei'vd, and accordingly Forms that Deſign which is moſt Perfect, not abſolutely in its ſelf, but with relation to the Simplicity of thoſe ways. And when he has Form'd it, then he Executes it by thoſe moſt Simple ways with relation to which he firſt Propoſed it. The Executing a Deſign and the

the *Forming* it are two very different things and that ought carefully to be diſtinguſh'd, as laying a ground for a different Conduct. God in the *Execution* of his Deſign regards only the Simplicity of the ways, that is, how to do it with the greateſt Compendium, to come at his Point by the ſhorteſt Line. But tis not ſo in the *Forming* of it. He then has a double Regard, that is, he does not always Form that Deſign which may be moſt Compendiouſly Executed, becauſe there is alſo ſome Regard due to the *Perfection* of the *Work*. Nor does he Form that Deſign alwaies which is in it ſelf abſolutely the moſt excellent, becauſe it becomes him as a Wiſe Agent to have reſpect alſo to the *Simplicity* of the *ways*. But he compares both together, and like an infinitely wiſe Artiſt as he is, that knows how to proportion things by meaſuring and eſtimating the means as well as the end, Forms the beſt Deſign that can be effected by the moſt ſimple means.

25. And herein (if I rightly conſider what is before me) the Conduct of the Infinitely Wiſe God differs from that of Men. They firſt Form their Deſign, and then Deliberate about the means whereby they may accompliſh it. And this makes Men (who in all things are apt to meaſure God by themſelves, tho' he himſelf tells us that *his ways are not as our ways*) inclinable to think that God does ſo too, that he firſt *Projects*, and then conſults his Wiſdom how to *Execute*. This indeed is our way, but this cannot be God's way, becauſe tis not the Wiſeſt way. 'Tis more reaſonable to think that he acting by the beſt and wiſeſt meaſures

measures and after the most perfect manner of acting, compares both means and end together in one simple simultaneous View, and among an infinite number of possible Works determins himself upon that which is most excellent and perfect, with relation to and in consideration with the simplicity of the ways and means which are to be employ'd in the execution of it, that so in every respect his Conduct may carry in it the *Signature* of his Attributes, and express the Perfection of his Nature.

26. To prevent all misconception and cavil in this matter, let it be heedfully noted that the meaning is not (as it may perhaps appear to the less attentive Reader) that God should prefer a Design less perfect before another much more perfect, merely upon the account of the Simplicity of its Execution, or because it may be more compendiously accomplish'd; for this would suppose him to regard nothing but the means, and not to matter how vile and imperfect his Work was, so the ways whereby it was brought to pass were but simple and few, which would be as much in the extreme as to suppose him to regard only the end, to form always the most excellent and worthy Designs absolutely consider'd without attending by what ways or means they were to be procured. This therefore is not the thing intended by the *Simplicity* of the Divine Operation, nor the right Sense of that modern Maxim, *Deus agit per vias Simpliciſſimas.* But the meaning (once more) precisely is, that since the Simplicity of the means employ'd in the Execution of any Design enters into

into the Commendation of the Work and Honour of the Artiſt, as well as the Internal Perfection of the Work it ſelf, it has a proportion of Regard due to it as well as the other, and that therefore God having in his View all poſſible Works and all poſſible ways of accompliſhing them, does not determin himſelf by an *Abſolute* Conſideration of either, ſo as to chuſe that which is abſolutely beſt in its ſelf, or that whoſe Execution is moſt Simple and Compendious, but *Compares* both together, the Perfection of the Work with the Simplicity of the ways of Execution, and as a perfect and uniformly wiſe Agent Forms that Deſign which as ſo compared, and upon the whole Conſideration appears beſt, moſt perfect and moſt worthy of him. I ſay, upon the whole Conſideration, for as there are ſome *Deſigns* that are more perfect than others, ſo alſo there are certain *ways* and manners of acting that are more perfect than others, and both are to be Conſider'd by an Agent of Infinite Wiſdom as God is, that ſo his whole Conduct may carry in it the Characters of ſuch a Wiſdom. Should he regard only the Simplicity of the ways, then he might Form any Deſign tho' never ſo mean, and a Chaos would do as well as the preſent World, and on the contrary ſhould he regard only the Internal Perfecton of the Work it ſelf, then he ſhould alwaies do what is abſolutely beſt, and then the World muſt have been more perfect than it is. But I ſuppoſe him to act by neither of theſe meaſures, as carrying each of them the marks of Imperfection in them, one in reference

to

to the means, and the other in reference to the end, but to Form that Design which is most perfect and eligible, consider'd with and in relation to the Simplicity of the ways whereby it is to be effected, and which both upon the account of the Work, and the manner of its Accomplishment may redound most to his Glory, by representing him as an Agent Infinitely Wise and Adorable in his *Ways*, as well as in his *Works*.

27. Now to apply this Principle thus explain'd to the present purpose. This great Simplicity of the Divine Operation, or the exceeding fewness of those Laws of motion whereby the Institutor of Nature proceeds in the ordinary course and conduct of it, tho' it really serves to commend the Work, and to illustrate the Wisdom of its Divine Author (as was noted before) who could do such great things by so few and such simple means, yet however it is and must necessarily be the occasion of some little Defects and Irregularities in external Nature (and that notwithstanding the supposition of its being framed and directed according to the standing measures of an *Intelligible* World) tho' not such neither, but what the order and simplicity of its formation and management, will more than compensate for. God indeed might have made the World more perfect than it is, that is, more conformable to its *Ideal Pattern*, (for that is all I can understand by the Perfection of the World) and effectually have provided if he had pleas'd, against all Irregularities and Disorders in Nature, but then he must have departed from the Simplicity

of

of his ways, and have multiplied the Laws of the Communication of Motion, and ſo have proceeded after a more operoſe manner and by more complex and compounded methods, which it was not worthy of him to do for the prevention of ſome few little accidental Defects, the World even as it is and with thoſe little Defects being a Work more expreſſive of the Wiſdom of its Author, and more redounding to his Honour and Glory, conſidering the Simplicity of the ways whereby it is order'd, than if it were ſomewhat more perfect and exact at the expence of that Simplicity. For then his *ways* would more Diſhonour him, than his *Work* by thoſe leſſer Additions of Perfection would Honour him.

28. From the Conſideration of this double Principle thus explain'd and applied, we have a ſolution of the Objection. For now it plainly appears that thoſe few Defects Irregularities, Diſorders, Monſtroſitys or whatever you pleaſe to call them, which are to be found in the World, and ſeem a little to *Disfigure* the *Face* of Nature, are no arguments that things are not Form'd upon Ideal or Intelligible Meaſures, ſince as from the general Uniformity of the *Specific Figures*, it is ſufficiently evident that thoſe Meaſures are aim'd at; and a Conformity to them intended, ſo if they are not alwaies exactly hit, this is purely reſolvible into the generality and great Simplicity of thoſe Laws of Motion whereby the Allwiſe Author of Nature maintains and directs the Courſe and Order of it.

29. But

29. But there is ſomething elſe wherein there is a more ſtrict and unerring Uniformity Præſerv'd, and that is in the *Specific Natures* and *Eſſences* of things. As there is a Specific *Extent*, and a Specific *Figure*, ſo there is alſo a certain Specific *Nature* belonging to Creatures of the ſame kind or order, and whereof they all partake according to an *Indiviſible Exactneſs*. Here is neither Latitude nor Deviation as in the other Inſtances of *Extent* and *Figure*, but the utmoſt Uniformity of Participation, the ſame common Nature running through them all, in which they have ſuch an *Agreement*, as is next to *Identity*, and ſo are ſaid to differ only in *Number*. Indeed they ſeem not ſo much to be different things as the ſame things repeated and told over again, as when I go over in my mind ſo many Circles, ſo many Triangles, ſo many Squares, or as when I take a Muſical Inſtrument, and Strike the very ſame Note upon it for ſeveral times one after another, thereby not ſo properly making *different* Sounds, as *Multiplying* the *ſame*, which accordingly I call (as having the ſame Degree of ſound in common between them) ſo many *Thirds*, or ſo many *Fifts*, or ſo many *Eights*. Juſt ſo it is in the nature of things. There are diſtinct Degrees of Being as there are degrees of Sound, and the whole World is but as it were a greater *Gamut*, or Scale of Muſic. And as there are ſeveral Particular Sounds of the ſame Degree, ſo there are ſeveral particular Beings of the ſame Degree of Being. The Degrees themſelvas are what we call *Species* or Kinds, the particulars of the

ſame Degree are what we call *Individuals*, which agree in the Degree of Eſſence, and differ only Numerically, that is, not as a Third differs from a Fiſt, or a Fift from an Eighth, but as one Third from another Third, or one Fift or Eight from another Fift or Eight. So ſtrictly is the Specific Nature preſerv'd in the Individuals of the ſame kind, who all equally partake of it, and are ſo very reſembling and uniform in it, that they ſeem but as ſo many *Self-ſames*, ſo many Reproductions of one thing, like the Image of the ſame Face repeated by a Multiplying Glaſs. Thus for Inſtance in Men, there is the ſame common Human Nature in all of them without Intenſion or Remiſſion, the ſame Intellectual Frame, the ſame thinking Principle, the ſame rational Faculties, the ſame Radical Deſires and Inclinations, the ſame Natural Affections, the ſame Springs of Paſſion, *&c.* So that one Man is but the Duplicate or *Counterpart* of another, and a Man need but ſtudy himſelf to be acquainted with the Nature of other Men, and feel how his own Pulſe Beats to find out the Temper of all Mankind. But now whence ſhould this Specific Uniformity in the Naures of Men ariſe, (and the ſame may be ſaid of other Creatures) or what account is there to be given of it, if not that they are all Caſt in one Mould, Form'd upon one and the ſame Model, Stamp'd with the ſame *Archetypal Seal*, and made in their ſeveral Ages according to the ſame Eternal and Invariable Pattern, even that *Intelligible Adam*, that truly *firſt Man*, that was in Being when the adorable Councel was held

held for the formation of the other, and whom the Divine Architect has in his View in every period of Human Generation, as well as at the first Creation, when 'twas said, *Let us make Man.*

30. Farther yet, as the limitation of Bodies gives them *Figure* (that resulting from the termination of Magnitude) so the different manner of their Limitation gives them a *different* Figure. Some are Round, and some are angular, and that with an Infinite Variety, according to the different Relations and Proportions of the sides and angles to each other. Accordingly I see Right Lines, Globes, Circles, Squares, *&c.* So indeed custom obliges us to call them, and there is also some Reason for complying with the Popular use, because they do indeed approach nearer to these things than any besides, even so near that our Senses oftentimes cannot discern any Reason why they may not justly be so call'd. And my Understanding having been all along used to credit the Reports of Sense, (before it was able to examin or rectify them) and to judge of things according to its confuse representations, I find my self inclined to think that these things really and strictly are what they appear to be, especially when at the presence of a globular Body I have naturally excited in me an *Idea* of a perfect Globe or Sphere, and at the presence of a Line Sensibly Writ an *Idea* of a perfect right Line, and so again at the presence of a Sensible Circle, or Square, an Idea of a perfect Circle, and a perfect Square. *Argument the Third.*

I say I finding in my self at the presence of these Bodies, Figures and Lines, Ideas of such justness and exactness naturally awaken'd, am apt to join one with the other, and to conclude that those Bodies, Figures and Lines do perfectly resemble and are of equal exactness with those Ideas which upon their occasion arise in my mind. But yet when upon farther Thought and Reflection, I come to consider these things *Geometrically*, I find there is a great difference between them, and that neither those Bodies are perfect Spheres, nor those Figures perfect Circles or Squares, nor yet those Lines exactly right, which upon common sight and appearance I presumed as such, as any competent Mathematician will readily allow, and as even Sense it self with the assistence of a *Microscope* will easily inform him that shall make the Experiment, which by the way (as a late Writer of great Account and Consideration well remarks) is a Demonstrative Argument against our having our Ideas from Sensible Objects, it being Impossible that those Objects should send forth Images or Species more perfect then they themselves are, as for instance, that a Figure that is not exactly Round in it self should ray forth the Image of a perfect Circle, and that because the effect cannot have more perfection than its Cause, or (as it may be otherwise expres'd) because the Cause cannot give that to the effect which it has not it self.

De la Conoissance de Soimesme. Tom. 2. p. 130.

31. But

31. But to return, those material Figures which are presented to my Eye, are not truely what they seem and pretend to be, (which by the way may also serve to shew the Fallaciousness of our Senses, or of those Judgments which we pronounce upon their Report, and how defective and erroneous our Notions are of Bodies) and yet however 'tis most certain that I do also at the same time see those Figures in strict perfection, perfect Circles, perfect Squares, *&c.* For 1*st*. 'twas the Occasional coemergency of those Ideas, at the presence of those Figures, and the confuse Application of one to the other, (as I noted before) that partly inclined me to think them *Perfect*, which supposes them to be so themselves. Then 2*ly*. 'tis the repeated Application of them, and the more deliberate comparing one with the other that afterwards makes me conclude them *Imperfect*, which I should have no reason to do but that upon farther examination I find that they do not come up exactly to the Perfection of those Ideas. And indeed if I did see no other Figures but those Sensible one's which ly before me, how should I be able to know whether they were perfect or no? Other Figures therefore I do see, and those perfect one's, because I make use of their perfection as a Measure whereby to discover the others Imperfection, But besides all this I find, 3*ly*. That I have a just, exact, and adequate Idea of these Figures which I alwaies contemplate with the same clearness and distinctness in whatsoever Light (bright or dim) I behold the other, and can withal demonstrate several

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neceſſary Properties and Affections concerning them, and ſuch as proceed upon the Suppoſition of their moſt abſolute perfection, as for Inſtance, That all the Diameters of a Circle are equal, which muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe the Circle to be a perfect Circle, ſuch whoſe Circumference is every where equally remote from its middle Point, ſince if there be the leaſt Inequality of Diſtance in any part of the *Circumferente*, 'tis impoſſible that it ſhould have all its *Diameters* equal.

32. I do then ſee theſe Figures in ſtrict and full perfection, and according to the utmoſt ſeverity of Truth and Juſtneſs. For they are (as we ſay) *Mathematically* right and exact, which is the higheſt degree of exactneſs. But where is it that theſe Figures are, or where is it that I do ſee them? Not in thoſe Senſible one's which lie before me, and upon which I direct my Eye, becauſe they have not that Geometrical Perfection which I ſee. Nor yet in any Images or Species that may be ſuppoſed to Iſſue forth or Eradiate from them, ſince beſides that ſuch Eradiations of Images from Senſible Objects is a moſt Extravagant and Unphiloſophic Thought, if ſuch a thing in the general were poſſible, yet however they cannot be ſuppoſed to ſend forth Images more perfect than they themſelves are, much leſs ſuch as are abſolutely perfect when they themſelves are ſo very imperfect, unleſs we could ſuppoſe an imperfect Cauſe ſufficient to produce a perfect Effect. 'Tis plain then that the Figures which I contemplate are not the Figures which I ſee, or rather that the Figures that I ſee are not the Figures

gures which I turn my Eye upon. For I ſee Mathematical Figures, perfect Circles and perfect Squares, *&c.* whereas thoſe which I regard with my Eye are not only alwaies imperfect, but many times ſo groſly defective and unaccurate, that 'tis a ſtretch even to *Analogy* that they are call'd by thoſe Names. Beſides the Figures that I contemplate are *Immutable Natures*, ſuch whoſe Eſſences like that of Numbers have no Latitude, but conſiſt in an *Indiviſible*. I find they appear to me alwaies a like, are at all times and places the very ſelf ſame, and that I cannot change or alter them in the leaſt, or make them any leſs, or any more perfect than they are. But now the other Figures that are the Objects of my *Senſe* have a great Latitude and Variety in them, are Mutable and Changeable, capable of Addition or Subtraction, admit of infinite degrres of Intention as well as Extenſion, and may by manual Operation be made more or leſs perfect, or if you pleaſe, more or leſs like thoſe which I *Intellectually* ſee or contemplate. But where is it then that I ſee them? Not certainly in their Natural State, nor in this Natural or Senſible World, there being nothing here to be found of that Exactneſs and Perfection which I find in theſe Figures, beſides alſo that there is nothing here (where all things are in Perpetual Flux and Motion) of that ſtable and immutable Nature that I behold in them. The ſhort then this, I ſee no ſuch Figures here, nor any thing like them whether for Perfection and Exactneſs, or for Stability and Fixedneſs, (ſince

Time it ſelf will work a change in all Natural things, if nothing elſe does) and yet ſuch Figures I do ſee, and therefore I muſt ſee them in their Ideal State, and in an Intelligible World. They are then Intelligible Figures that I ſee (even while the Material and Senſible one's imploy my Eye) Intelligible Circles, and Intelligible Squares, *&c.* That is, I ſee theſe Figures in their Ideal Reaſons and Meaſures, according to which alone they have that Perfection wherein I ſee them, and conſequently there is an Ideal as well as a Natural State of theſe things, ſince even while they *have* a *Natural*, they are *beheld* in and according to their *Ideal* State.

33. But beſides it may farther deſerve to be conſider'd how the *Propoſitions* concerning theſe Figures are Salv'd, or what is the *Ground and Pillar* of their Truth. As for Inſtance, that all the Diameters of a Circle are equal, or that all the Angles of a Square are right, *&c.* 'Tis beſides all Queſtion that theſe are true Propoſitions, or if any ſhould be made, 'tis eaſy to demonſtrate the Truth of them. But of what are they true, or what is the Immediate and Adequate Subjects of their Truth? Of what Circles, and of what Squares are theſe and ſuch like Propoſitions to be underſtood? What of thoſe Material and Senſible one's which I have in my Eye? But then the Propoſitions would be falſe, contrary to what is ſuppoſed. For neither have theſe Circles their Diameters exactly equal, nor theſe Squares their Angles exactly right, and that becauſe they are not perfect Circles, nor perfect Squares. For of ſuch only

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the Propoſitions are to be underſtood, becauſe of ſuch only they are True. And therefore ſince theſe material Figures are not perfect in their reſpective kinds, it is plain that theſe Propoſitions do not proceed concerning them, and that they are not the proper Subjects of them, (however we point to theſe Figures for Illuſtration ſake when we make our Demonſtrations) but that they are to be underſtood of Intelligible Circles, and Intelligible Squares, or of theſe Figures as they exiſt Intelligibly, and according to thoſe perfect and immutable Natures which they have in the Ideal World. I ſay, 'tis of theſe Intelligible Figures only that theſe and ſuch like Geometric Theorems are to be underſtood, becauſe of theſe only they are true, and that becauſe theſe only have all that Perfection, Exactneſs and Immutable Stability that is ſuppoſed and required in the Demonſtration of them. Which, as St. *Auſtin* expreſſes it, is, *judicare de Corporalibus Secundum Rationes incorporales & Sempiternas.* *De Trin.* lib. 12. c. 2.

34. And whereas theſe and the like Theorems are the Objects of *Geometric Science* whoſe Province it is to be employ'd in the Contemplation and Demonſtration of them, is it not hence a very deducible Corollary that the Science of Geometry as Perfect and as Noble as it is, and which in the whole Circle of the Science has the Glory and the Precedency for Evidence and Certainly, proceeds wholly concerning Ideal and Intelligible Figures, and that they only are the true and proper Subjects of its Theory and Demonſtration?

monſtration? I think this a Conſequence that cannot be denied. For if when a Mathematician contemplates ſuch and ſuch Figures, and demonſtrates ſuch and ſuch Relations and Properties concerning them, the Propoſitions themſelves (as has been ſhewn) are verify'd of theſe things not as they are in *Nature*, but only as they are in *Idea*, then he that Contemplates and Demonſtrates the Truth of them, muſt intend the proof of it with reſpect to the ſame Ideal State of theſe Figures, or elſe his Demonſtration will not be true. And ſo if the Propoſitions to be conſider'd in this Science be true only of Ideal or Intelligible Figures, then alſo the Science that Conſiders them muſt reſpect the ſame Figures, or elſe there will be no Agreement nor Proportion between the Diſciplin and its Object, and ſo even Geometry it ſelf will be but *vain Philoſophy*, and a *Science falſely ſo call'd.* By which it appears that of what uſe ſoever Material and Senſible Figures may be either in the Theory or in the Practice of Geometry, whether for the better fixing the Imagination, or for the giving us an Occaſion of Converting our Minds to thoſe Ideal Objects, whereof theſe Senſible one's are but groſs and imperfect Imitations, yet that they are the *Intelligible Figures alone that are the True and Adequate Objects of Mathematic Conſideration, the things which that Noble and Abſtract Science is immediately converſant about, and ultimately

* *Accordingly we are told by* Suarez, *that it was the Pythagoric Doctrin that res Mathematicæ ſint re ipſâ ſeparatæ & immobiles.* Diſput. 42. Sect. 2. Num. 1.

ly founded upon, as the only firm Ground and Bottom of all its Truth and Evidence. So that even Geometry it ſelf the moſt Perfect and Satisfying of all the Sciences, and which in all Ages has ſtood as an invincible Mound and Bank againſt the overflowing Tides of *Scepticiſm*, has you ſee its Baſis and Foundation in the *Ideal World*.

35. And this I take to be the beſt Account of the *Abſtractedneſs* of this Science, which indeed by theſe Meaſures appears to be much more Abſtract than is ordinarily allow'd. The common Doctrin of the Degrees of Abſtraction in the Sciences (if I rightly underſtand thoſe that treat of it) is in ſhort this. They diſtinguiſh of a threefold Abſtraction from Matter, according to the like number of the Speculative Sciences. *Phyſics* is ſaid to Abſtract from Matter, but tis only ſingular Matter, as conſidering and being alſo defined with reſpect to Matter in common. *Mathematics* is ſaid to Abſtract not only from ſingular Matter, but even from Matter in common, but not really, but only *ſecundum Rationem*, as being really converſant about material Beings, tho' not defined with reſpect to them as ſuch. *Metaphyſics* is ſaid to Abſtract from all Matter, both ſingular and common, and that both really and rationally, which is the higheſt degree of Abſtraction. You ſee here that according to the Scholaſtic Account of Abſtraction, that of *Mathematics* is made to be purely Notional, and to conſiſt not in the reality of the thing, but only in the manner of Conception, and ſo to be beneath that

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of *Metaphyſics*. The reaſon of which I ſuppoſe to be taken from the common Preſumption that the Objects of Geometry are thoſe material and ſenſible Figures which are in Bodies, tho' it does not Conſider them under that Formality, and accordingly is conceiv'd to abſtract from matter not in Reality, but only by way of Conſideration. Which indeed would be very true upon the preſumed Hypotheſis. But now if, as it has been ſhewn, not the Figures of this Senſible, but only thoſe of the Intelligible World are the proper objects of Mathematic Conſideration (the Propoſitions and Demonſtrations of this Science being ſtrictly verify'd only of them) then the Doctrin of *Abſtraction* muſt be otherwiſe Stated, ſince it now appears that *Geometry* abſtracts from matter not only according to the manner of Conception but alſo in very deed and reality, and ſo is every whit as Abſtract a Science as *Metaphyſics*, as being equally converſant about the *Immaterial* Objects of the *Intelligible* World. Ac-

Soliloq. lib. 2. ch. 18. cording to that of St. *Auſtin*, who tells us that thoſe Figures which are taught in Geometry, dwell in Truth it ſelf.

36. See now a whole Science, and that the moſt firm and beſt Eſtabliſh'd of any, Built and Reſting upon the *Ideal Hypotheſis*, as upon its Ground and Foundation, ſince the objects which it contemplates, and concerning which it demonſtrates ſuch an Infinity of the moſt Abſtract, yet ſolid Truths, are properly no other than *Intelligible Eſſences*. Whereof it may be a farther con-

confirmation, that if all material and Senſible Figures were removed out of being, nay if matter it ſelf were utterly annihilated, yet however the Science of Geometry would be ſtill as it is, and remain the ſame unſhaken Reality, without the leaſt diminution to its mighty Syſtems, or loſing ſo much as the leaſt Truth in that great Ruin. Which plainly ſhews *a Poſteriori* that they are no part of its Foundation. Whereas ſhould theſe Intelligible Entitys be ſuppoſed to fail, this Science as firm as it ſtands (not to ſay all others) would immediately fall with them, as being no more able to Subſiſt, than a Building is when its Foundation is taken away. From whence ſhould I conclude that the Exiſtence of the Intelligible World is as certain as any Propoſition in Mathematics, I ſhould hardly do juſtice to the Argument, which concludes more if poſſible, ſince by it, (if I well Conſider) it appears to be full as certain as that there is any ſuch Science as *Geometry*. This therefore I think may very modeſtly paſs for a Demonſtration.

37. The ſum then is, as I ſee Mathematic Figures as they are in Idea, becauſe I ſee them in ſuch Perfection and according to ſuch a ſtate of Immutability as they have not in Nature, ſo alſo the Propoſitions which in Geometry are demonſtrated concerning them, reſpect them no otherwiſe than according to the ſame ſtate, and that for the ſame Reaſon. So that tho' the Natural World be the object of *Senſe*, yet the Ideal World is the proper object of *Knowledge*, as well as Intelligible Viſion or Perception (the Senſe and

Truth

Truth of which will better appear hereafter) ſince things are both ſeen and known according to their Intelligible Eſſences, the propoſitions concerning them being, as you ſee, verify'd of them only with relation to this their Intelligible State, even tho' at the ſame time they have alſo a Senſible Exiſtence in the Natural World. But what if the ſame Propoſitions that are verifi'd of them now, were alſo verifi'd of them *before* they had any ſuch Exiſtence? Muſt not the Ideal Natures be the Subjects of ſuch *Propoſitions*, as well as of that *Science* which muſt alſo be ſuppoſed alwaies to have been concerning them? Or will you ſay that either of theſe might Subſiſt without any Subjects at all? This then leads me to another Argument, and I think a very Concluding one for the Exiſtence of an Ideal World, taken from the Conſideration of *Eternal Truths*.

Argument the Fourth.

38. Whatever Diſputes there may be among ſome about the Dependency or Independency of Eternal Truths upon the will and Eſtabliſhment of God, yet that there are ſuch Truths is a Principle ſo Univerſally Conſented to by the Thoughtful and Conſiderate of all Ages, that I know of none but ſuch *Sceptics* as will diſown Truth and Science in the general, that can refuſe to Subſcribe to it. So that if there be any need to prove it, 'tis for the ſake of ſuch Men (if any ſuch there be) that I am concern'd to do it. Which yet I am not neither, ſince they will be found to grant in effect the very Concluſion they Contend a-

gainſt,

gainſt, and ſo to confute themſelves rather than their Adverſaries. For when they ſay that there is no ſuch thing as Truth or Science, but that every propoſition has ſome other of equal force and moment to counter-ballance it, according to that ſaying παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται, I ſay when they ſpeak thus, eſpecially if they allege Arguments from Reaſon and the Nature of things to defend it, tis plain that they (as tis to be ſuppoſed they will, or elſe what they ſay deſerves no regard) advance their Scepticiſm as an oppoſit Poſition or Aſſertion, and ſo do indeed as really *Dogmatize* as their Adverſaries. For they ſuppoſe themſelves to be in the Right (as other diſputants do) and their Adverſaries in the Wrong, which yet they cannot be if there be no Truth, ſince Errour is a departing from Truth, and where theſe is no Truth there can be no Errour, even as where there is no Law there can be no Sin. And a *Libertin* that denies all moral Diſtinction between Good and Evil may as well ſay that a Man Sins, as a *Sceptic* that allows no Truth, that a Man *Errs*. One is as Inconſiſtent as the other, becauſe Errour does as much ſuppoſe Truth, as Sin does the diſtinction of Good and Evil. Such *Sceptics* then would overthrow themſelves, allowing that Truth and Science *in Hypotheſi*, which they deny *in Theſi*. They contradict the Doctrine they maintain, and in pretending to prove it, they really diſprove it. For what is it leſs, to declare againſt Truth, and yet to endeavour to have that Propoſition receiv'd and believ'd as True, to argue againſt Science, and yet

to

to do it in a Demonſtrative and Scientific way? What is this but to fight againſt their Adverſaries with one Hand, and with the other to fight for them, and to admit that Truth and Science in at one Door, which they exclude at the other? So that indeed they give up their Scepticiſm in the very Defence of it, and are themſelves no longer *Sceptics*, but only another ſort of *Dogmatiſts*, from whom they would differ rather in the *Singularity* of the *Propoſition*, than in the *Manner* of maintaining it, which muſt be done by the uſual methods of the rational way, by Affirming and Denying, Premiſing and Concluding, *&c.* only with more Abſurdity and Inconſiſtency than is elſewhere to be obſerv'd. So that the Queſtion now lies between them and their Adverſaries as between two *Dogmatiſts*, and is no longer to be conceiv'd in this Form whether there be any ſuch thing as Truth or no, (for all Diſpute ſuppoſes that) but whether what *they* ſay, or what their *Adverſaries* ſay be True. One or other of them muſt be ſo, and 'tis impoſſible that what they ſay ſhould be true, becauſe the Propoſition is ſelf repugnant and would deſtroy it ſelf, which is a certain mark of Errour and not of Truth. It is impoſſible therefore that it ſhould be true that there is no Truth, and therefore moſt certain that there is. Since which ſoever of the Contradictories be ſupoſed right, Truth is equally confeſs'd, as having this peculiar quality to be alike Eſtabliſh'd either by the Affirmation or by the Denial of its Exiſtence. For when they ſay there is no Truth, is that Propoſition true or falſe? If falſe

falſe, (as moſt certainly it is) then there is that Truth which they deny. But if we ſuppoſe it true, yet however there muſt be ſuch a thing as Truth, or elſe how comes their Propoſition to have it. So that Truth is ſecure both ways, but they that attack her will be equally baffled upon either ſuppoſition, ſince even their own Argument recoils upon them, and thoſe very Arrows which they let flie at Truth (as is moſt juſt) upon their own Heads.

39. Truth therefore they muſt, and do by certain and immediate Conſequence grant. But then before we go any farther let them conſider whether that can be any thing leſs than neceſſary which they cannot avoid granting, nay which is granted even by the very denial of it? And beſides when they go to prove this ſceptical Poſition they muſt do it by pretending to lay the Grounds of it in Philoſophic Principles and Maxims, which beſides the Confeſſion of ſuch Principles would be to erect their Scepticiſm as an Inſtitution or Science, and then ſince all Science is of *Neceſſary* and *Immutable* things, and whatſoever is neceſſary and immutable is alſo Eternal, hence it follows yet farther that they will by conſequence and muſt allow not only Truth in general, but alſo *Eternal* Truths, ſince both the Concluſion which they pretend to prove, and the Principles whereby they prove it, according to them muſt be ſuch. For I preſume the Deniers of Truth and Science, will not ſtick to ſay that their Arguments againſt theſe things conclude neceſſarily, ſince otherwiſe how can they

expect to confute or convince their Adversaries, and if they conclude *necessarily*, they must needs conclude *Eternally*. For what ever is necessary, is also Eternal. They must therefore even upon their own Principles, be brought to the Confession of Eternal Truths.

40. And were there any occasion for the Proof of so Confessed and well Assured a thing, this very Consideration last hinted at, would furnish us with a clear and convincing Argument for that purpose. For that there are Propositions of *necessary* Truth as they are usually Contradistinguish'd to those that are of a contingent Order, is as certain as that there is any such thing as *Necessity* or *Contingency* in the World. This appears most evident in first Principles and their immediate Consequences, and in those Propositions which (as the *Logicians* speak) are in *primo modo dicendi per se*, wherein the Predication is Essential, that is, the Predicate belongs to the Essence or Definition of the Subject, one of these Ideas vertually including and containing the other. And because they do so, there must needs be a necessary Union and Connexion between such Ideas, so that the things cannot but be as they are, and it would be a Contradiction to suppose them all to be otherwise, and he that should so conceive or affirm of them would not only grosly Err, but also plainly give himself the Lie. And this in some instances appears so very Clearly that no body does, or so much as offers to conceive otherwise of them. Nay in many Propositions the Union of their

Ideas

Ideas appears ſo indiſſolvible, that we find we have it not in our Power to Diſunite them in our Thoughts, but muſt needs conceive them after ſuch a certain determinate manner, nor can apprehend how they can be otherwiſe Conceiv'd by any Underſtanding whatſoever, even the Infinite one of God himſelf, the Perfection of which may indeed inable him more clearly to ſee the ſame things, but not to ſee them *otherwiſe*. And upon this neceſſity of Union and Connexion of Ideas in certain Propoſitions is founded all *Reaſon* and *Diſcourſe*, and all *Certainty*, which at laſt reſolves into ſuch Propoſitions, and tis alſo the Ground and Foundation of all *Science* which, as all agree, is *de neceſſarijs & eodem modo ſe habentibus*, concerning things of a neceſſary and invariable Nature. But now if there are certain neceſſary Truths, there is no need of proving them Eternal, ſince if they either once were not, or might ever ceaſe to be what they are, they would not be neceſſary. There are then and muſt be Eternal Truths.

41. But now ſince by Truth according to the Objective and Complex Notion of it, as it is here taken, is meant only certain Habitudes or Relations of Union or Agreement, Diſunion or Diſagreement between Ideas, according as they are in themſelves and with reſpect to one another, to affirm that there are Eternal Truths imports as much as that there are ſuch Eternal Habitudes and Relations, that never were made by any Underſtanding or Will, nor can ever be unmade by them, but have a certain ſtated and unalte-

rable Order from Everlasting to Everlasting. As for example, he that shall say that, *all right Angles are equal*, is an Eternal Truth, (as every Man must say that owns it to be a necessary one, and thinks it demonstrable) may be justly understood to say in effect that the Relation of Equality between right Angles is Eternal. If therefore there are Eternal Truths, there are also Eternal Habitudes and Relations of things to one another.

42. And thus far there is no great *Difficulty*, nor *Question*, but the very next step will ingage us pretty deep in both. Some Relations and Habitudes of things, it is said, are Eternal, or else there can be no Eternal Truths. But how are they Eternal? What are they so in an Abstract and Solitary Consideration, without the Coexistency of those simple Essences, Natures, or Things whose Habitudes and Relations they are? This indeed would be a very short and Compendious account of Eternal Truths, to say that they are Relations Eternally Existing by themselves in a separate State from the things so related. And tis great pity but that it were as Intelligible, as tis short and Easy. But that I am apt to think it is not, for tis against the very general Nature and Formal Reason of *Relations* to be able to exist thus Separately and Independently by themselves. Indeed could they do so they would be no longer *Relations*, but *absolute* Beings. For all Relations are the Relations of something to something, and therefore carry with them essentially and as such a necessary Connotation and Coimplication of the things

things to which they belong, and without which they cannot be. So ſays the great *Metaphyſician* expreſly concerning Relation, telling us that it requires a real *Subject*.

This Aſſertion ſays he, *in the general is clear, for Relation is an Accident, but every Accident requires ſome Subject. Beſides, Relation is a certain Form, but every Form does inform ſomething. But that which it informs is call'd its Subject, eſpecially if it inheres in it, and depends upon it, which we have ſhewn to be true of Relation, even as it is Relation.* Again a little afterwards to the like purpoſe we have him declaring for the neceſſity of the Exiſtence of the *Term*, telling us that it muſt have a Term *real*, and *really Exiſting*, and that this is the common Opinion of *Ariſtotle*'s Interpreters. The truth of which he argues, 1*ſt*. From the common Principles receiv'd of theſe Relations, ſuch as that the Relation and Term are together in Time, and that the Correlate or Term being taken away the Relation is alſo taken away, and being put it ariſes. All which he ſays do ſuppoſe the real Exiſtence of the Term, becauſe they include the Coexiſtence of the Extremes, which implies the Exiſtence of both. 2*ly*. From the very inward being and Nature of Relation, Namely, in that it conſiſts in a pure Reſpect, nor has any other Deſign or Function in Nature, and accordingly is not a thing intended by it ſelf, but a meer *Reſultancy*. For from hence he thinks it may plainly be Collected, that as ſuch it has no Being unleſs

Suarez Diſp. metap. Tom. 2. *Diſp.* 47. Sect. 6. Num. 2.

Sect. 8. Num. 4.

the Coexistence of its Foundation and Term be supposed from whence it may result. And in the Conclusion of the Section he moves a curious Question, whether the Dependence of Relation upon the Existence of its Term be so great, that it does not only require it from the Nature of the thing, but even by an Absolute Power cannot subsist without it. To which he answers that it cannot subsist without its actual Term by any Power whatsoever. For which he assigns this Reason, because in the very formal affect of Relation its real and actual Term is involv'd.

43. 'Tis true indeed that *Suarez* applies this to those kind of Relations which he has there under Consideration, Namely such as are of the *Predicamental* Order. But tho' the Application be particular, yet the Reason is general, and such as holds as well of other Relations, at least such as are *Real*, and have an Existence out of, and independent upon the understanding, as the Relations of the present Consideration most apparently have, they being such as the Understanding supposes and finds in being, and does not make, and not only so, but Withal finds (as we have shewn) to have a necessary and Eternal Existence. These Eternal Habitudes therefore and Relations of things wherein consists the formal Reason of Eternal Truths, cannot Exist without the reality of their respective *Correlates*, those things or natures whose Relations they are. And that because they do as necessarily suppose, include and connote them, and as immediately result from them, and as essentially depend

depend upon them as other Relations do upon their Subject and Term, upon the Position of which they instantly arise, and upon the removal of which they immediately Cease. As therefore those other Relations (as the Schools themselves allow) cannot Subsist without the Existence of Subject and Term, so neither can these without the Coexistence of those Natures or Essences which have these Relations, and whose real Existence is as necessary to sustain them, as the Reality of Subject and Term is to Sustain the other. The thing that I would say in other Words is that as there can be no Truth of the Subject without Truth of the Object, because Truth of the Subject supposes that of the Object to which it may be Conformable, so there can be no Truth of the Object Complex without Truth of the Object Simple, that is, no Relation without the Things between whom the Relation is, these things necessarily supposing and inferring one another. I conclude therefore that these Eternal Relations, of Truth cannot Exixst by themselves, and if they do Exist at all (as most certainly they do if they are necessary and eternal) the Simple Essences which they respect must Exist too, and if they Exist Eternally, those Essences must be Eternal too. As for Instance, if there is an Eternal Relation of Equality between Right Angles, then those Angles must have an Eternal Existence. I conclude therefore that the Simple Essences of things are Eternal.

44. But least this way of Reasoning should have the same ill fortune that some other *Me-*

taphyſical Arguments have had, to be ſuſpected of Fallacy becauſe of its concluding ſo ſurprizingly, beſides the Strangeneſs and Singularity of the Concluſion it ſelf, which thoſe that meaſure Truth by Authority rather than by Reaſon, will perhaps think they have ſufficient cauſe to Condemn, becauſe it agrees not with the Principles of the *School-Philoſophy*, that will by no means allow the *Eſſences* of things to be *Eternal.* (which by the way one may juſtly wonder at ſince they cannot but own the Eſſential Habitudes of things which we call Eternal Truths, and at the ſame time make it ſo neceſſary as they do to Relations to have really and actually Exiſting Subjects.)

I ſhall endeavour ſome farther Satisfaction and Conviction in this Matter, not ſo much by a new Argument, as by changing the poſture of the ſame, which perhaps may give it greater force, it faring with *Arguments* as with *Pictures* whoſe advantage depends upon a happy point of View, and which by changing their Light improve their Appearance.

45. To give then yet a brighter Colour to this *Platonic Hereſy* that the Eſſences of things are Eternal, and to clear it up if poſſible into the very light of Day, my attentive Reader is deſired farther to Conſider with me, that when 'tis ſaid that there are Eternal Relations of things, this Propoſition reſolves into this, that things are Eternally Related to one another, and that when 'tis ſaid again that theſe Relations cannot ſubſiſt without the real and actual Exiſtence of

of the things themſelves whoſe Relations they are, this Propoſition alſo is tantamount to this, that things that are not cannot be related, or that things cannot be related unleſs they are, and ſo conſequently cannot be Eternally related unleſs they *Eternally* are. And *can* they? Who is able to Conceive that they can? Men indeed through Prejudice, heat of Diſpute, Spirit of Contradiction, or out of meer haſt and præcipitation are apt to affirm a great many things whereof they have no Conception, nay which are in themſelves utterly inconceivable, and ſo perhaps there may be ſome hardy enough to affirm this, but *Saying* is one thing and *Conceiving* is another and if any underſtanding be able to Conceive this, ſure there is nothing but what may be Conceived. For can any thing be more inconceivable than this, that there ſhould be any relation of Union, Agreement or Connexion between things that are not. For what ſhould ſuſtain ſuch Relations? Or that things that have no being at all, meer non Entities, pure nothings ſhould be thus or thus related or affected one towards another, that is, one *Nothing* towards another *Nothing*. And what a noble Science would it be to contemplate ſuch Relations and Properties, the Relations of *Nothing*? Things indeed moſt worthy of our Study when we are out of Employment or can find no better, but ſure it muſt be a Study of a very *dark Complexion*, ſuch a profound muſe as when we are ſaid to think upon *Nothing*. And would not the Sciences themſelves

ſelves reſt alſo upon the ſame Foundation? Might it not be moſt ſtrictly ſaid of them what *Job* by way of Figure ſays of the *Earth*, that they *hang upon Nothing*? And would not this undermine the Foundations of Truth, evacuate our Philoſophy, and turn all Science into meer Dream and Reverie, as having no better realities even for its moſt ſtable and permanent Objects than the Relations of *Nothing*? But I thought it had been a confeſs'd and receiv'd Maxim all the World over, that *Nothing* could have no Properties or Relations.

46. Well remember'd, a very clear and fruitful Principle, upon which great things have, and greater might be Built. And indeed I do not know a more Univerſally acknowledg'd Principle than this. It has paſt unqueſtion'd through all Schools, and has undergon the probatory Teſt both of Antients and Moderns. The old Philoſophy lays it down, and the new takes it up and proceeds upon it. *Des Cartes*'s *Cogito ergo ſum* reſolves into it. Whatever we doubt of beſides, we cannot doubt that we Exiſt while we doubt, becauſe while we doubt we think, and if we think, we are very right. But why? Why becauſe if I think I have ſome Property belonging to me, which could not be if I were not; And why? becauſe of Nothing there can be no Affection. This is the point upon which this whole Reaſoning turns, here it is that the weight of it *Centers*.

47. And a very firm and ſtable Center it is, the Earth it ſelf has not a Better. But does not the

the preſent Argument reſt upon the ſame? When tis ſaid, things are Eternally Related, therefore they Eternally are, the conſequence here, even as in the *Carteſian* inſtance, bottoms upon this, that if things are related then they have ſome property belonging to them, which is not poſſible if they have no Exiſtence, becauſe of nothing there can be no Affection. And if this be a true principle (whereof I believe no Man ever yet doubted, or ever will) then that things Eternally related have an Eternal Exiſtence, is full as true as that *he that thinks is*, or otherwiſe there would be ſome real Affection of nothing, contrary to the principle ſuppoſed.

48. But let us a little examin the ground of this Principle, whereby we ſhall gain a double Advantage, 1*ſt*. By giving yet more evidence to the Principle it ſelf, 2*d*. By diſcovering that the Argument here maintain'd does not only (as was ſhewn before) reſolve into this Principle, but alſo ſtands upon the very ſame common ground with it. *Of nothing there can be no Affection*, a Propoſition not only bright enough to be ſeen by its own light, but, as one would think of the moſt *immediate* Evidence, not reſolvible into any thing more Evident than it ſelf, and ſo as much above the *Poſſibility* as the *Neceſſity* of Demonſtration, in one Word, a very firſt Principle. And for ſuch I doubt not but that it has been taken. But yet that in ſtrictneſs it cannot formally be ſo is plain, becauſe a *Negation*. For as ſuch it muſt be founded in ſome Affirmation as every Negation is, and the

the Affirmation in which it is Founded is this, that Affection or Quality is the neceſſary and adequate property of Being. And why ſo? Is this alſo accountable for *a Priori*? Yes, very clearly. Becauſe to be anywiſe affected or qualify'd is Modal Being, but Modal Being ſuppoſes pure Being, even as a Modal Propoſition ſuppoſes the pure one which it modifies. Or to expreſs it in more familiar terms, to be thus, or after any certain particular manner ſuppoſes being ſimply, as every more contract and determinate Nature does the more general, and that becauſe it *includes* it, as being a farther Addition to it. So that here is a *Subſiſtendi Conſequentia*, one may with the juſteſt illation argue from one to the other. For tho' it may not alwaies follow from being Simply to being thus; yet if a thing be *thus* it muſt neceſſarily *be*, becauſe being thus, is Being and ſomwhat more, and therefore includes it, as every greater does the leſs, which accordingly is the laſt Propoſition of this Analyſis, or at leaſt as far as we can well go.

49. Well but now let us ſee whether the Argument in hand does not wind up into the very ſame Bottom. And I think the Reſolution is exactly the ſame. Things are eternally related, therefore they eternally are. For to be related is a modification of Being, and does not modal Being here alſo imply pure Being? Does not a Propoſition of the 3*d*. *Adject* ſuppoſe that of the 2*d*.? Does not being thus or thus imply being Simply? For muſt not a thing firſt be, before it can be thus, at leaſt in priority of Nature, and

and according to order of Conception? For being thus is an Addition to Being, 'tis Being and ſomewhat more, 'tis Being with a certain Modal Specification, and does not every greater include the leſs? If you ſay it does, I have my intent, it being plain that to be thus or thus related imports more than Simply to be, but if you ſay it does not, I confeſs I know not well how to prove it, but from the Simple Ideas of greater and leſs, or whole and part. And I would not deſire a better confeſſion of the Truth of the preſent Argument than to be required to prove that Propoſition.

50. By this it appears that the concluſion of the Eternal Exiſtence of things from their being Eternally Related, does not only depend upon that celebrated Principle or rather Maxim, that of nothing there can be no Affection (which yet one would think were ſtability enough) but alſo centers upon the ſame Foundation whereon that Maxim ultimately reſts, *viz.* That *the greater Includes the leſs*, which is the common Baſis to them both. So that our conſequence is every way as true as that Maxim is, which whoever receives muſt alſo admit the other, or elſe he will apparently contradict himſelf, as departing from that in the *Hypotheſis*, which in the *Theſis* he maintains. For things to be related to one another as they are in Propoſitions of Eternal Truth, is to have certain Affections or Properties belonging to them, and therefore to ſay that the things that are ſo related yet are not, or that tho' they are not yet they are ſo related,

related, is a plain contradiction to that Principle, *of nothing there can be no Affection*, no otherwise to be avoided but by confessing the real Existence of the things supposed to be so Related.

51. And this in other instances Men are ready enough to confess, nay to argue. *Suarez* proves that first matter is not *so* a *pura Potentia* but that it has some entative Actuality belonging to it, that is, that tho' it be in *purâ potentiâ receptivâ* as to any formal Act, yet it is not in *purâ Potentiâ Objectivâ* as to reality of Being, but is a real something (however incomplete) and actually *extra Nihil*. But now how does he prove it? Why he proves this entative actuality of first matter from the very attribute of its Potentiality. *Because the first Subject* (such as he there supposes first matter to be) *must necessarily have a real Passive Power, but says he a real Passive Power cannot be understood without some entative Actuality. For* (says he) *how is it possible to conceive that any thing should be truely and really receptive of another, unless it be something in it self.* How indeed! He must be a wiser Man than *Suarez* that can conceive this, and must have a peculiar System of Metaphysics to go by, such as this part of the World at least has not been acquainted with, and such as my curiosity would lead me a great way to see. In the mean time we must do as well as we can with such Metaphysics as we have, and I am inclinable to think that whatever becomes of the

Metap. Disput. Tom. 1. *Disp.* 13. Sect. 5. Num. 9.

Question

Queſtion concerning thoſe two celebrated Principles of Phyſical Compoſition, *Matter* and *Form*, yet that allowing the ſuppoſition he goes upon, it will not be in haſt denied that our *Metaphyſician* reaſons rightly, when from the *Receptiveneſs* of firſt matter he concludes the real and actual *Exiſtence* of it.

52. *Des Cartes* reaſons in the very ſame method in his laying the firſt Foundation of Philoſophic Science. *I think*, or I am thinking, (for ſo the Propoſition muſt be reſolv'd) *therefore I am*. He argues from his having the attribute of thinking belonging to him to his Exiſtence. And tho' ſome may Object againſt either the truth of this being the Principle that firſt occurs (as he will have it) in the Order of right Philoſophizing, or againſt the great uſefulneſs and importance of it as to the Diſcovery of Truth and improvement of knowledge, yet I think there is no body but will allow the conſequence it ſelf to be good, that if he thinks, he undoubtedly is, and ſo that he has ſufficiently proved his own Exiſtence from that Attribute, however ſome may think it ſuch a proof as might have been ſpared. Whether it might or no I am not in this place concern'd to examin, my preſent purpoſe being abundantly ſerv'd as far as I intended it ſhould, in theſe two Remarks, 1*ſt*. That thus he reaſons, proving his Exiſtence from his having a certain Affection or Property belonging to him, and 2*d*. That in ſo reaſoning his Argument is good. Neither of which I ſuppoſe will be denied.

53. And

53. And thus you see here two great Men, as great perhaps as any in their several ways, one for the Old, and the other for the New, proceeding in this very method and form of Reasoning. *Suarez* proves the Existence of first matter by it, and *Des Cartes* proves his own. First matter is receptive of Form, therefore it is, says the former, I think, therefore I am, says the latter. And how do either of these differ from the other, or from this 3*d*. Things are Eternally related, therefore the Eternal are! 'Tis plain that in all of them the consequence runs from being so to being *Simpliciter*, from Modal to pure Being. The matter indeed of these Arguments differs, but the form is one and the same in all, and so is the Foundation, and so consequently must be the Truth and Solidity. I might then crave leave for once to be as positive as these great Men, and since I both have their Authority, and proceed upon their Bottom, to determin as freely and securely for the Eternal Existence of things, as one of them does for the Existence of *first matter*, and the other for his *own*.

54. The sum is, the Relations of things cannot Exist without the Coexistence of the things themselves, or, things cannot be related unless they are, whenever therefore they are related they must be, and if Eternally Related, they must Eternally be. Or thus, A thing must first be, before it can be Related or have any other Affection, and therefore cannot be related when it is not, then neither Eternally related if not

Eter-

Eternal, ſince otherwiſe it would be related before it is, that is, when it is not, which is impoſſible. If then the Relations of things be Eternal, the things themſelves muſt be Coeternal with them, and ſince tis as certain that there are ſuch Eternal Relations as that there are Eternal Truths, I therefore conclude again that the Eſſences of things are Eternal.

55. And indeed it is a great concluſion, and ſuch as would appear to be of the moſt momentous importance were we to conſider it in its full Power and Extent, View it in all thoſe noble Truths it is pregnant with, and perſue it through all thoſe weighty Conſequences that hang upon it. At preſent I remark, that it gives the beſt and indeed only intelligible account of *Eternal Truths*, and lays the firmeſt Foundation for *Science* which has ſuch Truths for its Proper Objects, and is the moſt ſtrongeſt and moſt invincible Bulwark againſt *Scepticiſm*, which otherwiſe muſt unavoidably break in upon us, it being impoſſible to give an intelligible account of the Stability of Science as well as of Eternal-*Verities* but upon the ſuppoſition of the Eternal Exiſtence of the Simple Eſſences of things. That indeed renders all things clear and plain, ſtrikes a light through the regions of Truth, and makes as bright a Day in the Intellectual, as the Sun does in the Natural World. But let this Hypotheſis be given up, and we are immediately in the Darkneſs, and for ever Condemn'd to it. For if the *Eſſences* of things be not Eternal, then neither are the *Relations*, (ſince

that which is not cannot be related) and if no Eternal Relations, then no Eternal Truths, and if no Eternal Truths, then no Science.

56. Which indeed is but another way of inferring the ſame concluſion from the ſame general ground, *viz.* The inſeparable Connexion that being related has with Abſolute Being. For whereas before it is argued thus, If things are Eternally related, then they Eternally are, but things are Eternally related, therefore they Eternally are. The Argument may as well be turn'd thus, If things are not Eternally, then they are not Eternally related, or there are no Eternal Relations. But there are Eternal Relations, therefore again things Eternally are, *viz.* Becauſe of the Abſurdity that would follow from the contrary ſuppoſition, which it ſeems is no leſs than the utter Abolition of Eternal Truths, and with them of all Science. A vaſt and firightful Ruin, to which the diſſolution of Ten thouſand Worlds bears no Proportion, but ſuch as cannot poſſibly be avoided if theſe eternal Eſſences of things, the *Corner Stones* of the *Building*, be once removed.

57. There is I know a moſt notable Device for this found out by the *Syſtematical* Men, who being loth upon *Ariſtotle*'s Account to admit the Doctrin of *Eternal Eſſences*, and more loth upon their own to let go that of *Eternal Truths*, well knowing that the Conſequence of that would be to undermine their own Syſtems, have contrived a way how to avoid both theſe Inconveniencies, and ſuch a one as carries the force

force of an Objection at the ſame time. It is indeed as you will conſider it, and as the ſide is on which you View it, an Objection one way, and a Salvo another. An *Objection* againſt the eternal Exiſtence of things as inferr'd from their having eternal Relations, and a *Salvo* for their having ſuch Habitudes and Relations notwithſtanding their non Exiſtence. And becauſe it appears with ſome ſhew of Reaſon, and with a great deal of Authority, and withal falls in ſo directly in our way, it may be worth our while to conſider it. Let us hear then what they offer.

58. They tell us very gravely (if I conceive their meaning well enough to expreſs it) that in theſe Propoſitions of neceſſary and eternal Truth which are the Objects of Science, theſe Habitudes and Relations of things belong to them and are affirm'd of them, not Abſolutely (as if then in actual Being) but only *ex Hypotheſi*, upon ſuppoſition or condition of their Exiſting; ſo that whenſoever they ſhall have actual Exiſtence they ſhall alſo have ſuch Relations. The preſent Affirmation of which imports only a conditional Connexion between the Subject and what is affirm'd of it, ſo that one cannot be without the other, but not an abſolute Poſition of either. Accordingly they will tell you that the term (is) when tis of the ſecond Adject, as when we ſay *Man is*, has indeed the force of a Verb, and ſignifies the Exiſtence of the Subject to which it is annex'd. But when tis of the 3*d*. Adject as when we ſay *Man is an*

Animal, then it loſes its own proper ſignification and only Unites the Subject with the Predicate, and is no longer a *Verb*, but only *Copula verbalis*, a verbal Conjunction, and ſo a kind of Syncategorematical Term, ſuch as is not directly Significative by it ſelf, but only ſerves to bind and hold the extremes together in the form of a Propoſition. So that in ſhort 'tis not the actual Exiſtence of either extremes, but only their Connexion that is affirm'd. Nor their actual, but their Hypothetical Connexion. Thus for example, when from the Ideal Relation that is in this neceſſary Propoſition, Man is an Animal, it is argued therefore Man is, they will tell you that the copulative Particle (is) imports not the Exiſtence, but only the Connexion of the extremes. But then if from that very thing it be again urged, That therefore the extremes are becauſe they are connexed, it being impoſſible there ſhould be any Connexion between things that are not, you ſhall have them then explain the Ideal Connexion of ſuch a Propoſition after a Conditional manner, making the exiſtence of the Subject to be the condition of it. Wherein they ſeem in effect to diſtinguiſh of a twofold Connexion or Relation, one Abſolute or Actual, and another Hypothetical or upon Suppoſition, and to apply the latter to the caſe in hand, as not inferring the exiſtence of the things ſo connected. For 'tis plain, that they own that the extremes are ſome way or other connected. (as tis neceſſary they ſhould to ſolve not only the truth and the neceſſity, but even the very Senſe

Senſe of the Propoſition) And 'tis as plain, 2*ly*. That they deny the Connexion to be actual and real. And 'tis as plain, 3*ly*. That they give a Conditional explanation of the manner of it. To which purpoſe you have a very conſiderable Metaphyſician and Divine delivering himſelf thus. *If any one demands what* (is) *ſignifies in neceſſary Propoſitions, that conſiſt of non exſting extremes. I anſwer that that Term does not ſignify an actual and real Conjunction of the extremes exiſting in the thing it ſelf, but only that the predicate is of the Reaſon or Eſſence of the Subject, and does neceſſarily cohere with it. As for inſtance, when we ſay that Man is an Animal, abſtracting from the difference of time, we mean nothing elſe, but that ſuch is the Nature of Man, that he cannot be made, but he will be an Animal. Whereupon* Suarez *ſays that theſe Propoſitions are reduced to an Hypothetic Senſe.* He does ſo indeed, and by Hypothetic Senſe ſeems to mean the ſame as an Hypothetic Union of the Extremes. 'Tis true indeed that a conditional Senſe is another thing than a conditional Union, as not formally importing any Union at all, but only that there would be one if ſuch a Condition were put, which is alſo the only thing that conditional Union (tho' formally importing Union) can really and Intelligibly ſignify. But this ſeems not to be what they intend either by the one or by the other, but ſomething of a different importance, there being an appearance in their way of talking of theſe things as if they apprehended a ſort of

Baron. Metaph. p. 444.

Union of a Nature purely Conditional between the extremes of the propoſition. For do they mean that one of the Extremes is Abſolutely, or if you pleaſe rather, *actually* and *really* in the thing it ſelf United to the other? No, that you ſee they expreſly declare againſt. But then do they mean that there is no manner of Union at all, but only would be one in ſuch a certain Caſe or Suppoſition? So indeed one would be really to think by their ſaying that it is not *actual* and *real*. And yet this cannot reaſonably be thought to be their meaning neither, ſince a *Connexion* in a Propoſition that only *would* be, will amount to as much as a *Truth* that only *would* be. And will any of them ſay that, *viz.* That the Truth of a Propoſition is only a Truth that *would* be? This therefore methinks they ſhould not mean, becauſe then there would be no preſent Truth or ſo much Senſe in the Propoſition, in which alſo they themſelves avowedly maintain that the Predicate is United with the Subject, and that not only as to the formal Operation of the Mind, but alſo as to the Nature of the things themſelves, making the Truth or Falſhood of the Judgment to conſiſt in its Uniting or Diſuniting things according as they are antecedently in themſeves United or not United. But then ſince they are for a Union of Ideas in propoſitions of Eternal Truth, and yet declare againſt an actual and real one, how are they United if not by a conditional Union? For as they *will* not ſay that the Union of Ideas in ſuch propoſitions is *actual* and *real*, ſo they *dare* not ſay it is *none*,

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leſt they ſhould diſſolve the *Truth* of thoſe Propoſitions which they allow to be even *neceſſary*. And therefore what Union can we preſume to be intended by them but a conditional Union, which tho' really none at all, yet ſeems by them to be apprehended (confuſedly I confeſs enough) as a diſtinct ſort of Union, and ſuch as is ſufficient to ſalve the preſent Truth of a neceſſary Propoſition. And according tis remarkable that when the great Metaphyſician had ſaid that the Propoſitions now under Conſideration are reduced to a conditional Senſe, he by and by adds, *atq*; *hinc fit ut hæ Connexiones in hoc Senſu*, that is in the conditional Senſe before ſpoken of. But now by a Connexion in a Conditional Senſe, what can he be ſuppoſed to mean other than a Conditional Connexion? But however that be, (for tis not eaſy to explain Mens meaning when they do not well underſtand themſelves) this in the mean time is clear and certain, that they do not allow any real or actually exiſting Union or Connexion between the extremes in Propoſitions of eternal Truth, Which is as much as my preſent concern will require. *Diſput.* 31. Sect. 12. Num. 45.

59. And that I deliver the Scholaſtic Senſe rightly in this matter at leaſt, let the great *Suarez* ſpeak both for himſelf and me. Who having before determin'd that the Eſſences of things may be deſtroy'd, becauſe actual Exiſtence is ſeparable from them, and Eſſence without Exiſtence is nothing (the force of which way of Argu- *Diſput.* 31. Sect. 12. Num. 35.

ing ſhall be conſider'd in its place) he begins to bethink himſelf, as indeed it was time, whether ſuch an utter Annihilation of Eſſences (ſuch I ſuppoſe he means as takes away their exiſtence abſolutely, and not only as in the ſtate of Nature, ſince otherwiſe there would be no occaſion for his Objection) would not ſhock the Foundation of eternal Truths in Eſſential Prædications, as alſo on the other ſide whether the Poſition of ſuch Truths would not infer the Stability and Perpetuity of thoſe Eſſences. And after ſome debate upon the matter he reſolves the Queſtion thus, by diſtinguiſhing upon the Word *eſt*, by which the extremes are United, which he ſays has a double ſignification. Either firſt as it ſignifies an actual and real Conjunction of the Extremes, and ſuch as exiſts in the thing it ſelf. Or 2*ly*. as it only ſignifies the Predicate to be of the Eſſence of the Subject, whether the extremes exiſt or not. In the firſt Senſe he ſays that without doubt the Truth of Propoſitions depends upon the Exiſtence of the Extremes, *&c.* But in the other Senſe (that which he ſuppoſes to be of the preſent concern) the Propoſitions he ſays are true tho' the extremes do not exiſt. Nay are of neceſſary and eternal Truth, becauſe ſince the *Copula eſt* in the foremention'd Senſe does not ſignify Exiſtence, it does not attribute to the extremes an actual reality in themſelves, and therefore does not require Exiſtence, or actual reality to its Truth. So that according to this account of *Suarez* the deſtruction of Eſſence does not overthrow eternal Truths, nor does the poſi-

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tion of eternal Truths infer the Stability and Eternity of Eſſences, but as eternal Truths may be tho' the things are not, ſo the things may not be tho' eternal Truths are. And all by vertue of this neat Solution. Wherein it would be ſtrange if he ſhould not be follow'd by the leſſer Syſtems, ſince it can do ſuch rare feats. Accordingly not many diſtinctions more current in the Schools than this, it being an expedient for a double ſervice. For by this they reckon they ſhall avoid the Eternal Exiſtence of things notwithſtanding their Eternal Truths, and yet at the ſame time Salve the Doctrin of Eternal Truths notwithſtanding the Non-exiſtence of things.

60. But I beleive upon a cloſer Conſideration of the matter, it will appear that they do neither. The ſolution indeed is formal and plauſible, eſpecially with the Authority of *Suarez* to recommend it, and will ſerve very well for the ſatisfaction of a young Scholar at a Logic Lecture, or to acquit himſelf with at a Diſputation, but I think when that's don, he may e'n lay it aſide for any other uſe or Vertue there is in it. Let it be here conſider'd however that were there more in this Scholaſtic account of Eternal Truths than there will be found to be, yet when a thing is clearly and diſtinctly proved, and appears with the utmoſt evidence of demonſtration to be true, (as I think the conſequence does from the Eternal Relations of things to their Coeternal Exiſtence) 'tis not the Aſſault of an Objection that ſhould make us depart from it, tho' ſuch as we know not well how to put by. Becauſe this would

would be to prefer Obſcurity before Light, and to give up what we plainly and clearly ſee for what we do not ſee, which with the beſt maſters of Reaſon is thought a Conduct not very reaſonable. But leaving the advantage of this Plea to thoſe that have more need of it, let us conſider what is here with ſo much Authority offer'd, and with ſuch obſequiouſneſs receiv'd.

61. Firſt then I remark that when theſe Men ſay (as I conceive they do in effect, if not in terms) that in Propoſitions of neceſſary and eternal Truth the Affirmation is only *ex Hypotheſi*, and imports only a conditional Connexion; *&c.* Or at leaſt when they ſay it is not actual they do by conſequence allow that in caſe the Affirmation be abſolute, and ſuch as imports an actual, real and preſent Conjunction of Ideas, the ſubjects of ſuch Affirmations muſt have a real Exiſtence. For when the Argument proceeds from the Relations of things to their Exiſtence, and they deny the conſequence, and that for this reaſon, becauſe things are related not Abſolutely or Actually, but only (as their meaning ſeems to be) *ex Hypotheſi*, this is as good as to ſay that Exiſtence does not follow from all Relation but only from that which is Abſolute or Actual, which is in effect to grant, that if things were actually Related then indeed they would actually Exiſt. And accordingly had *this* been the Argument, they would not have deny'd the Conſequence, but the minor Propoſition. For this latter Conſequence they implicitly grant, tho' they deny the firſt, and it is expreſly own'd

own'd by *Suarez* in the Application of his Diſtinction, when he ſays that in the firſt Senſe (*viz.* that of actual and real Conjunction of the Extremes) *without doubt the Truth of Propoſitions depends upon the Exiſtence of the Extremes.* So then that conſequence which they deny from Relations in general, they grant as to a certain determinate Species of Relation, *viz.* That which is Abſolute or Actual. Only they deny that things are ſo related.

62. Here then turns the Point, and here, with my Metaphyſical Maſter's good leave, I humbly contend that in Propoſitions of neceſſary Truth, the relations of things do belong to them, and are likewiſe affirm'd of them, not *ex Hypotheſi*, or upon condition of their Exiſting, but Abſolutely, that there is not a conditional but an Abſolute Union of Ideas, or according to the Language of *Suarez* that there is an *actual* and *real Conjunction of the Extremes.* For firſt, there is no Union or Relation of things but what properly ſpeaking is Abſolute and Actual, and if things are not ſo related, how are they related at all? For what is it for things to be related *ex Hypotheſi*? It can mean no other than to be ſo, if ſuch a Condition be put. Well but then till it be put, there is no Relation. And if that condition upon which the Relation is ſuſpended be the *Exiſtence* of the things as they ſay, (telling us that things ſhall have ſuch Properties or Relations if or when they *Exiſt*) then till they do actually Exiſt, by their own Confeſſion they have them not, and ſo are not related. As on the other-

otherside, if it otherwise appears that they are, then by their own Confession again it follows that they do Exist. The short is, whatever truly is, is *Actu*, and whatever is not *Actu*, really is not. These I take to be clear Propositions, and therefore if in necessary and Eternal Truths the Relations of things are only *ex Hypothesi*, or not Actual, then as yet those Relations are not, nor consequently those Eternal Truths which are Founded in those Relations, contrary to what they themselves suppose. Relation then is the same as actual Relation ,nd Union the same as actual Union, and for things to be only Conditionally Related or United is really to be Unrelated to, and seperated from one another, which whoever says of the Ideas of Eternal Truths will I doubt in the consequence be found to deny such Truths. From which indeed I see not how these Men can be excused in denying as they do the Connexion of these Ideas to be actual and real, that being as good as to say that it is none at all. For as if no Connexion of Ideas there is no Truth in the Proposition, so if no actual and real Connexion, there is no Connexion, which farther shews the confusion and inconsistency of these Men in maintaining a Connection of Ideas, and yet denying the Actuality and Reality of it.

63. But stay, if to be related is in reality the same as to be actually related, and so all Habitudes and Relations of things are Absolute and Actual, what shall we say then as to *Hypothetical* Propositions? For are there not many such Pro-

Propoſitions among Eternal Truths, and are not thoſe Truths Relations, and are not thoſe Relations then *Hypothetical?* The Objection indeed is not a little puzling and ſurprizing, but yet ſtill it appears to me moſt clear and evident that there can be no Truth or Relation of things but what is Abſolute and Actual. This therefore I might juſtly ſtand by, according to the rule before obſerv'd, whatever becomes of the Objection. But however as to that I anſwer, that the Relations even of theſe Hypothetical Propoſitions are as Abſolute and Actual as in any other, and 'tis only the form of them that impoſes upon us, and makes it ſeem otherwiſe. To clear this paradoxical Aſſertion we muſt diſtinguiſh in a Hypothetical Propoſition between that which is ſuſpended upon the condition, and the whole Conditional. As in this Propoſition, if a Square has 4 ſides, it has 4 Angles. That which is here ſuſpended upon the condition is a Square's having 4 Angles, the conditional it ſelf is, its having 4 Angles if it has 4 Sides. Now that which is affirm'd here of a Square is not that which is ſuſpended upon the condition, *viz.* its having 4 Angles, tho' that otherwiſe be true, (as may appear in a Propoſition of the like form, where the thing ſuſpended is *materially* falſe, as in this, if the Soul be extended it's a Body) but this intire conditional, that it has 4 Angles if 4 Sides. And conſequently the *Relation* that is here attributed as belonging to a Square is not that which is ſuſpended upon the Condition, (for if ſuſpended how attributed ?) but the intire Conditional

nal it ſelf. There 'tis plain the Connexion or Relation lies, becauſe therein lies the *Truth* and *Power* of the Propoſition, (even according to themſelves who make the Truth of an Hypothetical Propoſition to conſiſt not in the Truth of the antecedent or conſequent, but in the Connexion of them, otherwiſe call'd the *Truth* of the *Conſequence*) and 'tis as plain that the Relation is Abſolute and Actual, for tho' the having 4 Angles be under Condition, yet 'tis abſolutely affirm'd of a Square that if it has 4 Sides it has 4 Angles. This *whole Conditional*, I ſay, is *abſolutely* affirm'd, and indeed is the only thing that is properly affirm'd at all, as will moſt evidently appear from the contradiction to it, which as every Logician knows muſt fall, not upon that part which is *Suſpended* upon the *Condition*, but upon the *Conditional it ſelf*. But the contradiction muſt be to the part *Affirm'd*, or elſe it is no juſt Contradiction. The intire Conditional therefore is truly the part Affirm'd, and conſequently the Relations properly lies in that part, which is not Suſpended upon a farther condition, (for then you might run on *ad Infinitum*, and yet prove *Nothing*, becauſe you reſt *no where*) but is Abſolute, Actual, and without reſerve. So that in ſhort, tho' ſome part of the Propoſition be under ſuſpenſe, (which is that which gives it the form of a *Hypothetic*, and diſtinguiſhes it from a *Categoric* Propoſition whereof the whole is Abſolute) yet that wherein the Relation and Truth of the Propoſition preciſely lies is Abſolute and Poſitive, and runs as peremptorily as in any

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Categoric Propoſition whatſoever. For an *Hypothetical* Propoſition affirms as much as any other, and as Abſolutely as any other, ſo far as it affirms, (for the part under ſuſpence is no part of the Affirmation) and therefore is indeed upon the whole ſtrictly *Thetical*. Properly ſpeaking therefore there is no ſuch thing as a Propoſition purely *Hypothetic*, that is in Senſe as well as form, becauſe ſuch a Propoſition affirms nothing, and conſequently can prove nothing, and ſo would be of no uſe in Argumentation. And that this is the very right of the matter moſt undeniably appears from the *Reſolution* and *Proof* of a *Hypothetical* Propoſition which is proved by and reſolves into a *Categoric* ground, there being no other way of proveing the Truth of this Propoſition, or as a Logician would here rather ſpeak, this *Conſequence*, that if a Sqaure has 4 Sides it has 4 Angles, but by this *Enthymem*, every Figure that has 4 Sides has 4 Angles, *&c.* which you ſee is an Abſolute Affirmative, and indeed the very ſame thing, only more generally expreſs'd with what the other intends.

64. But what, you'l ſay, may not a thing be affirm'd *ex Hypotheſi*? What tho' the intire Conditional be the thing abſolutely affirmed of a Square, that if it has 4 Sides it has 4 Angles, yet is not the thing Suſpended, its having 4 Angles, affirm'd at leaſt *Conditionally*? No, the Affirmation of the propoſition falls, even as the Contradiction to it does, upon the whole Conditional, and not upon the part depending on the Condition. But is it not the common Language of the

the World to ſay ſuch a thing is affirm'd *ex Hypotheſi*? ſo indeed we generally ſpeak, and there is ſcarce any thing that more impoſes upon our underſtandings than general forms of ſpeaking, the firſt Authors whereof had not alwaies the exacteſt Apprehenſion of the Agreements and Differences of things. But let us conſider what we ſay, and not think as popularly as we are forced ſometimes to ſpeak. What is it then to affirm a thing *ex Hypotheſi*? 'Tis in ſhort to affirm ſo, if ſo. Now that which impoſes here is becauſe the Word *Affirm* is the leading Word, and that firſt ſtrikes and poſſeſſes the fancy which is apt to imagin that affirming *ex Hypotheſi* is affirming, eſpecially conſidering that Being thus includes Being Simply as was before remark'd. But to ſhew that this rule has no place here, and that the whole fallacy of this matter may appear in open View, we need but invert the Order of the Words, and inſtead of *I affirm ſo if ſo, ſay, if ſo, I affirm ſo.* For hereby we may plainly ſee that what is ſaid to be affirm'd *ex Hypotheſi*, is not indeed affirm'd at all. For do I affirm the laſt *ſo* here, the thing under Condition? No, 'tis plain I do not, but that 'tis the intire Conditional only that I affirm, and that I affirm *Abſolutely*; for I abſolutely ſay of a Square, that it has 4 Angles if 4 Sides. So that even in *Hypothetical* Propoſitions the Connexion is Abſolute, ſince what therein paſſes for a Conditional affirming, is indeed in the ſtrictneſs of the thing an Abſolute affirming of a *Conditional*.

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65. I am ſenſible that this will be but dry Entertainment to the generality of Readers, but perhaps not ungrateful to thoſe that are more Metaphyſically diſpoſed, who I doubt not will allow me to continue a little farther the Diſcuſſion of a point wherein the ſtability of our preſent *Theory* is ſo much concern'd, and which is more particularly of ſuch neceſſary importance for the clearing up the Doctrin of Eternal Truths, than which none in the Rational way is of greater Conſequence to be well ſtated and rightly underſtood, as being the Groundwork and Foundation even of *Science* it ſelf. Without which our defining our ſelves to be Rational Creatures will ſerve rather for our *Diſtinction* from the Brutes, than for any great *Privilege* we have above them.

66. To proceed then, it appears that all real Relation or Union of Ideas is properly Abſolute and Actual, and that to ſay things are Conditionally or Hypothetically Related or United to one another is only a large and improper way of ſpeaking, ſince in reality a Conditional Union or Relation is none at all. For till the Condition be put there is no Relation, even according to the very Suppoſition it ſelf, and when it is put, then it becomes Abſolute and Actual. The Relation of things therefore muſt be Abſolute and Actual, or none. Which appears yet more fully in this, that even thoſe Propoſitions which are *Hypothetical* in their form, are yet Abſolute and *Categoric* as to what they truly affirm. Where they affirm at all, they affirm Abſolutely, and where the

Affirmation does not lie, there no Relation can be pretended. The Relation therefore that is, even in such Propositions, is Actual, and therefore they that deny these Actual Relations of things in Propositions of Eternal Truth, do as good as deny that there are any Relations of things at all, and so by the nearest consequence (which I think would be a very bad one) that there are any such Truths. This then evidently proves against the Men of the *Hypothetical* way that in Propositions of necessary Truth the Relations and Habitudes of things are Absolute and Actual, because in the first place properly speaking there are none but such.

67. But then besides, tho' we should suppose such a thing in general as a Conditional or Hypothetical Relation, and that things might be truly and really United or Related *ex Hypothesi*, (which you see appears to be an unsound and ill consider'd Notion, since the thing affirm'd properly is the intire Conditional, and not what is under the condition) yet however that it is not so in Propositions of Eternal Truth, but that there the Relations of things are Absolute and Actual, and such as import a present and real Union and Connexion between them, will farther appear if we consider, 2*ly*. That these necessary Propositions do not hang in suspense then to be actually verify'd and made good when the Subjects of them shall come to have an Existence in Nature, (for then besides that this would make their truth depend upon the will of God even as the *Existence* of things does, and so turn neces-

sary

ſary into Contingent Truth, their truth would be alſo Confined to *Time*, which is contrary to the notion and ſuppoſition of Eternal Truths) but are at this preſent, or any aſſignable inſtant actually True, and that as much as ever they will or can poſſibly be. As for inſtance, a Circle has equal Diameters. This is a Propoſition of neceſſary and Eternal, and I may alſo ſay of Abſolute Truth. For does this Propoſition depend upon any *Condition* for the Truth of it? Is it not as Abſolutely and Actually true to ſay that a Circle is Round, as to ſay that God is Juſt? This latter they themſelves will allow to be a Propoſition wherein the Relation is Actual and why not then in the other? The *Form* of the Propoſition is the ſame, Roundneſs being as Abſolutely affirm'd of a Circle as Juſtice is of God, and the *matter* of the Propoſition is alike *neceſſary*, Roundneſs being comprehended in the Idea of a Circle even as Juſtice is in the Idea of God. And why then does the Truth of one dependupon a *Condition* any more than the Truth of the other?

68. Much leſs can it depend upon a *Future* Condition. For 'tis an *Actual Truth*, and can an Actual Truth depend upon a Future Condition? Then it is not Actual. But I pray what is that Future Condition that ſhall verify this Propoſition, a Circle is Round, or a Circle has equal Diameters? It's Exiſtence in Nature? But beſides that Equality of Diameters is here Abſolutely attributed to a Circle as a Property actually belonging to it, what if it ſhould never Exiſt in Nature? What if there ſhould never be ſuch a

thing as a material Circle? This is a very ſuppoſable Caſe, for *matter* is a Created Being, and conſequently no *neceſſary Emanation* of God, but a thing purely Contingent, as is alſo *Figure* the mode of matter, 'Tis poſſible therefore that ſuch a thing as a material Circle, or a Circle in Nature might never have been, not to inſiſt at preſent that what is here ſuppoſed only as a Poſſibility is indeed really and actually the very Caſe, there being no ſuch thing (as was obſerv'd in the preceding Argument) as a Circle exactly perfect to be found *in rerum Naturâ*. But what then, is the Propoſition ever the leſs actually True? So indeed it ſhould and muſt neceſſarily be if the Natural Exiſtence of a material Circle were the Condition of its Truth, becauſe ſuch a Circle might not be, and in ſtrictneſs *de Facto* is not. But is it ſo? No, Truth is the ſame Actual invariable thing notwithſtanding, whether any of theſe things do exiſt in Nature or no, and 'tis actually True of the Circle that it has equal Diameters, whether there be any Circle in Nature or no, which as it plainly ſhews that theſe and the like Propoſitions are not concerning ſenſible but Intellectual Figures, (as was obſerv'd in the preceding Argument) ſo it as plainly convinces that the actual Truth of the Propoſition does not depend upon the Exiſtence of a material Circle as the condition of it. For was it not actually true before there was any, and would it not be equally true if there were none, and is it a whit the more true becauſe of the

the Exiſtence of material Circles? Strange indeed would be the Power of a pair of *Compaſſes*, if in drawing a Circle upon a Table it makes a Truth too, and ſuch as would ſerve much for the Advantage of Practical beyond Speculative Geometry. Since the former upon this ſuppoſition would really *make* Geometric Truths, whereas the latter pretends only to *Contemplate* and demonſtrate them.

69. But how after all does it Cotemplate them? What as Futurities or Potentialities? Or as things that have a ſtate of Actuality, and a Preſentialneſs of Being? The latter without all queſtion. For *neceſſary* Truth in the very notion of it implies Actuality of Being, (ſince whatever is not, muſt be contingent if ever it be) and therefore is of neceſſity a Preſent and an Actual thing. And accordingly when I demonſtrate ſuch a Truth I do not foretel what will be, but I demonſtrate what actually is, and what indeed ever will be too, but in no other Senſe than as what neceſſarily is will be, that is, becauſe it immutably is what it is. Indeed actual Exiſtence is of the very Eſſence of neceſſary Truth, it *Eſſentially is*, as Metaphyſicians ſay of the Divine Nature, and therefore cannot but be, or as they ſay of one of its prime Attributes, it is a *nunc Stans*, a preſent ſtanding and immoveable *now*, wherein there is neither beginning nor ending, neither motion nor alteration, neither flux nor ſucceſſion, neither paſt nor future (any other wiſe than after our manner of conception, and as it may be ſaid to *Coexiſt* with thoſe differences of time, even as

Eternity it ſelf does) but an actual, permanent and ſimultaneous preſent, all *Totally* and *Intirely*, as well as *Interminably* exiſting. Which Divine Characters among many others that might be aſſign'd, do by the way repreſent it to have a nearer Union than is ordinarily imagin'd, with him, of whom it is ſaid, *to day have I begotten thee*, and *before* Abraham *was I am.*

70. 'Tis impoſſible for the Mind of Man to conceive any thing to be of a more abſolute and actual Nature than neceſſary and Eternal Truth is. There is nothing of Potentiality, Capacity, Futurity, Poſſibility, or Suſpenſe in it, it has not the leaſt Compoſition of Power and Act, but is alwaies in its laſt Perfection and final completion of Being, not capable of being ever more or leſs perfect, or any otherwiſe than it is. For indeed the intrinſic neceſſity of its Nature does of it ſelf exclude all ſuch Objective potentiality, or ſtate of Exiſting in Power, as abſolutely contrary to and inconſiſtent with its very eſſential and ſpecific Character. It is therefore alwaies in Act, and indeed no leſs than an *Actus Purus*, a Pure, Mere and Abſolute Act, having a firm, ſettled and neceſſary Stability in it ſelf, altogether independent upon and utterly unconcern'd with the Exiſtence or Non-exiſtence of Creatures, or any of the things of Time, or any of their Changes or Revolutions, in the midſt of which it ſtands as a fix'd and unmoveable *Central Point*. For as Truth did not begin with the World, ſo neither would it end with it,

it, but whether there be a * World or no, continues the same steady permanent Actuality, which again by the way may be an intimation to us how nearly it stands related to him, who is *without any Variableness or shadow of turning*, and who is the *same yesterday, to Day, and forever.*

* *Erit igitur Veritas etiamsi mundus intereat. St.* Aust. *Soliloq.* lib. 2. chap. 2.

71. And indeed all Contemplation, and all Science, and all Demonstration proceed upon this Ground as their Fundamental Supposition. As Truth is the general Object of Contemplation, so *Contemplation* is of the things that are, τῶν ὄντων as the Platonists speak, things that have a reality and a present Actuality of Being in them. For Contemplation is an Intellectual Sight, or mental View and Inspection of things, and accordginly *Aquinas* says (22*d*. *Q*. 180. *Art*. 3*d*.) of it, that it belongs *ad ipsum Simplicem intuitum veritatis*, to the very simple intuition of Truth. But now all View or Intuition is of a present Reality, of an Object that is in Act, or that actually is, and by the Actuality of its Nature objectively terminates, and as it were *Actualizes* the Power that is conversant about it. Thus 'tis in sensible View, and thus 'tis also in that which is Intellectual. And therefore that Truth which is the Object of that Intellectual Vision which we understand by Contemplation, and even Grammatically expres's by *Theory*, cannot be a thing in *Potentiâ*, but must be a real and an actual Nature. And so for *Science*, that also is exclusive of all Potentiality in its formal Object, which

it alwaies ſuppoſes to be in *Act*. For to know is to Perceive a thing determinately to be ſo, or in ſuch a State, and therefore unleſs it actually be in that ſtate, my knowledge will not be conformable to its Object, which is impoſſible even to a Contradiction. Becauſe then I ſhall know and not know at the ſame time. 'Tis true indeed Science is ſaid by our Metaphyſicians to abſtract from Exiſtence. But this Maxim (as will better appear hereafter) is to be underſtood not of Exiſtence Abſolutely and Simply, but only of Exiſtence *Secundum quid*, or according to the preſent State of Nature in the ſenſible World. And from this kind of Exiſtence indeed it does Abſtract, it being purely Accidental to Science whether things do *thus* Exiſt or no. But as to Exiſtence at large, Science is ſo far from Abſtracting from *that*, that it neceſſarily involves and implies it. Accordingly Science by the ſame Authors is ſaid to Suppoſe its Object. Which it does, not only in *not Proving* it, (for ſo only the *Subalternate* Sciences ſuppoſe their Objects, as taking them from the Superior Science wherein they are proved, and that only their general one's, becauſe they prove their particular Concluſions) but alſo in neceſſarily *prerequiring* according to natural Order at leaſt the Actual Being of it. For a thing muſt firſt be ſo, before it can be known to be ſo, or elſe it will be known to be otherwiſe than it is. And according to this latter Senſe of ſuppoſing its Object, even when Science does *prove* it, (as in many caſes it does) it does alſo *ſuppoſe* it at the ſame time, and by the very

ſame

ſame Act. For in like manner as to *Demonſtration* tho' the Object be not here ſuppoſed, as that ſignifies *not proved*, or taken for granted as already proved, but the quite contrary, yet it is ſuppoſed as to reality and actuality of being in the thing it ſelf. For Demonſtration tho' it produces Knowledge, yet it ſuppoſes the thing known. I don't ſay it ſuppoſes it to *be* known, (for then it needs not prove it) but only that it ſuppoſes the thing which is known, and which by the Evidence of the Demonſtration comes to Be known, that is, it ſuppoſes the thing to be really in that ſtate of being, wherein afterwards it appears to be, or in other Words, it ſuppoſes its *material*, tho' not its *formal* Object. For indeed unleſs a thing be firſt of all conceiv'd according to the order of Nature to be ſo or ſo actually and really in it ſelf, 'tis not all the Logic or Philoſophy in the World that will be able to prove it to *be* ſo. For all that our Reaſon can do is only to follow the Nature of things, with which as it agrees or diſagrees ſo it is true or falſe, and if things are not already ſo in themſelves we cannot make them ſo, however by the falſe colours of *Sophiſtry* we may deceive our ſelves or others into wrong Perſwaſions about them. In ſhort then, Truth is preſuppoſed to all Underſtanding, and to all Acts of it as a ſtated Actual and Determinate Nature, out of which ſuppoſition it would neither be contemplable, nor knowable, nor Demonſtrable, nor ſo much as Intelligible.

72. Theſe Conſiderations do, I think, abundantly ſhew the *Actuality of Truth*, that it is not an Eſſence

Eſſence in *Potentia* as Effects are ſaid to be in their Cauſes, but an Abſolute and Actual Nature, without any Capacity, Poſſibility, Conditionality or Suſpence. 'Tis true indeed that in Propoſitions that are the ſecondary Tranſcripts and Images of theſe Eternal Truths the caſe is much otherwiſe. Theſe are not alwaies in Act, becauſe they are the Effects of Humane Underſtanding, which is not it ſelf a pure Act, but an Eſſence Compounded of Act and Power (as all Created and Finite Beings are) and of a contingent Nature. and ſo can have no other Effect but what is Potential and Contingent, and in no other Senſe Actual and Neceſſary but only as we ſay every thing Actually and Neceſſarily is while it is. But do we not talk of Neceſſary Propoſitions, and Eternal Propoſitions? And was it not but juſt now contended that Propoſitions of Neceſſary and Eternal Truth are all over Actual and do not hang in Suſpence, *&c.*? To ſet this Matter clear then (which is of ſome importance to be clear'd) we muſt before we go any farther diſtinguiſh of a twofold Order of Propoſitions, *Ideal* and *Mental*, under Mental Comprehending alſo Verbal, whether Spoken or Written. *Ideal* Propoſitions are the very Simple Eſſences of things themſelves as they ſtand, ſo and ſo Related or United to each other according to an immutable State and Order which they have in the Intelligible World, (as will be better Underſtood after I have fully Demonſtrated and given an account of that Ideal ſtate of things) and indeed are no other than thoſe very *Eternal Truths* we have

have been hitherto diſcourſing of. And accordingly whenever we ſpeak of Neceſſary or Eternal Propoſitions as we uſually do, or Confound ſuch Propoſitions with Eternal Truths, as we alſo uſually do, we muſt be underſtood (if we would be thought to ſpeak what is Intelligible) of theſe *Ideal* Propoſitions, it being moſt evident that no other can be either Neceſſary or Eternal.

73. By *Mental* Propoſitions is meant an Intellectual (as the other is a real) Union or Diſunion of things, or a Joining or Disjoining of things by an Act of the Underſtanding. Which if it be as they are really in themſelves, then they are true, otherwiſe falſe. For the Ideal Propoſitions being the ſame with Eternal Truths are the Originals and Standards of Mental one's, which are ſecond Draughts and Tranſcripts of them, and are true or falſe according to their Conformity of Difformity with them. *Ideal* Propoſitions are alwaies Right, as having a real Identity with the Eternal Eſſences of things, and ſo being very Eſſential and Subſtantial Truth it ſelf, but *Mental* Propoſitions are right or wrong as they happen to agree or diſagree with the other. Ideal Propoſitions are Neceſſary and Eternal, Mental one's Temporary and Contingent. Ideal Propoſitions are the ſame as Truth in the Object, Mental one's (when right) the ſame as Truth in the Subject. Or, the former may be ſaid to be Propoſitions in the Thing, the latter in the Underſtanding. And this Diſtinction is neceſſary. For as there is Simple Truth in Things, as well as in the Apprehenſion, ſo there is alſo Complex

plex Truth in Things, as well as in the Judgement, or elſe upon what ſhall our Judgements proceed, and by what ſhall they be Meaſured? Which by the way make me extremely wonder what a certain *Logician* of conſiderable Account means by ſaying (after he had divided Truth into Simple and Complex, and had made Simple Truth to be in Things) that Complex Truth, or as he calls it *Veritas Thematis Complexi*, is not in things, but in the Judgement of the Mind, or in a Sentence. How, not in Things? What is there then no *Objective Truth Complex*? Is there no Truth in things but what is Simple? But ſure I thought there had been Eſſential Relations and Habitudes to be Conſider'd in things, as well as their Simple Eſſences. And are not thoſe Eſſential Habitudes Complex Truth? And how then is all Complex Truth in the Judgment? Or if it be all in the Judgment, and none in the Thing, what then I pray is the Foundation or Meaſure of that Judgment, and what is the Object of it, what is it that we Think, Study, Contemplate, and Reaſon about, and what will become of all Metaphyſical and Mathematical Demonſtrations with other Rational Diſcurſes, and to go no farther, to what purpoſe was his *Logic* written, or how can it be known whether any one Propoſition in it be true or falſe, if there be no Complex Truth in *Things*, but only in the *Judgement*? It would be very bad with Contemplative Men if there were no other Complex Truth but what was in the Author's

Burgersdictus. Inſtitut. Log. p. 119.

thor's *Judgment* when he wrote this, But did ever any Man more ſtrangely Forget and Contradict himſelf than he does when in the very ſame Line and Breath he tells us that *the Judgement of the Mind is ſaid to be True when it Compounds thoſe things which are indeed Compounded, and divides thoſe things which are indeed divided.* And that *a Propoſition is ſaid to be True when it agrees with things.* And again, when he defines *Logical* Truth to be the Agreement of a Propoſition with things, in Contradiſtinction to *Moral* Truth, which is its Agreement with the Judgement of the Mind. But now how can all this be if there be no Complex Truth in Things, which therefore I think is as plainly ſuppoſed by him here, as it was denied before.

74. Now this Complex Truth in things is what I would call a Propoſition in things, or an Ideal Propoſition, even as a Complex Truth in Notion or Judgement is call'd a Propoſition in the Underſtanding, the former being a kind of *Real*, as the other is a *Mental* or Intellectual *Propoſition.* For there is a Union in the thing, as well as in the Conception, and I conſider this Complex Truth in things as that State of Real and Eſſential Union or Relation which they immutably have in their Ideal or Intelligible Natures. And accordingly as the Union of things in Conception is what we mean by a Propoſition in the Mind, ſo the Union of things in themſelves or their own Ideal Nature ſhould by the like Propoſition make a Propoſition in the Thing or in the Idea, ſuch as we (at leaſt confuſely) mean

mean when we say this is a Necessary Proposition, or this is an Eternal Proposition, or this Proposition is an Eternal Truth, *&c.* Which Denominations cannot be applied to those *Mental* Propositions which are the Creatures of our own Understanding, and therefore must of right belong to those Ideal one's, whereof the other are but the Images, Expressions or Representations. For as *Suarez* says of *Temporal Laws*, that they are *Participations of the Eternal Law*, so I may say of Temporary Propositions such as we poor frail Creatures, the late Offspring of Time and Contingency compose and put together in our Thoughts, that they are but *Participations* of the Ideal and Eternal Propositions, that Divine and Substantial Truth, whose *Spring* rises in the Intelligible, and whose remoter Streams reach and glide through the barren Regions of our Natural and Sensible World.

Tract. de Leg. lib. 2. chap. 4. p. 66.

75. But to resume our thred, lest I or my Reader lose it, Tho' there is a constant Actuality in Original Truth, yet it was said not to be so in the Transcripts and Images of it, *viz.* the Propositions that express and represent it. And whereas to this it was Objected that 'tis also said of Propositions that they are Actual and unsuspended, *&c.* To this it is answer'd by distinguishing Propositions into a double Order, *Ideal* and *Mental*, or of the Object and of the Subject. And that when we say of Propositions that they are not alwaies in Act, the Propositions intended are not Ideal but Mental Propositions. As

for

for thoſe of the Ideal Order, the pure and conſtant Actuality of them is not only granted, but all along contended for in all that has been alledged for the *Actuality of Eternal Truths*, with which theſe Ideal or Objective Propoſitions have a real Identity. So then a Propoſition of the Mind is ſometimes in Act and ſometimes in Power only as being the Temporary effect of a contingent Cauſe, but an Ideal Propoſition is ever an Actual Truth. So groſſely do they miſtake the Nature of Eternal Truths who ſuppoſe the leaſt Potentiality or Dependence in them, aſcribing that imperfection to *Ideal*, which can belong in no Senſe or Degree but only to *Mental* Propoſitions. But then if Truth (as has been abundantly ſhewn) be an Actual Nature, or if an Ideal Propoſition be an actual unſuſpended Truth, then there muſt be an actual Union or Relation between the Ideas of it, ſince 'tis in ſuch Unions and Relations that the very Nature and formal Reaſon of Truth does conſiſt. There is in ſhort no Actual Truth without Actual Union, and therefore if the Truth be in Act, the Union muſt alſo be in Act. Which by the way ſhews the ſtrange and groſſe Inconſiſtency of thoſe Men who granting the Actual Truth of neceſſary Propoſitions, do yet deny the Actuality of their Connexion.

76. It is then very clear thus far in the general that there muſt be ſome Predicate or other actually join'd with the Subject in Propoſitions of Eternal Truth, ſince in the Union of theſe the very Truth of them does conſiſt, ſo that

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if no Actual Union, no Actual Truth, which would be a dreadful Conſequence. And now tho' this be Sufficient to carry the Point againſt the Scholaſtic Notion of Conditional or not Actual Relation or Union of Ideas in Propoſitions of Eternal Truth, yet it may be alſo farther maintain'd, that as in all ſuch Propoſitions there is an Actual Union between the Subject and *ſome* Predicate. (ſince otherwiſe the Propoſitions have no Actual Truth) So in moſt of them 'tis the Abſolute and Simple Predicate that is thus United. This is plain from the form of ſuch Propoſitions, which in moſt of them is Simple, Abſolute and Categorical, poſitively and directly pronouncing ſuch an Attribute to belong to ſuch a Subject. As for Inſtance, A Circle has equal Diameters. This is a Propoſition of Eternal Truth, and here Equality of Diameters is Abſolutely and Actually attributed to a Circle as a real and neceſſary Property of it. So the *Mental* Propoſitions expreſly affirms it to be, and unleſs it be ſo alſo in the *Ideal* one, the Mental Propoſition will not be true, which I ſuppoſe no body will preſume to ſay. And whoever ſhould go to contradict ſuch a Propoſition would think of doing it no other way but by actually Severing or Diſuniting the Simple Ideas of it in his Mind, which yet would be juſt no Contradiction if they were not ſo United before. And ſo whoever ſhould go to demonſtrate ſuch a Propoſition to him that Contradicted it, what is it that he would demonſtrate, or what would be the Subject of his Demonſtration, the *quod erat*

erat demonſtrandum, but the Actual Connexion of its Simple Ideas. And how would he demoſtrate it but by ſhewing that it is actually ſo, and by aſſigning a cauſe from the very intrinſic Reaſon and Nature of the thing why ſo it muſt neceſſarily be. And no doubt it is in all Senſes as Abſolutely and Actually true, that a Circle has equal Diameters, as that God is Juſt, the form of the Propoſition being a like Abſolute, and the matter of it like neceſſary, as was to a more general purpoſe before Obſerv'd. And therefore ſince in one of theſe Propoſitions there is an Abſolute and Actual Conjunction of the Simple Attributes with the Subject, why ſhould it not be ſo in the other? Beſides that to ſay that it is not, but only would be ſo if ſuch a Condition were put, (which is the only Intelligible Senſe of Union *ex Hypotheſi*) would in the conſequence of it turn all ſuch kind of ſayings into *Hypothetical* Propoſitions. And ſo indeed they ſome times expreſs, *Suarez* contends that *homo eſt Animal* is equivalent to *ſi eſt Homo, eſt Animal*. A fair Confeſſion 'tis true, but however this is to evacuate and confound the Diſtinction of Propoſitions into Categorical and Hypothetical, Simple and Compound, which they themſelves with the reſt of the World allow. And 'tis methinks a ſtrange ſhift and a ſign of a deſperate cauſe when they ſhall Sacrifice even their own School-diſtinctions to ſerve it, and ſhall be forced to ſay that, *Homo eſt Animal*, is an *Hypothetical* Propoſition.

Metap. Diſput. Tom. 2. *Diſput.* 31. Sect. 12. Num. 45.

77. But the unhappineſs of it is that neither do they ſerve their Cauſe by it. For after all, (to turn the thing every way, to ſee whether in any Poſture it will favour them) ſuppoſe we ſhould be ſo kindly and liberally diſpoſed as to admit the very utmoſt that our *Syſtematic* Objectors do or can with any colour of Reaſon pretend, *viz.* That Eternal Truths are reducible to a conditional Form, and that thoſe Propoſitions concerning them, which all Men beſides, and even they themſelves, when this turn is not to be ſerv'd, call Abſolute and Categorical, are indeed *Hypothetical,* yet what or where the Advantage is that they will have by this large Conceſſion, I ſhould thank him that would undertake to ſhew me. But let us ſee, as well as we can. This indeed would follow from it, that the *Simple* Attribute would not be Abſolutely United with the Subject. Not that it would be United Conditionally, (for as I ſhew'd before there is no ſuch thing Intelligible as a Conditional Union) but becauſe indeed it would not be United at all. 'Tis true it may with due propriety be ſaid that it *would* be United if the Condition upon which the Union is Suſpended were actually put, (which is all that can be underſtood by a Conditional Union) but ſince the Propoſition goes no farther of it ſelf than a bare Suppoſition, and there muſt be another Propoſition added before the putting of the Condition, there is therefore thus far *no Union.* As appears plainly in this Propoſition, If a Square has but 3 Sides, it has but 3 Angles, where tho' the intire Propoſition be true, yet there

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is no Union (as may the eaſier be diſcern'd becauſe there can't be any) between the Subject and the *Simple* Attribute.

78. Well but what then? This however does not hinder the *Truth* of the Propoſition, as they themſelves will acknowledge. 'Tis every whit as true that if a Square has but 3 Sides, it has but 3 Angles, as that a Square has 4 Sides, or 4 Angles And is there then no actual Union at all? Tho' the Simple Attribute be not actually United with the Subject, yet is there no other that is? So indeed they muſt ſay to do their cauſe any real Service, and were it really ſo they would moſt effectually Serve it, and we muſt yeild it up to them. But how then is the Propoſition *True*, or how is it ſo much as *Intelligible*, what Senſe can it have, or what can a Man underſtand by it, or how ſhall he know whether he ſhould grant or deny it? And what a Strange Propoſition would that be that affirms nothing, (for that it would come to if there be no Actual Union of *any* Attribute with the Subject of it) means and ſignifies nothing, and ſo is neither True nor Falſe, but a meer Blank or Cypher in Diſputation, in which however Hypothetical Propoſitions are allow'd their due place and uſe, and that even by themſelves.

79. The right then of the matter will and muſt be this. Truth conſiſts in the Union or Connexion that things have one with another. And therefore there muſt be ſome Attribute or other actually join'd with the Subject to make any Propoſition true. And we have already

ſhewn concerning neceſſary Truth, that it is not a *Potential* or *Actuable*, but an *Abſolute* and *Actual* Nature, whence it neceſſarily follows that in all Propoſitions of that kind, (be they Categorical or be they Hypothetical, it matters not) the Subject muſt be actually in Union with ſome Attribute or other. Since without this there can be no *Truth*, nor ſo much as *Senſe* in the Propoſition. But the Union is not with the Simple Attribute in Propoſitions that are *Hypothetical*. That indeed is freely confeſs'd, ſince otherwiſe the Propoſitions would not be *Hypothetical* but *Categorical*, it being the ſimplicity or complexneſs of the Attribute, (not any Quality of the Subject) that lays the ground for that Diſtinction, as alſo for that more general one preſuppoſed to this, whereby Propoſitions are divided into Simple and Compound, which is wholly taken from the Difference of the Predicate, which as Simple or Complex, makes the Propoſition either one or the other reſpectively. Well remember'd, It is then the *Complex* Attribute that is here join'd with the Subject. So it *muſt* be becauſe ſome one is neceſſary, and there is no other. And ſo it appears *de facto* to be, becauſe *that* is the Attribute that Specifies a Compound Propoſition whereof the Hypothetic is a certain Species. It is I ſay then the *Complex* Attribute that is connected with the Subject in Hypothetical Propoſitions, that which we call'd before the *intire Conditional*. And this is alſo Connected Abſolutely and Actually, as was before ſhewn in ſtating the Nature of thoſe Propoſitions, which affirm

firm Abſolutely as far as they affirm at all, no leſs than others. For in ſhort tho' the Propoſition be Hypothetical, yet the Truth affirm'd in it is Actual, (an Hypothetical Propoſition being as actually true as a Categorical one) and if the Truth of it be Actual, its Union muſt be Actual too, and ſince it is not ſo in reſpect of the Simple, it muſt be ſo in reſpect of the complex Attribute.

80. For once more (to make this clear if poſſible beyond all Contradiction or Miſunderſtanding) the true point of difference between a Categorical and an Hypothetical Propoſition does not conſiſt in this, (as it ſeems to be apprehended) that in a Categorical Propoſition the Simple Predicate is Actually join'd, and in an Hypothetical one the ſame Simple Predicate is *Conditionally* join'd. No, the Union is Actual in both, and in one as much as another, (becauſe one Propoſition affirms as truly, and is as true in what it affirms as the other) only in a Categorical Propoſition 'tis the Simple Predicate that is thus actually join'd with the Subject, whereas in a Hypothetical one 'tis the complex Predicate that is actually join'd. So that 'tis not the Actuality or Potentiality of the Union, but the Nature or Quality of the Attribute United that makes the Difference.

For Inſtance. Theſe two Propoſitions, *Man is an Animal*, and, *if Man is he is an Animal*, do not differ from each other in this, that in the former Animal is United with Man Actually, and in the latter Conditionally. No, the Union of the Predicate with the Subject is equal-

ly actual in both, or else they could not be both equally true Propositions. But the true difference between them is, that the *Predicate* is not the same in both. For if we heed the matter well, we shall find that in the latter Propositions the thing attributed to Man is not the Simple Predicate, *Animal*, but the complex Predicate, or the whole Conditional. For this Proposition *if Man is, he is an Animal*, rightly disposed will resolve into this, *Man if he is, is an Animal*. So that as Man is the Subject concerning which it is spoken, so the thing said of him is, that *if he is, he is an Animal*. And that is said of him not Conditionally, but Absolutely. So that now should those Propositions of Eternal Truth which are Categoric in their form, be, as is pretended, Hypothetic in their meaning, yet at least it cannot be denied but that the *Complex* Attribute implied in that Hypothetic meaning is as Absolutely and actually United to the Subject, as the Simple Attribute would be if the meaning were as Categorical as the form.

81. See then both the Issue, and the Advantage of this Concession. The Simple Attribute is indeed excluded from actual Union with the Subject in Propositions of Eternal Truth, should it be as is pretended (which is the best of their plea) that such of them as are Categorical in their form are yet reducible to a Conditional Meaning. Well, But then we have the complex Attribute in its place, and where is the odds or the Advantage? For should this Proposition for instance, A Circle is round (which in my Logic

Logic I confeſs paſſes for a very Categorical one) be equivalent to this, that if a Circle did exiſt it would be round, tho' according to this Senſe of it the Simple Attribute, *(Round)* be not actually affirm'd of a Circle, yet thus much at leaſt is affirm'd of it, and that Actually, that *whenever it ſhall exiſt it will be Round.* I ſay this complex Attribute, or as I call'd it before this intire Conditional is Abſolutely and Actually affirm'd of it. Or elſe the Propoſition affirms nothing, and ſo is indeed no Propoſition, much leſs one of Eternal Truth. But then I ask again where is the Advantage in ſuppoſing theſe Propoſitions of Eternal Truth be to of a Conditional Nature? Indeed could it be abſolutely affirm'd and well made appear that there was no Union at all between the Subject and *any* Attribute in ſuch Propoſitions, this would moſt effectually overthrow the Argument that Proves the Eternal Exiſtence of things from their Eternal Relations, (tho' the miſcheif of it is, even Truth it ſelf would be alſo involv'd in the Ruin) but to put only a * conditional Senſe upon a Categorical Propoſition, what is this but to ſhift off the Union from one Attribute to another, from the Simple to the complex Attribute? And what does this exchange do, juſt nothing at all. It makes indeed ſome alteration in the *Propoſition*, (by turning a Categoric form in-

* *Meaning by a conditional Senſe the Senſe of a conditional Propoſition. For a Conditional Senſe, and the Senſe of a Conditional are two diſtinct things, the former denying actual Connexion ſimply, and the latter only as to the Simple Predicate, as may appear from the Premiſe.*

to a Hypothetic meaning) but none at all in the *Argument*, which concluding the Eternal Exiſtence of things from their Eternal Relations, demands only the Actual Union of the Subject with *ſome* Attribute, and is equally ſatisfied whether that Attribute be Simple or Complex.

82. I have ſtay'd the longer upon the Examination of this School-Objection, (tho' perhaps but dead and ſleepy Entertainment to moſt Readers) partly becauſe of the great Authority and plauſible Appearance of it, but chiefly becauſe of the great and near concern that our preſent *Theory* of the Intelligible World, as well as the general Doctrin of neceſſary and Eternal Truths has in it, which makes it to be of the laſt importance to have it well inquired into and laid out in the fulleſt and brighteſt light, and accordly I thought it worth ſome room and pains throughly to diſcuſs it, and examine it to the very bottom. And now notwithſtanding the great Reverence otherwiſe moſt juſtly due to ſome of its great Authors, the grave and ſolem Figure it may have made in our Logic Siſtem and Lectures, and the general Approbation wherewith it has been receiv'd I think I have good reaſon to aſſure my ſelf, and believe that my competent and impartial Reader will allow me to ſay it, if not, yet the liberty that belongs to the Study and Profeſſion of Truth will, that there is juſt nothing at all in it, and that in ſtead of being a ſolid Objection or Solution (call it which you pleaſe) as one might reaſonably expect from ſo much *Authority* and *Reception*, it is one of the

the groſſeſt Fallacies, and moſt wretched peices of Sophiſtry that ever impoſed upon a Rational World. The beſt in ſhort that I can ſay of it, is, that 'tis a mere Scholaſtic Evaſion, to be uſed as a ſhift in a Logic Exerciſe to put by the paſs of a cloſe Opponent, but not to be reſted on as a ſolid and ſatisfactory Anſwer in a cool, retired, and ſerious inquiry after Truth. It may do in the duſt of a School, but will not bear the ſerener Teſt of a Study. Which conſideration by the way may be a proper and ſeaſonable Admonition to us to caution us againſt the danger of *Authority* and *implicit Faith* in our Speculative Reſearches, to teach us to ſee with our own Eyes, and to uſe our own Reaſon and Underſtanding in matters of a rational Nature and Cogniſance, and not to rely upon the greateſt Names or Numbers, but to examine things carefully and with due ſuſpence, and never to yeild our Aſſent even to the Dictates of our *own*, much leſs of *other* Men's Underſtandings, till the Evidence and Light of Truth extorts it from us, and unleſs our Conſcience would inwardly reproach us for abuſing our Liberty of Suſpence ſhould we any longer withhold it. Taking that no leſs wiſe and modeſt ſaying of a great Man for our Motto, *Nihilq; ab ullo credi velim, niſi quod ipſi Evidens & invicta Ratio perſuadebit.*

83. But to the point, After having with ſome care and diligence examined and diſplaid this great Objection of the School-Philoſophers, (which how weak ſoever it appears to be, I have not much reaſon now to quarrel with becauſe, beſides

ſides the light and ſtrength it has given to the Argument in hand, it has alſo been the occaſion of my making ſome uncommon Reflexions upon the Nature and Difference of *Categorical* and *Hypothetical* Propoſitions, which perhaps may not be unuſeful to the improvement of Logic) and ſhewn that in Propoſitions of Eternal Truth there is, contrary to what is pretended, an Abſolute and Actual Union or Connexion of the Subject with the Attribute, I have now their own warrant and Allowance to conclude the Eternal Exiſtence of things from their Eternal Relations. For beſides that the very objection implies ſo much, we have alſo the great *Suarez* expreſly confeſſing that according to the Senſe that imports an *Actual* and *Real* Conjunction of the Extremes, without doubt the Truth of the Propoſition depends upon the Exiſtence of the Extremes, which reſolves into this double *Hypothetic*, that if the Propoſition be true the Extremes do really exiſt, and ſo again backward, that unleſs the Extremes do really exiſt the Propoſition cannot be true. Now I have proved this actual and real conjunction upon which *Suarez* himſelf Suſpends theſe Conſequences, and ſo having made good the Condition I have a right to the Illation, and may *Cum Scholæ Privilegio* conclude that the Eſſences of things are Eternal, becauſe their Relations are ſo, and ſo alſo the other way, that unleſs the Eſſences of things be Eternal there cannot be any ſuch Relations, and conſequently no Eternal Truths, and thus that in both Senſes the *Truth of the Propoſition*

poſition (as *Suarez* expreſſes it) *depends upon the Exiſtence of the Extremes.* It being impoſſible that things ſhould be actually related unleſs they Actually are, or that a Non-exiſting Subject ſhould have any Predicate or Attribute, whether Simple or Complex, belonging to it. All which is firmly bound upon them by a Principle of their own acknowledging, that *of nothing there can be no Affection.* A maxim as clear as the Light of Heaven, and as unmoveable as the Center of the Earth.

84. *Suarez* then is now our own again, argues for us, and is ſo far brought over to our ſide, as to lend us a good *part* of our Argument, and his Authority to ſupport the *whole.* For he himſelf lays down (or, which here comes to the ſame, *allows*) this Major Propoſition, that if in Propoſitions of Eternal Truth, the Conjunction of the Extremes be Actual and Real, then indeed they do really Exiſt. But now this which he has ſuſpended upon an *if*, I have I think demonſtrated to be the very Caſe, and that even upon the moſt diſadvantagious Conceſſion, that of admitting, (which yet is againſt common Senſe and Reaſon) that Abſolute Enunciations carry in them only a Conditional ſignification. So that I have Subjoin'd a *Minor* to his own *Major*, (for you ſee plainly that 'tis his as much as mine) and accordingly do in Vertue of what he himſelf grants, as well as in conſideration of what I have proved, and upon the joint and united Strength of both theſe, warrantably Conclude, that the Simple Eſſences of things

things have an Eternal Exiſtence. I do not ſay that they ſo exiſt in *Nature*, (for I ſpeak not here of Created Eſſences, tho' of the Eſſences of Creatures) nor can it be pretended to follow from the Argument here uſed that things do thus Exiſt, (which is all I can yeild to my Adverſaries, and ſo much I yeild freely) but ſtill *exiſt* they muſt in ſome real Senſe and State, and ſo much I ſay does and cannot but follow, becauſe there can be no real Affection of that which is *Abſolutely* is not.

85. The Concluſion then, that *the Eſſences of thing are Eternal*, ſtands on all ſides firm and good, and indeed ſo much the firmer by the kind help of this Scholaſtic Objection, which inſtead of weakening its grounds, has been the Occaſion of giving it an additional Strength and Eſtabliſhment, ſince the more the *Actuality* of Truth is diſplaid, and the more real and actual the Union appears to be that is between its Ideas, (which has I think been ſtrictly juſtified upon the largeſt Conceſſions and Suppoſitions) ſtill the greater and the more indeſpenſable will be the neceſſity of the Exiſtence of thoſe Simple Eſſences in the Union of which the Nature of Eternal Truth does conſiſt. But then if it be as we have ſhewn, that the Eſſences of things are Eternal, and that the Doctrin of Eternal Truths (of all certainly the moſt weighty and important, ſince even Divine and Moral as well as natural Science depends upon it) is no otherwiſe to be ſalv'd but upon this

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Hypotheſis, this immediately concludes again for the neceſſity of our Ideal ſtate of things, the reality of an *Intelligible World*. For ſince this Senſible World is a Temporary Production, and there is nothing here but what is mutable and contingent if the Eſſences of things have an Eternal Exiſtence that it cannot be in the State of *Nature* is plain, and then the neceſſary conſequence will be, that this Natural ſtate is not the only ſtate of things, but that they have another ſtate beſides that of Nature, which can be no other than that Ideal Sate we are ſpeaking of, or that State which they have in an Intelligible Word. And beſides by the Ideal State of things we mean that State of them which is Neceſſary and Eternal, *&c.* and therefore if there be ſuch a Neceſſary and Eternal ſtate of things, then we have that very Ideal ſtate we are contending for. Beſides that alſo *Ideas* are here taken (as I preſume they are likewiſe in the *Platonic School*) for the *Rationes rerum Æternæ*, the eternal Reaſons, Natures or Eſſences of things, as the *Ratio Circuli*, or the *Ratio Trianguli*, or the *Ratio Hominis*, as they are Abſtractly conſidered in the reſpective Sciences that treat of them. Not as if by Eternal Eſſences we meant the very things themſelves that Exiſt in Nature as having alſo an Eternal Exiſtence, (for that were a contradiction) but only ſuch degrees of Being and Perfection as correſpond to them and are truly expreſſive and repreſentative of them, (as was ſaid before) and are therefore ſaid to be their Eſſences. Now I ſay

by

by Ideas we mean theſe Eternal Eſſences of things, and therefore if there be ſuch Eternal Eſſences, or if the Eſſences of things be Eternal, then *dantur Ideæ*, there are Ideas, or things in Idea, which is the ſame as to ſay that there is an Intelligible World, or an Ideal as well as a Natural ſtate of things. For 'tis in reality one and the ſame Queſtion, only differently worded, whether the Eſſences of things are Eternal, and whether there are Ideas or an Intelligible State of things, (Ideas and Eternal Eſſences of things being the ſame) and therefore in proving the former, we do truly and effectually prove the Latter. And this by the way may with great probability be preſumed to be the reaſon why the School of *Ariſtotle* has all along ſo Zealouſly oppoſed the Doctrin of *Eternal Eſſences*, becauſe they could not but be ſenſible that the Conceſſion of that would neceſſarily draw along with it, and even extort from them the Confeſſion of the *Ideal Hypotheſis*. But this latter upon an *Anti-platonic* intereſt they were concern'd to deny, and therefore could not otherwiſe have been conſiſtent with either *themſelves* or their *Maſter*, but by denying the other too. So inſeparable is the Connexion between the Doctrin of Eternal Eſſences and that of our Ideal State. And ſince this latter is as certain as the Eternal Eſſences of things, and thoſe Eternal Eſſences again as certain as Eternal Truths, what leſs can be concluded from theſe Premiſes, but that the Intelligible World is as true and certain even as

Truth

Truth it ſelf. For in ſhort if Eternal Eſſences be as certain as Eternal Truths, and Ideas be as certain as Eternal Eſſences, then Ideas are as certain as Eternal Truths, than which nothing can be more certain, becauſe nothing is more neceſſary.

Argument the Fifth.

86. But we may ſtep yet farther, tho' we cannot well go higher, ſince the ſame concluſion which we have proved from Eternal Truths may alſo be drawn from another Principle that carries a near Alliance with the former, and that is *Science*. A thing too little diſputed, and too much pretended to, to need any formal proof only to avoid confuſion, the Ambiguity of the Word may perhaps want a little clearing, before we make any advantage of the thing. We talk of the Sciences which we Study, and we talk of the Science which we acquire by Study. But by theſe we cannot rightly mean one and the ſame *thing*, tho' we call them both by the ſame *Name*. For the Science which we are ſaid to Study is the *Object* of our Contemplation, but the Science which we acquire by Study is the *Effect* of it. But now 'tis impoſſible that the Object of Contemplation ſhould be the ſame with the Effect of it, and that becauſe Contemplation does not make, but ſuppoſe its Object. Science then may be conſider'd either as in the *thing*, or as in the *Mind*, Science *as in the thing* I conceive to be no other than a ſet or order of certain Princi-

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ples and Concluſions, and indeed to be the very ſame with thoſe neceſſary and Eternal Truths before ſpoken of, only with a connotation of a certain order of dependency, and a common *Formality* of Conſideration in which they agree, and under which they ſtand related to each other, which *Formality* of Conſideration I add, as that which fixes the Bounds of the Sciences, and diſtinguiſhes one Science from another. This Science as in the *thing* perhaps is the ſame that ſome intend by what they call Science as in the *Syſtems*. But if that be their meaning, they cannot be excuſed from great confuſion and impropriety in Expreſſing it, ſince they muſt needs acknowledge that there was ſuch a Science as *Geometry* before ever it was reduced to a *Syſtem*, (or elſe how could it be reduced) and that 'tis wholly accidental to the Nature of any Science whether it be comprehended in a Syſtem or no, unleſs by Syſtem they will permit us to interpret them not of a material, but of an *Ideal Syſtem*, and then indeed Science may be ſaid to be a Syſtem. For indeed it is really an *Ideal Syſtem*, or a Syſtem of Ideal Truths. But however to decline all ambiguity, I chuſe to call it Science as in the *thing*, rather than as in the *Syſtem*. Now to this is Contradiſtinguiſh'd that which was call'd Science as in the *Mind*, by which I mean no other than that *Intellectual* habit which Ordinarily goes by the name of Science, conſiſting in a mediate Perception of Ideal Relations, or to ſpeak more conformably to the School-language, in a knowledge acquir

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ed by *Demonſtration*. Science of the thing you may call, if you will, Science *Objective*, and Science of the Mind, Science *Subjective*. The former we are to underſtand when we ſpeak of ſuch or ſuch a Science, as the Science of *Metaphyſics*, or the Science of *Geometry*, or of our ſtudying the Sciences. And the latter when we ſay that Demonſtration begets Science. This is to be underſtood of the *Habit* of Science, or Science as in the *Mind*, as the other is to be underſtood of Science as in the *Thing*. For we are not ſuppoſed either to Contemplate that Science which is the *Habit*, (that not being the *Quod* but the *Quo*, not the thing which, but that *by* which we formally know) or to beget or produce. That Science which is the Object. But the Science Contemplated is Science Objective or of the thing, and the Science produced by Contemplation is Science Subjective or of the Mind. How far my Conceptions do or may agree with thoſe of other Men about this matter I do not ſo well know, as that I ſhould not be Intelligible either to my ſelf or them, without thus diſtinguiſhing of theſe things.

Now for the preſent purpoſe I take Science here in the latter Senſe, for that which is an Intellectual habit, the other being, at leaſt *Materially*, the ſame with Eternal Truths, as was noted before. And in this Senſe it will furniſh us with a diſtinct Argument for our *Ideal Concluſion*, which may be compriſed within a very little compaſs. That there is ſuch a thing as Science according to the preſent acceptation of it,

I here ſuppoſe as a confeſs'd Principle. And I may alſo take the ſame liberty to ſuppoſe another thing, and that is, that all Science is concerning things that have a neceſſary and immutable Nature, this being moſt plain and obvious in it ſelf, and no leſs confeſs'd than the other. But then why ſhould not the Concluſion be ſo too? For there needs but one ſtep more to infer it, and that is full as plain and obvious as either of the former, *viz.* That things in their Natural State are neither neceſſary nor Immutable, but Mutable and Contingent. And accordingly even in the Philoſophy of the Schools Science is ſaid not to be of Singulars but of Univerſals, and abſtracting from the Exiſtence to conſider only the Eſſences of things. Wherein as they imply that the Object of Science muſt be neceſſary and immutable, ſo being conſcious that there is nothing of that Character to be found in the Nature of things, they are forced to have recourſe to I know not what *Eſſences* and *Univerſals* as the immutable Objects of Science. But why will they not ſpeak out? For what are theſe Univerſals, and theſe Eſſences that Science is ſo much beholden to? Are they only Abſtractions or Inadequate Conceptions in the Mind? But then they will be altogether as Contingent and Mutable as the Mind it ſelf is wherein they are form'd. Or are they really in the things themſelves that exiſt in Nature? But then again they will be as Contingent and Mutable as thoſe things, and ſo no more capable of being the Objects of Science than

than the things themſelves are. Here then is a confuſe intimation of thoſe very Ideal Reaſons of things we are contending for. But why again then will they not ſpeak out? What means this mincing and this diſguiſing of a plain and unavoidable Truth? But the thing audibly ſpeaks it ſelf, and immediately reſolves into this ſhort and clear iſſue. Science is of neceſſary and immutable things. But things in their Natural ſtate are all mutable and contingent. Therefore things in their Natural ſtate cannot be admitted as the Objects of Science. Therefore Science muſt be of things as they are in their Ideal or Intelligible State. Therefore in fine there is ſuch an Ideal ſtate of things, or elſe there is no ſuch thing as Science in the World, either in Act or Poſſibility. The Ideal State of things is then as certain not only as *Truth*, but alſo as *Science* it ſelf, as being the only fix'd and immoveable ground upon which it can reſt ſecure.

And may I not farther conclude from hence that the *Being* of a *God* is as certain as either of them, ſince as is obvious to conceive there could neither be Ideas, nor Eternal Eſſences, nor Eternal Truths, nor conſequently Science, without the ſuppoſition of an Eternal Mind? I doubt not but that I might, and that the ſame Arguments that prove againſt the *Anti-Idealiſt*, will conclude as ſtrongly againſt the *Atheiſt*. Bleſſed God, *How can we chuſe but know thee, when even our very knowlege it ſelf by ſo ſhort and ſure a clue leads us to thee?* For if there be Science

there must be Eternal Truths, and if Eternal Truths there must be Eternal Essences or Ideas, and if Ideas there must be a God. But I leave this hint to the private Reflection of my Reader, desiring him to renew the Consideration of it after he has gon through the course of this System, which I hope he will then think not unworthy either of his own labour, or of mine, if he find a *God* at the end of it.

CHAP. III.

Where this Ideal State of things, or Intelligible World is, with a farther Demonstration of its real Existence.

1. THE running through so many things, and some of them of the nicest Consideration, and of a very intricate and intangled Nature, has been the occasion of some prolixity, tho', I hope, not of much obscurity, in the foregoing Chapter, but these greater Difficulties being Clear'd, I hope, for the Comfort of my Reader, as well as for my own Ease, that our following Stages will be shorter, our way smoother, and our journy more pleasant.

2. We have now a remote Discovery of that which has been the great Subject, and will more than reward the Pains of our inquiry. Tis true we

we have been forc'd to climb a ſteep and cragged Hill for it, but are now at length come in view, upon the top of our *Philoſophic Pilgah*, whence the Contemplative Eye is ſaluted with the fair and beautiful proſpect of a bright and glorious World, as with the Rays of a Riſing Sun, ſhooting forth Beams of ſtreaming Glory, and bringing light enough with it of its own from its Eaſtern Treaſures to render its Beauty viſible, and to charm them that behold it. And now I may ſay 'tis *Day all Abroad*, a ſerene and refulgent Day, now our Intellectual Sun is up, that ſhining Orb of Ideal Light, the great Luminary of Spirits, and bright Mirrour of Intelligences. Now our groſs Atmoſphere begins to be clarified and refine into the temper of pure *Æther*, things clear up about and round us, and we are able to carry forth our View into the Regions of Truth, and can deſcry the very Baſis and Foundation upon which it ſtands, the * στυλος and the ἑδραίωμα τῆς ἀληθείας, *the Pillar and the ground of Truth*, even thoſe Eternal and Immoveable Pillars upon which *Wiſdom* has Built her Magnificent and Stately Fabric. For the Eternal Eſſences or Ideas of things are they, upon theſe all neceſſary and Eternal Truths are Founded, of whoſe Conſtant, Uniform and Immutable order, (otherwiſe unaccountable) we have now a fair and ready account in the Diſcovery and View of our World of Ideas or Intelligible World, all ſhining with the Light and Glory of Eſſen-

* *I Speak only by way of Alluſion to the Sacred Text. not by way of Interpretation.*

tial and Subſtantial Truth. The only World that is Eternal; that was in the Beginning and yet never began, that was never made, and can never periſh, neither Subject to Time nor chance, nor alteration, where are thoſe Eſſences of things that are neither Generated nor Corrupted, which had their orderly Syſtem when the Earth was without Form and Void, and ſhone forth in full Light and Luſtre, when Darkneſs was yet over the Face of the Deep, and would ſtill perſevere what they are tho' this Senſible All were reduced either to *Chaos* or *Nothing*, where there is Subſtance without Shadow, Act without Capacity, and Light without Darkneſs, even that pure incorruptible and univerſal Light which inlightens every Man that comes into this World, and which (as St. *Auſtin* ſays) does not feed the Eyes of Brute Creatures, but the pure Hearts of thoſe who beleive God, and turn themſelves from the Love of viſible and temporal things to the keeping of his Commandments.

De geneſi contra Manich. lib. 1. chap. 3.

3. Such is the World we have diſcover'd, and there appears to be an abſolute neceſſity for its Exiſtence, even the very ſame neceſſity that is for Eternal Truths, or Sciences, which can maintain their Settlement and Immutability upon no other Ground; but in what Poſition or Situation it lies, or where the Seat of it is to be placed, does not yet ſo well appear. For this then we muſt conſider farther, it faring with us in this Affair as with an *Aſtronomer* when looking through a Teleſ-

Teleſcope, he diſcovers ſome of the *Planetary* Worlds, who tho' he plainly diſcenrs and is fully ſatisfi'd that ſuch Worlds there are, becauſe he has a bright and open View of them, yet in what Region to fix them, or how to calculate and adjuſt their Diſtances, this he cannot learn from his *Teleſcope*, but muſt be beholden to the uſe of other Inſtruments and ways of Meaſering.

4. And yet I think we need not ſtay long in conſidering what Anſwer to return to him that ſhall inquire where our Intelligible World is. For is not Truth every where? So the neceſſity of the thing will conſtrain us to acknowlege. For is it not *every where* as well as *alwaies* Intelligible, may it not be any where conſulted and attended to, and does it not every where give its Anſwers and diffuſe its Light, and is it not alſo perceiv'd every where alike and after one and the ſame uniform Manner? But how can all this be if it *be* not every where, if it be not Omnipreſent as well as Eternal, equally unconfined to Place as well as Time. And ſo no doubt it is, and accordingly ſays St. *Auſtin*, *Ubiq; veritas præſides omnibus conſulentibus te, ſimulq; reſpondes omnibus etiam diverſa Conſulentibus.* And again, *Veritas nec quadra eſt, nec rotunda, nec longa, ubiq; præſens eſt ſi Cordis Oculus ad eam pateat.* And in many other places to the like purpoſe, for 'tis a Doctrin that he much inculcates. But now how can Truth be every where preſent, unleſs thoſe Ide-

Confeſs. lib. 10. chap. 26.

Enar. in Pſal. 30.

al Reasons or Essences of things which are the Ground and Foundation of it, and in whose Union and Essential Relation the very Nature of it does consist, be every where present too? For as from the *Eternity* of Truths or Relations of thing, we have concluded the Eternity of the Simple Ideas so related, so likewise from the *Omnipresence* of Truth there is as good reason to conclude the Omnipresence of the Ideas. The argument holds as well one way as the other, and as Truth cannot exist *when* the Ideas are not, so neither can it possibly exist *where* they are not. As then the Ideas are *Coeternal* with Truth, so likewise are they *Compresential*, and since the presence of the latter is not limited or confined to any Place, so neither is that of the former. So that now to the Question that asks where our Intelligible World is, instead of assigning the proper Place of its Existence, I may return Answer by putting another Question, *yea rather where is it not?* According as St. *Austin* says of God or Truth, (for he joins them both together, and speaks of them, according to his usual manner, as one and the same thing) *Quo nihil Secretius, nihil præsentius, qui difficile invenitur ubi sit, difficilius ubi non sit.* The same may be said of the Intelligible World, and there is a great Platonist that says a great deal more,

Lib. de Quantitate Animæ. chap. 34.

Marsil. Ficinus upon Plotinus Ennead. 6. lib. 4. p. 645.

Mundus Intelligibilis quum dicitur ubiq; esse, est ipsum quod appellatur ubiq;.

5 But

5. But if this Account ſhould be thought too general and indeterminate for the ſatisfaction of the Inquiſitive, and I muſt ſpeak out more Explicitly, then let them for whoſe ſake 'tis expected I ſhould do ſo, be pleas'd to conſider and recal to mind what has been ſhewn at large in the preceding Chapter, concerning the ſimple Reaſons or Eſſences of things, which are the Principles of our *Ideal Syſtem*, the conſtituent parts whereof the Intelligible World does conſiſt. Does it not evidently appear from what has been there ſo fully diſcours'd, that the Simple Eſſences or Ideal Reaſons of things are of a neceſſary and eternal Exiſtence, like thoſe Truths which are founded upon them? And have we not more lately ſhewn theſe Ideas to be Omnipreſent as well as Eternal? Both theſe have been prov'd. But now Conſider, can there be any thing that is Neceſſary, Eternal, or Omnipreſent out of the Superlatively excellent and adorable Nature of that infinitely perfect Being who is Neceſſary, Self-exiſtent and Independent, to whom it is Eſſential to be, as having the Root of all Being and Perfection in himſelf, and who is therefore Eternal and Omnipreſent, comprehending all Duration and filling all Places, becauſe he is Infinite and Immenſe both in his whole Being, and in the whole manner of it? He exiſts every way Infinitely, and therefore both *Eternally* and *Omnipreſently*. But then I ſay again, is there, or can there be any ſuch Exiſting out of the Divine Nature? To this Queſtion all the Reaſon and all the Philoſophy in the

the World anſwers directly, *No.* And the Point is too clear and too confeſs'd to need any formal diſcuſſion or confirmation. And therefore ſince there is no ſuch way of Exiſtence poſſible out of God, I think I need not ſcruple to conclude that our Intelligible World or World of Ideas, that has been proved ſo to exiſt, is really *in God.* And there St. *Auſtin* expreſly places them, when he ſays, ſpeaking of Ideas, where ſhould we think that theſe Reaſons are, but in the very mind of the Creator? For he did not behold any thing without himſelf as a Pattern of his Work, *&c.*

Lib. de 83. *Quæſt. Q.* 46.

6. Nor do I doubt but that I have herein concurring with me the general Suffrage of the *Platonic* School, not excepting the *Head Maſter* of it. There is I know a certain Traditional Preſumption (whereof it is not ſo eaſy to trace the Original as to prove the Untruth) that has been handed down among ſome Learned Men from one to another, I know not well how nor why, as if *Plato* ſhould place his Ideas out of God, repreſenting them as ſo many Abſtract and Univerſal Forms or Eſſences ſeparately Exiſting from the Divine Nature. Which muſt be very groſs Philoſophy if really *Plato*'s, but I think (and find there are a great many Learned Men that think the ſame with me) that it is indeed none of his, and whoever can but keep himſelf awake while he but Reads over his *Timæus* will I beleive find reaſon to think

See Eugubinus de perenni Philos. Tom. 3. lib. 1.

think ſo too, *viz.* That by his Ideas he meant no ſuch Abſtract and Seperated Form or Eſſences as is vulgarly imagin'd, but only the *Exemplaria rerum in mente Divinâ* the Original Forms or Patterns of things in the Divine Underſtanding, (the very ſame we are now contending for) and accordingly that he placed his *Ideas* no where elſe but in God; as indeed by good and juſt conſequence he was Obliged to do, and that upon the ſame grounds that I think my ſelf ſo at preſent, *viz.* Becauſe he alwaies ſuppoſes theſe his Ideas to have a neceſſary Eternal and Immutable Exiſtence, which 'tis impoſſible they ſhould have any where elſe than in the Eternal God. To this Senſe the genuin Force of his Expreſſions, and the Reaſon of the thing it ſelf naturally lead, and I wonder that any Intelligent and Equitable Reader ſhould take him in any other. Indeed that *Epicurus* ſhould be ſo widely miſrepreſented (as *Gaſſendus* and * *M. Bernier* after him pretend that he is) in his Doctrin of Pleaſure's being the cheif good and laſt end of Man, is not ſo much to be wonder'd at, conſidering what Slender remains we have of his Philoſophy, how broken an imperfect they are, and the *Suſpiciouſneſs* of the Word *Pleaſure*, which is commonly taken for the more Vile and Brutal ſort, that of Senſe, but that a Philoſopher that has left behind him Writings ſo perfect and intire, as ſtanding Monuments of his Thoughts, and that has expreſs'd himſelf ſo largely and fully upon this particular Point,

* *Abrege de la Philoſoph. de Gaſſend.* Tom. 7. p. 47. &c.

Point, ſhould yet have his meaning ſo groſly perverted againſt all Senſe and Reaſon, (as there is great Reaſon to think, and the more judicious part of the learned World begins to be pretty well ſatisfi'd, that it is) is indeed a thing of a very ſtrange and amuſing Conſideration, and ſuch as reflects very diſhonourably upon the Faith and Sincerity of Mankind, and may ſerve to ſhew withal what little truſt is to be repoſed in *Tradition without Writing*, when 'tis ſo very unfaithful and uncertain even *with* it.

7. But to the thing before us. The neceſſary and *Eternal Exiſtence* of our Ideas together with their *ubiquity* make it neceſſary that we place the Intelligible World in God, out of whom there is nothing but what is Temporal, Mutable, Limited and Contingent, as upon Principles of Region as well as Philoſophy will I ſuppoſe moſt readily be Confeſs'd. But then that it is indeed rightly fix'd there, will as plainly and a little more directly appear from another Conſideration taken from the Nature of God, *viz.* That *he has in himſelf the Ideas of all things.* Which as it moſt immediately proves the Intelligible World to be in God, ſo it may be conſider'd alſo as a farther Demonſtration of its Reality.

Argument the Sixth. For if God has indeed in himſelf the Ideas of all the things, then as we have *where*, ſo we have alſo the *Exiſtence* of that Intelligible World or State of things, which we are endeavouring to evince. Theſe Conſequences are both ſo plain, that neither of them

them I ſuppoſe will be denied. All the buſineſs then will be to make good the *Principle*.

8. And now were I diſpoſed for the way of Quotation and to plant my Margent thick with Authorities, I need not deſire a better opportunity for it than is at preſent offer'd me. For I do not know many Propoſitions (ſetting aſide firſt Principles and Axioms) that are more Unanimoſly Conſented in by Authors of all ſorts Antient and Modern, than this, That God has in himſelf the Ideas of all things, or as they otherwiſe expreſs it, the Perfections of all things, or that he contains in himſelf whatever is in the Creature, at leaſt after a more *Eminent manner*. Which laſt qualifying Clauſe is ſo far from excluding the *Ideal* Senſe at preſent in queſtion, that it neceſſarily includes and reſolves into it. For when they ſay that things are contain'd in God *per modum Eminentiæ* * what is this if reduced to plainer Senſe, but that tho' the very Eſſences of things as they are *in rerum Naturâ* are not contain'd in God, (as indeed who can be ſo extravagantly Abſurd as to imagin that they ſhould) yet there are in him ſuch degrees of Being and Perfection as are equivalent to them, and repreſentative of them, and ſo vertually the ſame with them. Which is the very ſame that we intend and ſay by our Ideas. Now I ſay, that theſe Ideas of things are in God is a very common Doctrin, and particularly with the *School-Writers*, tho' by the way how

* *I do not give this as the School-Senſe of* Eminentor, *but as that which in the preſent Caſe is moſt Intelligible.*

how it ſhould be ſo, and yet at the ſame time the Doctrin of the Eternity of Eſſences ſhould paſs with them for ſuch a Paradox, is what I cannot eaſily reconcile, and ſhould not a little wonder at, but that it is no new thing for the greateſt Men to be ſome times inconſiſtent with themſelves, eſpecially when they will hold Doctrins without conſidering either the Principles upon which they are built, or the conſequences to which they lead.

9. But to perſue our *Theory*, let us ſee whether this ſo acknowledg'd Principle that God has in himſelf the Ideas of all things has *reaſon* enough on its ſide to deſerve ſo much countenance from *Authority*. And I think it is a Propoſition capable of the ſtricteſt Demonſtration, the weight of which I ſhall lay upon a double ground, 1*ſt*. The general Perfection of the Divine Nature, and 2*ly*. Upon one of its moſt principal Attributes.

10. Firſt upon the general Perfection of the Divine Nature. And here the Demonſtration is ſhort, Simple, and eaſy. God is an Infinite Being. This I beg leave to Suppoſe. But now if God be an Infinite Being then he is alſo Infinite in *Being*, as well as Infinite in *Wiſdom* or in *Power*, or in any other reſpect. But if Infinite in Being, then is he infinitely remov'd from *not Being* or *Nothing*, ſo as to exclude even the leaſt Participation of it. But then if he be Infinitely remov'd from Nothing ſo as not in the leaſt to partake of it, then he muſt have all poſ-

ſible

ſible degrees of Being in himſelf, or in other Words, he muſt be *all Being*, ſince if he were deſtitute of any degree of Being, or ſhould any where fail or come ſhort of the fullneſs and Integrity of it, there he would begin to be terminated and conſequently ſo far would partake of *Nothing* or not being, contrary to what is preſuppoſed. But then if God be *All-Being* hence it neceſſarily follows that there neither is nor can be any degree of Being *out* of God but what is *in* him, and conſequently that there is no degree of Being in the Creatures whether Collectively or diſtributively taken, nor any ſo much as abſolutely Poſſible, which does not ſome way or other pre-exiſt in God, at leaſt as to the Intelligible order and kind of it, ſince if any ſuch degree of Being of an Order plainly different from the Divine Perfections either actually were, or could poſſibly be, it would thence evidently follow that God is not *All-Being*, which again would contradict the ſuppoſition. It is therefore neceſſary to ſay that the Perfections of all things are in God, which is alſo the formal and expreſs Concluſion of *Aquinas*, which he proves firſt by the Authority of *Dionyſius*, quoting for it that ſaying of his, *Deus in unâ eſſentiâ omnia præhabet*, and then by a twofold rational Conſideration, the firſt of which proceeds upon that common Maxim that whatever Perfection is in the effect muſt alſo be to be found in its effective Cauſe, either according to the ſame Reaſon if the Agent be *Univocal*, or after a more Eminent manner, if *Equivocal*. Which

1. 2. 4. *Art.* 2.

Which Maxim I think to be true and ſolid, as well as the Argument that is built upon it. And to let you ſee how well a Perſon of far greater Conſideration than my ſelf thought of it, 'tis upon this very Maxim that *Des Cartes* grounds one of his Demonſtrations of the Exiſtence of God, when he contends that whatever Perfection is in the Idea Objectively, muſt be in its Cauſe really, either in the way of *Formality*, or in the way of *Eminence*, and accordingly that the more of Objective Perfection there is in the Idea, the more perfect muſt be its Cauſe, whence he concludes the Exiſtence of God, becauſe of the Perfection of a certain Idea we find in us, to which no other Being is anſwerable, and which we could not have unleſs there were indeed ſuch a Being, which way of Arguing I take to be right as to the main, *viz.* So far as this comes to, that unleſs there were a God 'tis impoſſible we ſhould have any Idea of him, only he here takes a ſuppoſition for granted which I can by no means allow him, which is that the Idea which we have of God is one of his *Effects*, and that he is the efficient cauſe of it in us. Whereas, as ſhall be ſhewn hereafter, as we ſee all things in God, ſo we ſee God in himſelf, and not by any Idea diſtinct from him, or that is the Effect of him, it being impoſſible that God ſhould be repreſented by any thing leſs than himſelf. But however this Exception does not lie againſt this Argument as 'tis here uſed by *Aquinas*, ſince tho' the *Idea* of God be not as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes, the Effect of God, yet 'tis moſt certain that the *World* is,

and

and therefore there can be no Perfection either in the whole or in any part of it but what is in God. And here at leaſt that Queſtion which *Des Cartes* puts in favour of his own Argument is moſt unanſwerable when applied to this, *Whence I pray can the effect aſſume its Reality but from its Cauſe, and how can the Cauſe give it, unleſs it alſo had it?* *Medit. de Prim. Phil.* p. 18. The other Argument made uſe of by *Aquinas* to prove that the Perfections of all things are in God, is of a more Metaphyſical Complexion and runs thus, That God is *ipſum eſſe per ſe Subſiſtens* Being it ſelf Subſiſting by it ſelf, and therefore muſt contain all the Perfection of Being in himſelf. For, ſays he, 'tis manifeſt that if any thing that is hot has not the whole perfection of hot, it is for this Reaſon becauſe it does not perfectly participate of Heat. But now if Heat were ſubſiſtent by it ſelf, 'tis impoſſible it ſhould want any thing of the Vertue that belongs to Heat. Wherefore ſince God is very ſubſiſtent Being, nothing of the Perfection of Being can be wanting to him, *&c.*

11. Thus *Aquinas* reaſons for our purpoſe, and I think alſo *to the purpoſe*, only if there be any fault 'tis that this latter Argument is a little too Metaphyſical and Abſtract, or if you will too *Angelical*, for the Comprehenſion of moſt Capacities. But as for thoſe that want not Metaphyſics to penetrate the force of it, I ſuppoſe they will find it concluding enough for their Conviction. However for their better advantage let them take *Suarez*'s Comment with

them who thus illuſtrates the force of *Aquinas*'s Argument. *D. Thomas*, ſays he, *ex hoc, quod Deus eſt ipſum eſſe Subſiſtens, infert, ita eſſe Summe perfectum ut omnem eſſendi perfectionem in ſe includat. Cujus illationis vis in hoc potiſſimum ſita eſſe videtur, quod cum Deus a nullo participet eſſe, ſeu rationem Entis, ſed ex ſe & ex intrinſecâ Naturâ ac Neceſſitate ſit id quod eſt, non poteſt in ſe habere diminutam, & ſolum quaſi ex parte rationem & perfectionem Entis. Eſt ergo aliquo modo includens totum ens, totamq; entis Perfectionem.* And what he explains he alſo approves, by concluding himſelf the Infinity of God from the ſame Principle, and after the ſame manner and Proportion. And as he here approves the Argument it ſelf, ſo is he elſewhere a plain and expreſs aſſertor of the concluſion for which it is brought. So plain that he makes it to be one of the Senſes wherein that Propoſition of God's being a Being Abſolutely perfect is to be verifi'd. For in anſwer to the Queſtion whether he is ſo or no, he firſt of all ſuppoſes that to be Perfect to which nothing is wanting, which he ſays may be underſtood either *Privatively*, or *Negatively*. In the firſt Senſe that is ſaid to be perfect to which nothing is wanting that is naturally due to it, for its Integrity and Accompliſhment. And in this Senſe he ſays there are many Beings that are perfect in their kinds, and yet are not Simply perfect in the whole latitude of Being. And therefore in the latter Senſe that

Metap. Diſput. Tom. 2. *Diſp.* 30. Sect. 2. Num. 20.

Tom. 2. *Diſp.* 30. Sect. 1.

is

is ſaid to be perfect to which abſolutely nothing of Perfection is wanting. And in this Senſe *that* Being is ſaid to be *Abſolutely* perfect, to which all Perfection is ſo due that none can be wanting to it, neither *Privatively* nor *Negatively*. And in both Senſes he ſays 'tis of the Eſſence of God to be Simply Perfect.

12. For the Proof of the latter which is the only Senſe wherein we are at preſent concern'd, he produces ſeveral Authorities from the Antients, and ſeveral Reaſons, the firſt of which (which is the only one I ſhall mention leaving the reſt to him that pleaſes to conſult them) is as good an Illuſtration of the firſt Argument of *Aquinas*, as the Paſſage but now quoted was of his ſecond. The Perfection of the effect ſays he is neceſſarily ſuppoſed in the Cauſe which from it ſelf and by a ſufficient Power of its own can Communicate ſuch a Perfection to the Effect. For how can the cauſe give that which it no way had in it ſelf? And this Reaſon ſays he equally concludes concerning any poſſible Perfection that is true and real, whether it be actually found in any Creature or not. For if it be poſſible it cannot be but from God, Therefore it is neceſſary that it ſhould be ſome way or other already in God, becauſe nothing can be *from* him but what is ſome way or other *in* him. Whence he concludes that God muſt needs include in himſelf ſome way or other the whole Perfection of Being. And indeed that he does ſo is the common Doctrin of the Schools, and much glanc'd at by other Writers, and ſeems indeed to be one

of the moſt audible and natural reports which our Reaſon gives of God. But now if the Perfection of all things are in God, as the Argument here offer'd, eſpecially in concurrence with the other Conſiderations, does I think abundantly prove, then we have the intended Concluſion without any farther deductions, this being but in other Words the very ſame as to ſay that there is ſome thing in God that Intelligibly correſponds, and is as it were the *Counterpart* to whatever Reality there is in the Creature, or that there is no Reality in the Creature but whereof there is the Repreſentative in the Creator, that his Divine Eſſence is truly Exhibitive of all Entity, or *Omniform* as *Ficinus* ſpeaks, and that he has in himſelf the Eſſential Reaſons, exemplary Forms, or Ideas of all things, which again immediately concludes the Truth and neceſſity of our *Intelligible World.*

13. But let us ſee whether this Propoſition wherewith the general Perfection of God is ſo big and pregnant, may not alſo be as well deduced from one of his principal *Attributes.* The Attribute I ſhall make choice of is that of his *Wiſdom.* I ſuppoſe God to know all things that are Poſſible. But now this being granted (as I preſume it muſt and readily will) it follows from hence that even things that are Poſſible have ſome real Entity. For otherwiſe they would not be knowable, ſince it is neceſſary that whatever terminates the Underſtanding ſhould be a Reality; For an Abſolute and pure nothing cannot poſſibly be known, much leſs by God, who can-

cannot in any manner or way tend to wards *Nothing*. But now if all Poſſible things have ſome real Entity, it is neceſſary for them to have it either out of God, or within them. Not out of God, ſince they are ſuppoſed to be merely *Poſſible*. Therefore within him, or elſe they would have no real entity at all. But then upon this Conceſſion that all things Poſſible have a real entity in God it neceſſarily follows again that the Natures, eſſential Reaſons, or Ideas of things are alſo in God, which again moſt Evidently Concludes for the Exiſtence of an *Intelligible World*.

14. I ſee no part in this Argument that lies open to the leaſt Objection unleſs it be that which infers that things Poſſible have ſome real Entity from their being known. And here perhaps ſome buſy opponent tho' not really in his mind diſallowing the force of the Illation may yet for Argument ſake thus attaque it with a Scholaſtic Maxim. Be it ſo that God knows all things Poſſible, yet how does it thence follow that things Poſſible, have ſome real Entity, ſince from being in the *Underſtanding* to being in the *thing* there is no Conſequence. For we know Impoſſible things no leſs than poſſible, as *Chimera*'s and what we call *Entia Rationis*, which not only not are, but alſo cannot be. And how is it then that from this Principle that Poſſible things are known by God, you aſcribe to them ſome real Entity? To which difficulty ſince the main force of the Argument turns upon it, I ſhall endeavour to return a clear and full Anſwer.

15. I say then first of all in general that there is no Principle in all Geometry, of whose certainty I am more intimately persuaded than of the Truth of this Proposition, that of nothing there can be no Affection or Denomination, whether Intrinsic or Extrinsic. Therefore neither *Knowledge*, since for a thing to be known is to be some way affected and denominated. Therefore whatever is known is *nonnihil* or some thing, and has a real Entity. Therefore even *Possible* things, since they are all the Objects of knowledge, must necessarily be concluded to have some real Entity. Which is farther thus Confirm'd, whatsoever is known is True. Concerning * this Proposition there can be neither Difficulty nor Controversy, if this one limiting Clause be added, *viz.* In respect of that Reason or Formality under which it is known. So for instance an *Hircocervus* or any other Fictitious Being is true and real with respect to the Simple Essences or Natures, which are properly the things that are said to be known. Nor does it signify any thing that 'tis a mere Figment in respect of the *Composition*, since in that respect 'tis not the object of knowledge. For to know is to know things as they really are, and not as they are not, and he is so far from being said to know, that he most grosly Errs that shall Compound or Unite together things so incompatible with each other. Whatever is known then must necessarily be True

* *Nemo enim falsa Novit nisi cum falsa esse Novit. Quod si Novit, Verum novit. Verum est enim quod illa falsa sint. St. Aust. De. Trinit.* lib. 15 c. 10.

True ſo far as is known. But then this being granted it is farther neceſſary that it be alſo a real *Being* ſince Being and True have a reciprocal and convertible Relation. Whence it neceſſarily follows that *Poſſibles* if they are known muſt have ſome real Entity. To which I add how impoſſible it is to be Conceiv'd that the Underſtanding ſhould be Terminated by *Nothing*, or that that ſhould be ſaid to be known, which Simply is not. Yea I moſt Evidently perceive that theſe things do involve the utmoſt Repugnancy, and cannot poſſibly be. In which I have alſo the *Angel* of the *Schools* concurring with me, when he therefore concludes God as to himſelf to be the moſt Intelligible Object, becauſe every thing is Simply Intelligible in proportion to the Actuality of its Being. The Words of that great Author are theſe, *cum unumquodq; eſt cognoſcibile ſecundum quod eſt in actu, Deus qui eſt Actus purus abſq; omni permixtione potentiæ, quantum in ſe, maximi Cognoſcibilis eſt.* And I think he argues well. But who does not ſee that the Conſequence of his Argument can never hold good but upon the Principle ſuppoſed? For it would not follow that God is therefore moſt Intelligible in himſelf becauſe he is *Actus purus*, if a meer *Nothing* could be known, or as he expreſſes it if every thing were not ſo far Intelligible as it is in actual Being. Wherefore we cannot but moſt firmly perſiſt in our Adheſion to this Propoſition, that every thing that is known, ſo far as it is known, muſt be a real Being.

1. *Part. Quæs.* 12. *Art.* 1

The Truth of which Propoſition ſhines out upon my Mind with ſo bright a light, that tho' I could not diſintangle it from ſome Difficulties that might involve and perplex it, yet I find it not in my power to withhold my Aſſent from it.

16. But neither wants there a formal Solution to the Objection, and that as clear as the Truth it ſelf is which it oppoſes. *Eſſe in re* or being in the thing, is an equivocal Term, whoſe Ambiguity need but be diſtinguiſh'd to clear at once both the Maxim, and our Argument. Being in the thing may be taken either as 'tis oppoſed or contradiſtinguiſh'd to being in the Underſtanding, ſo as to ſignify being *out* of the Underſtanding. Or elſe as 'tis oppoſed and contradiſtinguiſh'd to meer *Nothing* or not being at large, ſo as to ſignify only *Reality* of Being. When therefore it is urg'd, *Ab eſſe in Intellectu ad eſſe in re non eſſe Conſequentiam*, that from Being in the Underſtanding to Being in the thing there is no Conſequence, the Objection is thus anſwer'd in Form. If Being in the thing be taken according to the firſt Senſe as 'tis oppoſed or contradiſtinguiſh'd to Being in the Underſtanding, ſo as to ſignify Being *out* of the Underſtanding, it is then granted that the Conſequence does indeed not hold from Being in the Underſtanding to Being in the thing. That is, it does not follow that becauſe a thing is in the Underſtanding, it does therefore exiſt out of the Underſtanding. Neither is it here contended that *Poſſibles* according to this Senſe are *in re*

re or in the thing, *viz.* Out of the Divine Understanding, since this would overthrow the very supposition of their being *Possibles*. But now if Being in the thing be taken (as we here take it) as 'tis oppos'd and Contradistinguish'd to meer *Nothing* or not Being Absolutely, so as to signify only *Reality* of Being, or the having of a real Entity, in this Sense the Consequence from Being in the Understanding to Being in the thing is most logical, as the Premises do abundantly prove.

17. Then as to the *Instance* wherein it is urg'd that we know Impossible as well as Possible things, *viz.* Chimeras and other *entia Rationis*, which neither are nor can be, to this I distinctly answer, 1*st*. That it is ill Supposed that there are any impossible things. For Impossiblility is not in the things themselves, but in the Relative Habitudes of things to one another by way of Composition or Division. 2*d*. That 'tis an impropriety to say that Impossible things are *known*. For as far as they are known they are both Possible and True. 3*d*. That Chimeras and such like fictious Entities in the same respect and formality as they are indeed known have a true and real Being. As far as they are truly known, they truly are. For that which is truly known, in such a *Rational* or rather *Phantastic* Entity, are the Simple Terms or Essences that answer to them, which also are real absolutely and separately Consider'd, altho' their Union or Composition be Fictitious. But this not being what we are properly said to *know*, unless we could be suppos-

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ed to know and to be miſtaken in reſpect of the ſame, makes nothing againſt our preſent Concluſion. Wherefore we need not doubt to affirm that whatever is really known is a real Being, whence it follows that even *Poſſibles* ſince they are truly known by God, have real Entity belonging to them. But then ſince even by Vertue of the ſuppoſition it ſelf they have it not *out* of God, (ſince then they would be no longer in *Power*, but in very *Act*) they muſt neceſſarily have it *in* him. Which is the beſt ground of that ſaying of a * Perſon of great Acuteneſs, (wherein he alſo ſpeaks the Sence of the Schools) *That God by Underſtanding himſelf, knows all poſſible Creatures.* And that becauſe all things Poſſible are indeed in God, and have a reality of Being in him before ever they come to have an actual Exiſtence in Nature. In reſpect to which that expreſſion of the Apoſtle concerning God may not perhaps be miſapplied, when he ſays that *he calls thoſe things that be not as though they were*, Rom. 4. 17. Becauſe indeed tho' non exiſtent as to the ſtate of External Nature, they really are in him, as we have ſhewn. But then ſince this cannot be any otherwiſe than by their *Ideas*, what is more obvious than from hence to conclude that the Eſſential Reaſons or Ideas of all things Poſſible are in God?

*The Animadverter upon Poiret's Cogit, Rat. p. 656.

18. Again as our laſt Argument proceeded thus, God knows all things Poſſible therefore even Poſſibles really are, *&c.* So we may alſo argue thus, God

God knows all things Poſſible, and if ſo, then either in *themſelves* or in *himſelf*. Not in themſelves becauſe as ſuch they are ſuppoſed not to be, or to have any reality of Exiſtence. Therefore 'tis in himſelf or in his own Eſſence that he knows them. If you ſay he know them in their *Ideas*, this is either a vertual Confeſſion of the very Concluſion we are proving, or an impertinent Objection to it. For if by *Ideas*, you mean any *Created* Forms or Species (ſuch as ſome Philoſophers talk of, and I would give ſome thing to ſee) or indeed any thing out of God, or really diſtinct from him, inſtead of going againſt the *Argument*, you go againſt the *Suppoſition*, forgetting that we are now conſidering things in a ſtate of meer Poſſibility wherein at leaſt there is no room for any *ſuch* Ideas, they by this ſuppoſition being as much excluded from all Actuality as the things themſelves that are to be repreſented by them. But if by Ideas you mean ſuch as are really Coeſſential with and indiſtinct from the Eſſence of God, this is but to fetch a Circuit to the ſame Point, and in other Words to confeſs that he knows things Poſſible juſt as 'tis here contended, not in *themſelves*, but in *himſelf*. But then I ſay if he knows them in himſelf, then it plainly follows again that he has the Ideas of all things Poſſible in himſelf, and ſo produces nothing without, but what he has firſt within. Whereof Nature gives us an Emblem in Plants and Animals, which have the ſeed within themſelves of whatever they generate without themſelves.

19. Thus

19. Thus again from Poſſibles to *Actuals*. As God knows all things *Poſſible*, ſo there is as much if not greater reaſon to ſuppoſe that he knows all things *Actual*. For if he knew them even when Poſſible, before they had any Actual Exiſtence, much rather muſt he know them when actually Exiſting. But how does he know them? Does he know them now they are in actual Being after a different manner or otherwiſe than he knew them before, when only Poſſible, or than he now knows *other* Poſſibles? Shall we ſuppoſe God to know his Creatures one way before, and another way after their Exiſtence? Before in his *own ſelf*, and afterwards in *themſelves*? No, God forbid we ſhould be ſo abſurd as to imagin ſuch a change as this in that Immutable Being who is moſt *Conſtant* and *Uniform* as well as *Infinite* in all his Perfections, without the leaſt Variableneſs or Shadow of turning, the ſame Yeſterday, to Day, and Forever, even as the Spirit of God that ſearches all things, even the deep things of God, deſcribes him to us. The Wiſdom of God as 'tis really Conſubſtantial and Coeſſential with himſelf ſo 'tis alſo every way as immutable as himſelf, and therefore can have but one and the ſame way of Underſtanding things. * He muſt then know Actual Beings after the very ſame manner as he knews Poſſible one's. And therefore ſince, as has been ſhewn, he knows the one only in himſelf, (it being impoſſible from the very Nature and ſuppoſition of the thing that he ſhould know

* *Nec aliter ea ſcivit creata quam Creanda. St.* Auſtin *de Trin.* lib. 15. chap. 13.

know them any otherwiſe) it follows that he muſt alſo know the other in himſelf.

20. And to make it yet plainer that he does ſo, I farther Conſider, that upon the contrary ſuppoſition, that of God's knowing the Creatures in themſelves the Conſequence will be, that the Creatures are truly illuminative of their Creator, that they are the Intelligible Species or Form of his Underſtanding, that they are a Light to him, render him actually Intelligent as being the immediate Object of the Divine Mind, and ſo perfect and Meliorate his Being, and that accordingly he depends upon them, and is beholden to them for a conſiderable part of his knowledge, or as a certain Scholaſtic writer expreſſes it, *Emendicaret Notitiam a rebus, & per Species Creatas Intelligeret*, *That he would precariouſly borrow his knowledge from things, and would underſtand by the help of Created Species* or *Ideas*, which are ſuch Conſequences as comport not with the excellent Perfections of the Divinity, eſpecially thoſe of his Self-ſufficiency and Independency, and ſuch as no *Sound Metaphyſics* can reliſh or admit. This Conſideration is frequently touch'd upon by *M. Malebranche* to another purpoſe, *viz.* To expoſe the Abſurdity of *our* ſeeing Creatures in themſelves or by Created Species, in ſo much that he ſays in a certain place that he had rather be call'd a *Viſionaire*, a Phantaſtic or Fanatic, or by any of thoſe pleaſant names which the Imagination (which

Magallanenus. Tract. de Scientiâ Dei. p. 19.

Recherche de la verite Tom. 2. p. 427.

(which is ever disposed for Rallery in little wits) is wont to oppose to such Arguments as it does not comprehend, or cannot defend it self against, than to grant that Bodies are able to inlighten him, or that he is to himself his own Master, his own Reason, his own Light, and that to be solidly instructed in all things he need only consult himself, *&c.* What force this way of arguing has, as *M. Malebranche* uses, it I am not concern'd in this place to consider, the Question now being not whether one Creature can *Objectively* inlighten another, but whether a Creature can so inlighten God. And if the Argument holds good in respect of our selves (as I think it does) then *a Majori* does it conclude with respect to God. But supposing it not to do so in respect of our selves, (which is beside my present business to dispute) yet however I think it a very clear case that it must conclude with respect to God, and he must have a strange Notion of a Being infinitely Perfect, or must suppose God not to be such a Being, that can think it does not. For how low so ever the Philosophy of some Men may degrade both it self and them, and how meanly soever they may think of their own Spirits, so as to suppose them to receive Light from Creatures in seeing by Created, nay even by *Material* Species, yet sure we may allow the Infinite God to be a Light to himself, and not to know Creatures in any other Intelligible Species, than that of his own Essence. If *we* do not see Creatures in *him*, yet at least we may allow *him*,

to

to see them in *himself*, and to be his own *Intelligible*, as well as *Beatific* Object.

21. The knowledge of Creatures in themselves however otherwise supposed Possible, is yet even in the Judgment of the Schools esteem'd a very mean, inferiour, and imperfect kind of knowledge. Accordingly they call it (taking the ground and hint of the Expression from St. *Austin*) *Cognitio* Vespertina, an even-tide knowledge, because that St. *Austin* says, *Scientia creaturâ in Comparatione Scientiæ creatoris quodammodo* Vesperascit. And again *Cognitio Creaturæ in seipsâ* decoloratior *est quam cum in Die sapientiâ Cognoscitur, velut in arte quâ facta est.* And therefore tho' they deny not Angels to have this knowledge, yet considering what a mean Dispensation it is, and how unworthy (if alone) of the beatified condition of those blessed Spirits, and that state of *Comprehension* wherein all that is imperfect shall be don away, they have thought fit to allow them also a higher and more perfect kind of knowledge which, in Contradistinction to the former, they call *Cognitio Matutina*, meaning by it that knowledge whereby things are seen and known in God, or as they are in the Divine Essence. But then if the Sons of the *Morning* have also a knowledge of the *Morning*, and are priviledg'd to see the Creatures in God, (*per rationes rerum in verbo existentes*) then certainly God may well be allow'd to see them in himself. And if the *evening* knowledge be thought so disproportionable to the high Nature and Condition of

De civ. Dei. lib. 11. chap. 7.

Angels

Angels as not to be worthy to be their only knowledge, but they must have the Brightness of the *Morning* to clear up the falling Vapours and to fine the thickness of the *Evening*, much less can it be thought worthy to be any part of the knowledge of the infinite God, who is all glory, Happiness and Perfection. Whatever mixtures of Shadow or Darkness may sit upon the Face of the lesser Lights, yet sure there cannot be any *Vespers* in the great *Sun* of *Truth*, who alwaies Shines out pure and full without Cloud, Eclips or Twilight, and as having no *Horizon* to intercept his rays, can never, never *Set*. All must needs be *Morning* to him, or rather one full and perfect Noon, a fix'd *Meridian* Glory. For *God is Light, and in him there is no Darkness at all*, not so much as that of the *Evening*, and therefore there can be no such thing as *Cognitio Vespertina* in him. No, the most perfect Intelligence ought in all reason to be supposed to understand things after the most perfect and independent manner, and that is in himself, without having his Understanding *inform'd* by any created Species, or inlightned by any Object that is not *Divine*. And the Schools would have been guilty of the grossest inconsistency, if determining that God wills all things in his own goodness, and consequently that the *will* of God has no Cause, they should deny the *Understanding* of God to have its Object in his own Essence, and accordingly that he knows the Creatures in himself by the most-perfect *Morning* Knowledge, especially having bestow'd

beſtow'd that Privilege in good part upon the *Angels*.

22. But the Schoolmen do not often uſe ſo groſly to forget themſelves, at leaſt in *Metaphyſical*, whatever they may do in *Phyſical* Speculations. Nor do they in this Point. Accordingly it is their plain and poſitive Doctrin that God knows all things in himſelf. So ſays their great Doctor expreſly, *Deus, cum perfecte Seipſum intelligat, Omnia alia à ſe non per Speciem propriam, ſed per Eſſentiam ſuam intelligit.* *Sum. Theol. Part. 1. Quæſt. 14. Art. 5.* And again in the Body of the ſame Article, whereof the former Citation was the Concluſion, ſays he, *Ad ſciendum qualiter alia à ſe cognoſcat, Conſiderandum eſt quod dupliciter aliquid Cognoſcitur: uno modo in ſeipſo, alio modo in altero*, &c. which being premiſed he farther ſays, *Dicendum eſt quod Deus Seipſum videt in ſeipſo, quia ſeipſum videt per eſſentiam ſuam. Alia autem à ſe videt non in ipſis, ſed in ſeipſo, in quantum eſſentiâ ſuâ continet Similitudinem aliorum ab ipſo.* Again, more expreſly yet if poſſible, *Sic patet quod in Deo Intellectus, Intelligens, & id quod intelligitur, & Species Intelligibilis, & ipſum Intelligere ſunt omnino unum & Idem.* (Art. 4.) Nothing need or can well be more expreſs than theſe Paſſages, with many others to the like purpoſe, which my Reader (whom I ſuppoſe Learned) may remember or find out, almoſt with as much eaſe as I can ſet them down.

23. *Aquinas* being ſo plain upon the Point there will be the leſs occaſion to take account of thoſe that follow him, which cannot be done

neither without the expence of ſome *Trouble* on *my* ſide, and ſome *Patience* on my *Reader*'s, unleſs they were leſs numerous and voluminous than they are. I ſhall therefore ſpare both my ſelf and him that tedious Superfluity. Only there is a certain *Thomiſt* of conſiderable account whoſe thoughts in this matter it may be worth while to Conſider, not only becauſe being a Modern Writer and coming after the reſt he has the Advantage of better underſtanding and refining upon their Senſe, eſpecially being a Man of Acuteneſs and Subtilety in the Scholaſtic way, but alſo becauſe he has written a profeſs'd Treatiſe upon this very Subject *De Scientiâ Dei*, and particularly to the 14 Queſtion of the *1ſt.* Part of *Aquinas*, the very place we were laſt upon. The Perſon I mean is one *Petrus Magallaneus*, who is as clear and appoſite to our purpoſe as need be deſired, even if the matter were to be decided wholly by his Authority. For ſays he, *In Deo ſemper res Cognita eſt per identitatem, & eadem cum Cognoſcenti in eſſe rei.* Again, ſays he, *Eſſentia Divina eſt ratio Cognoſcendi Creaturas, Cognoſcit enim illas Deus non ſolum in Eſſentiâ ſuâ ſed ex Eſſentiâ ſuâ tanquam ex Causâ*, &c. (p. 13.) Again, *Scientia Dei dum extenditur ad Creaturas, Specificatur intrinſice ab eâdem Specie intelligibili, nimirum Eſſentiâ Divinâ, per quam Seipſum intelligit.* (p. 16.) Again inquiring whether God knows himſelf in the Creatures, he anſwers in the Negative, and gives his reaſon for it. (*p.* 18.) Becauſe that God ſhould know himſelf in the Crea-

Tract. de Scientiâ Dei p. 5.

Creatures by a knowledge distinct from that whereby he knows himself in himself, it is necessary that he should know the Creatures in themselves by a Species distinct from that whereby he knows himself, which he supposes as a manifest Absurdity, and that because as he says, *Deus Vendicaret Cognitionem a rebus.* (*p.* 19.) And a little after, *Deus emendicaret Notitiam a rebus, & per Species Creatas intelligeret.* And to the Objection that the Blessed in their state of Comprehension retain that way of knowing God from the Creatures which they acquired in this Life. He answers, that this belongs to the *Evening Knowledge*, in which the Blessed do not use any Divine intelligible Species, but that no body who is well in his Senses will think of such a thing as an Evening Knowledge in God. *Nullus autem sanæ mentis dicet, nec ponet in Deo Cognitionem Vespertinam.* (*p.* 20.) Besides these incidental passages he has an intire Chapter concerning the *Secondary* Object of the Divine knowledge, where he distinctly inquires whether the Creatures are known by God in *himself*, or whether they are immediately seen in *themselves*? For the resolution of which, after having before premised a very useful remark concerning the manner of the knowledge of things in another, that there need not (as some imagin'd) a double notice or Species for that purpose, but that one and the same will suffice, only distinguishing between the same Species as adequately consider'd for the *Primary*, and as inadequately for the *Secondary* Object. (*p.* 83.) His Proposition is, that God *ex parte*

Cognoſcentis does by no means behold the Creatures in themſelves, but in himſelf. (*p.* 91.) Which he proves firſt from the impoſſibility of God's taking his knowledge from Created things, ſince otherwiſe the Divine knowledge would be Specified by the Creature, and that therefore he muſt have in himſelf a ſufficient and adequate Principle of Knowing Creatures in themſelves (which Phraſe muſt be taken *Specificatively*, not *Objectively*) by his own Eſſence, as by an Intelligible Species, and as by ſome thing that is Expreſſive or Repreſentative of them. And that the Creature is not actually underſtood by it ſelf, becauſe not Intelligible by its Eſſence, partly becauſe of its Potentiality, and partly as being without. He ſays again, *3ly.* That if any thing ſhould hinder this repreſentation of the Creatures in God, it muſt be the Divine Excellence. But this he ſhews rather to make for it. For, ſays he, an excellent form the more perfect it is, the more nearly it contains its Inferiours, even according to their ultimate Differences. And therefore the Divine Eſſence which is moſt Perfect, will contain all Created things better than they are in themſelves, in all reſpects, *Secundum omne eſſe & modum repreſentationis.* Whence he concludes with *Aquinas*'s ſaying, that God not only knows things to be in himſelf, but by containing them in himſelf knows them in their proper Nature, and by ſo much the more perfectly as every thing is more perfectly in himſelf.

Part. 1. Q. 14. *Art.* 6.

24. To our *School-Divine*, I ſhall only join for

for a companion a certain *School-Metaphyſitian*, one of thoſe good Authors which by a natural Prejudice ſome perhaps may be tempted the leſs to regard, becauſe they formerly convers'd with him in the inſtitution of their younger Studies, tho' I think he deſerves to be Read (as well as ſome others) with more Conſideration than we commonly uſe at that time. It is honeſt *Chriſtopher Scheibler* who in his Metaphyſics profeſſedly conſiders this very Queſtion, *An Deus Cognoſcat res Creatas in Seipſo ſolum, an vero Cognoſcat eas juxta proprias earum Eſſentias?* Which indeed is not ſo exactly Worded as ſhould be, there not being a due oppoſition between the two parts of the Queſtion, and that becauſe ſuppoſing God to know things *in Seipſo*, he does alſo in a true Senſe know them *juxta proprias earum eſſentias*, one of theſe being very Conſiſtent with the other. But however his meaning is right enough, and he expreſſes it better afterwards when he gives this for the Senſe of the Queſtion, Whether Created things are the Object of the Divine Underſtanding in their own Beings, or only as they are Eminently, Ideally or Vertually contain'd in God? To which his direct Anſwer is, *In ſe Cognoſcit Deus res Creatas*, that God knows the Creatures in himſelf. Which he farther explains and reconciles with his knowing them alſo *juxta eſſe proprium* according to their own proper Beings, by ſaying that the Divine Eſſence has the ſame reaſon or proportion in that knowledge whereby God knows, as the Species has in Humane knowledge. And that both of them are immediately

that Reaſon or Form whereby the knowledge becomes Actual. As therefore upon the Union of the Species with the Cognoſcitive Power the things is apprehended which in its Being is out of the underſtanding, and that according to that its proper Being which it really has in the Word out of the Mind. Even ſo ſays he it is when God underſtands his own Eſſence, in which as in a Species repreſenting the Eſſences of Creatures, the Creatures are underſtood by God according to their proper Natures. As in a *Looking-glaſs*, in which he that looks does indeed immediately behold the *Species* in the Glaſs, but does alſo at the ſame time actually behold *Peter* or *Paul* whoſe Image it is. In Sum he tells us, That God does underſtand the Creatures both in *their* own, and in *his* own Being. In *their* own as to the *Quod*, meaning I ſuppoſe the thing that may ultimately be ſaid to be underſtood, and in *his* own as to the *Quo*, meaning I ſuppoſe the *immediate* Object or Form of his Underſtanding. So that according to this Author, tho' God may be truly ſaid to know the Creatures according to their proper Nature, becauſe he ſees that which truly repreſents them, (more truly indeed by infinite degrees than the *Image* in the *Glaſs* does him whoſe Image it is, which is but a faint Illuſtration of the Divine *Ideality*) yet that which is the immediate Object that *terminates*, or intelligible Form that truly *Specifies* his knowledge, is his own Divine Eſſence, which ſerves him as a Species for the underſtanding all things out of himſelf, which very well agrees with our fore-

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going Account concerning God's knowledge of things, which you ſee wants neither *Reaſon* nor *Authority* for its Eſtabliſhment.

25. If now after all it ſhould be demanded by way of Objection, how then will you diſtinguiſh between God's knowledge of himſelf and his knowledge of the Creature, ſince 'tis *himſelf* that is ſtill the ſpecifying Object in both? It is anſwer'd, that this is already prevented in that diſtinction of *Magallaneus* concerning the Primary and the Secondary Object, and concerning the adequate and inadequate way of Conſideration. God knows himſelf as the Primary, the Creature as the Secondary Object of his knowledge. Again when he knows himſelf abſolutely Speaking, he conſiders himſelf *adequately*, but in the knowledge of the Creatures, or rather of himſelf in relation to the Creatures, he conſiders himſelf inadequately, according to thoſe degrees of Being or Perfection wherein his Eſſence is imitable or participable by them, as will be better underſtood when we come more diſtinctly to reflect upon the manner of the Divine *Ideality*. But however, 'tis himſelf ſtill that he alwaies beholds, either *adequately* or *inadequately*, and not the Creatures. True, *and not the Creatures*, any otherwiſe than in a *Secondary* way, and as he may be ſaid truly to behold them, becauſe he ſees that which truly and perfectly repreſents them. Accordingly both theſe propoſitions rightly accepted are true, God does behold the Creatures, and God does not behold the Creatures. He does behold them, becauſe

he beholds them by an inadequate Conception of himſelf. And he does not behold them meaning that they are not the formal and immediate Object of the Divine Underſtanding. And thus I am taught to adjuſt theſe things by my *Angelical* Maſter who accordingly thus interprets that paſſage quoted by him from St. *Auſtin*, *Deus Nihil extra ſe intuetur*, *God beholds nothing out of himſelf*, which he ſays is not ſo to be underſtood, as if God did behold nothing that is out of himſelf, but that God does not behold that which is out of himſelf any otherwiſe than in himſelf.

Part. 1. *Qu.* 14. *Art.* 5.

26. But now to apply what we have thus fully prov'd and partly explained too concerning the manner of the Divine Knowledge to the purpoſe of our *Theory*, if God knows the Creatures in himſelf, (as every one muſt grant he did *before* they were made, and why not *afterwards*) then it neceſſarily and immediately follows again, that he muſt have the Ideas of them all in himſelf, it being otherwiſe plainly impoſſible that he ſhould know them in himſelf. This way of arguing is indeed *a Poſteriori*, but however never the leſs Concluding. For as from God's having the Ideas of all things in himſelf it follows *a priori*, (and might have been ſo proved had that been my principal point) that he muſt needs know all things in himſelf, ſo if it be otherwiſe proved (I ſay *otherwiſe* to avoid committing, a * Circle) that he knows all things in himſelf, it fol-

**Which would be if I ſhould prove his Ideas from his knowledge, and his knowledge again from his Ideas.*

lows

lows as truly and neceſſarily, tho' not ſo directly, that he muſt have the Ideas of all things in himſelf, and that there is nothing that exiſts out of him but what is alſo *Ideally* in him. And accordingly this latter Doctrin is as current with the Schoolmen as the former, who indeed otherwiſe would have forgotten themſelves as well as Truth, and have betray'd ſuch an inconſiſtency as the looſeſt and moſt unprincipl'd Writers are not often guilty of. So cloſely do theſe things hang together, and like the Stones of an *Arch* depend one upon the other. But ſuch skilful Builders do not uſe to be ſo groſs in their Architecture as to leave an *Arch* unfiniſh'd. And therefore I ſay as they hold one part of it, that God knows all things in himſelf, ſo are they alſo as careful and mindful to adjoin the other, *viz.* That he has alſo the Ideas of all things in himſelf. And indeed the Doctrin of the *Divine Ideas* may be ſaid to be with the *Scholaſtic* what that of *Juſtice* and *Charity* is with the *Sacred* Writers. 'Tis in a manner their *Law* and their *Prophets*, the Burthen of their Diſcourſes and the ſum and ſubſtance of their abſtracter Theories, the Ground upon which they deſcant, or if you will the String upon which (ſo well do they like the Muſick) they are ever and anon Harping. 'Tis in ſhort the Spirit that breathes in their Writings, and Inſpires them with *Life*, and which, like a brighter Vein of rich Oar, runs through the Bowels of their Syſtemes. Whereof they abound with *Inſtances* as I might eaſily do with *Quotations*, but that I care not to ſwell my own,

or

or to increaſe my Reader's Work when there is ſo little Occaſion for either.

27. Upon Conſideration then of the full and united Strength of the Premiſes I think I may now preſume upon every competent Reader's leave to Conclude, and I do it the more ſecurely becauſe 'tis the very Concluſion of *Aquinas*, *Part.* 1. *Q.* 15. *Art.* 1. *quod neceſſe eſt ponere in mente Divinâ Ideas*, that it is neceſſary to affirm that the Ideas of things are in the Mind of God. Or as he otherwiſe expreſſes it in the ſame place, that it is neceſſary that the Ideas of all things ſhould preexiſt objectively in his Mind. It is indeed every way neceſſary, both a *Priori*, and a *Poſteriori*. *A Priori* becauſe of the infinite Perfection and *All-beingneſs* of his Eſſence, including in it every poſſible Degree of Being and Perfection. And *A Poſteriori* ſuppoſing (what we have proved) that he knows the Creatures in himſelf. The former of which indeed is the Cauſe, Reaſon or Principle, and the latter the Effect or Conſequence of the *Divine Ideality*, or of God's having the Ideas of all things in himſelf, but they both agree to prove in their different waies that he is indeed poſſeſs'd of them.

28. *But then O my God, thou that haſt the Perfections and Ideas of all things in thy ſelf, what an infinitely great, rich and glorious Being art Thou! All that is good or Excellent in the fartheſt extent of Nature is in thee, and all that the fruitful Womb even of Poſſibility it ſelf can ever*

ever bring forth is alſo in thee. Thou art the Center of Being, whence all the Rays of Perfection riſe, and where again they meet, and as there is nothing but what is from *thee, ſo there is nothing but what is* in *thee. And where in ſuch an Infinite Circle of Glories ſhall I begin, or rather where ſhall I leave off to Adore, Admire, and Love thee!*

O my Divine King of Glory, who art what thou art, and what every thing is, thou art become exceeding Glorious, thou art Cloath'd with Majeſty and Honour. Thou deckeſt thy ſelf with Light as with a Garment, even with that true Intelligible *Light, wherein Thou ſeeſt, and wherein we ſee, which inlightens all the Generations of Men, and all the Orders of Angels. In the great Sun of Truth thoſe bright and Eternal* Ideas *Shine to which the Light of this World is but Darkneſs, in which thou ſeeſt all the things that are or that can be, which give Light to the whole Intellectual Sphere, to the Spirits above that wait about the Throne, as well as to thoſe below, that Dwell in Houſes of Clay. For which thee is the tranſparent Mirrour of Truth as well as the* Well *of* Life, *and with both thou ſufficeſt Eternally for the Contemplation and Joy of all thy Creatures.*

And why then didſt thou not ſuffice for thy ſelf, *and what* * *needeſt thou who art ſo rich in thy ſelf, and*

* *Quid ergo tibi de eſſet ad Bonum quod tu tibi es, etiam ſi iſta vel Omnino nulla eſſent, vel informia re remanerent, quæ non ex indigentiâ feciſti, ſed ex Plenitudine Bonitatis tuæ.* S. Auſt. *Confes.* lib. 13. chap. 4.

who

who alone art All, to have made a World? Thou could'ſt not inlarge thy Grandeur or Happineſs nor, Almighty as thou art, produce one new degree of Being or Perfection that thou had'ſt not before in thy infinite Eſſence. Thou mad'ſt thy Creatures out of nothing, and yet thou had'ſt them all in the Fruitful and pregnant Boſom of thy own Ideality, nor could thy Power outwork thy Wiſdom, any more than thy Wiſdom could exhauſt or overtask thy Power. And why then did'ſt thou not ſuffice thy ſelf? Yea, thou waſt ſufficient to thy ſelf, but thou overfloweſt with Love and Goodneſs, and tho' happy in Solitude, yet would'ſt not be happy Alone.

And why my ſelf ſufficient Creator do'ſt thou not ſuffice me *thy Creature? Why do I ſeek for any thing out of thee, when thou thy ſelf haſt all that my Soul can deſire? Why do I Contemplate any thing but thee, and why do I Love any thing but thee? For what do not they ſee that ſee thee, and what do not they enjoy that enjoy thee?*

And why then, O my God, do I go from thee after thy Creatures who are vain to themſelves, and therfore muſt needs be ſo to me, and when, be they never ſo Charming, I can propoſe nothing to my ſelf in them but what I may have in thee, and with greater Perfection and Abundance? And why then do I leave thee, when thou can'ſt ſhew me all good, *and I can gain nothing, not ſo much as the Pleaſure of Variety, by the Change? Nay when I*

muſt

muſt be ſo great a loſer, in quitting thy true ſubſtantial good for Shadows and Appearances? What an unlawful, * Adulterous *Love then is mine that turns it ſelf from thee, and ſeeks thoſe Joys out of thee which are to be found pure and ſincere only in thee?*

* *Ita fornicatur Anima cum avertitur abs te, & quærit extra te ea quæ pura & liquida non invenit niſi cum redit ad te. S.* Auſt. *Confes.* lib. 2. chap. 6.

But above all my God why do I Sin *againſt thee, and provoke thy Anger, for what do I tranſgreſs the Eternal Order and Reaſon of thy righteous Laws, and render my ſelf Obnoctious to thy Juſtice, for what indeed, when all that can invite me to Sin I may find in thee? Fool that I am to be tempted by Pleaſure to depart from thee, when in thee are the Springs of all Delight, and there is no Pleaſure like that of Loving and Serving thee?*

And how O my God can I chuſe but Love thee? Who art all that is good, all that is lovely, all that I can Love, all that is. Who art ſo excellent in Beauty, ſo rich in all variety of Good, ſo every way perfect, ſo altogether Lovely. My God I cannot chuſe, *I can only* Love. *Thou haſt given me liberty of will, but thou thy ſelf tak'ſt it from me. I have no liberty for* thee, *nor ſo much as deſire to have any. Thy Love O my God conſtrains me, and the ſweetneſs of it over comes me. Divine Conquerour take thy Captive, and Pardon him that he yeilded no ſooner. But now he ſubmits, and finds he muſt, for thy Love is Almighty, and thy Beauty Irreſiſtible.*

I. Lay

I.

Lay down Proud Heart thy rebel Arms,
And own thy Conquerour Divine,
In vain thou do'ſt reſiſt ſuch Charms,
In vain the Arrows of his Love decline.

II.

There is no dealing with this potent Fair,
I muſt my God, I muſt Love thee.
Thy Charms but too Victorious are,
They leave me not my Native Liberty.

III.

A holy force ſpreads through my Soul.
And raviſhes my Heart away.
The World its motion does control
In vain, the happy Captive will not ſtay.

IV.

No more does ſhe her wonted Freedom boaſt,
More proud of thy Celeſtial Chain,
Free-will it ſelf were better loſt
Than ever to revolt from thee again.

V.

Sun of my Soul, what ſhall I do
Thy Beauties to reſiſt, or bear?
They Bleſs, and yet they Pain me too,
I feel thy Heat too ſtrong, thy light too clear.

VI.

I Faint, I Languiſh, I almoſt Expire,
My panting Heart diſſolving lies,
Thou muſt ſhine leſs, or I retire,
Shade Thou thy Light, I cannot turn my Eyes.

29. But to unſtring my Inſtrument for a while, and reproſecute our Theory, wherein after this little devotional Interlude my refreſh'd Reader may perhaps accompany me with new Vigour. The foregoing Conſiderations concerning the natural Perfection of God, and the manner of his knowledge of things do I think make it very plain both *a Priori* and a *Poſteriori*, that he has the Perfections and Ideas of all things in himſelf whether Actual or Poſſible, that his infinite Being, as Simple as it is, in the multifarious Plenitude and Fecundity of it is Exhibitive and Expreſſive of all Being, and ſo that he is truly an *Omniform* Eſſence as the foremention'd *Platoniſt* very ſignificantly Stiles him, and that becauſe he has the Specific Forms of all things in the Comprehenſion of

of his Divine Ideality, and ſo is Eminently and Vertually, or if you will *Intelligibly*, every thing. In which Senſe that of the Poet (*Lucan*) contains and well expreſſes a very ſtrict and Phyloſophic Truth,

Jupiter eſt quodcunq; vides——

which were I to Conſtrue as a Philoſopher I would render, not that whatever you ſee is *Jupiter*, (leaſt it ſhould favour that ſtupid conceit of taking the World for God) but that *Jupiter* is whatever you ſee. Only I would add, and whatever you do not ſee, For ſo indeed the true *Jupiter* is, as containing in himſelf *Ideally* all things whether Viſible or Inviſible. In which reſpect the Platonic Poet (*Virgil.*) that ſaid, All things are full of *Jupiter*, might as well have ſaid that *Jupiter* was full of all things, as indeed that excellent Being who was confuſely deſign'd by that name really is, as having the fullneſs of Being, and ſo the Ideas of all things that are or may be in himſelf. To which purpoſe are all thoſe ſayings and Sentences among the Antients that repreſent the Univerſality as I may call it of the Divine Nature, or that God is All. Such as that of *Euphorion*, as I find him quoted by *Huetius*,

Demonſtratio evang. edit. Amſtel. Page. 209.

Ζεύς ἐστιν, αἰθήρ, Ζεύς ἡ γῆ, Ζεύς δ' οὐρανός,
Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα.

Jupiter

Jupiter is the Ether or Air, Jupiter is the Earth, Jupiter is the Heavens, Jupiter is all things. As alſo that Orphic Sentence mention'd by *Ficinus*, Ζεὺς ἐστὶ πάντων. *Jupiter* is the Form, Species, or Ideas of all things. To which I may add that old Celebrated Inſcription upon one of the Heathen Temples ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονὸς, καὶ ὂν, καὶ ἐσόμενον. I am all that has been, all that is, and all that ſhall be. As alſo that at *Capua* mention'd by our Learned Antiquary Mr. *Fleetwood*, *Te tibi, una quæ es Omnia, Dea Iſis*, &c. with other like paſſages (which the Monuments of Antiquity were I at leaſure to ranſack them, might I ſuppoſe plentifully furniſh me with) that carry an Inſinuation of this Notion. But *Plotinus* ſpeaks out when he ſays, ωὐδὲν ἔξω ζητεῖ, &c. *ſeek nothing out of God, but all things that are after him are within him. For he himſelf is that which is without, the Comprehenſion* (περίληψις) *and Meaſure of all things.*

Inſcriptionum Syllogo. p. 30.

Ennead. 6. lib. 8. chap. 18.

30. But as to the more expreſs Doctrin of the Divine Ideality, I ſhould tire even the *Preſs*, as well as my ſelf and my Reader, ſhould I gather together what by Authors of all ſorts Antient and Modern, Fathers, Schoolmen, Divines, Philoſophers, Poets (with other miſcellaneous Writers) has been ſaid to this Purpoſe. But I am not ſo much in Love with *Prynne's* Hiſtrio-Maſtix, or *Burton's* Melancholy, as to affect ſuch a common-place way of Writing

my ſelf, or to think it a proper Entertainment for the nicer Taſt of our more correct and judicious Age. However *Marſilius Ficinus* has expreſt this matter ſo rarely well, that ſhould I report his Words at large, even thoſe that have the leaſt reliſh for Quotations would not think me Impertinent.

Tom. 1. p. 103. I beleive *Omnis Cauſa* (ſays he) *per aliquam agit Formam, & agit Effectum ſuum in Forma quodammodo ſimilem, ideoq; oportet effectus Formam a Causâ Comprehendi. Cum vero Deus ſit Omnium Cauſa, neceſſarium eſt in eo Omnium Formas eſſe. Eſt ergo Deus Eſſentia Omniformis. unde Orphicum illud,* Ζεὺς εἶδος πάντων, *Jupiter Species Omnium. Quemadmodum vero in Potentiâ purâ, id eſt, Materiâ, ſunt Omnes Naturales Formæ Secundum Confuſam quandam potentiam, ſic oportet in Actu Puro, id eſt, Deo omnes ſecundum actum diſtinctum Formas eſſe.* To the like purpoſe again a little after ſays he, (p. 104.) *Deus Seipſum intuendo ſe Concipit tanquam propriam Formarum Omnium Rationem. Videt enim in ſe quicquid eſt Cuiq; proprium, dum cernit quo gradu Divinam Formam quodlibet imitari queat, quove deficere. Ut ecce dum intelligit Formam ſuam per modum vitæ, non autem Cognitionis imitabilem, Concipit Formam Ideamq; Plantarum. Dum vero imitabilem per modum Cognitionis quidem, ſed non Intelligentiæ, propriam Animalis Ideam, atq; cæteris eodem pacto. Et profecto in Omnibus quæ non caſu, ſed vel Naturâ vel propoſito fiunt, neceſſe eſt Effectionis finem eſſe Effecti Operis formam.*

mam. Causa vero agens actionem ad Formam non per aliud quicquam dirigit, quam per Formam in ipsâ Manentem. Cum igitur Mirabilis ordo mundi Casu ordinis experte Constare non possit, necesse est in Opificis ipsius Intelligentiâ Formam esse ad cujus similitudinem sit effectus. Et quonian Dei proposito universi ordo potissimus est, principalis penes illum Idea, est Idea ordinis universi. And afterwards in the Conclusion he tells us that this his Account is conformable to the Doctrin of *Plato* and his School, in opposition I presume to those that traduced his Ideas as Universal separate Forms. For says he, *Hæc autem est, & si canes quidam aliter latrant, Certissima Platonis Nostri Platonicorumq; Sententia.* Here are in this Quotation some strokes that glance at the *manner* of the Divine Ideality, but reserving the Consideration of that to its proper place, that which I now produce it for is in Confirmation of the thing it self, that the Ideas of all things are indeed in God, for which I think it not only a noble *Testimony*, but also a very good *Argument*.

31. And now who that freely uses his Reason or has any regard to the Judgment of those that do, can be so confined to the information of Sense as to think this Natural *Scene* is the only state of things, or that there is no other World but what is Temporal and Sensible. For setting aside the other Arguments, this last is alone sufficient to conclude our Point. For if God has the Ideas of all things in him-

ſelf, (as I think is made very plain if Reaſon and Authority can make any thing ſo) then the immediate *Conſequence*, or rather more explicit *Reſolution* of this is an Intelligible World. For the reality of whoſe exiſtence I might again produce a Cloud of Authorities eſpecially among the *Platonic* Writers, but that I think there is no ſuch extraordinary occaſion for them after ſo much Rational and (if the Ballance that I weigh it in be true) Demonſtrative Evidence. I ſhall only here remark that as the ground for the Diſtinction of an Intelligible World in oppoſition to that which we call Natural or Senſible is abundantly laid in *Plato*, (for I do not remember that he uſes the expreſs Terms of *Intelligible World*) ſo the Diſtinction it ſelf in the very formality of it is frequently uſed by the Retainers to his School, particularly by *Philo Judæus* in his Coſmopoea, *Plotinus*, and *Marſilius Ficinus*, nay 'tis uſed by St. *Auſtin* himſelf, and that with approbation. For tho' he retracts his founding this Diſtinction upon that Expreſſion of our Saviour, *Joh.* 18. 36. *My Kingdom is not of this World*, as if that implied an Intelligible world diſtinct from the Senſible, yet as to the thing it ſelf he allows it, declares himſelf ſatisfi'd with it, and ſeems to wonder how any body ſhould be ſo abſurd as to deny it. For ſays he,

Retract. lib. 1. chap. 3. *Nec Plato quidem in hoc erravit quia eſſe Mundum Intelligibilem dixit, ſi non vocabulum, quod Eccleſiaſticæ conſuetudini in re*

re illâ not uſitatum eſt, ſed ipſam rem velimus attendere. Mundum quippe ille Intelligibilem nuncupavit ipſam Rationem Sempiternam atq; incommutabilem, quâ fecit Deus Mundum. Quam qui eſſe negat, Sequitur ut dicat, irrationabiliter Deum feciſſe quod fecit, aut cum faceret, vel antequam faceret neſciſſe quid faceret, ſi apud eum Ratio faciendi not erat. Si vero erat, ſicut erat, ipſam videtur Plato vocaſſe Intelligibilem Mundum. This Teſtimony is ſo clear and full that to ſeek for any more would look like Quoting for Quotings ſake, and 'tis the more Conſiderable becauſe 'tis in a *Retractation*, where he was concern'd to uſe particular caution, and not to let the thing it ſelf paſs any more than that Circumſtance relating to it which he formally retracts, if he had thought in the leaſt erroneous. But that he could do ſo is otherwiſe impoſſible becauſe he is upon all Occaſions ſo very liberal of Expreſſions that lay the Foundation and imply an utter neceſſity of an Intelligible World, thoſe I mean that repreſent the Reaſons or Eſſences of things as Eternal and immutable, and that theſe Eternal Reaſons are in God, according to that, *Apud te rerum Omnium inſtabilium ſtant Cauſæ, & rerum Omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent Origines, & Omnium irrationabilium & temporalium ſempiternæ vivunt rationes.* To which I alſo add all thoſe Paſſages (ſome of which I may have occaſion hereafter to produce and reflect upon)

Confes. lib. 1. chap. 6.

that run upon the notion (which to ſome perhaps will not appear ſo uncouth when they ſhall be minded that one of the greateſt Fathers of the Church does ſo expreſly aſſert and patronize it) of our ſeeing and underſtanding things in the Eternal and Immutable Reaſons of them, which can be no other than that Ideal or Intelligible Syſteme, whoſe Exiſtence we have hitherto been pleading for. And indeed I look upon St. *Auſtin* to be as great an *Idealiſt* as any in the World, and conſidering his Authority, the greateſt Patron of the Ideal Philoſophy. The Principles of which ſerve him for ſome of the nobleſt and moſt elevated ſtrains in his Devotional Diſcourſes, and are indeed ſo current and familiar with him that he hardly thinks of proving them. And that Intelligible World which with other Writers is diſcourſed as a *Concluſion*, paſſes with him as a *Suppoſition*. So inwardly and thoroughly does he ſeem to be poſſeſs'd with it, and perſwaded of the Truth of it.

32. Should I then expreſs my ſelf with ſome Aſſurance concerning the ſame Concluſion, I hope that neither my rational Conviction will be Condemn'd for Raſhneſs or Preſumption after ſo great an Authority, nor my deference to Authority be cenſured as Credulity after ſo much and ſo convincing Reaſon. I conclude therefore upon the full conſideration of the Premiſes, that there is an abſolute neceſſity of an Intelligible World. Which concluſion differs only in the way of expreſſing it, from that of

of *Plato*'s, when he says, πᾶσα ἀναγκη τόνδε τ' κόσμον εἰκόνα πνὸς ἔναι, that there is all necessity, or that it is altogether necessary that this World should be the Image of some thing. For if this World be the Image of some thing, then some thing is the Archetype, exemplar, or Ideal Form and Original of that, which is that very Intelligible World which is the Subject of this *Theory*. Concerning the Existence of which altho' *Sense* gives us no direct information, but is rather the greatest Prejudice we have to contend with in this Argument, yet I cannot but think it a thing of greater Certainty than any thing which we receive upon the Testimony of that great and Authentic Informer. The Consideration of which matter may perhaps deserve the Formality of a particular and distinct Chapter. *In Timæo.* p. 29. *Edit. Serran.*

CHAP. IV.

That the Existence of the Intelligible is more Certain than that of the Natural or Sensible World. With an Account of the Comparative Certainty of Faith and Reason.

1. CErtainly is either *Objective* or *Subjective*. By *Subjective* Certainty I mean that firmness of Perswasion whereby we assent to the Truth of a thing, For then we say a Man is certain when fully determin'd in his Assent, or when he is so perswaded of a thing as to have no doubt concerning it. By *Objective* Certainty I mean that state of the Object which affords just Ground or Foundation for such a firmness of Assent. This Objective Certainty is again twofold. For a thing may be said to be Objectively Certain, either Simply in it self, or in relation to us. The Objective Certainty of a thing in it self implies I think no more than the Reality, Existence, or Truth of it. And when in this Sense we say a thing is certain we mean no other than that it is *True*. And accordingly every thing that is True may be said thus far to be also certain. But the Objective Certainty of a thing in relation to us besides the

the bare Truth of it connotes withal the greater or leſs Reaſon, or Foundation of that Truth. And in this Senſe one thing may be ſaid to be more certain than another in as much as the Truth of it Depends upon more or better Reaſons, or as the Suppoſition of its Falſhood would lead to more or worſe Abſurdities.

2. This premiſed, when I ſay there is greater Certainty of the Exiſtence of the Intelligible than of the Senſible World, I do not mean in the firſt place, that there is a greater Subjective Certainty. On the contrary I might be very ignorant of Human Nature if I ſhould want to be inform'd that Men are generally perſwaded of nothing ſo much as of what their *Senſes* report to them, and that of all Senſible Objects there is none of whoſe Exiſtence they leſs doubt than of that of the *World* wherein they Live, and which too often Lives in them. Nor do I mean that the thing is more Objectively certain as Simply and in it ſelf Conſider'd, ſince this would imply as if it were more *True* which cannot well be conceiv'd. For Truth (and the ſame may be ſaid of certainty in this Senſe) has no Latitude, but conſiſts in an Indiviſible, as much as Rightneſs or Streightneſs does. And accordingly as one right line cannot be ſaid to be more right than another, ſo neither of two things or Propoſitions that are True, can one be ſaid with propriety to be more True than the other, unleſs it be with Relation to us and the Grounds upon which it

is

is Founded, as was ſaid before of Certainty. For the greateſt Truth is but True, and the leaſt is ſo much, or elſe it would be falſe or not true, which the ſuppoſition will not admit.

3. The certainty therefore that I mean is that of the *Object* in relation *to us*, or as I might have ſaid, (and any one may that likes that way of diſtinguiſhing better) in relation to the Grounds and Reaſons of it. But I chuſe rather to expreſs it by its relation to *us* becauſe of the order which thoſe Reaſons have to our *Underſtanding*, and the Subſerviency of them to our perſwaſion of the Truth of the Object, which is that certainty which we call *Subjective*. My meaning therefore preciſely and breifly is that the Intelligible World is more certain than the Natural, not in it ſelf, but as to us, in as much as we have or may have if we will carefully and freely conſider and Compare the Natures of things, more and better Reaſons to aſſure us of the Truth and Reality of its Exiſtence.

4. Not that I would be thought hereby to inſinuate any *Sceptical* ſuſpicion ot diſparagement of the Teſtimony of Senſe. For tho' I cannot magnify it as ſome do, nor am ſo much an *Epicurean* as to make Senſe the Foundation and meaſure of all Certainty, and the Criterion of Truth, or to ſay with *Lucretius*.

Oxford Edit. lib. 4. p. 212.

In-

Invenies primis ab Senſibus eſſe Creatam
Notitiam Veri, neque Senſus poſſe refelli.

And again,

Quid Majore fide porrò, quàm ſenſus haberi
Debet ——

So neither am I ſo much a *Sceptic*, nor yet ſo much an *Academic*, as to reject abſolutely the Reports of Senſe as falſe, or at leaſt uncertain. I might add, nor yet ſo much a Friend to *Deiſm*. For how Confuſely ſoever our Senſes may repreſent ſome things to us, and how greatly ſoever in ſome nicer, inſtances they may ſtand in need of the Correction of our Reaſon, yet if there be no dependence upon their Fidelity, tho' the Mathematical Sciences would not ſuffer much by it, becauſe (as I ſhew'd before) they proceed upon the Ideal Reaſons of things, and accordingly abſtract from the Natural Exiſtence of them, yet ſome thing elſe of nearer Concernment to us would, I mean *Reveal'd Religion*, which relies in great meaſure upon the Teſtimony of Senſe, which if altogether unfaithful, there could be nothing more vain and impertinent than that aſſuring Introduction of St. *John*, *That which we have ſeen with our Eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of Life* ——. *That which we have ſeen and heard declare we unto you.*

5. Much

5. Much leſs would I be ſuſpected of Indulging a Sceptical humour under the colour of *Philoſophical doubting*, to ſuch an Extravagance, as to make any ſerious Queſtion of the Exiſtence of that general and collective Object of Senſe, a *Natural World*. For whatever I may think of the Erroneouſneſs of our Senſes in many caſes, and how far ſoever upon that conſideration I may be farther induced to think with M. *Malebranche*, that they were not intended to inſtruct us in the Exactneſſes of Truth, but rather to ſerve us for the common uſes of Life, and that they do not diſcover what Bodies are in themſelves, ſo much as what they are in relation to us, yet however I am well enough ſatisfy'd that they do not, when duely uſed, deceive or miſinform us as to the meer *Exiſtence* of things. And accordingly tho', (as the Apoſtle ſays) *Through faith we underſtand that the Worlds were Framed by the Word of God*, yet that there actually is a World, the *Senſible* Perception we have of it is ſufficient to aſſure us. All that I pretend is that the Houſe of Wiſdom, the Ideal Fabric ſtands upon a more Stable Foundation than the Frame of External Nature, and that as ſure as this Senſible World is, the Intelligible World is yet ſurer. And that becauſe we have

1. More.
2. Better Reaſons to aſſure us of its Exiſtence.

6. Firſt,

6. First, *more* Reasons. For this Sensible World being no necessary Emanation from the Nature of God, but the free and (in that respect) *Contingent* effect of his Will and Power, there is no proving *a priori* or from the *Cause*, that there should be such a Word, nor consequently (that way) that there is one. The only Argument producible for its Existence must be from the *Effect*, namely from those impressions which are made upon our Senses in our conversing with Bodies. What the force or moment of this Argument is I am not now to Consider? My present business is sufficiently served in remarking, that be the moment of it what it will, 'tis the only one that the thing has, or is capable of in a Natural way. But does not Faith tell me so as well as Sense? For is not the Natural World the Object of Divine Revelation as well as of Sensible Perception? I grant it is so. But then I ask again whether the certainty I have of this Divine Revelation does not ultimately depend upon the information of Sense? not I mean as *Divine*, (that being a matter of a more Rational discussion, tho' even that too will be found in some measure to have its Foundation in Sense, as in the Attestation of Miracles) but purely and simply as *Revelation*. That is without considering at present the Authority of such a Revelation either as to its being from God, or as to the Truth and Certainly of it supposing it be, all that I now inquire is whether I must not be beholden to my Sense to inform

me

me whether *de facto* there be any such Revelation extant or no? And I think it cannot be denied but that I must. For I have no other certainty of the Existence of such a Revelation than I have of the Existence of my *Bible* wherein it is contain'd. And then again I have no other certainty of the Existence of my *Bible*, or of such and such Characters in it, than I have of other *Bodies* or of any of those *Figures* whereby they are Modified. So that you see all at last resolves into the testimony of Sense, which therefore upon an ultimate and final Consideration may be said to be the only Argument I have for the existence of a Natural World. The short is, Revelation tells me there is such a World, but then 'tis my Sense that tells me there is such a Revelation, and therefore ultimately and fundamentally speaking, I have but one Argument to assure me that there is a Natural World, and that is because my *Sense* tells me so. But now as to the Intelligible World, the Existence of that (as may appear by that little Specimen already given of it) is demonstrable by a great Variety of Argument, both the Nature of God and the Works of God prove it, all the Arts and Sciences proceed upon it, every Eternal Truth Supposes it, and there is no talking Intelligibly, nor so much as thinking without it.

7. But the *Quality* of Reasons is more Considerable than their *Number*. And here also the Intelligible World has the advantage, because we

we have not only more, but alſo *better* Arguments to aſſure us of its Exiſtence than the Natural World can pretend to. This I expect (if any thing) will give a rude ſhock to the Prejudice of Vulgar Minds, who have been accuſtom'd to think nothing ſo ſure and certain as a Material Word, and with whom Senſible Objects are the greateſt, if not the only Realities, and who in Compariſon of this great Certainty are apt to think all other things ſo uncertain, that for the ſake of this ſhort but ſure Preſent, they will hazard their immortal Souls, and that Eternal Heaven of Glory and Happineſs for which they were deſign'd, and for which they even Breath and Live. But yet as great a Paradox as this may ſeem, I ſhall hint at a few things the more particular Conſideration of which will ſufficiently clear and evince the Truth of it.

8. Firſt then let it be conſider'd that as the Argument for a ſenſible World ſtrictly ſpeaking is but one, ſo even that one is from the *Effect*, whereas the Intelligible World being the neceſſary Conſequence and Reſult of the Divine Perfections, not to ſay (what will hereafter appear) a neceſſary Emanation from the Nature of God himſelf, is demonſtrable *a Priori*, and in a cauſal way of deduction, which with the Maſters of Reaſon is accounted the moſt direct and perfect way of Demonſtration. And that moſt juſtly, ſince the end of Demonſtration being to beget Science, that muſt be the moſt perfect Demonſtration that begets the moſt perfect Science, and

and then we are said most perfectly to know any thing, when we know its *Cause*.

9. Again it may be farther Consider'd as another Comparative Advantage on the side of the Intelligible World, that the *Abstracter* Objects are most knowable, as being more Universal and more necessary, and that the Abstracter Reasonings are most Certain, Evident and Conclusive. Accordingly the Sciences are ranged and disposed according to the degrees of Abstraction, and those Sciences have the greatest reputation for certainty which are most Abstract, as *Metaphysics* and *Geometry*, which proceeding from the Abstracteſt Principles to the Abstracteſt Conclusions do for that reason exceed all other Sciences both as to the Immutability of the Subject, and the Evidence of the Demonstration, which are the two things wherein the Certainty of any Science does consist, and whereby it is to be measured. And indeed all our knowlege that strictly deserves that Name proceeds by way of Abstraction, both as to its Principles and as to its Conclusions, whence 'tis that *Aquinas* will not allow of any Understanding but by Abstraction from mattter, nor accordingly that Singulars are knowable but only indirectly and by way of Reflexion. *Cum non Contingat intelligere nisi Secundum Astractionem a Materiâ, impossibile est Singularia ab Intellectu apprehendi directe, sed tantum indirecte secundum quandam reflexionem*, are the expres Words of his Conclu-

Part. 1. *Quæst.* 86. *Art.* 1.

sion.

ſion. For indeed that which I know in a ſtrict Senſe muſt be neceſſary and immutable, (becauſe I muſt know that it cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe) which can only be an Abſtract or Univerſal Truth or *Concluſion*. And ſo alſo that whereby I know it, muſt be neceſſary, which is true only of Abſtract and Univerſal *Principles*. And as Science takes its Original from Abſtract Principles, ſo is it at laſt reſolv'd into them. Thence it is that its *Syntheſis* begins, and thither it is again that its *Analyſis* returns. So that its whole Proceſs, both Egres and Regres, is within the Circle of Abſtraction. Hence ſuch Scholaſtic ſayings as theſe, *Scientiam eſſe de Univerſalibus*, and *Intellectio fit per Abſtractionem*, &c. For in ſhort we *know* nothing but either Intuitively or Demonſtratively, (for as for *Senſible* knowlege it is but improperly ſo call'd) and both theſe proceed upon the higheſt and moſt refined Abſtractions, ſince the Subjects of *Intuition* are firſt Principles or at leaſt Self-evident Maxims, the Abſtracteſt things in the World, and the Subjects of *Demonſtration* ſuch Abſtract Truths as have a neceſſary Connexion with them. But now of all Intelligible Objects or Subjects of Rational Diſcourſe, nothing is or can be of a more Abſtract Nature than the Intelligible World, or thoſe Ideal Reaſons or Eternal Eſſences of things whereof it Conſiſts, thoſe Ideal Reaſons or Eſſences being the very Formal Objects of all Contemplation, and particularly of thoſe Sciences which are moſt Emi-

nent and remarkable both for their *Certainty* and for their *Abſtraction.*

10. Again, the general ground upon which I build my Certainty of an Intelligible World is the clear and difinitive Anſwer of my moſt conſiderate and attentive Reaſon, whereas my Aſſurance of a Natural World has the Teſtimony of Senſe for its Bottom. The Competition then will lie between *Senſible* and *Rational* Evidence, and the Queſtion will be which of theſe is the beſt ground of Certainty, or *Criterion* of Truth. But in the deciſion of this Queſtion Reaſon muſt and will be Judge, tho' it be in her own Cauſe, (for who ſhould Judge elſe) and if ſhe decide in favour of her ſelf, what ſuperiour Juriſdiction ſhall queſtion the equity of her Sentence? But I think there need be no queſtion at all about it. For in the firſt place Reaſon does not always need the Aſſiſtance of Senſe, ſince I can reaſon very clearly and diſtinctly, and with the utmoſt Exactneſs and Certainty, about many Abſtract Truths whereof my Senſe can give me neither information nor Evidence, but now Senſe ever wants the *Aſſiſtance*, and ſometimes the *Correction* of Reaſon. My Reaſon will aſſure me of many things without having any Senſe of them, nay of thoſe things moſt which are leaſt Senſible, but Senſe on the other hand cannot aſſure me of any one thing within the whole Sphere of its Juriſdiction without the Concurrence of Reaſon, no not ſo much as of that great Senſible Object, a *Natural World.*

'Tis

'Tis true indeed the ordinary and proper Argument, for this is *Senſe*, but then this Argument, as Self-ſufficient as it ſeems, is not good, I mean as to my Conviction, whatever it may be in it ſelf, but upon the ſuppoſition of a Principle in *Reaſon*. For let my Senſe aſſure me by all the variety, and with all the clearneſs of Senſation I am Capable of that there is a Material World, yet how can I rely with Acquieſcence upon that Teſtimony, unleſs I am withal aſſured that the Contradictory to this cannot be true? For if it can, then for ought I know it may be as true that there is *not* a Material World, as that there is one. It is therefore neceſſary I ſhould be aſſured that this cannot be. But now how ſhall I be aſſured of it? Not by any information from Senſe, this being a thing of too Abſtract and intentional a Nature to fall within the compaſs of Senſible Perception, which in all Philoſophy is limited not only to *Matter*, but even to *Singular* and *Individual* Matter. It muſt be then my Reaſon that muſt do it, and that upon that Metaphyſical and Intuitively clear Principle, *Impoſſibile eſt idem ſimul eſſe & non eſſe*, from whence not only our Senſible but even our Intellectual and Rational knowledge receives all its Firmneſs and Certainty, according to that of the great Metaphyſician ſpeaking of this Principle, *a quo ſumit Firmitatem tota humana Scientia.* It being impoſſible I ſhould be

Suar. Metap. Diſput. 3. Sect. 3. Num. 9.

aſſured of any thing either in the way of Senſe or in the way of Reaſon and Demonſtration, unleſs I have a Certainty that the Contradictory to it is not alſo true, which I cannot have but upon the foreſaid general Principle. So that by this you may ſee how much Senſe is beholden to Reaſon, ſince even that Senſible Evidence which I have for the Exiſtence of a Material World (which to be ſure is the greateſt that Senſe *can* give) will not ſtand, and is not ſufficient for clear conviction without a Principle of Reaſon to ſupport and confirm it.

11. But to bring this matter to a cloſer Iſſue, let us Conſider what this Evidence of Senſe is which we have for a Natural World. I beleive there is ſuch a World upon the Evidence of Senſe. So the Language of the World expreſſes it, in which nothing is more common and familiar than to talk of the reports of Senſe, and the Teſtimony of Senſe, and the information of Sence, and that our Senſes tell us this or that, *&c.* And I ſhould hardly be Intelligible ſhould I without preparing the way for it, deliver my ſelf any otherwiſe. But am I truly Intelligible *Now*? Indeed we are ſo uſed to this way of Speaking, that every body fancies that they underſtand me, and I am ready to think that I underſtand my ſelf. But let me think again. Does my Sence in very deed inform me that there is a World? Yes, you'l ſay, moſt plainly. But hold, let me anſwer my Queſtion my ſelf, and that by another. What? does

does my Senſe then *Judge*, does it Affirm, Deny, or Infer, make Propoſitions, or draw Concluſions? But not to anſwer to I know not what, let me firſt conſider what I mean by *Senſe*. Do I mean by it that Perception, ſentiment or feeling which follows upon ſome corporeal motion or impreſſion mediately or immediately made upon the Brain? Or do I mean the Faculty or Power of having ſuch a Perception by ſuch an Impreſſion? Or elſe do I mean a certain Texture, or Configuration of ſome parts of my *Machine* whereby I am diſpoſed for ſuch an Impreſſion, and by that to ſuch a Perception? one of theſe I muſt mean if I mean any thing diſtinct. But the laſt belongs wholy to the *Body*, and therefore to be ſure there can be no ſuch thing as judging there. And tho' the other two do indeed appertain to the *Soul*, yet the former of them implying only a *Modification* of it, (that which we more properly call *Senſation* than Senſe) and the latter a capacity or potentiality of being ſo Modified, 'tis plain that there is nothing of Judgement included in theſe neither. For theſe are not Intellectual operations, but only different ſtates or manners of the Souls being, ſuch as *Pleaſure* or *Pain*, &c. Senſe then is ſo far from telling me that there is a World that in ſtrictneſs it tells me nothing, it being moſt Evident that there is nothing of *Judging*, and ſo nothing of telling, informing, reporting or teſtifying in all this.

12. But what then is this *ſenſible Evidence* which we are ſaid to have of a Material World, or what do people mean when they ſay that their *Senſes* do report to them or inform them of ſuch or ſuch things? Why truly I beleive moſt People when they uſe this way of ſpeaking don't know what they do mean, tho' the Familiarity of the Phraſe may impoſe ſo far upon them as to perſwade them that they do. And truly 'tis not very eaſy to tell preſently what they *ſhould* mean. However thus much I Think is clear that the proper, obvious and literal meaning is not Intelligible, it being moſt-certain that that which cannot Judge of the Exiſtence of Bodies (as Senſe cannot, becauſe there is no ſuch thing as Judgment belonging to it) cannot properly make any Report, or give in any Evidence or information about them.

13. But tho' my Senſe does not in ſtrictneſs *judge* of the Exiſtence of Bodies, yet does it not *feel* it? That would be pleaſant indeed. He muſt have a very Metaphyſical Senſe that ſhall feel *Exiſtence*, but not a very Metaphyſical *Underſtanding* that ſhall think he does. For to feel that a thing Exiſts, is the ſame as to feel a Propoſition. Well but however I may feel *Bodies*, tho' I cannot feel their *Exiſtence*, and may not this be the Evidence that I have of them from my Senſes? And an excellent Evidence too if it can be had. For there is nothing more clear than *Senſation*, and what I *feel* I am as certain of as of what I *know*. No

Principle

Principle or Concluſion in Geometry is more unqueſtionably Evident to me than *Pleaſure* or *Pain* is when I feel it. But do I indeed *thus* feel Bodies? What, as I feel Pleaſure or Pain? No, that cannot poſſibly be, for Bodies are without me, but that which I feel muſt be within me. And indeed to ſpeak with Philoſophic Accuracy how contrary ſoever to Popular Prejudice, as ordinary as it is to ſay we feel ſuch or ſuch Bodies when we have any Senſation through their occaſion, 'tis not the *Bodies* that we truly feel, but the *Senſation*. As for inſtance when I drink Wine, 'tis not the Wine that I feel, but *Pleaſure*. And ſo when I touch a Coal of Fire, 'tis not the Fire that I feel, but *Pain*. For I feeel only that which is within me, and whereof I am inwardly Conſcious to my ſelf, *viz.* That different Modification of its Being which my Soul then has. In a Word, I do not feel any thing that is out of my ſelf, but I feel my very ſelf otherwiſe Modified, and Exiſting after another manner than I did before. So that here is no ſuch thing as Senſation of *Bodies*, but only ſimple *Senſation*.

14. My Senſe then neither *Judges* of Bodies, nor *feels* them. And how then can it give any Evidence Concerning them? It goes no farther than a *Senſation*, and that Senſation goes no farther than my *Soul*. And what is either of theſe as ſuch to the Exiſtence of Bodies that are without me? But however upon ſuch Senſations I naturally judge that there are ſuch Bodies.

That indeed I do, and now you have hit it. But then this amounts to a plain Confeſſion that what you call the Evidence of Senſe is indeed not the Evidence of *Senſe*, but the Evidence of *Reaſon*. I feel a Senſation, and thence find my ſelf naturally carried to judge or conclude that there are Bodies, but then 'tis not the Senſation, but my Reaſoning or Judgement upon that Senſation that tells me or reports to me that there are ſuch Beings. And tho' to diſtinguiſh this from other ways of Reaſoning we may if we pleaſe in the Language of the People call it *Senſe*, yet if we will Conform to the Exactneſs of Truth in Thinking, as we do to cuſtom in Speaking, we muſt remember that 'tis not really Senſe, but reaſoning or making a Judgement upon Senſe. So then that Senſible Evidence which is alleged for a Natural World proves after all to be indeed a Rational Evidence, (tho' of a particular kind) and ſuch as upon no other Conſideration and in no other reſpect is to be call'd a Senſible one, than mearly as it proceeds upon a *ground* of Sence, becauſe as I ſaid before, 'tis reaſoning upon a Senſation, or if you will, concluding ſome thing without, from ſome thing felt within.

15. Inſtead then of Comparing Senſible with Rational Evidence in order to the better determining on which ſide lies the Advantage of Certainty, either on that of the Intelligible which has the one, or that of the Natural World which pretends to no more than the other, we muſt now

now rather compare *Rational* Evidence with *Rational*, or one Rational Evidence with another. For here the final Competition will be found to lie when Men have talk'd never ſo much of their Senſible Evidece, the Evidence which we have of both Worlds will after all in ſtrictneſs reſolve into that which is Rational. Our Senſes are all ſilent in this and all other matters, (as fine Reports and Speeches as we are pleaſed to make for them) and 'tis Reaſon alone that Speaks in us and to us; only it Speaks after a different manner, and with more or leſs clearneſs and Truth as the Grounds and Principles are upon which it goes. The true ſtate of the Queſtion then will be, (after this more diſtinct evolution of matter) not which gives the beſt and ſureſt Evidence my Senſe or my Reaſon, but preciſely this, when it is that I Reaſon beſt, that is, with moſt clearneſs, or with moſt certainty, when I Reaſon upon a *Senſation*, or when I Reaſon upon an Abſtract and *Intellectual Principle* or *Truth*.

16. But if the State of the Queſtion be reduced to this, methinks there ſhould be no great Queſtion about it. For tho' Senſation it ſelf, (as was noted before) be full as clear as Intellectual Sight, and I am as certain of that Pleaſure or Pain which I *feel* as I am of any thing that either in the Intuitive or Demonſtrative way I can ever *know*, yet Reaſoning upon Senſation is quite another thing, and ſuch wherein we muſt be contented with a far lower meaſure of Light

Light and Evidence. Senſation it ſelf indeed is very clear, I cannot think I am in Pain when I am not, nor that I am not in Pain when indeed I am, but our Reaſoning upon Senſation may be very Obſcure, Confuſe, and Uncertain, nay even falſe and erroneous, and oftentimes is ſo, as in thoſe caſes wherein we ſay our Senſes deceive us, but wherein to ſpeak more properly * we deceive our ſelves, by reaſoning confuſely upon a clear Senſation. For Senſe, if we nicely conſider the Nature of things, and ſpeak of them in the very ſtrictneſs of Truth, can never deceive or be deceiv'd, not upon the account of any *poſitive Infallibility*, ſuch I mean as is Founded upon a Perfection, but only in a *Negative* reſpect, becauſe (as was ſhewn before) there is no ſuch thing as Judgment any manner of way belonging to it. And there is nothing more plain than that where there is no judging at all, there can be no judging amiſs, which by the way ſhews all the Queſtions and Controverſies abut the *Erroneouſneſs* of the *Senſe* in propriety of acceptation, (as they ſeem generally to be worded) to be but idle and impertinent Amuſements. For I ſay 'tis not Senſe but our Reaſon that is deceiv'd when ever there is any Errour, and that by paſſing wrong Judgments upon, or drawing wrong Concluſions from ſuch Senſations as we really and truely feel. For as there are but two general ways of Erring,

* *Oculus recte videt, ſed Animus perverſe judicat.* St. Auſtin. *de verâ Religione* chap. 33.

Erring, either by reaſoning rightly upon wrong Principles, or wrong upon right one's, ſo accordingly this *latter* ſeems to be the caſe in the Errours of the Senſes, as they are call'd. We Err here by Reaſoning wrong upon a right Principle as I may ſay, and that becauſe we reaſon confuſely upon what we feel diſtinctly.

17. There may then be a confuſe Reaſoning upon a clear and diſtinct Senſation, or rather tho' the Senſation be alwaies clear and diſtinct, yet Reaſon may and often does proceed *Confuſely*, and by that means *Erroneouſly*, upon it. And conſequently Reaſoning upon Senſation tho' oftentimes actually right, is not however in the general ſo clear or certain as Senſation it ſelf is. But neither is it ſo clear or certain as the other way of *Reaſoning*, *viz.* When we Reaſon upon an Abſtract Intellectual Principle. Not that the Principle it ſelf is then better, (for as was before obſerv'd, and may not be amiſs again to inculcate, nothing can well be more clear than *Senſation*) but only we may Reaſon better upon it, and that becauſe there is a more cloſe and evident Connexion of the Principle with the Concluſion when we Reaſon upon a pure Intellectual Principle, than when we Reaſon upon Senſation, eſpecially as to the Exiſtence of Bodies. For in Reaſoning upon an Intellectual Principle I find the Concluſion oftentimes ſo nearly and viſibly connected with the Principle, that I can be as certain of the Concluſion

cluſion as I am of the Principle it ſelf. But now 'tis not ſo when I Reaſon upon a Senſation, unleſs in one Inſtance, and that is when I conclude my own Exiſtence from it, and then indeed, *I am in Pain, therefore I am*, or, *I am in Pleaſure, therefore I am*, is as good an Argument as, *I think, therefore I am.* But 'tis otherwiſe when from Senſation I conclude the Exiſtence of things without me. There is no ſuch immediate Connexion then, nor can I with Reaſon pretend to be as certain (however otherwiſe perſwaded or aſſured I may be) of the Exiſtence of thoſe Bodies which I prove from Senſation, as I am of the Senſation it ſelf. For as I do not properly feel Bodies, ſo neither are Bodies (or at leaſt it may juſtly be doubted whether they are or no) the cauſes of what I feel, as the beſt Philoſophers will now acknowledge.

18. Beſides, when I Reaſon Intellectually I have oftentimes that *Intuitive* Evidence which is the ground of Demonſtration, and which (as the Author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding well obſerves) is found in every ſtep of that Reaſoning which produces knowledge. I ſay I have here an intuitive view of the Premiſes upon which my Concluſion depends. By which means I can *Demonſtrate* a multitude of Propoſitions in the moſt perfect and Scientific manner. But when I Reaſon upon Senſation, I find this intuitive Evidence fails me, except only in the

Book 4. chap. 2. p. 265.

caſe

caſe of my own Exiſtence, which accordingly is the only thing I can ſtrictly demonſtrate in that way of Reaſoning.

19. That indeed which may be beſt prov'd this way next to my own Exiſtence, or of the things that are without me, is perhaps the Exiſtence of *God*. Whereof M. *Malebranche* has given a very rational Specimen in the firſt of his *Chriſtian Converſations*, but yet ſuch however as will hardly be admitted for a ſtrict Demonſtration, as near as it approaches to it. But as to the Exiſtence of *Bodies*, tho' it be a thing of no reaſonable doubt, nor to be ſeriouſly queſtion'd by any ſober Underſtanding, yet if a ſtrict and rigorous Demonſtration ſhould be required of it, I muſt confeſs that I know not how to give it upon a Principle of Senſation. And I think 'tis very plain that it is not *ſo* Demonſtrable. For I can demonſtrate no Truth but what has a neceſſary Connexion or Dependence upon its Principle, and of which Connexion or dependence I have alſo an Intuitive View, ſince otherwiſe that whereby I prove, will want proof it ſelf, and ſo not Demonſtrate. But now where is the neceſſary Connexion between a Senſation within and the Exiſtence of Bodies without, and what intuitive Evidence is there of this Connexion, that ſo I may reaſon demonſtratively from one to the other? I think it will ſoon appear upon an attentive Conſideration of the matter that there is none. And accordingly as *Suarez* ſhews

Diſput. 20. *Sect.* 6. N. 7.

that

that the Creation of the World from Eternity is not Demonſtrable becauſe Demonſtration is only of neceſſaries, but now it is not neceſſary that the World ſhould be ſo Created, neither from any inſtrinſic neceſſity of its own, nor from any Extrinſic neceſſity of the Agent, and therefore it is not Demonſtrable that it was Created from Eternity. In like manner I may ſay even of the World's preſent Exiſtence, that it is not Strictly Demonſtrable from Senſation, and that for want of a neceſſary and evident Connexion with that Principle, ſince as my Senſe does not feel Bodies, ſo neither can Bodies be the cauſes of what I feel, or at leaſt it may be juſtly queſtion'd whether they are or no.

20, But tho' Senſe does not properly *feel* Bodies, yet can any thing be more plain than that we *ſee* them? There is I confeſs this peculiar in *Viſion* that is not in our other Senſes, that it includes an outward Objective Perception, as well as an inward Sentiment or Senſation, that is I mean (as clearly as I can expreſs it in ſo ſhort a compaſs of Words) that in Viſion the Soul is not only otherwiſe Modified in it ſelf, and otherwiſe Conſcious to it ſelf, but that there is ſome thing ſeen or perceiv'd by it that is really diſtinct from it ſelf. But what is that *ſome thing*? Not the very Bodies that are without us, and that becauſe they are without us, and ſome times far diſtant from us. Beſides that (M. *Malebranche* well remarks) if one did ſee them in themſelves, one could never ſee them

them when they were not, which yet very often happens. And accordingly even the common Philoſophy finds it neceſſary to allow that we ſee not Bodies, immediately but mediately, that is, not the Bodies themſelves, but only the repreſentative Species or Ideas of them. But however thoſe Species which we ſee, come from thoſe Bodies which we do not ſee. That indeed would be a material Inſtance. But are you ſure of that? The contrary perhaps is Demonſtrable, and that from this very Conſideration juſt now borrow'd, but this belonging to the 2*d*. part of this Theory, 'twill be ſufficient to the preſent purpoſe to ſuppoſe it only doubtful (and ſo without doubt it is) whether the Species that repreſent Bodies to us come from the Bodies or no. And if they do not derive from them, they are as ſuch no poſitive Proof of them. So that even our Viſion it ſelf, and that even the moſt clear and awaken'd (not to make any advantage of the Illuſions of Dreams) has no immediate, much leſs abſolute or neceſſary Connexion with the Exiſtence of Bodies. 'Tis true indeed upon the appearances of Bodies, and thoſe regular and uniform Senſations which accompany thoſe Appearances, I find my ſelf Naturally determin'd to think that they Exiſt. But before I can rationally conclude that they do ſo, or by a reflex act of my mind approve of that Natural Judgment, ſome other Conſiderations muſt intervene, ſince neither my Senſation, nor my Judgment upon that Senſation is of it ſelf

any

any direct Argument for it. And therefore I cannot but think M. *Descartes* was much in the right, (how paradoxical soever he may seem to some less capable or less considerate Judges) when he suspended the Certainty, at least of Sensible things, upon the Existence of God. For thither we must have recourse at last for all the certainty that is to be had in this matter. And indeed those Considerations which are taken from the Truth and Goodness of the excellent and most perfect Author of our Natures, who there is no reason to suspect, would give us Senses to abuse and deceive us in the due and Natural use of them, are Sufficient to satisfie all sober and reasonable Understandings of the real Existence of Bodies. But yet I think that even these do not *Demonstrate* it, and that after all the thing is not capable of a strict Metaphysical Evidence. Which by the way may serve yet farther to convince that material Figures cannot be the Object of Geometric Science.

21. Indeed that which we may be most assured of upon the principle of Sensation in relation to Bodies, is their *Simple Existence*. For as to the *manner* of their Existence or the various Modifications belonging to them, here our Senses are so frequently deceiv'd, (I would be understood more Philosophically than I speak) that we even complain of their Fallaciousness, and think it advisable not to trust them without particuler Caution. And here come in the com-

common Instances of a *strait Stick* appearing crooked in the Water, and a *square Tower* seeming round at a distance, *&c.* with the more uncommon Observations that have been lately made upon the errors of our Senses as to the Quantity, Figure, Motion, and Rest of Bodies. But indeed as to their Simple *Existence*, their Testimony is more Creditable. And yet even here he that shall look for strict demonstrative evidence may reason long enough upon Sensation before he will find it, as I beleive any Competent Reader will be satisfied that shall with due care and indifference consider what M. *Malebranche* has offer'd upon this Argumeut in his sixth Illustration to his *Recherche de la verite.* I have a Sensation within me, therefore I my self am, is indeed an evident and irrefragable Consequence. But when I argue thus, I have a Sensation within me, therefore there is a world of Bodies existing without me, here the consequence is some thing remote, and not so evident but that several Objections may be rais'd against it by one that has a mind to be, I will not say *Sceptical*, but only very *Metaphysical.* Not but that I think such Difficulties may be fairly answer'd so far as concerns the *Truth* of the thing, and to all purposes of reasonable satisfaction about it, by such considerations as are taken from the Truth and goodness of God, who consistently with those his Attributes cannot suffer us to have such natural and regular Appearances of things and necessary

Tom. 2. p. 349. *Compared with what he says to the like purpose in his Entretiens sur la Metaph. & sur la Relig.* p. 196.

ceſſary Judgments about them, without their objective Realities in Nature. But tho' they may be ſhewn not to be concluding Objections as to the *Truth* of the thing, yet however for ought I can diſcern they will alwaies remain ſuch againſt the *Demonſtrability* of it. At leaſt they will ſerve to ſhew (what is ſufficient to our purpoſe) that we cannot *ſo* demonſtrate the Exiſtence of Bodies upon the Principle of Senſation, as we can a great many Metaphyſical and Mathematical Truths when we reaſon upon abſtract and Intellectual Principles.

22. In ſhort then, as my Senſe does not tell me there are Bodies, ſo neither does my reaſoning upon Senſe abſolutely conclude them. There is evidence enough from Senſation to exclude all *Reaſonable*, but not all *Poſſible* Doubt concerning the Exiſtence of Bodies. For I can doubt, if I pleaſe to uſe my liberty of ſuſpenſe to the utmoſt of any thing that is not abſolutely Evident, ſo Evident as invincibly to determin my aſſent. And 'tis well known who did ſo, and founded a Syſtem of Philoſophy upon it. Tho' I think he would have gon too far in the indulgence of his doubting Humour, when he carried it even to *Principles*, and Mathematical *Demonſtrations*, unleſs by Principles and Demonſtrations be meant, as he takes care to explain himſelf, thoſe which we have hitherto taken for ſuch, and unleſs by *doubting* of them be underſtood, as he ſeems alſo to mean, our diffiding ſo far to our former Judgments about them, as not to admit them till we have *de novo* conſider'd and

examin'd

examin'd them. But then we ſhall find it neceſſary to admit ſome ſuch Principles and Demonſtrations, for theſe things ſhine out too bright upon our minds to be doubted of when we actually think of them with due Attention. So that in the mid'ſt of all my Philoſophic ſuſpenſes and reſerves, and even while I doubt of the Exiſtence of Bodies, I find I cannot doubt of many Metaphyſical and Mathematical Principles, together with ſuch concluſion as neceſſarily depend upon them. And accordingly, as St. *Auſtin* obſerves, the credit of our Senſible has been more conteſted than that of our Intellectual Perception. For ſays he very appoſitely to this purpoſe, *Whereas there are two ſorts of things that are known, one of thoſe things which the mind has perceiv'd by the Senſes of the Body, and another of thoſe which the mind has perceiv'd by it ſelf, many things have been diſputed by thoſe Philoſophers* (meaning the Academics) *againſt the Senſes of the Body, whereas there are ſome moſt firm Perceptions that the mind has by it ſelf, ſuch as this, I know that I live, which they were never able to call into queſtion.* Whereby it plainly appears that as great as the certainty of Senſe is generally preſumed to be, and as to the caſe before us upon the whole really is, the certainty of the Underſtanding is yet much greater, or to expreſs my ſelf in a correcter tho' leſs uſual manner, that we proceed with more certainty when we reaſon upon an Intellectual Principle, (alwaies ſuppoſing that we reaſon well) than when we reaſon upon a Senſation.

De Trin. lib. 15. chap. 12.

ſation. And therefore even the Author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, as great a Patron as he otherwiſe ſeems to be of the *Senſes*, does yet with good Judgment make ſenſible knowledge to be the loweſt ſort of knowledge, and indeed will hardly allow it a place among the Degrees of it, as in ſtrictneſs it cannot challenge it, there being no knowledge properly ſo call'd but what is the Reſult of *Intuition* or *Demonſtration*. And all this is no more than what is Vertually and implicitly acknowledg'd by us when we ſay, as commonly we do, that *Reaſon Corrects Senſe*. For I pray how is it that Reaſon Corrects Senſe, or what is it that we mean when we ſay ſo? What does our Reaſon Correct our *Senſation*? Happy indeed were it for us in this miſerable Life if Reaſon could thus Correct Senſe, and I ſhould think much better of the *Stoic* Philoſophy than I do. But this cannot be, Senſe in this reſpect is too incorrigible, even for Reaſon it ſelf. For certainly what I feel I feel, and 'tis not all the Reaſon in the World that can perſwade me out of it. But how then does Reaſon Correct Senſe? Why truly I know not how to *Anſwer* your Queſtion, but by denying the *Suppoſition* of it. For indeed exactly ſpeaking Reaſon does not Correct Senſe at all, it being impoſſible that ſhould be Corrected or Rectified which does not Err, or that that ſhould Err which cannot Judge. 'Tis my Reaſon only that is *Capable* of Correction, and 'tis my Reaſon only that *needs* it. For no Man need deſire more

Eſſay of Hum. Underſtanding: Book 4. chap. 2. p. 267.

more either for the preventing of Errour, or for the undeceiving himſelf from it, than to have his *Reaſon* or Underſtanding ſet right. That then which we call Reaſons Corrected Senſe, is indeed Reaſons Correcting Reaſon. But then ſince the very ſame cannot Correct the ſame, becauſe then it muſt be ſuppoſed to be at once right and wrong, by Reaſons Correcting Reaſon we muſt mean that one Reaſon Corrects another, which again more explicitly will be found to reſolve into this, that by Reaſoning upon an Intellectual Principle we Correct or Rectify thoſe Judgments which we form'd by reaſoning upon the Principle of Senſation. And thus indeed Reaſon may and does oftentimes Correct Senſe, tho' by reaſon of our Prejudic'd Adheſions to thoſe ſenſible Judgments, not ſo often as it *ſhould*. But then I hope that which Corrects is more perfect than that which is Corrected, or elſe it would not be the better for mending. And therefore ſinceReaſon does thus Correct Senſe, what can be more plain than that Reaſoning upon an Intellectual Principle is (*Cæteris paribus*) a more perfect and certain way of Reaſoning than Reaſoning upon Senſation. But now the Intelligible World is founded upon Intellectual Principles of Truths, (not to ſay that it is the very *Foundation* of them) and thoſe as clear, ſome of them, as can well be preſented to the mind of Man, as particularly that, *of nothing there can be no Affection*, upon which is grounded the Eternity of Eſſences or Ideal Reaſons of things, and accordingly I conclude upon an equal Ballancing of the Evidence on

both ſides that the Exiſtence of the Intelligible World, (as much an *Eutopia* as it may be fancied by ſome) is more certain than that of the Natural. And I beleive I might defy any Man to prove the Reality of the Latter, as well as even I my ſelf have done that of the former.

23. Well, but does not *Faith* certify me of the Exiſtence of this material World as well as *Senſe*, and yet if notwithſtanding that, the Intelligible World be the more certain of the two, becauſe the Foundation of it is laid in Rational Principles, will it not hence follow that *Reaſon* is more Certain than *Faith*? To ſatisfy therefore this Objection, beſides what has been already offer'd toward the Prevention of it, I ſhall here upon this occaſion with all convenient Brevity and poſſible clearneſs endeavour a reſolution of that great Queſtion concerning the *Comparative* Certainty of Faith and Reaſon, or Science. The Abſolute Certainty of each of theſe is no part of the preſent Queſtion, but rather the ſuppoſition of it. 'Tis ſuppoſed here that there is a certainty belonging to Reaſon, and that there is alſo a certainty belonging to Faith. The thing inquired, and to be conſider'd, is, which is the greater of the two. And here I find, as in moſt things, Men are apt to divide upon the Extremes, and accordingly as far from Truth, as from one another. Some ſeem to think they can never exalt Faith enough, and others again that they can never exalt Reaſon enough. Accordingly ſome will ſtate the Certainty of Faith beyond that of Reaſon. But in the firſt place I think it a moſt clear

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caſe that this Account (how Pious ſoever in its intention) cannot be ſtrictly True, ſince the final Reſolution of Faith being into a Principle of Reaſon, it is impoſſible I ſhould be more certain of the *Concluſion*, than I am of the *Principle* whence it is drawn. For the great Principle upon which my Faith is grounded is the utter Impoſſibility that what God reveals ſhould be falſe, or, that whatſoever God reveals is True. But now this is a Principle of *Metaphiſical* Truth, ſuch as is the Subject of Natural Speculation, and is rationally Demonſtrable from the Ideas of God, and accordingly is a true Object of *Natural* Science, as much as any other Concluſion is that is drawn from any other Principle of Reaſon. But then as 'tis impoſſible that my Faith which proceeds upon this Principle, and is a Concluſion from it, ſhould be more certain than the Principle it ſelf, or that I ſhould be more certain of what I beleive upon this ground than of the ground it ſelf upon which I build my Faith, ſo is it equally impoſſible that my Faith ſhould have a greater certainty than that of Reaſon, becauſe the Principle of my Faith is *Reaſon*. The Argument more breifly and more formally is this,

The Concluſion can never be more certain than its Principle.

But Reaſon is the Principle of Faith, *&c.*

Therefore Faith cannot be more certain than Reaſon.

The major Propoſition ſpeaks the Natural Senſe as well as *Logic* of all the World, and is in it ſelf moſt evident, ſince if the Concluſion were more

certain than its Principle, there would be ſome thing in the Concluſion, that is not in the Principle, that is, ſome thing in the Effect that is not in the Cauſe, which is impoſſible. The minor Propoſition will appear by the *Analyſis* of Faith, which reſolves into the Impoſſibility of God's revealing any thing but what is True, which, as I noted but now, is one of the Principles of Natural Reaſon. And indeed as certain and inconteſtable a one as any in the World, nothing being more impoſſible than that God who is Infinitely Wiſe, and Infinitely Good and True, ſhould either be deceiv'd, or deceive.

23. But then perhaps this very thing will be pretended (and I think is) by ſome as an Argument to the contrary purpoſe, *viz.* For the Elevation of the certainty of Faith above that of Reaſon or Science. Becauſe the Truth of God is ſo very firm a Foundation, and there can nothing be conceiv'd more impoſſible than that what God reveals ſhould not be True, for this very reaſon perhaps it will be urged, that there is no certainty like that of Faith, no not even that of Reaſon or Science it ſelf. But thoſe that argue thus ſeem to forget, 1*ſt*. That that Principle is not the *Object* of Faith, but the *Reaſon* or *Motive* of it, and but one of the Motives neither, and conſequently that the certainty of that Principle ought not to be Confounded and made one with the certainty of Faith. 2*d*. That that Principle, as was ſaid before, is a Principle of *Metaphiſical* Truth, and therefore tho' we ſhould ſuppoſe it never ſo certain, and that Faith had all the cer-

tainty

tainty of it, (and 'tis impoſſible it ſhould have more) yet it could not be more certain than Reaſon, becauſe that very Principle is Reaſon. 3*d.* That Natural Truths are as much the Objects of God's *Knowledge*, as Divine Truths are of his *Revelation*. And that 'tis every whit as impoſſible (as a Judicious Author well remarks) that God ſhould be deceiv'd in what he *knows*, as in what he *ſays*. And that therefore the Objects of Faith have in this reſpect no peculiar Advantage. So that it appears every way utterly impoſſible that the certainty of Faith ſhould *exceed* that of Reaſon or Natural Science.

Traite de la Foi Divine. p. 143.

24. But tho' the certainty of Faith cannot poſſibly exceed that of Reaſon or Science, yet does it not *equal* it? So much at leaſt upon a Religious Conſideration you cannot chuſe but grant. But ſtay, even our Zeal for Religion ſhould be according to Knowledge, and this is a Queſtion that carries too much latitude in it to be either affirm'd or denied (as the manner is) in the groſs, being either True or Falſe according as 'tis underſtood, or according as the ſtate or Hypotheſis of Faith ſhall be laid. For tho' it can in no caſe be truly ſaid that Faith is more certain than Reaſon, yet there is a caſe wherein it may be truly ſaid to be as certain, and it may alſo be as truly ſaid that it is not as certain. For both theſe may be true Propoſitions. But then they cannot be contradictory becauſe both True. And whenever there is Affirmation and Negation without contradiction in the Anſwers, 'tis

a certain ſign that there is Ambiguity in the Queſtion, which therefore muſt be better clear'd, before it can be well anſwer'd.

25. In the mean time this is clear, that Faith is a Rational Aſſent, or an Aſſent founded upon Reaſon, tho' not the Reaſon of the thing beleiv'd, yet however a Reaſon from *without* inducing to beleive it, and that accordingly as being a Concluſion proceeding upon Premiſes, (as much as any other Concluſion does) it can have no more ſtrength or certainty than the Premiſes have upon which it depends. So then according as theſe Premiſes are ſtated, ſo will the certainty of Faith be.

26. But before we can make any Judgment upon the certainty of theſe Premiſes, we muſt firſt ſee what they are. Faith we ſay is an Aſſent to a thing upon the Authority of God. And ſo the Authority of God is in groſs the Reaſon or Ground of Faith. But if we take this in peices and conſider it more diſtinctly, we ſhall find that it will reſolve into theſe two Principles. 1*ſt*. That whatſoever is Reveal'd by God is True. 2*d*. That this or that in particular is Reveal'd by God. For to beleive a thing upon Divine Authority is, more explicitly, to beleive it to be true becauſe *He* has ſaid it, who can ſay nothing but what is True. Which plainly reſolves into the two foremention'd Principles, which are the Premiſes from whence that Concluſion is drawn which makes up the *Act*, and ſo the intire *Syllogiſm* of faith.

27. Now the firſt of theſe Premiſes is as was before obſerv'd a Propoſition of Metaphyſical Truth, and

and as certain a one as any whatsoever. And accordingly in this *respect*, or as far as Faith depends upon this Principle, it is full as certain as Science. But then this being but one of the Pillars that supports its weight, whether it be *Absolutely* so or no must depend upon the strength and firmness of the other. This therefore is to be Consider'd, since 'tis this upon which both the Conclusion of the Syllogism, and the Issue of the Question turns.

28. And here who can say that it is not Possible for Almighty God if he so pleases, to accompany the outward Revelation of his Word with such a brightness of Internal Light and Evidence, that a Man may as certainly know and be as well assured that this or that in Particular is Reveal'd by God, as he is in the general that whatsoever is Reveal'd by God is True. And for ougut I know this might be the actual case of the inspired Writers, Prophets and Apostles, who with their Divine Inspirations had also it may be an infallible Criterion whereby to discern the Divinity of them. But that it is not ordinarily and *de facto* so now I thing admits so little Question, that it may be reasonably presumed that the certainty we now have of this 2. Principle is not *Metaphysical*, such as we have of self-evident Principles, or conclusions drawn from them with such Evidence that we perceive 'tis plainly impossible they should be otherwise, but such as arises from a Collection of Rational Considerations which fairly laid together are sufficient to convince and satisfy an indifferent mind of the Truth proposed, so far, as to exclude all reasonable doubt concerning it, which is what in contradistinction to the other,

other, we call a *Moral* Certainty, and that becauſe it is founded upon Moral Evidence, ſuch as has force enoughto perſwade, tho' not enough to extort the Aſſent. This Certainty is indeed of an order inferiour to the other, but as great as the preſent caſe will ordinarily admit. For ſure no Man can now be well preſumed able, with any reaſon or modeſty, to pretend that he is as certain that the Scripture is the Word of God, as he is of the other general Principle, that *whatever God has reveal'd is True.* Nor do I know of any, except thoſe that plead for *inward Revelation* and Immediate Inſpiration, that pretend to any thing like it.

29. To the Queſtion therefore whether Faith be as certain as Reaſon or Science, I now formally and diſtinctly anſwer, that if Faith be taken according to the higheſt and moſt perfect Idea poſſible to be conceiv'd of it, or according to that its firſt ſtate or *Hypotheſis* wherein the Man is ſuppoſed to be as certain of the 2*d.* Principle as of the firſt, it is then as certain as Science. That is in other Words, that what a Man beleives upon the Authority of God knowing that he has indeed his Authority for it, he may be as certain and well aſſured of, as of any thing he can know upon the Principles of Reaſon. For as what a Man beleives upon Divine Authority is really as certain in it *ſelf*, ſo if he knows it to be of ſuch Authority, it is as certain to *him.* In which Senſe I would be underſtood when in my *Account of Reaſon and Faith* I equal the certainty of Divine Faith with that of Science.

30. But in caſe Faith be taken according to the other ſtate or *Hypotheſis* of it, that which ſuppoſes

the

the 2*d*. of the Premiſes to depend only upon moral Arguments, and ſo to have no more than a moral Certainty, then ſince the concluſion alwaies partakes of the Feebler ſide, and Metaphyſical certainty can never be the Reſult of Moral Evidence, 'tis moſt clear that the certainty of Faith can be but Moral, and conſequently not equal to that of Science. And ſince this latter is the preſent ordinary ſtate of Faith, it muſt be ſaid, and I hope may without any offence to ſuch as have the light of knowledge with the heat of Zeal, that Faith in its preſent ordinary ſtate has but a *Moral* certainty. Which indeed is ſufficient for all the purpoſes of Chriſtian Life, to perſwade a Man to renounce the preſent World for the Glories of the next, and to make it ſuch a *Faith* as ſhall work by *Love*. And they do no real ſervice to the Intereſt of Religion, but rather expoſe it to the ridicule of the more *Philoſophic Libertins*, who go to ſtrain the matter any higher.

31. So then Faith can never exceed the certainty of Science, but may very well come ſhort of it, and ordinarily does ſo, as having only a Moral Certainty, and that becauſe one of the grounds on which it reſts ordinarily has no greater. And indeed after all were it otherwiſe, there would be more difficulty than perhaps is generally imagin'd in accounting for the *Infidelity* both of the preſent and of former Ages. For the firſt of the Premiſes upon which Faith proceeds. *viz*. That whatſoever God Reveals is True, being moſt unqueſtionably Evident, if the other were ſo too, that this or that Article is reveal'd by God, the Concluſion

of

of Faith methinks ſhould naturally and neceſſarily follow, ſo that there ſeems as little room left for *Infidelity* as there is for the denial of the Concluſion when both the Premiſes are clear and unexceptionable. I conclude therefore that the certainty of Faith is ordinarily no more than *Moral*, and that the more ſecurely, becauſe I have herein concuring with me ſome very Rational and Judicious Divines, particularly *Le Blanc* in his Theſis *de Certitudine quæ Fidei Competit*, and the formentioned Author of *Traitè de la foi divine*, who tho' as far from being wanting in any reverential regard to the ſacred Honour and Dignity of *Divine Faith* as any of its moſt Zealous Advocates, do yet allow it no more than a *Moral* Certainty. And if this be that which the late Ingenious Author of *Theologæ Chriſtianæ Principia Mathematica* means by what he talks concerning the *Probability* of Faith, I think he is ſo far in the right, tho' I could have wiſh'd *1ſt.* That he had expreſs'd himſelf more Cautiouſly, and in ſtead of the Diminutive Term of *Probability*, which carries not a very *good* Signification, and by thoſe who are not the beſt Friends to Reveal'd Religion may be abuſed to a *worſe*, he had uſed the ſafer and more Theological Term of *Moral Certainty*,. *2d.* That he had not put Probability into the Definition of Faith. *3d.* That he had not made it neceſſary to diſtinguiſh it from *Science*. Since tho' we ſhould ſuppoſe *Certainty* to belong to Faith, yet it would be ſufficiently diſtinguiſh'd from that Perſwaſion which he calls Science, ſince in the one the Certainty is from *within* or from the Nature of the thing it ſelf, whereas in the other it is from

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without or from an external Evidence. For indeed 'tis not the degree of the *Assent*, but the Quality of the *Motive* that here makes the Distinction.

32. Now in two Words to apply my self to the Objection whereas 'tis urged that we have Revelation as well as Sense for the Natural World, and therefore if notwithstanding that the Intelligible World be the more certain of the two, because *Rationally* Evident, it will thence follow that Reason or Science is more certain than Faith. To this I answer by admitting the Consequence, or if you will by denying the minor Proposition, if the Argument were intire. For I see no inconvenience in allowing Reason or Science Ordinarily to exceed Faith in Certainty, since according to the forestated measures it appears that the Certainty of Faith is Ordinarily no more than *Moral*.

CHAP. V.

The State of the Intelligible World represented in a more distinct View, containing some modal Account of the Divine Ideality or Omniformity.

1. HAving laid the Foundations, and rais'd the Fabric of an *Intelligible* World by shewing the Reality and Necessity of its Existence, we are now invited by the regular persuance of our *Theory* to take a nearer View of it, and Contemplate a little the Nature and Manner of this fair and lucid Syste me. For what more Natural and Consequential than from the Existence of things to pro-

proceed to the Consideration of their Natures, and if the appearance of a new Star or Planet draws after it the Observation and Excites the Curiosity of its admiring Beholders, much less should so great and awakening a *Phenomenon* as that of a rising World, pass without our Philosophizing upon it. Especially since as the Natural World imploys our *Physical*, so the Intelligible World is the proper subject of our *Metaphysical* Contemplations.

2. And these we may now enter upon with some Heart and Courage after such abundant satisfaction given of the actual Existence of the thing to be inquired into, since however short or defective we may be in our Representations, (as indeed 'tis hardly possible to be otherwise in such an Undertaking as this) yet we shall not want the comfort of being secure of their Fundamental *Hypothesis*, the *Reality* of what we are inquiring into, that we are not drawing the Picture of a Dream, or representing the state of an Imaginary Being, and that our Ideal World is not (as they say) a World *in Idea*. For whatever Pleasure there may be in *Fiction* when it descants upon a ground of Truth, yet I cannot but think it a heartless thing to trace out the Nature and Properties of a Non-existing Subject, and tho' perhaps I might not refuse to *Read*, yet I think I should hardly take the *Pains* to *Write* a pure Romance.

3. It may reasonably be disputed to which Question the Precedency is due, or which according to Logical Order ought first to be Consider'd, that of the *An Sit*, or that of the *Quid Sit*, that which inquires whether a thing be or no, or that which

which inquires what the Nature of it is. For on the one ſide it ſeems odd and Præpoſterous to inquire into the Nature of a thing before we are ſatisfi'd whether there be ſuch a thing or no, becauſe all *Modal* Being Præſuppoſes being *Simply*. And again, on the other hand it ſeems no leſs, if not more untoward, to inquire whether a thing be, or to go to prove that it is, before we know what it is we inquire about, or would endeavour to Prove. In the former caſe we run the hazard of ſearching after *Nothing*, and in the latter we make our inquiſition *Blindfold* and in the *Dark*. And as the firſt Conſideration proves that the *An* ſhould be before the *Quid*, ſo the other does no leſs ſtrongly Plead for the Prælation of the *Quid* before the *An*, which indeed is a hard competition for Præcedency, to which they both ſeem to claim an equal Right. To get out of this intanglement we muſt diſtinguiſh of a twofold Conception or Conſideration of things, *Confuſe* and *Diſtinct*. If the Queſtion concerning the *Quid ſit* or the Nature of the thing reſpect that Conception or Conſideration of it which is explicit and Diſtinct, then Indeed the *An ſit* muſt go before the *Quid ſit*, it being againſt all Reaſon and Order for a Man to ſet himſelf explicitly to Examin the Nature of a thing before he is ſatisfi'd whether there be any ſuch thing in Being, as the Argument on that ſide rightly urges. But if the *Quid ſit* be meant only as to the confuſe Conception of the thing propoſed, then 'tis as neceſſary that the *Quid ſit* ſhould go before the Conſideration of the *An ſit*, ſince a Man muſt have at leaſt a groſs or confuſe Notion of what he is inquiring after, or elſe he will neither

know what 'tis he looks for, nor be ſatisfi'd when he has found it, which is according to the Geometric method, wherein *Definition* is premiſed to *Demonſtration*. So that in different reſpects theſe two Competitory Queſtions do mutually precede and follow one another. And 'twere well for the Peace of the World if all other *Competitions* might be as well Accommodated.

4. According to this order of Conſideration I have in the entrance premiſed a general, rude and confuſe Account of the Intelligible World, ſuch as may ſerve to give us ſome Notion of it, that we may know what 'tis we are about, and how to diſtinguiſh it from the Natural or ſenſible World. In the next place having ſettled the Notion, I advance to the Demonſtration of the thing, whereof having proved the *Exiſtence*, I now proceed to a more particular and diſtinct Conſideration of the *State* and *Nature* of it, 'Tis indeed oftentimes extreme difficult to account for the Nature and Manners even of thoſe things whoſe Exiſtence in the groſs we have the greateſt certainty and aſſurance of. And this Obſervation holds not only in the *Myſteries* of *Faith*, but in matters of pure *Reaſon*, and in the viſible Phenomena's of *Nature*. For which we need go no farther than that moſt Ordinary one of *Motion*, which the moſt clear and unqueſtionable as to its *Exiſtence*, is yet attended with more Difficulties then ordinary Underſtandings are aware of, as to the *manner* of it. And indeed in moſt things the *How* is more difficult than the *Whether*, and our Philoſophy can *prove* a great deal more than it can *explain*. Which Conſideration as it ſufficiently

ciently expoſes the Abſurdity of that meaſure in general, of aſſenting to nothing but what we can Comprehend, ſo it may ſerve to prevent any Prejudice that may ariſe againſt our Intelligible World in particular, from the imperfection of ſuch Accounts as ſhall be given of it, ſince the Unaccountableneſs of the *manner* is no Argument againſt the Truth or Exiſtence of the *thing*.

5. And indeed it cannot reaſonably be expected that my Accounts concering the Nature of the Intelligible World ſhould be equal to the Proofs of its Exiſtence, much leſs that I ſhould exhibit a perfect Scheme of *Ideal Coſmography*. No, the Intelligible World tho' more certain (as we have lately ſhewn) is yet not ſo eaſily deſcribed as the Natural. Our Views here are very imperfect, and ſo muſt our Diſcourſes and Repreſentations be. Here the moſt inlarg'd and inlighten'd Capacity muſt be confined within that Apoſtolical limitation, of *knowing in Part*. And as we know in part, ſo we muſt alſo of neceſſity *propheſy* in part. The Intelligible Sun indeed ſhines bright and clear, but we ſee through a Glaſs darkly. The Veil of Fleſh, the Partition wall of Mortality as a Cloud intercepts it Rays. And beſides one World Eclipſes the Light of the other the Senſible World that of the Intelligible, as the Opake Moon does that of the Radiant Star which makes our Day. Much therefore I cannot pretend to, unleſs the Medium was clearer, or my Eye-ſight better; nor perhaps will it be convenient to *bring forth* all that I may *conceive*. For there is a Modeſty and a Reſerve due to ſuch Myſteries as are behind the Veil, which as they ought not to be

pried into with too much curiosity, so neither shou'd they be publish'd with undue freedom and confidence. But yet however since we dwell and converse in the Intelligible World, and have in it as I may say our Life, our motion, and our very Being, since it is the immediate Object of our Understandings, the informing Term of our Thoughts, and we see and perceive all things by its Light, as will hereafter be shewn, some thing without doubt may be known of it, and some thing may be said concerning it, tho' nothing in comparison to what the thing is in its self, or to those more elevated Conceptions which we shall hereafter have of its Grandeur, when the Scene of Glory shall open, and our *Eyes* shall be without a *Veil*, and our *Sun* without a *Cloud*.

6. There is a twofold Contemplation of Truth, according to the Distinction of the great Metaphysician. The first is *material* or in *Actu Exercito*, which consists in the knowledge of things and of the Properties that really belong to them. And in this Sence, he says, all Sciences do consider Truth, even those that are Practical. The latter consideration of Truth is *Formal* and in *Actu Signato*, and consists in inquiring into the Nature of Truth it self, or (as he Words it) what Truth it self is that is in things. Now in like manner and Proportion say I there is a twofold *Theory* or Contemplation of the Intelligible World, the one Material or in *Actu Exercito*, and in this Sense let us think of what we will, we do alwaies contemplate the Intelligible World, that being (as will hereafter appear) the real

Suarez Metaph. Disput. 8. p. 164.

real and immediete Object of our understanding in all its Intellectual Operations. The other Formal or in *Actu Signato*, when we Contemplate the Intelligible World under that very Formality, and as such, or as it Formally is in it self. And according to this way of Consideration our present Theory of it is to be understood.

7. And here since the Intelligible World is a Systeme of *Ideas*, or according to the Phrase of *Philo*, Κόσμος ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν συνεστὼς *a World Consisting of Ideas*, and since the Ideas of things as well as the World which consists of them, are (as we have shewn) in God, the first thing to be explain'd in order to our having a more distinct View of the Intelligible World, will be the *Divine Ideality*. Which indeed is a Subject of vast and most diffused Amplitude, but to bring it within as contracted a Compass as may be, I shall make my present Account of it to consist in a breif resolution of the following inquiries.

1. What the Divine Ideas are.

2. How or after what manner the Ideas of things are in God.

3. What part is assignable to them in the Formation of the Sensible World.

And lastly how they consist with the Simplicity, Immateriality and Infinity of the Divine Nature. Which Questions shall be the Subjects of so many distinct Sections.

SECT. I.

Wherein is Conſider'd what the Divine Ideas are.

1. THere are two ways of Conſidering the Divine Ideas, either as they are in relation to us, or as they are Abſolutely in themſelves. If it be ask'd what the Divine Ideas are in relation to us, it would be a *true* tho' not yet a very *Seaſonable* Anſwer (becauſe as yet the Queſtion is not ſo) to reply, that they are the Principles or Elements of our knowledge, the light of our Minds, the Intelligible Forms or Species whereby we underſtand, and the immediate Objects of our Thoughts in all our Intellectual Views. It is neceſſary that *ſome* Ideas *ſhould* be ſo, and I think generally acknowledg'd that they *are* ſo, ſince the Phyſical Objects themſelves are really Separate, and ſome times very diſtant from us. And they are the *Divine* Ideas whom I take to be thoſe Immediate Objects that terminate our Toughts, not apprehending either the *neceſſity* or the *poſſibility* of any other Ideas but the Divine. But this Relative Conſideration of the Divine Ideas belongs to the 2*d.* general Part of our Theory, to which accordingly it is adjourn'd. That which I am now concern'd to account for is their Abſolute Nature, what they are in themſelves.

2. That there are Divine Ideas, or that the Ideas of all things are in God, is here taken for granted, as being a Concluſion already Proved. As to the Queſtion what they are, I anſwer 1*ſt.* in general, that by *Ideas* indefinitely are underſtood any Forms, Repreſentations, or Similitudes of things. And as by

by *our* Ideas we ordinarily underſtand certain Repreſentative Forms of things in *our* Minds, which we contemplate as the immediate Objects of them, ſo in like manner by the *Divine* Ideas we are to conceive the Repreſentative Forms of things in the Mind of *God*. Only with this Difference, that whereas *our* Ideas are generally taken (how truly 'tis not of the preſent concern to examin) for Secondary Forms or Similitudes, derived from things, and repreſenting them as Copies, Pictures or Images do their Originals, in conformity to which preſumption they are alſo frequently call'd *Images*; by the *Divine* Ideas we are to underſtand *Originary* and *Archetypal* Forms, repreſenting things not as Images do their Originals (for * ſo other things imitate and repreſent *them*) but contrarywiſe as Originals do their Images or Pictures.

* *And in this Senſe is* Suarez *to be underſtood when he ſays*, Creatura repreſentat Divinam Bonitatem. *As appears by his adding to it*, & participat. *Diſput. Metaph.* Tom. 1. *Diſp.* 24 Sect. 2. N. 11

3 We are then arrived to a clear Conception of the Divine Ideas as far as theſe two general Thoughts,. 1*ſt*. That they are the Repreſentative Forms of things in the Mind of God. 2. That they are not Imaging or Imitative, but *Archetypal Repreſentatives*. Which you may put together in one if you pleaſe, and call them more Compendiouſly. The Archetypal Forms or Repreſentations of things in the Divine Mind.

4. But then ſince nothing but Being can be repreſentative of Being, and ſince one created Being differs from another only in the Degrees of Being whereof it conſiſts, even as one Number differs from another only by the multitude of *Units* which

it contains, (in which respect also as well as that of their *Indivisibility*, the Essences of things may be said to be as *Numbers*) it is therefore necessary to conceive these Representative Forms as certain different *Degrees* of *Being* or Perfection in the Divine Nature, which according as they either actually Correspond to, or are imitable or Participable by things without, are said to be the Ideas or Exemplary Forms of those things respectively, only in the former Consideration they are the Ideas of things *Actual*, in the latter the Ideas of things *Possible*.

5. Farther, these Divine Ideas, or as we may now more explicitly call them, these Degrees of Being in the Divine Nature, are the very Reasons, Natures, and Essences of things, Not those Essences which are the Temporary and Contingent Effects of their Omnipotent Creators *will*, (for 'twere a gross Contradiction as well as Confusion to suppose things out of God to be one and the same with things in him) but those which are the Necessary, Immutable and Eternal Objects of his *Wisdom*, those *Essences* which we are taught in Metaphysics to abstract from and contradistinguish to the Natural *Existences* of things, which are the Foundations of Eternal Truths, and the *Intellectual Hinges* upon which the Sciences turn, concerning which all Demonstration really proceeds, even when the Objects of Sense, Lines and Figures, seem to be the Subjects of it, and which amidst all the changings and Revolutions, Inconstancies and Vicissitudes, of this Flux and mutable Scene of External Nature, remain the fix'd

fix'd and ſteddy Objects of Human, Angelical, or in defect of theſe, of *Divine* Contemplation. Thoſe Eſſences which are ſaid to be *Ingenerable* and *Incorruptible*, which furniſh Logic with its Definitions, Metaphyſics with its Abſtractions, and to which Phyſics is beholden for its ſtation among the Sciences. Thoſe Eſſences in fine which St. *Auſtin* intimates by his *Creaturarum Rationes incommutabiles*, and which in the ſame place he takes care to diſtinguiſh from thoſe which exiſt in Nature, by ſaying *Aliter ſe habent Omnium Creaturarum Rationes incommutabiles in verbo Dei, aliter illa ejus Opera a quibus in die Septimo requievit.* And accordingly he elſwhere expreſly calls theſe Ideas the ſtable and incommutable Reaſons or Eſſences of things. *Sunt Ideæ*, ſays he, *principales formæ quædam, vel Rationes rerum, ſtabiles atq; incommutabiles, quæ ipſæ formatæ non ſunt, ac per hoc æternæ, ac ſemper eodem modo ſe habentes, quæ in divinâ Intelligentiâ Continentur. Et cum ipſæ neq; Oriantur, neq; intereant, ſecundum eas tamen formari dicitur Omne quod oriri & interire poteſt, & Omne quod oritur & interit.*

De geneſi ad Literam. l. 5. c. 12.

In Libro de diverſis Quæſtionibus. Quæſt. 46.

6. And here I have prevented my ſelf by quoting my *Platonic* Father a little farther than my purpoſe required. For I might have ſaid next, that as theſe Ideas are the *Eſſences* of things, ſo they are alſo Stable, Immutable, Increate, Eternal, alwaies Uniform and Self-conſiſtent, (as indeed they muſt needs be if they are in God, ſince as the ſame writer in the ſame place ſays,

neq;

neq; in Divinâ mente quicquam, niſi æternum atq; incommutabile poteſt eſſe) and that tho' they are without Original and without end of Being themſelves, yet they are the Originals and Patterns of whatever *Enters* upon, or can make an *Exiſt* from the ſtage of external Nature, as the Father here expreſſes it.

7. But to theſe Properties of the Divine Ideas I muſt add another as the Natural Conſequence of them, and that is their *Independency*. They are wholely independent upon the Creature, and in ſome meaſure even from the Creator himſelf. They Coexiſt indeed with the things that Exiſt in Nature in their ſeveral turns, even as *Eternity* is ſaid to do with the Succeſſive moments and Emergencies of *Time*, but they no more depend upon them than that Permanent *Now* does upon thoſe emerging Moments, but as they Exiſted before them, ſo ſuppoſing their Annihilation, they would as certainly Exiſt after them, and in the mean time are utterly unconcern'd in and unaffected with any of their Generations or Corruptions, Changes or Revolutions. So very utterly, that ſhould I ſay as much as the Stars in the Heaven are with the motions of the Ships that Sail by them, or as the Axis of the Earth is with the Diurnal Circuits that are deſcrib'd round it, I ſhould make but a faint Compariſon.

8. And as they are thus Independent upon the Exiſtence of things in Nature, ſo alſo upon all Mind or Underſtanding whatſoever, even that of God himſelf, that is I mean as *Conceptive*, or *Theoretically* Conſider'd. For however the Divine Ideas

Ideas may Be ſaid to depend upon the Mind of God as *Intelligible*, as being, tho' not by way of inhæſion, yet really in it, and Exiſting by a kind of ſubſtantial Emanation from it, yet if you conſider the Divine Mind as *Intelligent*, they are in order of Nature preſuppoſed to it, and conſequently cannot depend upon it. The Mind of God as it is Eternally prægnant with them, ſo it Eternally Views and contemplates them, and all things in them, but does not *make* them. For beſides that 'tis againſt the Nature of Underſtanding in general to make its Object, there is this peculiar here, that there can be no Act of the Divine Underſtanding above them, but what muſt of neceſſity ſuppoſe them as the Terminative Forms of it, and indeed as that without which there can be no ſuch thing as any knowledge of them, Since if they are known, it muſt be either by themſelves, or by their Ideas. God cannot therefore make them by his Underſtanding, nor by his *Will* neither, as Omnipotent as it is, ſince as the Underſtanding of God in order of Nature preſuppoſes his *Ideas*, ſo there can be no Act of his Will but what as neceſſarily preſuppoſes an Act of his Underſtanding whereby it may be regulated. And conſequently his Ideas are as much preſuppoſed to all the Acts of his Will, as their *Meaſure*, as to all the Act of his Underſtanding, as their *Object*. So that tho' the Divine Ideas have an Emanative Reſult as I may call it from the Eſſence of God, yet they are not the *Creatures* of his Underſtanding or of his Will, nor do conſequently depend upon them as effects upon their cauſe. Which by the way may intimate to us what

what near Relation they ſtand in to him of whom we are taught to ſay in our more Solemn Creed ——, *not Made, nor Created, but Begotten.*

9. This laſt Reflexion (beſides the advantage that may be made of it againſt the *Arian* Hereſy) is intended in oppoſition to (Mr. *Poiart.*) a certain Perſon, who to convince us that nothing is ſo abſurd but what even Philoſophical Minds may ſome times eſpouſe, could be guilty of ſo *Unmetaphyſical* a *Thought* as to make the Ideas of things to depend upon the Will of God, and indeed to be the poſitive and arbitrary Conſtitutions and Eſtabliſhments of it. Which appears to be a plain Impoſſibility even from this ſingle Conſideration that there can be no ſuch Decree or Conſtitution about them, but what muſt of neceſſity preſuppoſe them, ſince as God cannot Will what he has no Conception of, ſo neither can he Conceive or Underſtand without Ideas. But beſides, if the Ideas of things be from any poſitive Will or Ordination of God, then they muſt be as much *Creatures* as any of the other Effects of his Will. But then (beſides the Abſurdity of ſuppoſing Creatures to be in God, as I have ſhewn theſe Ideas to be) if they are Creatures they muſt either be made by themſelves immediately without the help of any Ideas, and then ſo might other things too, full as well, and then I would ask the Author of this *Hypotheſis* to what purpoſe it is that he aſſigns any Ideas at all, and Writes ſo much about them. Or if they are made by other Ideas (as there is as much reaſon that they ſhould, as that other things ſhould be made by them) then there is the ſame reaſon

reaſon that thoſe other Ideas ſhould be made again by others, and thoſe again by others, and ſo on *in Infinitum*. Which *Chaſe*, whoſoever ſhall run for a while, will at length find himſelf ſo out of Breath, that he will find it neceſſary to ſtop in ſome Ideas, which tho' the Patterns according to which all things are made, yet themſelves are made according to none, nor indeed made at all, but immediately and neceſſarily reſult from the infinitely perfect Eſſence of the great One. All ſuch in one Word, as are not *Copies*, but *Originals*. Which again leads us to that ſubſtantial Word and Wiſdom of God, by whom all things were made, but who himſelf was neither *Made*, nor *Created*, but *Begotten*.

10. Beſides, if the Ideas of things owe their Original to any Decretory Act of the Divine Will, then, as being Creatures, before they came to exiſt they muſt be conſider'd as *Poſſible*. But now I ſhould think him a great Diſcoverer that would give me any notion of *Poſſibility* but what is founded upon and preſuppoſes *Ideality*. Again, if they were poſſible, then God who knows all poſſibles, knew them as ſuch. But then ſince by the ſuppoſition they were not in *Act*, how could he know them but in *Idea*, and if from this Poſſibility he will reduce them into *Act*, what other can this be than from an Ideal to Tranſlate them into a Natural State, juſt after the ſame manner as it is in other things. So that the ſuppoſition of Ideas being alwaies Antecedent to all Intellectual Operation, they can never be brought into being by any. Nor will it at all help the matter to ſay that this

Eſta-

Eſtabliſhment of Ideas is from all *Eternity*, for as on the one hand this Conſideration will make them never the leſs Arbitrary (ſinee the Earlineſs of the *Date* makes no change in the Nature of the *Decree*) ſo on the other hand let the ſuppoſed *Fiat* for their Exiſtence be never ſo Eternal, the Ideas of things will have the Start of it, not indeed in Time, (there being no room for ſuch a Priority, where there is not ſo much as the thing it ſelf) but in Order of Nature and Conception. That which *Suarez* calls a Priority of *Præſuppoſition.*

Metap. Tom. 1. *Diſput.* 27. Sect. 2. Num. 1.

11. But after all, if the Ideas of things be of a Poſitive and Arbitrary Nature, reſulting from and depending upon the meer will and Pleaſure of God, then, as if he had pleas'd he might not have made them, ſo he may now alſo if he pleaſes unmake or annihilate them. And accordingly the Truths that reſult from them, (and indeed are no other than the Ideas themſelves as collated to each other) will have the ſame Arbitrary Original, and alſo hold the ſame precarious Exiſtence. That is, they might either not have been, or they may now have their whole Syſtem cancel'd, and abſolutely ceaſe to be. Which ſuppoſitions would threaten us with a *Darkneſs* to which that of *Egypt* would be the very Brightneſs of Glory. And what ſtrange Confuſion they would make in *Natural* and *Moral* Truths, and in thoſe Speculative and Practical, Sciences that depend upon them, how they would ſhake if not overturn *Morality* and Religion and put even the Foundations of the whole Intellectu-

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al World out of Courſe, is too obvious to need much *Amplification*, as alſo how pernicious as well as abſurd that *Hypotheſis* is, which draws after it ſuch a train of the moſt horrid Conſequences.

12. But now we talk of *Conſequences*, what will be the Conſequence of this? For it will be ſaid, if the Ideas you ſpeak of, have ſuch Properties as theſe, will it not hence follow that they are God? Yes it will, and ſo far is it from being an Objection that it does ſo, that 'tis the very conſequence I have been all this while driving at, and ſuch as I think moſt evidently follows, ſince 'tis both plainly and confeſſedly impoſſible that any thing ſhould be Neceſſary, Immutable, Eternal and Independent that is not God. Theſe are incommunicable and Convertible Attributes of the Divine Eſſence, and in whatſoever Nature they are found, they ſit as a diſtinguiſhing *Glory* upon it, and proclaim that Nature to be *Divine*. But beſides, it has been already ſhewn that theſe Ideas of things are in God, from the Proof of that *Equivalent* Propoſition, that God has the Ideas of all things in himſelf, and for this reaſon it is that I call them *Divine Ideas*. But now common Senſe and Reaſon would ſufficiently warrant me to ſay, tho' I had no *School-maxim* for it, that there is nothing in God that is not God. And therefore ſince theſe Ideas are in God. hence again it plainly and neceſſarily follows that their Nature is truly Divine, and that they can be no other than God himſelf. And ſo my *Angelical* Maſter has both Taught and Authoriſed me to ſay,

Sum. Theol. Part. 1 *Quæst.* 15. Art. 1. say. *Deus ſecundum Eſſentiam ſuam eſt ſimilitudo Omnium rerum. Unde Idæa in Deo nihil eſt aliud quam Dei Eſſentia.*

13. And I farther add that in theſe Divine Ideas we have ſuch an expreſs deſignation of the *Second* of thoſe three Subſiſtencies which the Catholic Faith teaches us to beleive and adore in the one undivided Eſſence of God, that I need not Scruple to refer them to him, as moſt agreeing to his Character and Diſtinction. Whom the moſt *Chriſtian* Philoſophy has long ſince decypher'd by the ſignal title of νῦς or the *Mind*, and who in the Holy Scripture is known by the more expreſſive Name of λόγος, and ſet forth as the Wiſdom of God, and the Brightneſs of his Glory, and the expreſs Image of his Perſon, and as the Image of the Inviſible God. And who alſo is ſaid to be the Light of the World, that inlightens every Man that comes into it, and even *Truth* it ſelf. And whoſe great Characteriſtic in the School-Account is, *procedere in divinis ſecundum Emanationem Intellectûs.* He indeed is the great Idea and Exemplar of the whole Creation, and the true Intelligible World, as *Plotinus* intimates when he ſays,

Ennead. 3. lib. 2. Num. 1. ἢ τὸ νῷ καὶ τῷ ὄντι φύσις κόσμος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθινός καὶ πρῶτος *that the Nature of Mind and Being is the true and firſt World*, and as the Divine Ideas themſelves give us a fair deſignation of his *Perſon*, ſo their neceſſary Emanation from the All-perfect and All-being Nature of God do as well expreſs his *Eternal*, but ineffable *Generation.*

14. For,

14. For that indeed (I mean the Immenſe Richneſs and Fullneſs of the Godhead, that which the *Platoniſts* may be preſumed to have ſignified by their τὸ ἀνάβδην, and which accordingly they put before the νῦς) is the great Spring and Fountain, or if you will *Parent*, of the Divine *Ideality*, as this is the fair Offſpring that neceſſarily and eternally eradiates from that All-prægnant Source of Light and Glory. Which well adumbrates the *Filiation* of the ſecond Hypoſtaſis, whom the *Platoniſts* call'd the νῦς, and whom the *Platonizing* Apoſtle calls the λόγος, and who may very rationally be ſaid to be the Word and Wiſdom of God, becauſe as being the Intelligible or Ideal World, he repreſents to him as an *Omniform Mirrour*, both Himſelf, and his whole Creation, nay all that is Poſſible, all that is Intelligible. Of him our *Platonick* Poet in rough but lofty Numbers thus Sweetly and Magnificently Sings

Dr. More *in his Philoſophic Poems*, p. 3.

VIII.

This Ahad *of himſelf the* Æon *Fair*
Begot, the Brightneſs of his Father's Grace.
No living Wight in Heav'n to him compare:
Ne work his goodly Honour ſuch diſgrace,
Nor loſe they time in telling of his Race.
His Beauty and his Race no Man can tell.
His Glory darkeneth the Sun's bright Face,
Or if Ought els the Sun's bright Face excel,
His Splendor would it dim, and all that Glory quell.

IX.

This is that antient Eidos Omniform,
Fount of all Beauty, root of Flowering Glee, &c.

15. Theſe Reflections ſhew how little to the purpoſe, tho' with unuſual Apparatus, the Author of the forementiond Hypotheſis argues, when ſpeaking of Ideas, he ſays with an Air of ſome Deriſion, *Quaſi vero fluerent illæ immediate & abſq; interventu Decreti ſive Placiti ex ipſa Dei Eſſentia: Cum hoc modo ſolus Filius & Spiritus Dei ex illo procedant.* For let it be never ſo much the Privilege of the Son and the Holy Spirit of God to proceed immediately and without the Mediation of any Degree from his Eſſence, yet what does this Allegation ſignify, if theſe Divine Ideas be indeed Identical with that very Son of God who is concern'd in this Privilege? As alſo again when he argues againſt the Neceſſity, Immutability, and Independency of Ideas from the Conſideration of the peculiar Right that God has to theſe and ſuch like Properties. For however Concluſive this muſt be allow'd to be againſt thoſe (if any ſuch there are) that hold Ideas in God *Accidentally* inhering in him, Acceſſory to him, and of a Nature diſtinct from him, and yet (ſtrange inconſiſtency) Independent on him, 'tis yet moſt obvious, that the Hypotheſis which Identifies and Conſubſtantializes theſe Ideas with the Nature and Eſſence of God, is no way concern'd in it. And of this the Author ſeems aware when he ſays,

Cogitat. Ration. p. 290.

Sola divina Eſſentia eſt neceſſaria. Ergo Ideæ quæ non ſunt divina eſſentia, non ſunt abſolute neceſſariæ, & potuerunt aliter eſſe. Very right. Herein I readily join with him that thoſe Ideas which are not the Divine Eſſence are not indeed abſolutely Neceſſary, but might have been otherwiſe, nay might not have been at all; But what Ideas of things thoſe are that are not the Divine Eſſence,

P. 311.

fence, or who holds any such (except himself) I profess I know not. And indeed the *Ideal Hypothesis* is here particularly beholden to this Ingenious Author for a great Advantage which he has given it. For it seems it is a Principle with him, that only the Divine Essence is necessary. But then as supposing Ideas to be really of the Divine Essence, this does not exclude them from being Necessary, so if it otherwise appears that they are Necessary (as I think by the foregoing Considerations it plainly does) then in Virtue of his own Principle, and by his own Confession they must be truly of the *Divine Essence*.

16. But now the Essence of God may be consider'd either *Absolutely*, or *Relatively*. Either as it is in its pure, mere, and abstracted self, or as it relates to things either Possible or Actual out of it self. And the Question here is in which of these Senses our Ideas are of the Divine Essence? To which I answer that the Divine Ideas properly so call'd, and as now consider'd, are of the Essence of God in the latter Sense. I say properly so call'd, and as now consider'd. For indeed there are Ideas, or rather *Perfections* in God (because the Word *Idea* more ordinarily connotes some Relation *ad extra*, according to that Remark of *Aquinas*, *Nomen Ideæ principaliter est impositum ad significandum respectum ad Creaturam*) that are of the Divine Essence as absolutely and simply consider'd, that is, that belong to God as he is in his mere and pure Infinite Self, and to which accordingly there neither is nor can be any thing answerable in the Creature. Which (as I * elsewhere shew) is the Ground of his Incommunicable Attri-

Sum. Theol. Part. I. Quæst. 34. Art. 3.

* *See the 4th Chap. of the Account of Reason and Faith.*

butes, as also of Incomprehensible Truths. And is there not also besides these a certain General Collective Idea consisting of these Divine Perfections, which is so strictly of the Essence of God as he is in his *Absolute* Self, that it is faithfully expressive of him to us, being what we call the *Idea of God*, such as always represents him to us truly, and would adequately, if we could have (what we never can) a comprehensive View of it, as being the very *Brightness* of his Glory, and the express Image of his Substance? But we consider Ideas now in a more special and reduced Sense, as they belong to and make up the System of the Intelligible World, the Great Pattern and Exemplar of this, and as thus consider'd they are of the Essence of God not as it is in it self, but as it relates to things out of it self, according as it is variously Imitable or Participable by them in their several kinds. And so *Aquinas* expressly, who tells us that the Essence of God has the Reason of an Idea, according as it is compared to other things, and not as it is compared to God himself. *Ideo habet rationem Ideæ secundum quod ad alia comparatur, non autem secundum quod comparatur ad ipsum Deum.* So then the Divine Ideas as indeed no other than the very Essence of God himself, as it is Exhibitive and Representative of things without. But how that is, falls more directly under the Consideration of the next Section.

Sum. Theol. part. I. Quæst. 15. Art. 1.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Wherein is consider'd how or after what manner the Ideas of things are in God.

1. HERE I must beg my kind Reader not to be too Inquisitive in his Researches into the *Deep things of God*, which the longest Line of Humane Thought will in vain attempt ever to fathom. Or if I cannot set bounds to *his* Curiosity, I must however govern my *own*, and in this Sense also not be *high-minded*, but *Fear*. For sure if there be any Knowledge that is too high and wonderful for us, and such as we cannot perfectly attain unto, this may be well presumed to be it, and if our Philosophy after so many bold and daring Attempts does yet but *float*; as it were upon the Surface of the *Natural*, sure it may well be excused (at least for the present Essay) from *diving* very far into the Bowels of the *Intelligible* World, and if after so many Dissections and Anatomizings even of Humane Bodies, we know not yet, as the Wise Man observes, *how the Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child*, much less may we be supposed able to understand the way of the Spirit, or to render an exact account how the Ideas or Archetypal Forms of things do arise in the Eternal Mind, how they flow from, or are contain'd in the Fruitful All-pregnant *Bosom* of the Divinity.

2. I shall not therefore presume to offer at any very Curious or Minute display of this Great *Arcanum* of Intelligible Nature, but content my self with such

a General and Groſs Delineation of it as may ſerve to ſhew the Intelligibility of the Notion, and of what farther Improvement it is in it ſelf capable, caſting the reſt under a Religious Shade, and leaving it to the Study and Contemplation of Angels, and to the *Comprehenſions* of that Angelified State, when that Glory of God which *Moſes* deſired to have ſhewn to him, ſhall ſhine out in its full Luſtre upon our Souls, and *we ſhall ſee him as he is, ſine ſpeculo, & ſine ænigmate.*

3. In the mean time if we thus conceive and explain the manner of the Divine Ideality, it may ſufficiently anſwer the Purpoſes as well as the Pretenſions of a Modeſt Theory. God is a Being infinite in Eſſence and Perfection, and accordingly muſt be ſuppoſed to have all the conceivable Degrees of it in himſelf. And tho' for this very Reaſon he cannot be *perfectly* imitated by any thing out of himſelf (*ſo* to imitate him, being the ſole Privilege of him who is the Brightneſs of his Glory, and the expreſs Image of his Subſtance) yet again for the very ſame Reaſon he muſt be conceiv'd in various Degrees to be Imitable and Participable, even *ad extra.* For he that has all Conceivable Degrees of Being and Perfection, muſt be ſuppoſed to have ſome that even a Creature may imitate and participate, or that may be capable of an *Out-being* or *Exiſtence.* Now according as the Eſſence of God is thus or thus imitable, or in this or that degree Participable by Things without, ſo it may be ſaid to be Exhibitive or Repreſentative of ſuch Things; or to have the Ideas of them in it ſelf, which accordingly (to reſolve them into their laſt and moſt explicit Account) will be found to be no other than certain preciſe Degrees of Being or Perfection

fection in God, that may be Imitated or Participated by Things out of him. So that the Eſſence of God may be ſaid to repreſent Things in the ſame Proportion as they can Imitate or Participate him in the ſeveral Degrees of his Eſſential Perfection, that is in ſhort, he has the Ideas *of* them as he is imitable *by* them. The Divine Eſſence conceiv'd as imitable in ſuch a Degree is in God, ſuch an Idea, or the Idea of ſuch a thing, the ſame Divine Eſſence conceiv'd as imitable in another Degree is in him another Idea, or the Idea of another thing, and ſo on throughout the whole Scale of Being, from firſt or mere Matter (the neareſt to nothing, and the fartheſt Creatural Projection from God) to the moſt Excellent of created Intelligences.

4. More diſtinctly yet; The Eſſence of God as only inadequately conſider'd, and partially imitable is the Idea of a Creature in general, and as imitable to ſuch a certain Degree or Meaſure it is, the Idea of this or that Creature, which accordingly when Actual, it *repreſents* as imitated by it according to thoſe Limitations or Imperfections which belong to this or that kind of Being reſpectively. Not that theſe Beings imitate any Imperfection in God (in whom there is nothing but abſolute Perfection) but that they imitate his Perfection *imperfectly*, nor do his Ideas repreſent the Imperfections of the Creatures any otherwiſe than as the All-perfect Eſſence of God is imperfectly imitated by them. For indeed properly ſpeaking all Idea is of *Being* (that which is not, not being capable of any Repreſentation, eſpecially by that which Eſſentially is) and God repreſents *them* in the ſame Proportion as they imitate *him*.

5. But they imitate him *inadequately* only and in part; and does he repreſent them *ſo?* No, he repreſents them intirely, becauſe even that Inadequation as I may ſay, of his infinite Eſſence anſwers moſt perfectly and intirely to theirs. But when I ſay that God repreſents *them* in the ſame Proportion as they imitate him, my Meaning is, that as they imitate nothing but Being and Perfection in him (He being that Light in which there is no Darkneſs at all) ſo he repreſents nothing but Being and Perfection in them. He does not therefore repreſent their Imperfections, whether *Negative*, as in natural and regular, or *Privative*, as in unnatural and irregular Productions. He repreſents only what is *Poſitive* in them, that preciſely which they imitate in him, or of him, and becauſe they imitate him deficiently,

He does indeed repreſent *imperfect* Beings, but not their *Imperfections* or Defects. And as for theſe their Defects, they ariſe in them not from their Imitation of him, but from their imitating him no farther than they do, that is indeed from their *not* imitating him. Only with this very obſervable Difference, that in regular Productions, the Limitation or Imperfection proceeds from their imperfect imitation of the Divine Eſſence at large, whereas in irregular Productions (ſuch as we term *Monſters*) it proceeds from their imitating their proper *Specific Idea* imperfectly.

6. I ſay *Specific* Idea. For I muſt farther note concerning the Divine Eſſence as variouſly imitable and participable, that as 'tis the Formal Reaſon of all Ideality in God, ſo is it the Ground of the Specific differences and poſſibilities of Things. As alſo of the Divine Knowledge concerning them. God knows what ſpecies or orders of Being are poſſible, becauſe in Con-

Contemplating himſelf he ſees in what degrees and ways his Eſſence is imitable or participable. And he need but conſult the ſame *Omniform Mirrour* to ſee the Things that actually exiſt, whoſe Natures thoſe Ideal Reaſons which he has of them in himſelf, will ſufficiently repreſent to him. And in this I go no farther than even the common *Metaphyſicks* of the Schools (as well as their *Divinity*) has gone before me, in founding the Knowledge of God upon his Ideality. For ſo ſays a conſiderable Writer of that Character, *Dico oportere aliquid eſſe in Deo quod repræſentet res creatas. Fit enim intellectio per repræſentationem objecti intelligibilis ad Intellectum. Illa autem repræſentatio, non eſt per Species a Creaturis acceptas, prout alias fit noſtra Intellectio. Eſt igitur aliquid intimius Deo, quod res Creatas repræſentet. Eſtq; id eſſentia ipſa Dei, quæ eſt quaſi luciditſimum ſpeculum, in quo, citra additionem Specierum, relucent omnes Eſſentiæ & perfectiones rerum Creatarum. Ipſa igitur ad eas repræſentandas ſufficiens eſt. Cumq; is modus intelligendi: Sit Eminentiſſimus, gratis Confingitur alius.* Scheibler. Metaph. Lib 2. p. 545.

In which Words he pleads expreſly for two Things. 1. For the Neceſſity of Ideas in God. 2. For the Sufficency of theſe Ideas in order to all the Purpoſes of Knowledge and Underſtanding, without the help of any Created Species. But that indeed there is no occaſion for them I need not ſhew now conſidering what has been ſaid upon it already * elſewhere, only I ſhall here conſider one Difficulty which was there omitted. It may be ſaid that this way of accounting for the Divine Knowledge of Things by the Ideal Reaſons of them, will

* *Chap. 3d.*

will reach no farther than their Natures or Eſſences, becauſe thoſe Ideal Reaſons repreſent no more. And that therefore if God will know that ſuch Things do actually exiſt, he muſt go out of himſelf for the Knowledge of that, againſt the former Meaſures. To which I anſwer, no. For tho' as the Objection rightly urges, God can know no more of things than their Natures by the Ideas of them, which expreſs only in what Degree his own Eſſence is imitable, yet there is no Neceſſity of his going out of himſelf, or being beholden to any Created Species to know whether things do exiſt or no. He need but to the Conſultation of his *Ideas*, join that of his *Will*, in knowing whoſe Decrees for the Exiſtences of ſuch Things, and the Omnipotent Efficacy of them (of both which we ſuppoſe him moſt intimately Conſcious) he does thereby *ipſo facto* know their actual Exiſtence. And as he need not have any *Other*, ſo he cannot have a *Better* or more certain Information of it. So that let the Divine Fecundity be never ſo Exuberant and out-flowing, and the *Will* of God never ſo Productive of Things without, yet the whole Scene of his *Knowledge* will ſtill be tranſacted within himſelf.

7. But to return once more to the Conſideration of the Divine Eſſence as variouſly Imitable and Participable. Into this is to be reſolv'd that *Eminential* Contention of things and their Perfections which is ſo frequently attributed to God by Scholaſtick Pens. His infinite Eſſence according to ſuch intelligible Degrees of it is variouſly Imitable and Partakable, and as ſuch becomes truly *Omniform*, and impregnated with the Ideas of Things. And by theſe as he truly repreſents, ſo he is alſo ſaid even to *contain* them and

their

their Perfections in himſelf. Which, even as the Schools themſelves diſtinguiſh, is to be underſtood not *Formally*, but *Eminently*, that is (according to the beſt Conception I have of it) in as much as he has, that in himſelf which intelligibly anſwers to them in their ſeveral Proportions. And thus indeed he may, not inconveniently, be ſaid even to *contain* all Things in himſelf* from the Baſis to the very Cuſpis of the myſtical Cone, from the moſt excellent and inlarg'd Beings to the Extremeſt of all his Projections, the very laſt *Reality*, that is contracted as it were into a Mathematical Point, and touches upon the very Confines of *Nothing*. For even Matter it ſelf (as *Aquinas* ſays) *tho' it recede from the Similitude of God according to its Potentiality, yet ſo far forth as even ſo it has a Being, it retains ſome Similitude of the Divine Being*. It is indeed the remoteſt and the fainteſt Imitation of him, his Shadow rather than one of his moſt projected Rays, and yet foraſmuch as it is a *Metaphyſical Unit* at leaſt, and has ſome Degree of Reality and Perfection in it, we muſt allow it to have its Ideal Counterpart in the Divine Mind (that which *Malebranche* calls Intelligible Extention) and conſequently to be Eminently and Intelligibly contain'd in it as well as other Things. And ſo St. *Auſtin*, *in ijs autem quæ per ipſum facta ſunt, etiam corpus quod vita non eſt, per ipſum non fieret, niſi in illo antequam fieret vita eſſet*, alluding to that of St. *John*, *in him was the Life*.

* *See the Figure in the Notes upon Dr.* Moor's *Poems, which will give great Light into this whole Matter concerning the Divine Ideality.*

Sum. Theol. Part I. *Quæſt.* 14. *Art.* 11.

De Trin. Lib. 4. *Cap.* 1.

§. And

8. And now I have gone almoſt as far in the Explication of this great Metaphyſical Myſtery, *the manner of the Divine Ideality*, as I dare well go, and indeed almoſt as far as my feeble Light will lead me, which now begins to burn low and dim, and by the Abatements of its waning Luſtre to admoniſh me of a Retreat. But however there is one Conſideration which M. *Malebranche* puts me in mind of, and whereof, for the farther Illuſtration of this Matter, and to prevent any Miſconception that may ariſe from the former Accounts of it, I think it convenient to mind my Reader. It is I ſuppoſe very deducible from the Premiſes that the Ideas in God do repreſent Things out of him. And ſo without doubt in the General they do, and that very truly too, ſince otherwiſe they would not be the Ideas of them, nor could God be ſaid by ſuch Ideas to have the Knowledge of Things. But we are not to Conceive this in ſo *Strict*, or rather ſo *Groſs* a Senſe as to imagine that they repreſent them after the ſame manner as they appear to us. For in our View of Things (as I ſhall ſhew in the ſecond Part of this Theory when I come to conſider how it is that we view them) we have *Sentiments* as well as pure *Idea*, and tho' theſe are very Diſtinct, yet we are apt to Confound one with the other, and to make our Sentiment enter into the very Formality of our Idea as an Eſſential Part of it, and ſo look upon Things, not only as they are in their pure Ideal Natures, but inveſted with certain *Senſible Qualities*, as we call them, which we Confuſely attribute to the Things themſelves as really inherent in them, tho'

Vid. Reponſe au Liv. de Mr. Arnauld *des vrays des Fauſſes Ide'es.* p. 94.

tho' indeed they are no other than certain Modalities of our own Souls occaſion'd by certain impreſſions made upon the Brain, in Conſequence of the Laws of Union eſtabliſh'd by the Author of Nature between Soul and Body, as will I hope be better underſtood hereafter.

9. But tho' Things appear thus to us by reaſon of our Confuſe mingling our *Sentiments* with our *Ideas*, we muſt not let our Imagination impoſe ſo much farther upon us as to think that the Divine Ideas repreſent them ſo, or that there is any thing in God reſembling things according to thoſe *Senſible Appearances* which we have of them. And indeed ſhould the Divine Ideas repreſent them ſo, they would repreſent them *falſly*, becauſe indeed they are not ſo in themſelves. Neither does God ſee them ſo. He knows indeed that we ſee them with ſuch Appearances, and are differently affected at the Sight of them, according as thoſe Appearances are, becauſe having made our Souls he has an Idea of them, and ſees in that Idea what Modifications they are capable of, and withal he knows what Laws of Union and Communication he has eſtabliſh'd between Soul and Body, as alſo the certain and infallible Efficacy of thoſe Laws, and therefore I ſay he cannot but know that Things do appear ſo to us, but he does not ſee them ſo himſelf, nor has he any thing in himſelf ſo much as *Intelligibly* anſwerable to ſuch Appearances. A Conſideration very neceſſary to be carefully heeded for the Prevention of ſome Indecencies, to which the Doctrin of the Divine Ideality might otherwiſe ſtand expoſed, and which for want of this Conſideration, a certain * Perſon of more Learning than nice and accu-

* Mr Arnauld.

rate

rate Reflection, was perhaps induced to throw upon it.

10. And thus you have my Thoughts (as far as I think it convenient to Communicate them) concerning the manner of the *Divine Ideality*, or *Omniformity*, and that this Account in the Ground of it so far as it states the Ideality of God upon his Imitability or Participability, is truly *Platonic*, may sufficiently appear from the forementionⁿd Passage of *Marsilius Ficinus*, where he tells you, that *God by beholding himself Conceives himself as the proper Reason of all Forms. For he sees in himself whatsoever is proper to every thing, whilst he beholds in what Degree every thing may imitate the Divine Form, or how far it may come short of it. As for Instance, while he Conceives his own Essence, as imitable by way of Life only, and not Knowledge, he Conceives the Form and Idea of Plants*, &c. Nor does this Account want the Authority of the Schools, but is in the aforesaid Ground of it as truly *Scholastick* as it is *Platonick*. For says *Aquinas*, *Propria Natura uniuscujusq; consistit secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat.* And this he gives as the Reason why God knows all Things by a proper Knowledge in himself. And so again, *Divina essentia potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscujusq; secundum quod diversimodi est participabilis vel imitabilis, a diversis Creaturis.* But more especially when he says, *Ipse essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit. Unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum, quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci*

Sum. Theol. Part I. Quæst. 14. Art. 6.

Ibid.

Part I. Quæst. 15. Art. 2.

non

non ſolum ſecundum quod in ſe eſt, ſed ſecundum quod eſt Participabilis, ſecundum aliquem modum ſimilitudinis, a Creaturis. Unaquæq; autem Creatura habet propriam ſpeciem, ſecundum quod aliquo modo participat Divinæ Eſſentiæ ſimilitudinem. Sic igitur in quantum deus cognoſcit ſuam eſſentiam ut ſic imitabilem a tali Creatura cognoſcit eam ut propriam rationem & Ideam hujus Creaturæ. A Teſtimony ſo very clear and appoſite, that it would not be very eaſy for a Man that loved Authority never ſo well, and wanted it never ſo much, to forge one more to his Purpoſe. And yet whoever would ſee this Matter deduced more at large, let him read (and well worth his Reading it is) the 54th Chapter of the firſt Book of this Great Author *Contra Gentiles*, with the Illuſtrations of his Excellent Commentator *Ferrarienſis* upon it, where he will alſo find ſeveral Things of great Importance to the Point in Hand, and that will ſerve to Clear as well as to Confirm the preceding Account of it, as alſo to ſupply ſome Omiſſions in it.

Sect. III.

Wherein is conſider'd what part is aſſignable to the Divine Ideas in the Formation of the Natural or Senſible World.

1. WE have hitherto been accounting for the Divine Ideality ſo far as concerns the Nature of Ideas, and the Manner of their being in God. And whatever Imperfections the Account may labour

bour under through the great Infirmity of him that gives it, beſides the ſublimity and difficulty of the Argument, yet I hope that even thoſe who do not think it ſo fully Satisfactory in every Particular as their Curioſity may prompt them to deſire, will yet allow it to be Intelligible as far as it goes. And now after the Conſideration of theſe Ideas as they are in God, it is but a Natural Tranſition to reflect a little upon their Influence *ad extra*, and ſince we find a Senſible World in being whereof they are the Repreſentatives, to conſider what part they had in the Formation of it. For that they had ſome may juſtly be ſuppoſed, ſince beſides the obvious Impoſſibility of making a World without the Mediation of *Ideas*, it would be a moſt ſtrange and ill conſiſting Thought, that that which is the very Ground and Meaſure of the *Poſſibilities* of things ſhould have no Concern in the *Actualizing* of them.

2. The only neceſſary Queſtion will be what that is? To which the Anſwer in General is not very difficult. For what other part ſhall we aſſign them in the Production of Things but that of an *Exemplary* Cauſe? For they could not have a Concurrence in that great Work by way of the moſt ſtrict and proper Efficiency, there being no Will or Power included in *Ideality* or ſuch, and conſequently no Activity. They were then the Patterns or Exemplars according to which the Creatures were made. God Contemplating himſelf, and ſeeing in what Degrees his Divine Eſſence was Imitable or Partakable, knew what Things were *Poſſible*, and when he Decred to bring ſuch Things into Act, and gave his Almighty

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Fiat for their Production, he * Consulted himself again, those Ideas which he had in himself, and which are himself, his Coessential and Consubstantial *Word* and *Wisdom*, the Eternal Issue of his Fruitful Mind, who is the true Intelligible World, and in whom the Ideas of all things shine forth with Original and inimitable Beauty, full of *Grace* and *Truth*, and form'd them according to that bright and glorious *Pattern* in the Mystical *Mount*. *Moses* insinuates this particularly in the Formation of Man, *Let us make Man in our Image, after our Likeness*, &c. and the same is as true in Proportion of all other things, that is, I mean, that they are in some respects Imitations and Resemblances of God; in as much as they were made according to their respective Ideas in his *Omniform* Essence, and are as it were Copies taken from those Divine Originals.

* Πρὸς τὸ ἀΐδιον ἔβλεπε. Plato *in his Timæus*, p. 28.

3. I do not say *imperfect* Ones. For tho' even the best and noblest Pieces of the Creation are most imperfect and defective Imitations of God, who has but one perfect Image of himself, even his *Natural* Picture, his Coeternal and Consubstantial Son, yet they were all so artfully and masterly drawn, and Copied, as I may say, so very near the *Life* by the skilful Pencil of the Soveraign Artist, as to be truly and duly conformable to those *Ideas* upon which they were form'd (that is, I mean, in a way of Intelligible Proportion, and as far as any thing out of God can be conformable to what is in him) as may be gather'd from that Approbatory Judgment pass'd on them by their Maker, who upon a Critical Review of them pronounc'd them *Good*,

yea *very Good*, that is perfectly anſwerable and conformable to thoſe Ideal Meaſures he had of them in himſelf, and by which he made them. And conſidering the Perfection and Uniformity of the Divine Operation, for ought we know, the meaneſt *Inſect* may be made as Conformably to its proper and reſpective Idea, as the *Seraphin* and *Cherubin* were to theirs, upon which Conſideration, by the way, I underſtand not the Philoſophy, nor the Decency, nor the Piety of their Language, that ſhall call any of God's Creatures *ugly* or *deform'd*. I mean as to the Kinds of them. For as to the Particulars or Individuals of thoſe Kinds, they may indeed upon a Principle of Reaſon be ſaid ſometimes to be deform'd, ſo far as by Accident they depart from their Ideal Standards. But as to the ſeveral Kinds or Species of Being, the Caſe is clear otherwiſe. They were all made by God in Number, Weight, and Meaſure, form'd according to their ſeveral Ideas, and thoſe Ideas truly *Divine*, and therefore how we can call any of thoſe things *ugly*, that had ſuch a *Maker* and ſuch a *Pattern*, without a profane Reflection upon either one or the other, or both, he muſt be a Nicer Caſuiſt than I am that can tell. It is ſaid that he that *mocketh the Poor reproaches his Maker*, and can he then do any leſs that ſhall upbraid the meaneſt of God's Creatures with a *Specific* Deformity. But the very Expreſſion implies a Contradiction, 'tis impoſſible any thing ſhould be ugly in its Kind, and 'tis moſt certain (whatever weak Underſtandings may fancy) they have no ſuch real Deformity in them, nor does God that made them and perfectly underſtands their Frame, ſee any. On the contra-

Prov. 17. 5.

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ry 'tis ſaid that he ſaw every thing that he had made, and that behold it was very Good. And how dare we then to oppoſe our weak Judgments to his, ſo as to write *ugly* where he has written *Fair* and Beautiful! It is certainly a ſenſleſs, unprincipled, and profane way of talking, and ſuch as nothing but the Ignorance or Inconſideration of thoſe that uſe it can excuſe. For in ſhort, God ſees no Deformity (how quick-ſighted ſoever we may be) but in a diſtorted or irregular Body, and in a corrupt and depraved Mind. The *Monſter* and the *Sinner* are the only real Deformities in Nature.

4. But to the *Exemplarity* of our Ideas. To the Queſtion that asks what part they had in the Work of the Creation, the general Anſwer it ſeems is that they ſerv'd as Patterns for the Formation of things. They were the *Archetypal Seals* from which the ſeveral Prints of Being were taken, or the *Intelligible Moulds* (if I may be allow'd to condeſcend a little to Imagination in the Repreſentation of the moſt Abſtract Spiritualities) in which they were caſt. And accordingly *Plato* in the Account of *Aquinas* aſſigns a double uſe of Ideas, one to be the Principles of the *Knowlege* of things, and the other to be the Principles of the *Generation* (meaning I ſuppoſe the *Origination*) of them. And the great School-Divine tells us that they ſerve both Purpoſes as they are in the Mind of God. Only he here minds me of a Diſtinction of ſome Conſequence to be heeded for the better clearing of the Doctrin of Ideality in general, as well as that part of it we are now upon, and that is, that Ideas conſider'd as they are the Principles of Knowlege are

Sum. Theol. Part I. Q^r. 15. *Art.* 3.

properly call'd *Rationes rerum*, the Reaſons or Eſſences of things, and belong to Speculative Knowlege, but conſider'd as Principles of Origination they are to be call'd *Exemplars*, and as ſuch belong to Practical Knowlege. And that becauſe as under the Former Conſideration they are the Formal Objects of God's *Eternal* Contemplation, ſo the latter expreſſes that peculiar Relation which they have to thoſe Works of his which are effected in *Time*, and whereof they may be ſaid to be ſo far *Effective*, as they are *Directive* in the Production of them.

5. But to make this general Account a little more diſtinct, we muſt diſtinguiſh a twofold Being, as I may ſay, in things. There is the *Eſſe Simpliciter* and the *Tale Eſſe*, their ſimple Being, and the Quality of their Being, or their being thus or thus. For tho' in Reality theſe are one and the ſame, every thing being ſuch a Being by the very ſame whereby it is Conſtituted a Being, yet however they muſt be allow'd to be *Formally* diſtinct, and may accordingly be ſo conſider'd. As for inſtance, when I conſider mere being *extra nihil*, I have then the ſimple *Eſſe* of a Creature, but when I conſider this with a certain Habitude of Dependence, *&c.* I have then the *Tale Eſſe* of a Creature. Now to apply this, I think I may ſay that in the Work of the Creation the Ideas of things did not concur to the Production of them as to their Simple *Eſſe*, but only as to their *Tale Eſſe*, that is, they did not, as I conceive, properly cauſe them from not being to be (that being the proper Work of Will and Power, and not of *Ideality* as ſuch) but only

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ſerv'd to * qualify or ſpecify their Being, by determining and regulating the otherwiſe *indefinite* Operation of that Omnipotent Agent, which from not being cauſed them to be. So then the Creatures owe their pure Being to the Power of God, but the Specification of their Being to his Ideality. That they are at all is to be reſolv'd into his *Will*, that Commanded them out of their Nothing, but that they are ſuch or ſuch determinate Beings, that is properly to be reſolv'd into his *Wiſdom*, which therefore is not for Nothing repreſented in Scripture to have had ſo conſiderable a ſhare in the Creation of the World, ſince it ſerv'd to no leſs Purpoſes than to direct the Activity of the Great Agent, and to *Specify* his Work.

* *Accordingly* Suarez *calls an Exemplar a Practical Form which directs the Work, and ſays alſo that it determines the Action of the Agent, and gives in a manner the Species to the Effect. See his Diſputation on* de Cauſâ Exemplari.

6. I might add alſo to *Beautify* it, for as the Specification of things was from the Ideas of them in the Mind of God, ſo I think it need not be doubted but that all the Order, all the Proportion, all the Harmony, and all the Beauty that ſhines in and through this Senſible Syſtem derives its Original from the ſame Ideal Principles. Will and Power ſeparately conſider'd as exerting themſelves without Rule or Meaſure, that is, without *Ideas* to conduct them, would have acted Exorbitantly, and at random, and ſo could have produced nothing Regular or Uniform, any more than blind Chance or Contingency, ſo that inſtead of an Orderly and Geometrical *World*, ſuch as awaken'd the Muſick of Heaven, and made the raviſh'd Morning Stars to ſing a *Te Deum* together, and all the Sons of God to

ſhout for Joy, we ſhould have had only a Confuſed *Chaos*, without Form, and Void, as ſuch as without *Hereſy* one might have thought unworthy of a good God. But they were the Divine Ideas, thoſe true *Plaſtick* Principles, and only *Subſtantial Forms*, that directed and conducted the Great Work, and ſerv'd as Line and Rule to the Almighty Architect in the Formation of it. And where the Power was ſo great, and the Rule by which it proceeded. So perfect, the Reſult could be no other than the moſt exquiſite Beauty and Perfection, the moſt exact and geometrical Compoſure; in a Word ſuch a World, (according to the Remark of St. *Auſtin*) as without the Voice of the Prophets would proclaim it ſelf to be made by a moſt fair and moſt powerful God.

[1] *De Civitate Dei. Lib.* 11. *Cap.* 4.

7. The Sum of this Matter is, tho' the Almighty Power of God brought all things into being (that which we underſtand by what we call their *Creation*) yet 'twas from his Ideality that they had their *Specification*, as alſo all their Ornament and Regularity. 'Twas this that gave them Weight, Number and Meaſure, and all that Orderly and Beautiful Arrangement which was neceſſary to the *Conſtitution* of ſuch a Syſtem as we call the *World*. Whoſe Beauty we may moſt juſtly *admire*, but not *wonder* at, ſince Wiſdom it ſelf was the Former and Diſpoſer of it. For *Wiſdom is the worker of all things*, and *if Prudence Work, who of all that are, is a more cunning Work-man than ſhe?* For *ſhe is the Brightneſs of the Everlaſting Light, the unſpotted Mirrour of the Power of God* (a moſt Emphatical Expreſſion, repreſenting how the Power of God acts in and by his Ideality, exactly according to the foregoing Account)

count) *and the Image of his Goodneſs.* For *ſhe is more Beautiful than the Sun, and above all the Order of Stars, being compared with the Light, ſhe is found before it.* And 'tis this *Wiſdom* that *reaches from one end to another, mightily and ſweetly does ſhe order all things.* And all things partake of her Beauty, for God *ſaw her, and number'd her, and powred her out upon all his Works.* This is the true *Anima Mundi*, the Vital form of the Creation (not as informing it, but as deriving upon it all its Form and Beauty) that conducted that Spirit that is ſaid to have moved upon the Face of the Waters. By which, we are told by a * Learned Pen, ſome of the Antient *Jews* underſtood the Spirit of the *Meſſiah*: Which he ſays explains the Evangeliſt St. *John*, who in the Beginning of his Goſpel ſays, all things were made by the Eternal λόγος or Word of God (the ſame with the Νοῦς of the Ancient Philoſophers) whoſe Almighty Spirit, agitated the vaſt Confuſed Maſſe of Matter, and put it into Form. So true is that of the *Platonick* Poet, tho' in a Senſe perhaps which he was not aware of,

* *See Biſhop Patrick's Comment upon Geneſis.*

Mens agitat Molem, & magno ſe Corpore miſcet.

8. I ſhall not here make any Compariſon between the Power and the Ideality of God, much leſs determine which had the greateſt ſhare in the Work of the Creation. I only pretend to aſſign the proper part which the Divine Ideas had in it. Which in general I make to conſiſt in their being the Patterns or Exemplars, according to which all things were made, from the Worm that creeps upon

on the Ground, to the Angels of Preſence that wait about the Throne. For ſo the Chriſtian Philoſopher and Poet divinely Sings,

——————*Tu Cuncta Superno*
Ducis ab Exemplo, pulchrum Pulcherrimus ipſe
Mundum mente gerens, ſimiliq; ab imagine Formans.

And this Exemplary Concurrence of theirs I more particularly Explain. 1. By their *Specification* of things. 2. By the regular Diſpoſition and harmonical Arrangement of them. By which it appears that tho' Activity be not the proper Character or Attribute of *Ideality* as ſuch, yet however the Divine Ideas were not mere Idle Cyphers, but very Significant Figures in the Creation of the World, and had a very conſiderable ſhare in that great Work, as deriving upon it its Specific Variety, and all the Order and Beauty of it. All which is ſummarily Comprehended in that of St. *Auſtin*, who ſpeaking of Ideas, ſays, *Quarum participatione fit, ut ſit quicquid eſt, quoquo modo eſt. By the Participation of which it comes to paſs, that whatſoever is is, after what manner ſoever it is.* Which Conſiderations may remind us again by the way in what Relation theſe Divine Ideas ſtand to that Eternal λόγος, concerning whom it is ſaid, that *all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made*, John 1.3.

In Libro de diverſis Quæſtionibus. Q. 46.

9. *By him* rather perhaps as an Exemplary than as an Efficient Cauſe. Ideal Meaſure or Standard, ſo *by him* as alſo at the ſame time *according to him*. Which Interpretation tho' the ſingle Notation of

of the Prepoſition διὰ would not much incourage a *Grammarian* to make, yet, as it ſtands in Conjunction with λόγος, I ſee not why it ſhould not a *Logician*. For, for a thing to be made by the Divine Reaſon or Wiſdom, methinks, ſhould at leaſt include the Rule of Meaſure as well as the Efficient, if not Principally denote it. For indeed the very Efficiency of the Divine Reaſon or Wiſdom is its *Exemplarity*, and for things to be made by it as a formally diſtinct Principle, can in my Judgment ſignify nothing ſo properly as to be made according to the Eternal Rules, Laws and Meaſures. And ſo on the other hand, as its Efficiency is its Exemplarity, ſo its Exemplarity is alſo a true and real (tho' not the moſt proper) kind of Efficiency, in as much as it ſerves to direct, regulate and ſpecify the Work. And accordingly the Schools themſelves judge it neceſſary to reduce Exemplary to *Efficient* Cauſality, and a *Statuary* is ſaid to be *Cauſa per ſe* of a Statue, when *Polycletus* is allow'd to be no more than *Cauſa per Accidens*, tho' it cannot be pretended that the *Statuary* adds any thing to *Polycletus* beſides the formal Conſideration of his Art, and thoſe Ideal Meaſures whereby he Works. By which it appears that tho' every Efficient be not as ſuch an Exemplary, yet every Exemplary is alſo as ſuch a kind of an Efficient Cauſe. So that as upon the other Conſideration when all things are ſaid to be made by the λόγος it may well ſignify the ſame as according to him, ſo upon this latter had it been meant that they were made according to him, it might well be expreſs'd as it is, by their being made *by* him, becauſe of the real (tho' not the ſtricteſt) Efficiency involv'd in his Exemplarity, in as much as the Formation

mation of all things was Regulated and Conducted, and so in a proper and intelligible Sense also *effected* by the substantial Reason and Wisdom of God.

10. But to this purpose I farther observe that as all things are here said to be made by the λόγος, so elsewhere the Formation of things is ascribed to God as working by him. *By whom* says the Author to the *Hebrews*, *he made the Worlds*, Heb. 1.2. which since it cannot with any tolerable Congruity to his Divine Character be taken of God's using him as an *Instrument* in the Work of the Creation, is I think most reasonably to be understood in the way of Exemplary Causality, of his forming things upon him as an *Intelligible Model*, and according to his Ideal Measures. Which for the same reason may be presumed to be the Sense of the Psalmist when he says, *O Lord how manifold are thy Works, in Wisdom hast thou made them all*, Psal. 104. As also when he sings a Hymn to him that *by Wisdom made the Heavens*, Psal. 136.

11. Accordingly 'tis farther and very remarkable that what in the two former Allegations is expres's'd by the Preposition διὰ is elsewhere expres's'd by the Preposition ἐν, which more plainly imports the Sense of *Exemplarity*. By him, says our Translation, all things were created, that are in Heaven, and that are in Earth, visible and invisible, whether they be Thrones or Dominions, or Principalities or Powers, *Colos.* 1.16. And so again by him all things consist, *Verse* 17. But in both Places the Original says, ἐν αὐτῷ in him, and it seems no little force upon the genuin simplicity of the Text, and looks too much like serving, or if you will declining an Hypothesis, to have recourse to an *Hebraism* to render it otherwise.

wiſe. But *Aquinas* prefers, not to ſay Authorizes, the Litteral, and, according to him, *Exemplary* Senſe of the Text. For ſays he upon the Words, *in him*, * *Circa quod ſciendum eſt, quod Platonici ponebant Ideas, dicentes quod quælibet res fiebat ex eo quod participabat Ideam, puta, hominis vel alicuius alterius Speciei. Loco enim harum Idearum* (he proceeds here upon the vulgar miſtaken Suppoſition concerning *Plato*'s Ideas, as if they were out of God) *nos habemus unum, ſcilicet filium, verbum Dei. Artifex enim facit Artificium ex hoc, quod facit illud participare formam apud ſe Conceptam. Et ſic Deus omnia in ſua ſapientia dicitur facere, quia ſapientia Dei ſe habet ad res Creatas ſicut ars ædificatoris ad domum factam. Hæc autem forma & ſapientia eſt verbum, & ideo omnia in ipſo condita ſunt, ſicut in quodam Exemplari.* So ſays the Great School Divine, and do not the Divines that continue Mr. *Pool*'s Work ſeem very inclinable to be of his Mind in their Annotations upon this Place? For ſay they, *ſome render the* Particle *in* rather than *by*. *But they diſclaim the Philoſophical Notion about Platonic Ideas, only conceive all to be made in Chriſt as the Exemplary Cauſe whom God had in his Eternal Decree ſet up as the Pattern of all Perfections, being his Image according to which 'twas agreed in the Council of the Trinity Man ſhould be made.* This is a fair Inſinuation to the purpoſe, but in their Annotations upon the forecited Place of the *Hebrews*, *by whom he made the Worlds*, they ſpeak out with more Plainneſs and Freedom. For there they ſay, *By this Word and Wiſdom of God who was the Rule and Idea of all things, all things were model'd, receiv'd their Shapes, Forms, and diſtinct Beings.* And here-

* *See his Comment upon St.* Paul's *Epiſtles*, Pag. 160.

upon

upon this Occaſion (which is very Remarkable) they refer to the forecited place of St. *John*, and this of the *Coloſſians*, as Parallel Texts, which implies their Underſtanding them all in the ſame Senſe, as indeed in all reaſon I think they ought to be underſtood.

12. In conformity to this Account the Eternal Wiſdom is by him that was ſo eminently inſpired with it introduced as poſſeſs'd by the Almighty in the Beginning of his ways, *Prov.* 8. (which ſeems very appoſitely to anſwer to St. *John's* ἐν ἀρχῇ ὢν ὁ λόγος) and repreſented as aſſiſtent to him in the Creation of the World, but no otherwiſe than as by being preſent with him and ſtanding by him (which anſwers again to St. *John's* καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν) and to what better or more conceivable Purpoſe than as an Idea or Intelligible Meaſure for him to order and regulate his Work by. *When he prepared the Heavens I was there*, &c. *And when he appointed the Foundations of the Earth then I was by him*, &c. Or as *Solomon* expreſſes it in his Philoſophick Prayer, *And Wiſdom was with thee, which knoweth thy Works, and was preſent when thou madeſt the World.*

13. Not but that this Eternal Word or Wiſdom of God taken *Eſſentialiter* (as the School-term is) or according to that ſame Divine Nature which he has in Common with his Father, muſt and is readily allow'd to be the Maker and Creator of the World in the ſtricteſt Senſe of *Efficient* Cauſality. Nor is any thing here ſaid intended to the contrary, but what I now ſtand for preciſely is, that *Perſonally* conſider'd, and as acting as a formally diſtinct Principle according to that Order which he holds

holds in the *Oeconomy* of the Bleſſed Trinity (in which Senſe it ſeems reaſonable to think that St. *John* and the other ſacred Writers ſpeak of him, whenever they concern him in the Work of the Creation) the Principal if not the only ſhare he could have in the Formation of things muſt be that of an *Archetype* or *Exemplar*, as having the living Forms of all things in himſelf, and ſo being in a ſtrict ſenſe the Manifold or *Multiform* Wiſdom of God.

14. But it will ſufficiently ſerve the preſent Purpoſe, if in the Creation of the World he really had that Part. And that he had ſo, will, I hope, be thought no Novelty or Singularity to ſay, ſince 'tis a Doctrin ſo much countenanc'd by St. *Auſtin*. Who ſeems to have had it in his View in his Expoſition of St. *John*'s Goſpel, as alſo to inſinuate it to be the very thing intended by that Sublime Evangeliſt, in thoſe Words, *All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made*. For ſays he, *Omnino ergo fratres ſic accipite; Omnia per ipſum facta ſunt*, &c. *Nulla enim forma, nulla Compages, nulla Concordia partium, nulla qualiſcunq; ſubſtantia quæ poteſt habere pondus, Numerum & Menſuram, niſi per illud verbum eſt & ab illo verbo Creatore, cui dictum eſt, omnia in menſura & numero & pondere diſpoſuiſti.* But now why among all other Conſiderations in the World does he chuſe to aſſign this as a reaſon why all things were made by the *Word*, becauſe nothing of Beauty, Order or Proportion but what is by him, quoting upon this occaſion, that in the Book of Wiſdom, that repreſents him as the Diſpoſer of all things in Meaſure, Number and Weight? Does not this imply

that

that things were made by the Word in as much as they were regulated by him as their Intelligible Measure. But having thus prepared the Way, he delivers himself more openly in what follows. For says he, again, *Quid enim non in illo factum est?* (Observe how he changes the Phrase from *per illum* to *in illo*) *Ipse est enim sapientia Dei. Et dicitur in Psalmo, omnia in sapientia fecisti. Si ergo Christus est sapientia Dei, & Psalmus dicit omnia in sapientia fecisti. Omnia sicut per illum facta, ita in illo facta sunt.* Again, he puts the Question, *Sed quomodo per ipsum facta sunt omnia?* To which having return'd a general Answer by the following Verse, *Quod factum est, in illo vita est*, and explain'd that *vita*, by a certain spiritual Reason in the Divine Wisdom whereby things were made, he thus farther illustrates it. *Faber facit arcam. Primo in arte habet arcam. Si enim in arte arcam non haberet, non esset unde fabricando illam proferret. Sed arca sic est in arte, ut non ipsa arca sit quæ videtur oculis. In arte invisibiliter est, in opere visibiliter erit. Ecce facta est in opere, nunquid destitit esse in arte? Et illa in opere facta est, & illa manet quæ in arte est. Nam potest illa arca putrescere, et iterum ex illa quæ in arte est, alia fabricari. Attendite ergo arcam in arte, et arcam in opere. Arca in opere non est vita, arca in arte vita est, quia venit* (I suppose it should be *quia vivit*) *anima Artificis ubi sunt ista omnia antequam proferantur. Sic ergo fratres Chariſſimi, quia sapientia Dei per quam facta sunt omnia secundum artem continet omnia, antequam fabricet omnia, hinc quæ fiunt per ipsam artem non continuo vita sunt, sed quicquid factum est, vita in illo est. Terram vides, est in arte Terra. Cælum vides, est in arte Cælum. Solem*

&

& Lunam vides, ſunt & iſta in arte: Sed foris corpora ſunt, in arte vita ſunt, &c. I hope this tho' a long, will not be thought an impertinent Quotation, ſince St. *Auſtin* here plainly ſuppoſes the λόγος to have the Ideas of all things in himſelf, making that the Senſe of, in him was the Life, and conſequently to be the true Intelligible World. And tho' he does not expreſly ſay that all things were made according to him, or that this was what St. *John* meant by All things were made *by* him, yet by what he ſays of the other may he not be preſumed to imply both, eſpecially when 'tis conſider'd, that all this is in anſwer to the Queſtion put in the Beginning, *Sed quomodo per ipſum facta ſunt omnia.*

15. If it be ſaid that his Suppoſition of the Ideality of the λόγος may conſiſt with his Suppoſition of his Efficiency, and that when he puts that into the Account how all things were made by him, his meaning poſſibly may be that he made all things *Efficient*, as having the Ideas of all things, to this I anſwer, 1. That his *having* the Ideas of all things, does in all reaſonable Conſtruction, as well as in the Senſe of St. *Auſtin*, amount to his * *being* the Ideas of all things, in the Formality of which no Efficiency but that of Exemplarity will be included. And therefore this would be a very impertinent Conſideration to ſhew how all things were made by him in the *Effective*, tho' very pertinent to ſhew how all things were made by him in the *Exemplary* Senſe. 2. That if in the Queſtion *how all things were made by him*, he had intended the Senſe of ſtrict Efficiency, and not of Exemplarity, the more

*According to that *ſaying of his*, Ipſe enim vita eſt quæ ita in illo eſt, ut ipſe ſit. De gen. ad lit. Lib. 2. Cap. 6.

more proper and immediate Anſwer had been by the *Power* of the Word, and not by his *Ideality*. But to this purpoſe I farther obſerve in the 3d place, and very obſervable it is, that St. *Auſtin* ſeems not to take theſe Words of St. *John*, *All things were made by him*, as equivalent to this, that he made all things, but to ſignify as much as that God made all things by him. For ſays he here by way of Precaution againſt the *Arian* Hereſy, *Quomodo poteſt fieri ut verbum Dei factum ſit, quando Deus per verbum fecit omnia?* Agreeably to what was quoted of him before, *Ipſe eſt enim ſapientia Dei, et dicitur in Pſalmo omnia in ſapientia feciſti.* And indeed I cannot eaſily conceive but that St. *John's All things were made by him*, imports the ſame, as that God made all things by him, ſince (as I noted before) 'tis ſo expreſs'd in other Scriptures, and 'tis but reaſonable to ſuppoſe the ſame thing to be intended in them all. But now how could the Ideality of the Word be made uſe of to ſhew how all things were made by him *(Efficiently)* when according to this way of taking the Words of the Text, 'tis not the *Word* that ſo made all things, but God that made all things by him? And if that be the general Senſe of St. *John*, that God made all things by the *Word* (as St. *Auſtin* ſeems to imply) in what more ſpecial Senſe is this ſo intelligible as in that of *Exemplarity?* For ſure St. *Auſtin* could not be ſo groſs as even ſo much as to dream that St. *John* meant that God made all things by the Eternal *Word*, as by an *Inſtrument*. His meaning then according to St. *Auſtin*, methinks, ſhould be that God made all things by him as by an *Exemplar*. And thus indeed St. *Auſtin*'s Diſcourſes will run clear, and his Conſideration

ſideration of the *Ideality* of the λόγ& will be very pertinent.

16. But for farther Conformation, let us compare St. *Auſtin* the *Expoſitor*, with St. *Auſtin* the *Preacher*. *Omnia per ipſum facta ſunt*, ſays the latter, *Si omnia utiq; & Homo. Si Cælum, ſi Terra, ſi Mare, ſi Omnia quæ, in ipſis ſunt, ſi univerſa Creatura, utiq; ille manifeſtius qui ad imaginem Dei factus, per verbum factus eſt Homo.* But now how could St. *Auſtin* conclude, that if all Creatures are made by the *Word*, Man was more apparently ſo, becauſe of his being made according to the Image of God, unleſs his being made by the *Word* be underſtood of his being made by him in the way of Exemplarity? For otherwiſe what has the Conſideration of the *Image of God* to do here? That indeed is a proper reaſon of his being made by the *Word* more apparently than other Creatures according to the Exemplary Senſe, but how it ſerves the purpoſe in the Senſe of Efficiency I do not ſo well comprehend. Again ſays he, *Si dicis, quia omnia in illo ſunt, non mentiris. Dictum eſt enim ipſum verbum ſapientia Dei. Habemus autem ſcriptum omnia in ſapientia feciſti.* But then if God made all things in Wiſdom, and this Wiſdom be the ſame with St. *Auſtin*, as the *Word*, then he does as good as ſay that he made all things in the *Word*. But now I pray what other Intelligible Senſe can God's making all things in the *Word* bear, but that of his making all things by him as an Exemplar? And beſides, how otherwiſe could the Conſideration of God's making all things in the *Word* ſerve St. *Auſtin* as a *Reaſon* to ſhew that he did not lie that ſaid all things are in

De Verbis Domini Sermo. 38.

the *Word*, or as a *Ground* to conclude that all things are in him, as he does afterwards, *Ergo in illo ſunt omnia*, St. *Auſtin*'s Argument is, *Deus omnia fecit in verbo, ergo in verbo ſunt omnia.* But where would be the Conſequence, unleſs by God's making all things in the *Word* be meant his making all things by him in the Senſe of Exemplarity? And then indeed the Conſequence proceeds well, *ergo in illo ſunt omnia.*

17. Theſe things I leave with my Reader, to conſider in what Senſe St. *Auſtin* may moſt reaſonably be preſumed to have apprehended St. *John* in thoſe Words, *All things were made by him.* But as to his own Senſe of the Matter he is more clear and poſitive; for it ſeems it is his expreſs Doctrin, that all things are in the Word. For which I need go no farther than that Place, *Unum verbum Dei eſt, ubi ſunt omnia non ſolum quæ nunc ſunt, verum etiam quæ fuerunt*, &c. But then as from God's making all things in the Word, as by an *Exemplar*, it rightly follows, that therefore all things are in the *Word*, ſo from all things being in the *Word*, it ſeems to be a very reaſonable Conſequence that therefore he made all things in the *Word*, as by an *Exemplar*. For by whom ſhould he be ſuppoſed to make all things, but by him in whom are all things? Again, as he expreſly holds the Eternal Reaſons and Ideas of Things, and that Things were made according to thoſe Ideas or Reaſons, ſo he expreſly places thoſe Ideas in the *Word*, all which he Comprizes at once, when he tells us, that things are known by the Angels otherwiſe in the *Word* of God,

De Trin. Lib. 4. Cap. 1.

De Civ. Dei. Lib. 11. Cap. 29.

God, where they have their Cauſes and their Reaſons, unchangeable and permanent, according to which they were made, then in themſelves. *Omnia hæc aliter in verbo Dei cognoſcuntur ab Angelis, ubi habent Cauſas Rationeſq; ſuas, id eſt, ſecundum quas facta ſunt, incommutabiliter permanentes, aliter in ſeipſis.* But if the Ideas of Things are in the *Word*, and Things are made according to thoſe Ideas, then are they not alſo made according to the *Word*? What Conſequence can be more plain than this, and may not he that affirms the two former Propoſitions be fairly preſumed to hold the latter. But for better Satisfaction that he does ſo, he himſelf tells us again in the ſame Place, that the Angels know the Creature better in the Wiſdom of God, as in the Art wherein it was made, than in it ſelf. *Ipſam quoq; Creaturam melius ibi, hoc eſt in ſapientia Dei, tanquam in arte qua facta eſt, quam in ea ipſa ſciunt.* And to clear any Doubt or Diſpute that may ariſe upon the Conſtruction of *qua facta eſt*, and to ſatisfy us that by the Art wherein it was made, he means the ſame as the Art according to which, he farther tells us a Line or two after, that the former kind of Knowledge is the Knowlege of the *Day*, and the latter that of the *Evening*; for which he gives a Reaſon from the great Difference that is between knowing Things in themſelves, and the knowing them in that Reaſon, according to which they are made. *Multum enim differt, utrum in ea ratione Cognoſcatur aliquid ſecundum quam facta eſt, an in ſeipſo.* Which Reaſon would be very impertinent upon the Suppoſition of any other Senſe. So then the Art wherein the Creature was made ſignifies the ſame as the Reaſon according to

which, and since this Art is no other than the *Word*, then 'tis plain, that the Creature was made according to the *Word*; which accordingly he elsewhere calls the Art of the Omnipotent God, full of all living and immutable Reasons, and tells us, that God knows in it all the Things which he made *by* it, that is, in all reasonable Construction, as having those living and immutable Reasons, which will be the same as *according to* it. Agreeably to which he very frequently explains that *Beginning*, wherein *Moses* says, that God created the Heaven and the Earth, of Christ. *Tu Pater in Principio, quod est tua sapientia de te nata, æqualis tibi & Coæterna, id est in Filio tuo, fecisti Cælum & Terram.* And this he makes use of against the Cavils of the *Manichees* upon those Words of *Moses*. *Quærunt*, says he, *in quo Principio, & dicunt si in Principio aliquo temporis fecit Deus Cælum & Terram, quid agebat antequam faceret Cælum & Terram*, &c. *His respondemus*, says he, *Deum in Principio fecisse Cælum & Terram, non in Principio Temporis, sed in Christo, cum verbum esset apud Patrem, per quod facta, & in quo facta sunt omnia.* And accordingly he makes Christ to be that Wisdom wherein God is said to have made all Things. *Omnia in sapientia fecisti. Ergo omnia in Christo fecisti. Ille Contemptus, ille Expalmatus, ille Consputus, ille spinis Coronatus, ille Crucifixus, omnia in illo fecisti*, &c. After which he goes on, *Quid enim non a Patre per Filium Creatum est?* Where by the way

De Trinitate. Lib. 6. Cap. 10.

Confess. Lib. 13. Cap. 5.

De Genesi Contra Manichæos. *Lib. 1. Cap. 2.*

In Enarratione in Psalm 103.

way obſerve how well he expreſſes the different Parts that the Father and the Son had in the Origination of Things. 'Tis *a* Patre, and *per* Filium. The former denoting the Effective or Creative, and the latter the Exemplary way of Cauſality. For indeed 'tis but Reaſon that the Father who is *Principium Eſſendi ad intra* ſhould be alſo ſo *ad extra*, that the Things without ſhould derive from him as well as the Perſons within, and that he ſhould be the Fountain of the *Creature*, as well as of the *Deity*. So that the proper Part and Character of the Son here cannot well be any other than that of an *Exemplar*. And to this purpoſe he delivers his Senſe yet more expreſly when he ſays, *Similitudo Patris Filius dicitur, quia ejus Participatione ſimilia ſunt quæcunq; ſunt vel inter ſe vel Deo ſimilia. Ipſa eſt enim ſpecies prima qua ſunt, ut ita dicam ſpeciata, & Forma qua Formata ſunt omnia.* Which is much the ſame with another Remarkable Paſſage elſewhere, where ſpeaking of the Eternal *Word*, he ſays, that it is *Forma quædam, Forma non Formata, ſed Forma omnium Formatorum, Forma incommutabilis, ſine lapſu, ſine defectu, ſine Tempore, ſine loco, ſuperans omnia, eminens omnibus, & Fundamentum quoddam in quo ſint*, &c. which laſt Clauſe concerning the *Word*'s being the Foundation in which things are, ſeems to ſtrike a *Concord* with that of the Apoſtle, *by him all things conſiſt*, or as it may perhaps be better render'd, were conſtituted, or put into a *Syſteme*.

In Libro de diverſis Quæſtionibus. Quæſt. 23.

De Verbis Domini. Sermo. 38.

18. There is indeed a certain place where St. *Auſtin* ſeems to limit and reſtrain the Exemplarity

of the *Word*, with reſpect to the Works of the Creation, by confining it to the Rational and Intellectual part of it, as if it were *their* peculiar Privilege to be form'd upon that Divine Model. The Words of that Great Author ſpeaking of the ſecond Perſon of the Trinity, under the Character of the Wiſdom and Image of God, are theſe. *Horum alia ſic ſunt per ipſam, ut ad ipſam etiam ſint, ut omnis rationalis & intellectualis Creatura, in qua Homo rectiſſime dicitur factus ad imaginem & Similitudinem Dei. Non enim aliter incommutabilem veritatem poſſet mente conſpicere. Alia vero ita ſunt per ipſam facta, ut non ſint ad ipſam.* In Anſwer to which, I once doubted whether all that concerns Exemplarity here were not expreſs'd by *per ipſam*, and whether *ad ipſam* were not uſed in the *Final* rather than in the *Exemplary* Senſe, to the ſame purpoſe, as when he ſays elſewhere, *feciſti nos ad te*, that is, to thee as our End, or for the Enjoyment of thee. Becauſe, he ſays again, as it were in the ſame Breath, *Et ideo rationalis anima ſi Creatori ſuo ſerviat a quo facta eſt, per quem facta eſt, & ad quem facta eſt*, &c. where he ſeems to denote the Efficient by *a quo*, the Exemplar by *per quem*, and the End by *ad quem*. And if this be the Senſe of *ad quem*, as by this threefold Diſtinction I was once inclined to think, then when he ſays, *Alia vero ita ſunt per ipſam facta ut non ſint ad ipſam*, the Limitation will reſpect the Eternal *Word* as the *End* only, and not as an *Exemplar*. And in this Senſe indeed the Limitation holds well, ſince tho' all Creatures are made according to the *Word* as an Ex-

In Libro. de verâ Religione. *Cap.* 44.

Confeſs. Lib. 1. *Cap.* 1.

Exemplar, yet none are made *ad ipſum* as to an *End*, but thoſe of the Intellectual Order. But I anſwer now otherwiſe, ſuppoſing the Limitation to reſpect not the Finality, but the Exemplarity of the λόγος, (as upon ſecond Thoughts I apprehend it does) yet ſtill this is no Denial but only a Confinement of his Exemplarity, and even upon this Suppoſition all the Intellectual part of the Creation are allow'd to be made by him as an *Exemplar*, and ſo much the more by virtue of the ſuppoſed Exception, which according to the Rule makes the Affirmation hold the more ſtrongly in the non-excepted Inſtances. And this will be ſufficient to ſerve my purpoſe at preſent. But then I anſwer again, that to make St. *Auſtin* conſiſtent with himſelf, this Limitation muſt it ſelf be qualified with a Limitation, that is, I mean, that when he ſays, that the Rational and Intellectual part of the Creation only, is *ad ipſam*, this muſt be underſtood *Comparatively*, and by way of Eminence, ſo as to intimate the very near and high degree of Conformity, that the Intellectual Beings have to that Intelligible Pattern, in Compariſon of which the other Creatures ſeem in a manner not to have been at all made by it, or to be *ad ipſam*. Such remote and faint Projections are they of the Great Intelligible Sun, and ſuch near and immediate Eradiations are the other, and ſo cloſely do they reſemble their Lucid Original. So that the Application of *ad ipſam* to the Rational Creatures only, ſeems to imply, that whereas the reſt were made according to their particular Ideas in the *Word*, they had as it were the *Word* it ſelf for their Idea, ſuch reſembling Imitations are they of

his Spiritual and Intellectual Nature. To the like purpose as he had said before, *Si omnia per ipsum, utiq; ille Manifestius qui ad imaginem Dei Factus, per verbum factus est Homo.* Thus I say we must qualify the Limitation here, or else I know not how we shall reconcile him to himself, and that not only elsewhere, but even in this very Book, wherein he represents the Eternal *Word* as the Universal *Exemplar* of all Things. For says he, immediately before the Place we are upon, *Præcessit enim Forma omnium summe implens unum de quo est* (that is God the Father, whose perfect Image he is) *ut Cætera quæ sunt in quantum sunt unisi milia, per eam Formam fierent,* which seems to be as clear a Testimony for the universal Exemplarity of the *Word*, as any that has hitherto been produc'd, or need be desired. Again says he, *Sanan-*

Cap. 3. *dam esse animum ad intuendam incommutabilem rerum Formam, & eodem modo semper se habentem atq; undiq; sui similem pulchritudinem, nec distentam locis, nec tempore variatam, sed unum atq; idem omni ex parte servantem, quam non crederent esse homines cum ipsa vere summeq; sit. Cætera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi, & tamen in quantum sunt, ab illo æterno Deo per ejus Veritatem* (that is by the Eternal *Word*, as *Veritas* is well known to signify in the Writings of this Father, according to that Re-

In Psal. 123. markable Saying of his, *Veritas immortalis est, veritas incommutabilis est, Veritas illud Verbum est de quo dicitur, in Principio erat verbum,* &c.) *fabricata consistere.* Again, speaking of the Father, the Son,

Cap. 7. and the Holy Ghost, says he, *Qua trinitate*

nitate quantum in hac vita datum eſt cognita, omnis intellectualis & animalis & corporalis Creatura, ab eadem Trinitate Creatrice eſſe in quantum eſt, & ſpeciem ſuam habere, & Ordinatiſſime adminiſtrari, ſine ulla dubitatione perſpicitur. Where obſerve that tho' he applies the term *Creatrix* to the whole Trinity (as indeed it may very rightly be applied, becauſe of the Joint-concern of all Three Perſons in the Work of the Creation) yet he more diſtinctly ſeems to refer the pure *Eſſe* or Being of Things to the Father, their Specification to the Son, and their Adminiſtration to the Holy Spirit. But leſt any ſhould conceive ſo groſly of the Concurrence of the Perſons, as to imagine that one made one part of the Creation, and another another, he aſcribes the Production of the whole to the Father working by the Son, and in the Virtue or Power (if I render it rightly) of the Holy Spirit. *Non ut alium partem totius Creaturæ feciſſe intelligatur Pater, & aliam Filius, & aliam Spiritus Sanctus, ſed & ſimul omnia & unamquamq; Naturam Patrem feciſſe per Filium in dono Spiritus Sancti.* Again, ſpeaking of the Firſt Wiſdom, he calls it the incommutable Truth, the Law of all Arts, and the Art of the Omnipotent Artiſt. *Cap.* 31. *Hæc eſt illa incommutabilis veritas, quæ lex omnium artium recte dicitur, & ars omnipotentis Artificis.* And leſt any thing elſe ſhould be pretended to be meant by the Art of the Almighty Artificer, than his working by the Eternal Wiſdom or Truth, as an Exemplar in the Formation of Things, he goes on a little after, to tell us, that all Things have this for their Rule, Form or Pattern. *Omnia enim quæ appetunt unitatem*

tatem hanc habent regulam vel Formam, vel Exemplum, vel ſi quo alio verbo dici ſe ſinit, quoniam ſola ejus Similitudinem a quo eſſe accepit, implevit. Which laſt Clauſe intimates the reaſon why all Things are made by the Eternal *Word* as their Pattern, becauſe he is the perfect and adequate Image of God, and therefore moſt fit to be the Meaſure and Exemplar of his Works.

Cap. 36. But he farther deſcants upon the ſame Ground, and having diſcourſed how imperfectly all other things do imitate God, and that there is ſomething that fully reſembles him, *viz.* Truth, the Word that was in the Beginning, *&c.* and that whereas other things are only like God, this is his very *Likeneſs*, and therefore *Truth* becauſe it repreſents him as he is, he then goes on to tell us, that this is the Form of all things. *Ut veritate ſunt vera quæ vera ſunt, ita ſimilitudine ſimilia ſunt quæcunq; ſimilia ſunt. Ut veritas Forma verorum eſt, ita ſimilitudo Forma Similium eſt. Ea Forma eſt omnium quæ ſunt, quæ eſt ſumma ſimilitudo Principii.* Again, he tells us, that the Wiſdom of God reaches from end to end, and that the Great Artiſt diſpoſed his Work by it. *Per hanc ſummus ille Artifex opera ſua in unum finem decoris ordinata contexuit.* But not to weary my Reader, I ſhall only farther obſerve that in the concluſion of this excellent Book (which

Cap. 55. for the great Things it contains I would commend to his intire Peruſal) the Author applying himſelf to the Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity, and giving to each his proper Character, forgets not continually to aſcribe to the Son that of *Exemplarity*. *Ecce unum Deum colo,*

unum

unum omnium Principum. Et unam Sapientiam qua ſapiens eſt quæcunq; anima ſapiens eſt, &c. *Quare ipſam quoq; veritatem nulla ex parte diſſimilem in ipſo & cum ipſo veneremur, quæ Forma eſt omnium quæ ab uno facta ſunt, & ad unum Nituntur. Unde apparet Spiritalibus animis per hanc Formam eſſe facta omnia, quæ ſola implet quod appetunt omnia,* &c. *Quare ipſum donum Dei cum patre & Filio æque incommutabile colere & tenere nos convenit, unius ſubſtantiæ Trinitatem, unum Deum a quo ſumus, per quem ſumus, in quo ſumus. A quo diſceſſimus, cui diſſimiles facti ſumus, a quo perire non permiſſi ſumus. Principium ad quod recurrimus, Formam quam ſequimur, & Gratiam qua reconciliamur, unum Deum quo Auctore conditi ſumus, & Similitudinem ejus, per quam ad unitatem reformamur, & Pacem qua unitati adhæremus. Deum qui dixit, fiat, & verbum * per quod factum eſt omne quod ſubſtantialiter & naturaliter factum eſt, & Donum benignitatis ejus, quo placuit & reconciliatum eſt auctori ſuo, ut non interiret quiquuid ab eo per Verbum factum eſt unum Deum quo Creatore Vivimus, per quem reformati ſapienter Vivimus, quem diligentes & quo fruentes beate Vivimus. Unum Deum ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia.*

* *My Reader is deſired to take notice that this is the very Expreſſion of St.* John, *and how St.* Auſtin *here uſes it.*

19. Theſe Teſtimonies even from this ſingle Book ſeem to want neither Weight nor Number to ſatisfy thoſe that ſhall conſider them. What St. *Auſtin* thought of the univerſal Exemplarity of the Eternal *Word*, Notwithſtanding any appearance to the contrary that may be pretended from the

the forementioned Paſſage. But not to leave my Author without a little more Reflection, I think it may deſerve a Remark by the way, how in ſome places of this laſt Quotation he intimates the Eternal *Word* to be the Form of the * *New* as well as of the *Old* Creation, that Grace proceeds by the Standard of Nature, and that we are *regenerated* by his perfect Model, as well as *created*. And indeed this ſeems to be no unreaſonable Suppoſition. For when the Works of God that are indued with a Principle of Liberty, ſhall ſo far abuſe it as to degenerate from the Perfection of their Original Standard, by what ſhall we ſuppoſe them with ſo much Congruity to be *reform'd*, as by the very ſame Standard of Perfection upon which they were *form'd*. Eſpecially conſidering that our † *Regeneration* implies only the *Reſtoration* of our Nature, and is but the Recovery of that primitive Rectitude which Originally belong'd to it. And if the State to be retriev'd be the ſame, why ſhould not the Meaſure be the ſame too? If a Picture be defaced or antequated, how ſhall it be better rectified than by being collated and adjuſted again to the ſame Original whereby it was at firſt drawn? Now ſuch Pictures are we, taken from the very Life of the Divinity (for in him was the *Life*) and drawn according to the *Likeneſs* of God, even that Subſtantial and only perfect *Likeneſs* of his, which is the Brightneſs of his Glory, and the expreſs Image of his Perſon, but

* *As he dots elſewhere, De Gen. ad. Lit. Lib. 1. Cap. 5.*

† *Hoc enim agit Spiritus gratiæ, ut imaginem Dei in quâ naturaliter facti ſumus inſtauret in Nobis. St. Auſtin. De Spiritu & Literâ. Cap. 27.*

but now all faded in our Colours, and grown out of all Order and Proportion. If then this once Beautiful, but now diſorder'd and diſcolour'd Piece, be to be wrought over again, 'tis methinks but reaſonable to ſuppoſe that it ſhould be by its Ancient Original, and tho' the *Work* be *New*, yet the *Model* ſhould be the *ſame*. So that in this Senſe alſo perhaps it may be true what St. *Auſtin* very remarkably ſays concerning the moral Order and Diſorder of the Rational Creature. *Averſa enim a ſapientia incommutabili, ſtulte ac miſere vivit, quæ informitas ejus eſt. Formatur autem converſa ad incommutabile lumen ſapientiæ, quod eſt verbum Dei.* The Exigence of our preſent Theory does not indeed *require* this Suppoſition, and ſo may without any Fundamental Detriment part with it, but I ſay it ſeems to be a very congruous and conſiſtent Thought, that the *New* Creature ſhould be form'd upon the Eternal *Word* as its Exemplar, as well as the *Old*, and how far this Suppoſition may contribute to give Light to thoſe places of Scripture which ſpeak of our putting on the New Man, which is renew'd in Knowledge after the Image of him that created him, *Coloſ.* 3. 10. and alſo how that we are his Workmanſhip, created in Chriſt Jeſus unto good Works, *Epheſ.* 2. 10. I leave to the conſideration of my Reader.

De Gen. ad lit. Lib. 1. Cap. 5.

20. That which I more inſiſt upon is the Exemplarity of the Divine λόγος with reference to the Works of the *Natural* Creation, and herein we have the Doctor of the *Schools* giving in his Verdict (as he generally does) with the Doctor of the

the *Church*. For after he had laid down and proved this general Concluſion, that God himſelf is the firſt Exemplar of all things, in anſwer to this Queſtion, whether the Exemplary Cauſe be any thing beſides God, he afterwards more diſtinctly tells us, that in the Divine *Wiſdom* are the Reaſons of all things, which Reaſons he there alſo calls *Exemplary Forms*. Again, having under Conſideration the different Oeconomy in the Work of the Creation that ſeems to be attributed to the Perſons in the Creed, under the diſtinct Characters of *maker of all things viſible and inviſible*, *By whom all things were made*, *and the Lord and giver of Life* (which by the way deſerves a particular regard) he tells us in the Concluſion of his Account, that the Reaſon of this Attribution may be taken from the Appropriation of their Eſſential Attributes. For ſays he, *Patri attribuitur & appropriatur Potentia, quæ maxime manifeſtatur in Creatione, & ideo attribuitur Patri Creatorem eſſe. Filio autem appropriatur ſapientia, per quem agens per intellectum operatur. Et ideo dicitur de Filio, per quem omnia facta ſunt. Spiritui ſancto autem appropriatur Bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in debitos fines, & vivificatio, nam vita in interiori quodam motu conſiſtit. Primum autem movens & Finis & Bonitas.* Again, ſays he in moſt plain and full Words, *Sicut formatio Artificiorum eſt per formam artis quæ eſt in mente Artificis, quæ poteſt dici intelligibile verbum ipſius, ita Formatio totius Creaturæ eſt per verbum Dei.* In which

Sum. Theol. Part I. *Queſt.* 44. *Art.* 3.

Quæſt. 45. *Art.* 6.

Quæſt. 74. *Art.* 3.

which he does expreſly aſſert, that the Works of Nature were as much form'd by the Divine *Word*, as any Piece of Art is by the Form or Idea of it in the Mind of the Artificer. Wherein I think he acknowledges his *Exemplarity* as plainly as he does his Divinity. And after all were it not ſo, 'tis not eaſy to conceive why the Formation of the World ſhould be aſcribed to the Second Perſon rather than the Firſt, and much leſs why the Firſt ſhould be ſaid to make the World by the Second, as he is in Scripture, the Language of the Old Teſtament being that he made all things by his *Wiſdom*, and of the New that he made them by his *Word*.

21. And all this ſeems very Conſonant to the Principles of the pureſt and moſt Genuin *Platoniſm*. For ſo *Plotinus* expreſly, who tells us, that the World is according to the *Mind* κατὰ νοῦν, and that the Mind is the cauſe of the World as the Archetype and Exemplar of it, and that the World is the Image of the Mind, exiſting and ſubſiſting by it. Αἴτιον τόδε, ἀρχέτυπον οἷον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνος τόδε ὄντος, καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάντος. And ſo likewiſe his excellent Commentator *Marſilius Ficinus* in his Comment upon this Book, calls the *Mind* (in whom he ſays are the Degrees of all Forms) the Exemplary cauſe of the World. As alſo in his Comment upon the Eighth Book of *Plotinus*, *Ennead.* 3. where he has this very appoſite and remarkable Paſſage, *Ipſum Bonum eſt Pater, Cujus Filius eſt Intellectus, ſemper a Patre plenus, hujus autem Intellectus eſt imago Mundus.* Which he carries with him to the next Book, in his entrance upon which this is his firſt

Ennead. 3. *Lib.* 2. *Num.* 1.

and

and capital Propoſition, *Quod Mundi Auctor ſit Intellectus primus, ipſius Boni Filius.* Which Words apparently proceed upon the Characters of the *Platonic* Trinity, the Second of which is Intellect or Mind. But I do not know any one *Platoniſt* whoſe Teſtimony is to this purpoſe more expreſs, or perhaps more Authentick than that of *Philo Judæus* who in his *Coſmopoea* calls the Divine λόγος by thoſe Emphatical Titles of ἀρχέτυπος σφραγὶς and ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα the *Archetypal Seal*, and *Archetypal Exemplar*, and that with the moſt peremptory Aſſurance. It is manifeſt ſays he, that the Archetypal Seal which we call the Intelligible World, is the very Word of God, the Archetypal Paradigme, the Idea of Ideas. But if the *Word* of God be the great Exemplary Form of the Creation according to which the Lines and Features of Nature were drawn, and this be alſo the Character of our Ideas that all things were made by them, and without them was nothing made that was made, then from this *Parallelliſm* and Coincidency of Characters (which is what I deſign in all this) may we not fairly conclude that this Archetypal Word of God is in Reality the very ſame with the Divine Ideas, and accordingly that he is the true Intelligible World? And here we meet with *Philo* again, who (beſides what was intimated to this purpoſe in the Paſſage laſt cited) ſcruples not expreſly to tell us, that if we will ſpeak out plainly, the Intelligible World muſt be ſaid to be no other than the Word of God, Εἰ δὲ τις ἐθελήσειε γυμνοτέροις χρήσασθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον ἢ θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος. The Eternal Word then is the true Intelligible World, or the World

of

of Life, wherein the Original Forms and Eſſences of Things eternally live and flouriſh. And accordingly St. *John* ſays, that in him was the Life, which Life * St. *Auſtin* underſtands of the Ideas of Things, making it alſo as the Apoſtle does, to be the Light of Men. Of which more hereafter, when we come to the other Part of our Theory.

* *See his Expoſition of St.* John, *Compared with De Gen. ad lit. Lib.* 2. *Cap.* 6.

22. But to our Ideas again, for there is one thing more that I have to Remark concerning them. And that is, that as they ſuſtain'd the part of Exemplars or Patterns in the *Creation* or firſt Production of Things, ſo do they alſo in all the Succeſſive *Generations* of them, which are from time to time carried on, and conducted by theſe Ideal Meaſures contributing equally to the maintaining, as they did at firſt to the introducing the ſeveral Species of Being that are in the World. What is neceſſary in the Work of Generation, by way of proper Efficiency or Activity is ſupplied and provided for by the Eſtabliſhment of certain Laws of Motion, which are the ſame with what we call the *Courſe* of Nature, and are indeed no other than the fix'd and general Will of its Author, but they are theſe Ideal Meaſures by which theſe Motions are directed, and 'tis by their Direction that they are ſo determinate and uniform in their ordinary Productions, bringing forth all things in the Vegetable, as well as in the Animal World according to their reſpective *Kinds*.

23. God guiding his Temporary *Fiat*, by his Eternal Ideas, was ſo well pleas'd with the Works which he had made, that he liked to have more

of them, and ſo eſtabliſh'd the Order of *Generation*. But the Bleſſing of *Increaſe* and *Multiply* would have had but a very wild, confuſe and indeterminate Effect, if the *Rule* and the *Hand* had not ſtill gon on together, and the Fecundity of his Will, had not been regulated by the Ideality of his Wiſdom. Tho' then the Work of the *Creation* be long ſince concluded in a *Sabbath* of Reſt, yet our Ideas muſt not be laid aſide. No, tho' their Effects were tranſient, their Uſe and Neceſſity is perſevering, and Nature can no more *proceed* than ſhe could *begin* without them, ſince to continue the ſame Species of Things ſhe muſt be conducted by the ſame Rule. It is therefore by theſe Ideal Meaſures that the great Agent proceeds in the Perpetuation and Multiplication of his Creatures, according to their ſeveral Kinds, and ſince theſe Ideas have a Real Identity with the Eternal *Word*, all things by him may be ſaid to be *Generated* as well as *Made*, and in this Senſe alſo that ſaying of his will be found to be true, *My Father worketh hitherto, and I work*, John 5. 17.

24. Only in perſuance of the Principles before laid down. I muſt here Remark, that there is this one very conſiderable difference between the manner of working *Now*, and in the *firſt Production* of Things. Then God acted by *Particular Wills*, and becauſe his Will was equal to his Wiſdom, the Divine Originals were copied with Exactneſs, Things were form'd moſt ſeverely according to their Ideas, and accordingly every thing was *very Good* and perfect in its Kind, and there was no *Monſter* to be ſeen at the opening of this *Firſt Scene* of Nature. But now in the Adminiſtration of the World

World (the Wiſdom and Order of his Conduct ſo requiring) God proceeds by General and Stated Laws of Motion, and thoſe exceeding few and ſimple, which is the occaſion of thoſe little Aberrations which ſometimes happen in the courſe of *Generation*, when the Wheel of Nature gives us a jogg by ſtepping a little out of the Tract, and ſince we will not admire the Regularity of her Ordinary Procedure, tries to amuſe and ſtir up our Wonder by *Irregular* Births. And theſe we Criticks are pleas'd to ſet down for *Erratas*, and to mark out as Defects and Faults in Nature, and ſo indeed they are ſimply conſider'd and with relation to Ideal Standards, from which they are real Deficiencies, but not when conſider'd and compar'd with the Generality and great Simplicity of those Laws of Motion by which they are produced. It being better, and more befitting the Wiſe Order of the Divine Conduct, that the Hand of Nature ſhould proceed as it does, ſo as not always to hit thoſe Marks of Ideal Perfection which it aims at (with ſo great a Simplicity of Adminiſtration) than to have her Works ſomewhat more Correct in a more operoſe Method, and by the Eſtabliſhment of more Laws of Motion purpoſely provided for that End.

25. But then upon this Suppoſition theſe occaſional Monſtroſities, or Irregularities in Nature are no Argument againſt Ideas, or the Formation of Things by them, as was diſcours'd before, ſince this comes to paſs by reaſon of the different Conduct in the after *Adminiſtration* from what was uſed in the *Creation* of the World. But to this I now farther add, that they are ſo far from being Arguments *againſt* the Ideal Formation of Things, that on the contrary they are moſt Co-

gent Arguments *for* it, and are themſelves utterly Unaccountable, I may ſay Impoſſible without it. For all *Irregularity* ſuppoſes a *Rule*, and if there were no Ideas, upon which Things were form'd, and by which their Perfection is to be meaſured, there is no Intelligible Reaſon to be aſſign'd why any one thing ſhould be accounted Monſtrous, Irregular, or deform'd rather than another. And accordingly from the like Conſideration or Objection rather, of Natural Agents ſometimes failing of their End, *Suarez* draws a like Argument for their acting *for* an End. For, ſays he, *As Art intending an End, ſometimes does not attain it, ſo in the Actions of Nature from their intending a certain End follow Monſters, or Defects of Nature, becauſe they cannot always attain their End by reaſon of ſome intervening Impediment. Otherwiſe if Nature did not tend to or aim at a certain End, there would be no Monſters in Nature, becauſe ſhe would not more ſwerve from her Scope in producing a Monſter than in producing any thing elſe. For a Monſter is properly a Defect in Nature coming ſhort of her End.* But then as to the Objection taken from the Intention of the Author of Nature, *viz.* that if Natural Agents did act by a Divine Intention, they would never err in their Actions, nor fail of attaining their Ends, this he ſays ſignifies nothing, becauſe that Intention is not always Abſolute and Efficacious, or in the Language of Divinity, by a Will of *Beneplacitare*, or a conſequent Will, but by a general or antecedent Will, which is as it were a Conditional Intention, conſiſting in this, that God will have a perfect Effect to follow, as far as it ſhall be

Metaph. Tom. 1. Diſput. 23. Sect. 10. Num. 11.

be able to follow according to the Order of Natural Causes, with which no Neceſſary Concurrence on his part ſhall be wanting. Now 'tis but *mutatis mutandis* to apply this Account (which indeed is moſt worthy of its Judicious Author) to the Hypotheſis of the Formation of things by Ideas, and it will give the ſame Satisfaction in this Caſe as in the other. For the *Locks* have the ſame *Wards*, and therefore the ſame *Key* will open both.

Sect. IV.

Wherein is Conſider'd how the Divine Ideas conſiſt with the Simplicity, Immateriality, and Infinity of the Divine Nature.

1. THE Truth and Neceſſity of theſe Attributes is ſo Unqueſtionably certain in the Nature of that Glorious and Adorable Being which we call God, that there needs no other Evidence of the Falſhood of any *Hypotheſis* how rational ſoever and well adjuſted it may otherwiſe appear, than the Repugnance which it ſhall be convinc'd to carry in it to all or any of theſe Attributes. And therefore it is neceſſary to acquit our Theory of Ideas from that Inconvenience which on this ſide it may ſeem to lie open to, and which alone would be ſufficient utterly to Silence and Overthrow it. And ſince it is ſo *Neceſſary*, 'tis no little Satisfaction to me to find it ſo *Feaſible*.

2. And first as to the *Simplicity* of God, to which it must be allow'd that his *Ideality* seems at the first Salutation to threaten some Opposition, as indeed what does not, that imports any thing of Plurality or Distinction. But 'tis not all Plurality or Distinction, that is inconsistent with Simplicity (for then the Divine *Attributes*, nay even *Personality* it self must come under the same Censure) but only such as implies a real Diversity of component Parts. For indeed nothing is contrary to Simplicity, but Composition, which imports real Multitude, and indeed is nothing else but the * Union of Things together really different and distinct from one another. But now it is not thus in the Divine Ideas, which according to the fore-stated Account of them are neither Things nor Modes really distinct from the Divine Nature, but the very same Divine Nature it self, as 'tis variously imitable or Participable *ad extra*, according to such or such intelligible Degrees of Being or Perfection. Indeed should we put any thing in God that was not God, or state his *Ideas* as *Vorstius* is said to do his *Decrees*, by supposing them to be really distinct from him, this I confess by the common consent of the Metaphysical School would be to intrench upon his *Simplicity*. But supposing, as we do, that the Ideas in God are in Reality no other than the very Essence of God himself as it relates to Things out of himself, 'tis plain that this will no more infer any real Composition in the Divine Nature, than that of St. *John* concerning him, to whose Character we suppose these Ideas to

* *Compositio nihil aliud est quam realis unio rerum distinctarum.* Suarez *Metap. Disput.* 34. *Sect.* 4. *Num.* 20.

to appertain. *The Word was with God, and the Word was God.*

3. The next Difficulty concerns the *Immateriality* of God. And this to thoſe that will uſe their *Imagination* more than their *Reaſon*, may perhaps appear a very great one. For it will be ſaid if God has in himſelf the Ideas of all things, then the Idea of *Matter* will be alſo in God, and ſo God will repreſent Matter, and according to the foregoing Account contain the Perfection of Matter, *&c.* and will not this make God to be *Material?* So Mr. *Arnauld* ſeems to have thought, who advances this very Charge againſt his Adverſary M. *Malebranche*, and upon like Grounds, *viz.* becauſe he ſuppoſes *Intelligible Extenſion* (by which he means the ſame as the Idea of Body) to be in God. The Objection ſeems to be moſt weakly and confuſely Urged, and is clearly and diſtinctly anſwer'd, and withal ſo fully, that a very little room may ſerve for the Conſideration of it here. Referring therefore my Reader for his more particular Satisfaction in this Matter to the * Accounts given of it by a more accurate Hand, I ſhall only at preſent Remark, that tho' there be ſomething *Formally* in God that anſwers to every Reality out of him (which may be call'd the Intelligible Being or Eſſence of thoſe Things, even as *Malebranche* calls that in God which anſwers to Body *Intelligible Extention*) yet the Things themſelves are not in him *Formally*, but only by way of *Eminence* and Superiority, ſo far forth as in the Simplicity of his Infinite Eſſence he contains what intelligibly anſwers

* *See the firſt of M.* Malebranche *his three Letters concerning the Defenſe of M.* Arnauld, *&c.*

to all that is really perfect, even in the most imperfect Beings. And in this Sense he may be said to contain those Beings, but then he contains them without their Imperfections, representing only what is pure Being and Perfection in them, and that too only after an Intelligible manner. So that Things are not in God as they are out of him (neither Body nor Spirit) but after a far more excellent and perfect Manner, according to those forecited Words of St. *Austin*, very pertinent to this purpose, *Terram vides, est in arte Terra. Cælum vides, est in arte Cælum. Solem & Lunam vides, sunt & ista in arte. Sed Foris corpora sunt, in arte vita sunt.* Which I think may suffice for a general Satisfaction that the Idea of Body infers no Corporeity in God. But if a farther inquiry be made concerning the Mode of this, how an Idea purely Spiritual can represent *Body*, I must confess my self unable to explain the very precise manner of it. But that it should be thus there is evident Necessity, it being impossible God should create Body, unless he had the Idea of it, and it is no strange thing that the Nature of an Infinite Being should have peculiar Properties, and special Privileges belonging to it, which a Finite Understanding, and so dull a one as mine is, has not force enough to Comprehend. And yet as dull as it is, perhaps I might not scruple to undertake, that if any one will distinctly explain to me how the Divine *Immensity* can be (as most certainly it is) without *Extension*, to give him as distinct an Account how the Essence of God can represent Body without *Corporeity*.

4. Now

4. Now as to the *Infinity* of God (tho' that be a ſtrange Attribute to ſay any thing about) it is to be conſider'd, that tho' Finite cannot poſſibly repreſent Infinite, yet Infinite may well be ſuppoſed Repreſentative of Finite. God is all that his Creatures are and infinitely more, and ſo contains them all Eminently, and by way of Excellence in his Simple Eſſence, as the greater Number contains the leſs, or as the more perfect Act contains the leſs perfect, according to the Illuſtration of the Great School-man. And indeed if he did not do ſo, he could not be Infinite. So that God's containing all Finite Beings intelligibly in himſelf, or which comes to the ſame, his having the Ideas of them, is ſo far from being Repugnant to his *Infinity*, that 'tis a neceſſary and inſeparable Conſequence of it. And accordingly one of the directeſt Mediums whereby we can prove that the Ideas of all things are in God, is from his Univerſality and Infinity in Being. And as his Ideality may be Demonſtratively proved from his Infinity, ſo his Infinity may be very Rationally collected from his Ideality, it being not Conceivable that any Being that is not Infinite in Being, ſhould be *Omniform*, or have the Ideal Reaſons of all things in himſelf. And if the Ideality of God infers his Infinity, to be ſure it is not inconſiſtent with it, ſince 'tis impoſſible that the ſame ſhould at once Eſtabliſh and Overthrow the ſame.

Sum. Theol. Part I. *Qu.* 14. *Art.* 6.

5. If it be pretended that the Ideas that are in God muſt however be of a Finite Nature, becauſe Repreſentative of what is ſo, and ſo ſtill there

there will be ſomething Finite in God, *&c.* To this I anſwer, that tho' thoſe Perfections or Intelligible Degrees of Being in God which relate to Creatures, and ſo are the Ideas of them, have the *Formality* of Finite (it being impoſſible that a Formal Infinite, or an Infinite conſider'd as ſuch ſhould repreſent a Finite Reality) yet they have at the ſame time the *Reality* of Infinite, becauſe of that real Identity which they have with the Divine Eſſence. They are indeed of a Finite Conſideration as to us, as importing the Divine Eſſence under certain Relative Conſiderations, as it anſwers to ſuch or ſuch Realities out of it ſelf, and accordingly we are able diſtinctly to conceive many of theſe Ideas as narrow and as limited as our Faculties are, but in themſelves they are really *Infinite*, becauſe really *Divine*. 'Tis true indeed they are of the Eſſence of God as it relates to *Creatures*, and ſo expreſs no more of it than may ſerve to repreſent thoſe Creatures, and accordingly they are rightly ſaid to be the Ideas of *Creatures*, and not the Ideas of *God*, who alſo ſees Creatures, not himſelf in them, as being Divine only according to their *Eſſe Reale*, not their *Eſſe Repreſentativum*, but yet ſtill they are truly of the Eſſence of God, and accordingly have that Infinity according to their *Eſſe Reale*, which according to *Eſſe Formale* they do not import. So that ſtill there will be nothing really Finite in God. And as the *Eſſe Reale* ſalves the Infinity, ſo the *Eſſe Formale* does equally ſecure the Ideality. So that the Ideality of God is every way conſiſtent with his Infinity.

6. And indeed this whole Caſe is in effect very well ſtated and reſolv'd in the Account which the great

great Metaphyſitian gives of the Divine *Relations*. The Queſtion is whether they are Finite or Infinite. And there ſeems to be Difficulty on both ſides. They cannot be Finite, becauſe in God. Nor yet Infinite, becauſe of their Multiplication. The Difficulty proceeds in like Proportion concerning our Ideas. They cannot be Finite, becauſe they are in God, and yet they muſt be Finite, becauſe otherwiſe they could not be Repreſentative of what is ſo. Let us ſee therefore how the *Metaphyſitian* ſatisfies the Difficulty as to the Divine *Relations*, and the ſame Anſwer will ſerve with due Accommodation in the Caſe of the Divine *Ideas*. Now as to this he anſwers firſt in groſs, that a Divine Relation (as ſuppoſe that of *Paternity*) tho' never ſo Preciſely and Formally conceiv'd by us is a Being ſimply Infinite, becauſe it can never be ſo Præſcinded or Abſtracted, but that in its Objective Conception it will eſſentially include the whole Perfection of Eſſence. For tho' our Mind may be ſaid to Præſcind Paternity in the Abſtract from the Eſſence as to the Formal Conception, or Expreſs Conſideration, becauſe by that Act the Mind does not conſider Paternity as including the Eſſence, nor the Eſſence as included in the Relation, yet however the Eſſence cannot be ſo præſcinded or excluded from the Objective Conception of Paternity, but that it is eſſentially included in it, ſo that if the Mind reflect and conſider what is included in that Paternity which is conceiv'd, ſhe will neceſſarily find that therein is eſſentially included the whole Divinity and Infinity of God, becauſe the Divinity is of the Eſſence

Diſputat. Metaphyſ. Tom. 2. Diſput. 28. Sect. 2. Num. 10.

Eſſence of all things that are in God. So that tho' Paternity ſo conceiv'd, be according to our Conception after the manner of a *Part*, yet as to the thing conceiv'd it is an intire Being, no leſs than the *Father*. Even as the *Divinity* is alſo conceiv'd after the manner of a Part, and yet 'tis indeed an intire Being as much as *God*. To the Argument then he proceeds to give this Formal Anſwer, that the Relations are Beings ſimply Infinite, and yet there is no Multiplication of Infinite neither, becauſe they have not this Infinity, but as they include the Eſſence in which they are one. In like manner ſay I of the Divine Ideas, that they are Beings ſimply Infinite, and yet Infinite is not ſuppoſed as ſuch to repreſent Finite neither, becauſe they have not this Infinity according to their *Eſſe Formale* (in which Reſpect they are conceiv'd to be Repreſentative) but according to their *Eſſe Reale*, as they include that Divine Eſſence in which *they* alſo are one.

7. But to obviate all Prejudice that may ariſe againſt the Suppoſition even of a *Formal* Finite in God, I ſhall follow our *Metaphyſitian* a little farther, who propoſing to conſider what it is that Paternity as ſuch in the Preciſe Conſideration of it adds to the Eſſence, whether it be Finite or Infinite, for the better clearing of the Matter, thought it neceſſary (as indeed it is) to diſtinguiſh the Term *Finite*. Which as he ſays, may be taken either Poſitively, or Negatively. To be Poſitively Finite, is for a thing to be ſo limited in Being and Perfection, as to be uncapable of Infinite Perfection. But a Negative Finite is that which of it ſelf does not import (*non affert*) Infinite Perfection, tho' there be

be no Repugnance in its having it from elſewhere. Now ſays he, that which Relation as Relation adds cannot be ſaid to be Finite *Poſitively*, becauſe this beſpeaks Imperfection; as alſo becauſe that very Thing, tho' not from it ſelf, yet from the Eſſence may be Infinite; But in the Negative Senſe it may be ſaid that of its own Preciſe Reaſon or Formality it does not ſimply import Infinity. And this he ſays is not Inconvenient, becauſe it expreſſes no Imperfection. For it is not neceſſary, nor does it belong to the Perfection of a thing that it ſhould be ſimply and intirely Infinite in *genere entis* from every Preciſe Conception. Wherefore (continues he) thoſe that think that the Divine Relations may be abſolutely preſcinded from the Eſſence, ſo as neither Formally to include it, nor to be included in it, will be neceſſarily forc'd to confeſs that the Relative Entity ſo Preciſely and Formally conceiv'd is not ſimply Infinite. But then if they be ask'd whether they are to be ſaid to be ſimply Finite, they are to anſwer that they are Finite Negatively, not Poſitively, according to the foreſtated Senſe of that Diſtinction. And which he farther Explains by ſaying, that tho' the Term Infinite be Negative, yet by that *Negation* we do define a certain chief Entity or Excellence, and that therefore with reſpect to this Poſitive, *that* may be call'd Negatively Finite, which of it ſelf does not import all that Excellence, tho' it does not exclude it, nor is Repugnant to it. And therefore in this manner they ought to ſay, that it is not Inconvenient to admit in God ſomething Finite according to a Preciſe Conception. The Application of which to the Caſe of the Divine Ideas is very obvious, and I think no leſs Satisfactory, ſince in ſhort, that which

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is Formally Finite may be really Infinite, and that which is really Infinite may yet be formally Finite, and ſo neither the Infinity of God will overſtretch his Ideality (ſo as to exalt him above the Repreſentation of Creatures) nor yet his Ideality contract his Infinity, but maintain the ſame Harmony and mutual Conſiſtence with each other as is to be found in any of the other Attributes of God.

8. Only one thing falls in here to be conſider'd with Relation to the Divine λόγ☉ to whoſe Character we have ſuppoſed our Ideas to appertain, and that is, that ſince theſe Ideas, tho' really Infinite are yet however Formally Finite, whether this will not make the *Word* to be *Comprehenſible* by a Finite Underſtanding, contrary to what is affirm'd in the *Athanaſian* Creed concerning the Son, that he is *Incomprehenſible*. To which it is anſwer'd by no means. For beſides that theſe Ideas are really Identical with the Divine Nature, and ſo partake of the ſame real Infinity and Incomprehenſibility that eſſentially belongs to it, and that they are alſo of a boundleſs Fecundity according to the Inexhauſtible Poſſibility of Things, it is farther, and with Attention to be conſider'd, that tho' with the Conſent of St. *Auſtin* and the *Schools* we ſuppoſe theſe Ideas to retain to the Character of the λόγ☉, as beſt expreſſing his Diſtinction, yet we are far from ſuppoſing that they *fulfil* it, or are adequately Commenſurate to it. For 'tis to be remember'd (tho' there was not that Occaſion to inſiſt upon it ſooner) that as he is the Idea of the Creature, ſo he is alſo the expreſs Image of the Inviſible God, that returns to him

him a juſt Reflection of his whole Glory, and wherein as in a moſt Faithful Mirrour he views himſelf (as well as his Creatures) with a ſatiſfying Complacency. *A full and perfect Image, not made by him from nothing, but begotten of him, and that has no leſs than he whoſe Image he is, ſo like him that there is nothing in him unlike him,* according to the Expreſſions of St. *Auſtin*, or as *Marſilius Ficinus* very ſignificantly expreſſes it, the equal and full Image of God, and the *more* than full Exemplar of the World.

In Lib Contra. Sermonem Arrianorum. Cap. 26.

Tom. 1. Cap. 13.

CHAP. VI.

A farther View of the Intelligible World, in the Doctrin of Eternal Truths.

1. WE have now carried our Proſpect of the Intelligible World through the bright and ſhining Regions of the Divine Ideas, and tho' converſing ſo long with ſuch dazling Objects, and travelling as one may ſay with the Sun in our Faces, we might now be reconciled to Shades and Thickets, and prefer refreſhing Greens before Sun-Beams, the confuſe Amuſements of the Imagination before the cleareſt Diſcoveries of pure Reaſon and Intellect, yet it fares with us as with Men that climb up a high Mountain, who tho' wearied with their latter Stages, and beginning to Number their Steps, yet finding their Proſpect to inlarge

inlarge with their Wearineſs, know not how to give over till they arrive as far as they can go, and are poſſeſs'd of the utmoſt View.

2. Proceed we now then from the Conſideration of the Divine Ideas to another equally neceſſary, and leſs conteſted part of this Theory, the Doctrin of *Eternal Truths*. Not that I ſuppoſe it is, or can well be denied (as I ſhould have remark'd before but that 'tis hardly poſſible in ſo Copious an Argument to think of every thing in its due place) that God has the Ideas of all things in himſelf, or that things are *Ideally* in him, as that ſignifies in general and at large that he thinks upon them, that they are in him *Objectively*, or *tanquam in Cognoſcente*, in the ſame Senſe as when we are ſaid to have ſuch or ſuch Ideas, when we think upon ſuch or ſuch Things, it being otherwiſe impoſſible that God ſhould be, I will not ſay an Omniſcient, but even a Thinking or Underſtanding Being. And accordingly even Mr. *Arnauld* himſelf, as great an *Anti-Idealiſt* as he is, will in this large Senſe not ſcruple to allow that all things are in God, that there is an Intelligible Sun, and Intelligible Extenſion, *&c.* But the Queſtion is (tho' I hope no Queſtion now) whether God has *ſo* the Ideas of Things as that his Eſſence or Subſtance ſhould have the Intelligible Perfections of all Beings really in it, and ſo be Repreſentative or Exhibitive of all Beings, according as it is variouſly Imitable or Participable by them. And this ſeems to be the Thing that Mr. *Arnauld* Conteſts with his Adverſary, denying all ſuch *Repreſentative Beings* (as he calls them) in God. 'Tis true he allows the Term *Ideas* (as indeed it would be

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ſtrange if he ſhould not, that has writ a whole Book about true and falſe Ideas) and that Things are in God *Ideally*, but then by Ideally he ſeems to mean no more than *Objectively*, that God thinks upon ſuch Things, or has the Conception of them in his Mind. Tho' herein I think he betrays a wonderful Inconſiſtency, ſuch as thoſe whom he expoſes under the ridiculing Title of *Meditative* Men, do not uſe to be guilty of. And indeed had he been one of thoſe, I ſhould more admire than I do now that what he *grants* of the Divine Ideality had not reconciled him to what he *Conteſts*. For tho' I cannot conclude from any act of *my* Underſtanding, or any Conception *I* have of Things, that therefore I my ſelf am eſſentially Repreſentative of them, as containing their Perfections in my own Nature, becauſe poſſibly I may be united to ſome other Being in whom thoſe Perfections are, and in whom I may View and Contemplate them, yet when I attribute the Conception of Things to God, and ſo ſuppoſe them to be Ideally in him, I find a neceſſity to conclude that he contains their Perfections in his own Eſſence, and accordingly ſees them in thoſe Repreſentative Perfections, all Suppoſition of Union to any other Being that may be a Light to him, or of his ſeeing Things out of himſelf, being in all Caſes moſt Impious and Unphiloſophical, or as St. *Auſtin* calls it, *Sacrilegious*, and in *one* Caſe abſolutely impoſſible, *viz.* that of his knowing Things in a State of pure *Poſſibility*, when nothing is ſuppoſed to be in Being but his own Infinite and ever Bleſſed Self. There is therefore no other Intelligible Senſe of Things being *Ideally* in

Lib. De 83. Quæſ. Q. 46.

God but that his Subſtance is Repreſentative of them, and contains their Perfections in its ſelf. And therefore methinks it is a very ſurprizing Inconſiſtency, eſpecially in a Learned *Sorboniſt*, to admit the Doctrin of the Divine Ideality in general, ſo far as to own that Things are in God *Ideally*, and yet with ſo much Zeal to oppoſe the *All-repreſentativeneſs*, or real Omniformity of his Eſſence.

3. But the Doctrin of *Eternal Truths* is not ſo conteſted. Here on the contrary is great Unity of Conſent, nor do theſe Truths agree much more with one another, than Mens Thoughts do concerning them, thoſe that are moſt divided and ſet at the wideſt diſtance in their other Opinions, meeting here as in a common Center. Some Diſpute there may be concerning their Nature (*Pilate*'s Queſtion, *What is Truth*, not meeting always with the ſame Anſwer) and more perhaps concerning their Dependency upon the Mind or Will of God, but I think there is very little Queſtion or Controverſy about the *Being* of ſuch Truths, as indeed there is not room for much, when there can be no Diſputing againſt them but upon the Suppoſition of them, and when the Denial of them muſt inſeparably draw after it the Denial of all *Science*, which cannot ſtand but upon that Foundation. Eternal Truths therefore can have no Enemies but thoſe that are Enemies to *Science* too, and accordingly thoſe that own *Science* are ſo conſiſtent with themſelves, as to acknowledge Eternal Truths. Tho' to be conſiſtent with themſelves *throughout*, they ſhould think themſelves obliged to acknowledge the Divine Ideas too, and that for equal at leaſt, if not great Reaſon, ſince as, if there are no Eternal

nal Truths there will be no *Science*, ſo if no Divine Ideas the Conſequence muſt unavoidably be that there will be no Eternal Truths nor Science. neither. Upon which Conſideration it may be juſtly wonder'd why the Doctrin of the Divine Ideality, and of an Intelligible World, is not as generally receiv'd, as the Doctrin of Eternal Truths is, ſince there can no more be ſuch *Truths* without *Ideas*, than there can be any ſuch thing as *Science* without ſuch *Truths*.

4. However, it is a Satisfaction that *ſome* part of our Theory is ſo ſecure of Admiſſion. And ſince it is ſo, the leſs Argument will ſerve for the Eſtabliſhment of it. And indeed *Explanation* here will be more neceſſary than *Proof*, there being more Diverſity of Apprehenſion concerning the Nature and Manner, than concerning the Abſolute Being of theſe Truths. To that therefore I ſhall chiefly apply my Thoughts, and that they may not proceed without ſome Order in the Conſideration of ſo great a Subject, I ſhall confine them to theſe Limits.

1. I ſhall exhibit a general Notion of Eternal Truths.
2. I ſhall ſhew that there are ſuch Truths, and how they reſult from the Divine Ideas.
3. I ſhall give a more particular and explicit Account of the Nature of theſe Truths. With ſome Reflections upon the *Carteſian* Hypotheſis of their Dependence upon the Will of God. As alſo ſome Animadverſions upon *Monſieur Regis*'s way of ſtating Eternal Truths.

Laſtly, I ſhall aſſign the Place or Region of Truth, with ſome farther Conſiderations concerning the Ground and Foundation that Eternal Truths have in the Intelligible World.

SECT. I.

The General Notion of Eternal Truths.

1. BEfore we diſcourſe of Eternal Truths it will be convenient to Premiſe a few things concerning Truth at large. The Equivocation of which Word makes it neceſſary to be Diſtinguiſh'd. And I do not know a more immediate or comprehenſive Diviſion of Truth, than into that of the *Object*, and that of the *Subject*. But this Diviſion being a little too generical to give us a diſtinct and thorough View of the Thing divided, we are farther to conſider that Truth of the Object is either *Simple* or *Complex*. By Truth of the Object Simple we are to underſtand the Tranſcendent Verity of it, that Verity which is * of Metaphyſical Conſideration, as being a Paſſion or Property which that Science Demonſtrates of *Ens*, from which it is only in Reaſon and Conception diſtinguiſh'd, as adding no Intrinſick Reality to it, but only Importing the Real Entity of the Thing, with a Connotation of a Conception of the Underſtanding, to which it is Conformable. So that this Simple Truth of the

* *Not but that Metaphyſicks conſiders that Truth alſo that is Complex. But when I ſay* of Metaphyſical Conſideration, *I mean of* pure *Metaphyſical Conſideration. This being a ſort of Truth that no other Science conſiders but Metaphyſicks. All other Sciences ſuppoſing it.*

the Object seems to be much the same with the Absolute *Intelligibility* of it. To which the Principles of our Theory oblige us to add another kind of Truth of the Object Simple, which may be call'd its *Specifick Truth*, as consisting in its Conformity to its particular Idea.

2. By the Complex Truth of the Object we are to understand the mutual Habitudes or Respects that are between Thing and Thing, according as they are in a State of Union or Disunion, that is, as they are supposed to be Equal or Unequal, Agreeable or Disagreeable with one another. So that Complex Truths here are the Relations of Equality or Inequality, Agreement or Disagreement in Things. I say in *Things*, in Opposition to the foremention'd *Logician*, who makes Complex Truth not to be in Things, but in the Judgment of the Mind, whereas that Judgment of the Mind must necessarily presuppose a Complex Truth in the Thing, since without it, it would be so far from having that *Truth* in it which he supposes, that it would not so much as have an *Object*. The Complex Truth that is in the Judgment is only its Conformity with the Complex Truth that is in the Thing, and therefore must of Necessity presuppose it, both as its *Object*, and as its *Measure*. So that without Complex Truth in the Thing 'tis impossible there should be any in the Understanding. Which when I consider, I cannot but wonder that our *Logical* Systems take so little notice of it as they do.

3. This Complex Truth of the Object may be also otherwise call'd the Truth of the *Proposition*. But then by Proposition must be meant the Pro-

poſition of the *Thing*, not that of the *Underſtanding*, that which is Objective, not that which is Subjective, that which the Underſtanding finds, not that which it makes, that which it Contemplates out of it ſelf, not that which it Forms within it ſelf, in ſhort, that which is the *Object* of the Underſtanding, not that which is the *Act* of it, in Proportion to what was obſerv'd before under the Diſtinction of *Ideal* and *Mental* Propoſitions, which to avoid Repetition as well as for the Moment of the Thing, my Reader is deſired to renew his View and Conſideration of.

4. I ſay for the *Moment* of the Thing. For indeed this is a moſt neceſſary Diſtinction, the Propoſition of the *Thing*, being that Propoſition in Conformity or in Deformity to which that of the *Underſtanding* is ſaid to be either true or falſe. For then the Underſtanding is ſaid to make a true Propoſition, when it joins or disjoins Things in the Act of its Conception, according to that antecedent State of Union or Diſunion which they have in themſelves. And when it does otherwiſe then it is ſaid to make a falſe one. And beſides do we not often talk of *neceſſary* Propoſitions, and *demonſtrable* Propoſitions, and ſuch as are the Objects of ſuch and ſuch Sciences? But now this muſt needs be underſtood of Propoſitions of the *Thing*, ſince thoſe of the Underſtanding are moſt apparently *Contingent*. Beſides that 'tis the *Object* of the Underſtanding, and not the *Act* of it, that is demonſtrated by it. 'Tis true indeed the Demonſtration it ſelf is an Act of the Underſtanding, but the Thing *demonſtrated* muſt always be its Object, and conſequently not a mental but a real Propoſition.

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For indeed to ſpeak exactly 'tis not the mental Propoſition that is *demonſtrated*, nor the real one that *demonſtrates*, but 'tis the mental Propoſition that demonſtrates the real. The former belonging to the Act, as the latter does to the Object of Science. Which gives me occaſion again to reflect with ſome wonder upon the little or no notice that is taken of this Diſtinction in our Logical Syſtems, which ſeem to continue their Conſideration of Propoſitions to thoſe of the Underſtanding, and yet (ſtrange Inconſiſtency) talk much of *neceſſary* Propoſitions, whereas 'tis moſt evident that neither the Underſtanding it ſelf, nor any thing belonging to it, can have that *Demonſtration*.

5. But I muſt not forget another very Celebrated Diſtinction which belongs in Common both to ſimple and complex Truth (tho' I need here but juſt mention it becauſe I ſhall have occaſion to inquire into the Nature and Ground of it more diſtinctly in the Proceſs) and that is that of *Neceſſary* and *Contingent*. By *Neceſſary* Truth meaning that which ſo is, as that it cannot not be. By *Contingent* that which ſo is, as that it *may* not be. Which latter is to be underſtood in a divided, not in a compounded Senſe, meaning by it that which has a preſent Actuality of Being, but with a Power or Capacity for not Being, either with reſpect to the Paſt, or with reſpect to the Future.

6. Truth of the *Subject* is either Logical or Moral. By *Logical* Truth of the Subject is meant, the Conformity that is between the Underſtanding and the Truth of the Object, or if you will between the Mental and the Real Propoſition, according to the forementionʼd Diſtinction. When

the Understanding follows the Intelligible State of Things, joyning or disjoyning them in her Conception according to the Union or Disunion, whereby they are related to each other in their own Natures, or if you please more generally (because we would include its Conformity with its Simple as well as with its Complex Object) affirming that which is, to be, and that not to be which is not. By *Moral* Truth of the Subject is meant the Conformity that is between the Words, or any other Significant Action, and the Understanding, when we speak as we think, or signify that outwardly which we mean inwardly. This Truth belongs rather to the Will than to the Understanding, as being not so directly opposed to *Error* as to *Deceit* or *Hypocrisy*, and as being that Truth which is more properly call'd by the Name of Veracity or Sincerity; a thing much talk'd of, and as little practised in the World.

7. Now our Eternal Truths do not belong to this last Order. For tho' indeed there is an Eternal *Conception* as well as *Representation* of things in the Divine Understanding, and that most exactly Conformable to their respective Natures, God always understanding things as they are, so that the *Mental*, as I may say, never fails here of Corresponding to the *Real* Proposition, and therefore may upon a very rational Foundation be consider'd as an *Eternal Truth* of the *Subject*, yet when we speak of Eternal Truth as a distinct Order of Truths (especially as they are consider'd in this *Theory*) we are not presumed to mean Truths of the Subject, but of the Object, those which the Supreme Intelligence Contemplates, and which

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are the Objects of his Eternal Conceptions, and in Conformity to which those Conceptions are said to be true. And as by Eternal Truths we ordinarily understand those of the Object in general, in Contradistinction to Subjective Truth, or Truth of the Understanding, so also chiefly if not solely those of the *Complex* Kind. For indeed by Eternal Truths we mean Eternal Propositions, or rather Propositions eternally true. Which again by the way shews the Necessity, and even virtual Acknowledgement of the Distinction of real from mental Propositions, it being impossible that any Proposition of *our* Understanding (and we do not use to think of any other, when we talk of Propositions) should have an Eternal Truth. For the Proposition of the Understanding is no more than a *Thought*, and 'tis plainly impossible that either a Temporary Thought should be eternally true, or that a Temporary Mind should have an Eternal Thought. By Propositions therefore eternally true must be meant Propositions of the *Thing*, the *nexus rerum insolubiles & incommutabiles*, and this I suppose every Body would mean by them if they would reflect attentively upon their Ordinary Expressions, and reduce those Confuse Notices which they have by them, to clear and distinct Conceptions. But to digress no farther upon this, what I directly intended was to Remark from our meaning by Eternal Truth's Propositions eternally true, that these Eternal Truths must be refer'd to the *Complex* Kind of Objective Truth. And since Truth of the Object Complex consists, as was noted before, in certain Habitudes and Relations of Things, 'tis plain that these must also enter into the

the Account of the other. So then briefly, *Eternal Truths* according to the general Notion which by these Premises we are led to conceive of them, will be found to be the same as Eternal Habitudes or Relations of Things, such as ever were, are, and shall be, or rather such as necessarily, immutably and perpetually are. These are the standing and indefectible Objects of *Theory* and *Science*, whether Natural, Moral or Divine, and the everlasting Theme of the Intelligent World, that brighten our Understandings, with their Light, and charm our Affections with their Beauty, and make us *Wise* and *Happy* by their Possession. In the Search and Study of which we Labour, and in the Knowledge of which we Acquiesce, because we cannot alter them, or make them to be any otherwise than they are. For they are no Creatures of ours, nor yet of God's neither. God is what he is, and they are what they are, and they can neither not be, nor be otherwise, but remain in their steddy and immutable Order and Nature, the same yesterday, to day, and for ever, without any Variableness, or shadow of turning. For they depend not upon any Will, nor any Understanding, no not even the Divine it self. That is, I mean, as *Conceptive* or *Intelligent*. But whether or how they may be said to depend upon the Understanding of God as *Exhibitive* or *Intelligible*, will appear in the Sequel of this Account.

SECT.

Sect. II.

That there are Eternal Truths, and how they result from the Divine Ideas.

1. Demonstration ordinarily proceeds concerning certain particular Truths, and undertakes to shew the Necessity, and consequently the Eternity of them, that this or that Proposition in particular is Necessarily and Eternally true, but that there are necessary and eternal Truths in general seems rather to be the Ground and *Supposition*, than the *Subject* of Demonstration, since if there were no such Truths, nothing could be demonstrated, and so nothing could be known. For, for a thing to be demonstrated is in the Resolution of it the same as to be shewn to be *Necessarily* so or so, or *Necessarily* true, and therefore there must be such a thing in the General as Necessary Truth, or else there could be no *Demonstration* of any one particular Truth in any Science whatsoever. Nor indeed could there be any such thing as *Science* it self. Which by the way is a most convincing Proof of the real Existence of such Truths to as many as allow either the one or the other. And accordingly those that own Science are so consistent with their Principle, as to acknowledge necessary and eternal Truths, as was noted before. But then a thing so universally acknowledged (as I may well call that which is acknowledged by as many as admit *Science*) seems not to need any Proof. And that which is the very Ground and Suppo-

Suppoſition of Demonſtration in all Arts and Sciences ſeems yet to need it leſs. And indeed I ſhould have left it for theſe Reaſons as much a Suppoſition as I found it, without attempting any Proof of it (eſpecially conſidering what I have offered in this way already) were it not that it belongs to the regular and formal perſuance of our Theory, and is the direct Conſequence of ſome Principles laid down in it, and ſo may ſerve to the farther Confirmation of thoſe Principles, as leading to ſo great and happy a Concluſion; but chiefly becauſe the *manner* of my proving theſe Eternal Truths will contribute to the letting in a conſiderable Light upon the *Nature* of them.

2. From the Suppoſition of Eternal Truths or Relations of things we have already infer'd the Eternal Eſſences or Ideal Reaſons of them. Now as before we argued from the Relations to the Simple Eſſences or Ideas, ſo now (eſpecially after having given otherwiſe ſuch an abundant Demonſtration of the latter) we may no leſs ſtrongly, only more directly argue from the Ideas to the Habitudes or Relations. For as theſe Relations cannot exiſt without thoſe Simple Eſſences to ſupport them whoſe Relations they are, ſo neither can the Simple Eſſences exiſt without being follow'd or accompany'd with ſuch their Eſſential Relations, as neceſſarily ariſing from them by way of Natural Reſultancy, in like manner as it is in other Relations, which immediately reſult upon the Poſition of the Subject and the Term. So then if there are Eternal Eſſences or Ideal Reaſons of things, there muſt and will be, and *ipſo facto* are Eternal Habitudes and Relations, that is, Eternal Truths.

Truths. 'Tis impoſſible to ſeparate the one *from* the other, ſo that the Argument proceeds with the greateſt Strictneſs and Evidence from one *to* the other. As for Inſtance, if the Eſſence or Reaſon of a Circle be Eternal (and as St. *Auſtin* ſays, *What is there ſo Eternal as the Reaſon of a Circle, with things of that Nature, which we can neither comprehend that ever it was not, nor that ever it ſhall not be*) then that one Intelligible Diameter of this Intelligible Circle ſhould be equal to another, will be a Habitude or Relation that will neceſſarily reſult from it, and for ever accompany it. And as from a Circle's having its Diameters eternally equal we may conclude, as before, that the Eſſence or Reaſon of a Circle does eternally exiſt; ſo again, ſuppoſing ſuch an Intelligible Circle to exiſt eternally, we may and cannot but conclude, that its Diameters are eternally Equal. And ſo in all other Inſtances, the Intelligible Eſſence or Ideal Reaſon infers the Habitude as truly as the Habitude does the Intelligible Eſſence or Reaſon, only more directly, becauſe *a priori*. And therefore ſince as we have ſhewn, the Ideal Reaſons or Eſſences of things are in God and conſequently eternal, the Concluſion ſhines out with full Evidence, that there are Eternal Habitudes or Relations of Things one to another, which in other Words is the ſame as that there are *Eternal Truths*, which according to all rational Conception have as neceſſary an Emanation from the Divine Ideas, as thoſe Ideas have from the All-being Eſſence of God.

Lib. de Immortal. Animæ. Cap. 4.

3. And thus you ſee how eternal Truths do neceſſarily reſult from the Divine Ideas, and alſo in the

the ſame View of what Moment and Conſequence the Doctrin of the Divine Ideality is, as laying ſo certain a Foundation for ſo weighty a Structure. The Conſideration of which as it well rewards the Pains we have beſtowed upon that neglected and uncultivated piece of Speculation, ſo it may juſtly return back ſome bright Reflections upon the Truth of thoſe Premiſes which appear to have ſo neceſſary and ſo immediate a Connexion with ſo important, and otherwiſe I think (at leaſt *a priori*) indemonſtrable a Concluſion.

4. And now we are come to the *Fons veri lucidus*, and have traced Eternal Truths to their Original Head, where their clear and living Spring riſes, and whence it richly flows to relieve the Thirſt of the Contemplative, and for the general Refreſhment of the whole Intellectual World. The Divine Ideas that live and ſhine in the Eternal Mind, are that living and lucid Spring, that from an inexhauſtible Fund, *viz.* the Infinite Eſſence of God, Streams forth perpetual and eternal Truths, ſufficient to employ the Contemplation of Eternal Ages, and which is more of an *Infinite Mind.* Here the Arts Originally flouriſh, hence the Antient Family of Metaphyſical Truths derive their Pedegree, and here Geometry was a Science before any Lines or Figures could be drawn upon Matter. Here Wiſdom furniſhes her Table, and mingles her Wine, and cries out to him that wants Underſtanding, come eat of my Bread, and drink of the Wine which I have mingled. *For with thee O my God is the Well of Truth, as well as the Well of Life, as the Springs of our Happineſs are in thee, ſo the Springs of our Light and Knowledge*

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are alſo in thee, that ſo thou maiſt be an Object truly Beatifick, the intire Good of our Souls, and every way qualify'd for our Love.

5. And now you that boaſt of your Pedegrees and Genealogies, ſee the great *Original* and high *Deſcent* of Eternal Truths, which immediately ſpring from the Ideas which for ever live and ſhine in the Mind of God, ſee alſo the *Antiquity* of their Family, as being from everlaſting, in which Reſpect all Worldly Greatneſs, nay even the World it ſelf, bears date from yeſterday. See alſo the *Neceſſity*, *Stability* and *Permanency* of it. The Divine Nature cannot be without Ideas, and theſe Ideas cannot be without being related to one another, ſo that the Ideal Relations are every whit as neceſſary as the Ideas themſelves are. This ſhews then that there are and muſt needs be Eternal Truths, neceſſary and immutable Truths, ſuch as no *Will* can bring into Being, and no *Underſtanding* can ever diſpute out of it. And what is there ſo neceſſary beſides him who eſſentially is? The Neceſſity of *Fate* (if any ſuch thing there be) is but Contingency to that of Truth, that being owing to Decree, whereas this is from the very Nature of the Things themſelves, which cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe than they are. Accordingly theſe Truths as they never began, ſo they will never end, but ſtand faſt for ever and ever, as the true Faithful Witneſs in Heaven. And if *Eternity* it ſelf cannot, much leſs can *Time* make any Change in them.

Sect. III.

Containing a more particular and explicit Account of the Nature of Eternal Truths, With ſome Reflections upon the Carteſian *Hypotheſis of their Dependence upon the Will of God. As alſo ſome Animadverſions upon* Monſieur Regis's *way of ſtating the Doctrin of Eternal Truths.*

1. AFter the general and confuſe Account given of the Notion of Eternal Truths, that we might have a *Reſt* whereon to fix our *Aim*, and might know what it was whoſe Exiſtence we were inquiring after, and after the Proof of that its Exiſtence in Conformity to that general Notion, it now follows according to the Method before obſerv'd, that we give a more diſtinct and explicit Repreſentation of its *Nature*. We have ſhewn that Eternal Truths do neceſſarily reſult from the Divine Ideas, and by this it appears that the Conſideration of them falls directly under the Cogniſance of this our Theory, and ſince it does ſo, as the Moment of the Argument *deſerves*, ſo the Pertinency of it to our preſent Concern *requires* that we ſhould *open* and *diſplay* it to a more full and diſtinct View. For ſure if any thing deſerves to be clearly ſeen, and to have its Nature well lookt into, it is Light.

2. But indeed he had need have a much finer and more dextrous Hand in Metaphyſical *Anato-*

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my than I can pretend to, that ſhall duly perform this part of the *Diſſection*. We have hitherto gone no farther than the *Common* and *Containing* Parts, but muſt now ſearch into the Entrails and Bowels, even into the very *Heart* of Truth. We have been hitherto giving our Attendance in the outer Courts of her Sacred Temple, but are now about to make our humble Entrance (as far as the Reverence and Awfulneſs of our Undertaking will allow) *within the Veil*. And indeed if ſhe ever wore one, it is in this Part. For this I take to be the great Difficulty of *Pilate*'s Queſtion, *what is Truth?* As for the general Notion of it, it is more Simple and Obvious, and ſuch as offers it ſelf not unwillingly to our Thoughts. And the Account I have given of it goes not much farther than a *Nominal* Definition, expreſſing what it is in general that we mean by it, concerning which I think there neither is, nor can be any great Queſtion. But the great Difficulty is to *Specialize* this Account, to ſhew in particular what kind of thing *Truth* is, and what is the inward Being, Eſſence or Nature of it. That it muſt have ſome real and poſitive Eſſence is certain, becauſe 'tis an *Intelligible* thing, and that its Eſſence muſt have a moſt permanent Fixedneſs and Stability of Being is no leſs evident, becauſe 'tis always Intelligible after one certain and determinate way and manner. But what this ſteddy immutable, and always uniform *Something* is, is the Great Queſtion now to be conſider'd. And indeed in this Senſe of it, I do not know many Queſtions more Difficult to be reſolv'd than this, *what is Truth?* And if he that put this Queſtion had had *Metaphy-*

ſicks enough to intend it in this Senſe, and *Faith* enough to have been aware to whom he put it, 'tis hardly preſumable but that he would have ſtaid for an Anſwer.

3. For never certainly was any Queſtion more happily directed, nor yet perhaps at the ſame time more ignorantly and unthoughtfully moved. A blunt unmetaphyſical *Roman*, fitter for the Diſciplin of a Martial Camp than of a Philoſophick School, and whoſe Notion of Truth went hardly beyond that of an *Evidence* in a Court of Juſtice, haſtily, careleſly, and as it were by the by, drops the moſt *Metaphyſical* Queſtion in the World, and to a Perſon who was the fitteſt in the whole World to have reſolv'd it. And to ſhew how little Senſe he had either of the Moment of his Queſtion, or of the ſacred Oracle which he conſulted, he immediately quits the Place, * without attending for a Reſolution, as if he were afraid of being farther inſtructed, and would have *waſh'd his Hands* alſo even from the Guilt of Wiſdom. Tho' † St. *Auſtin* indeed becomes his Apologiſt here and offers at a more favourable Account of the Matter, imagining that at the inſtant when *Pilate* ask'd, *what is Truth?* That Cuſtom of the *Jews* to releaſe one at the Paſchal Feaſt, came into his Mind. And that therefore he did not tarry to have an Anſwer from Chriſt what Truth was, leſt he ſhould delay his Deliverance, which he was ſo earneſtly ſet upon, and hoped this way to bring to paſs. But methinks when he had once recollect-

* *Nec expectavit audire reſponſum.* St. Auſtin *in Evangel.* S. Joan. *Tract.* 105.

† *Ibid.*

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ed himſelf of ſuch a Cuſtom, there was no great Danger of his forgetting it again, ſo that he might have taken his Anſwer along with him, if he had cared for it, and have made the ſame Improvement of that Cuſtom afterwards. And therefore tho' St. *Auſtin*'s Reaſon might be the Conſideration that made him leave the Bench ſo ſuddenly, (as indeed the Conjecture ſeems plauſible) yet however in all likelyhood 'twas his Indifferency for that Truth he inquired after that made it *prevail*. So that the *Conjecture* ſeems better than the *Apology*.

4. But perhaps the Great Light and Oracle of the World who came to reveal to it no other Truths but ſuch as were *Saving*, might not have indulg'd Curioſity ſo far as to give him an Anſwer upon ſo Metaphyſical a Point, if he had ſtaid for it. Nor indeed did ſo cold and indifferent (however otherwiſe important) a Queſtion deſerve one. He ſpeaks to Truth it ſelf (as the Divines of the *Port R.* remark after St. *Auſtin*) concerning Truth. He interrogates it, and turns his back upon it. And how many are there who after the Example of *Pilate*, either will not learn the Truth, or deſpiſe it, or that pretend Ignorance of it, that they might not be obliged to expoſe themſelves in the Defence of it. To which I add, how many ſlight and perfunctory Inquirers are there that careleſly interrogate this Divine Oracle, that ask as if they were in their ſleep and were afraid to awake themſelves, that knock as if they did not care to be heard, that ſeek as if they were unwilling to find, and that Conſult as if they did not Conſult. That

Abrege de la Morale de l'evangile. Tom. 2. P. 805.

go off too upon the firſt Addreſſes, and if they are not preſently anſwer'd, give over their impatient Inquiries. And which is worſe, that fancy they are anſwer'd when they are not, determine venturouſly upon the firſt Views, and impoſe their haſty and ſudden Reſolutions upon their no leſs undeceiving, than Infallible *Oracle*.

5. But *Truth* will not be ſo conſulted, or if ſhe be, ſhe will not give an Anſwer. To conſult her Oracle as we ought, and with Succeſs, we muſt retire from the World (for ſhe is not to be ask'd in a *Croud*, or in a Publick *Court*) and into our ſelves, we muſt ſilence our Paſſions, deveſt our ſelves of our Prejudices, recollect our Thoughts, and apply our ſelves to the Inquiry with the moſt inward Reflection, and the moſt awaken'd Attention. We muſt ſilence the noiſe of our Paſſions, that we may hear her ſoft ſtill Voice, and attend without Prejudice or Prepoſſeſſion, that we may underſtand it when we hear it. The Attention of the Mind (as a very thoughtful Writer excellently Meditates upon the like Occaſion) is the natural Prayer which we make to Interiour Truth, that ſhe would diſcover her ſelf to us. But this Sovereign Truth does not always anſwer our Deſires, becauſe we know not very well how to ask her as we ought.

Converſat. Chretien. p. 7.

We often interrogate her without knowing what it is which we demand of her. As when we will reſolve Queſtions, of which we do not underſtand ſo much as the very Terms.

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We interrogate her, and we * turn our Backs upon her, without caring to wait for her Anſwer; as when we are under an Inquietude, and our Imagination is heated by reaſon of our thinking upon ſuch things which have no Relation but to the Good of the Body.

* *Here the Author ſeems to allude to the Carriage of* Pilate.

We interrogate her, and we endeavour to Bribe and Corrupt her; as when our Paſſions agitate us, and we would have her Anſwers accord with our Sentiments.

In fine, we interrogate her, we hear her Anſwers, and we comprehend them not, as when we are prepoſſeſs'd with our Prejudices, and our Mind is full of falſe Ideas, and our Imagination is all over ſullied with an infinity of obſcure and confuſe Traces, which continually repreſent all things to us with Relation to our ſelves. Then God ſpeaks and the Body ſpeaks too, Reaſon and Imagination, Mind and Senſe. So that there is a Confuſe Noiſe, and nothing is heard or underſtood. The Darkneſs mingles it ſelf with the Light, and one ſees nothing, *&c.*

6. Theſe Reflections may not perhaps be improper to be taken in our way upon the occaſion of the manner of putting this great Queſtion. But now to the Queſtion it ſelf. In order to the Reſolution of which we have already laid a Train, and we need but follow the thread of it, to arrive at a Competent diſcovery of what we inquire after. For upon the Strength and according to the Tenour of the Premiſes I may hear ſuppoſe, 1. That there are Divine Ideas. 2. That theſe

Ideas are Eternal. 3. That from these Eternal Ideas result Eternal Relations, since as the Relations cannot be without the Ideas, so neither can the Ideas be without being accompanied with certain mutual Relations or Habitudes. This proves the *Necessity* of Eternal Truths. But does it not also strike a Light into their *Nature?* For if Eternal Relations do result from the Divine Ideas, then is not this a fair Intimation to us, that Eternal Truths are those very Ideal Relations? For the Relations of these Ideas must necessarily be Eternal Truths (Truth being supposed to be the same as the Relation of one thing to another, and these Ideas being supposed to be Eternal) and therefore what should Eternal Truths be but the Relations of these Ideas? For Eternal Truths must be Eternal Relations, and what other Essences of things are there besides the *Divine Ideas* that can be the Subjects of such Relations? So then to the premised general Notion of Eternal Truths, that they are Eternal Habitudes of things, we may now (which will be a fair step towards the Point under inquiry) venture to add this more Explicit one, *viz.* that they are the *Habitudes that are between the Divine Ideas*, or the Intelligible Essences of things in the Mind of God.

7. And indeed after a very attentive Consideration of this Matter, this seems to me to be the great specializing Character that distinguishes necessary and eternal Truths from those of the opposite Order, *viz.* such as are *Contingent* and *Temporary*. For as Truth in general consists in the Relations of things, so I can conceive but a threefold Order

Order of ſuch Relations for the Diſtinction and Specification of it. They muſt be either ſuch as are between Creatures, or ſuch as are between the Divine Ideas, or ſuch as are between Creatures and the Divine Ideas. I do not ſee how the Relations of things can be otherwiſe diverſified in our comparative Conſideration of them. And therefore this double Order of Truths muſt ſome way or other take its Diſtinction from, and be reſolv'd into this threefold Relation. Now I think it a moſt plain Caſe that Contingent and Temporary Truths take their Riſe and Diſtinction from the firſt and third ſort of Relations, and according to their Explicit Notion are nothing elſe but the Relations of Agreement or Diſagreement that are either between created Beings themſelves, or (ſince the Contingency of one of the Terms is enough to found a Contingent Relation) between created Beings and their Ideas. Theſe Truths are *Temporary*, becauſe theſe Relations could not begin to exiſt before thoſe created Beings were produced (for here alſo our Fundamental Maxim continues to hold, that there can be no Relations between things that are not) And they are alſo *Contingent*, becauſe theſe Relations might not have exiſted, and that becauſe thoſe Beings might not have been produced. But then ſince Contingent and Temporary Truths take up the Relations of the firſt and third ſort, they muſt be the middle Relations (thoſe between the Ideas themſelves) that conſtitute that eminent and illuſtrious Order of Truths which we diſtinguiſh from the other by the Character of *Neceſſary* and *Eternal*. And in-

deed thoſe are the only Relations that can be ſuppoſed to carry any Proportion to ſuch Truths. So then the radical and fundamental Difference between Neceſſary and Contingent Truths (according to the cleareſt Notion I can frame of theſe things) will in ſhort reſolve into this, that Contingent Truth regard things as they actually exiſt in Nature, or, are the Relations of things ſo exiſting, at leaſt as to one of the Terms. Whereas Neceſſary and Eternal Truths regard the Abſtract Natures, and immutable Eſſences of things, independently on their actual Exiſtence in *rerum natura*, or in other Words, are the Relations that are between the Ideas of them in the Intelligible World. Which I take to be the true and only Reaſon why they are not and cannot be affected with any of the Changes that happen to *this*.

8. Eternal Truths then are in the Reality of this Definition *Ideal Relations*, or the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas. But then this will be a ſtep to lead us to a farther diſcovery of their Nature. For we are to conſider that Relations (according to the moſt Scholaſtick and Metaphyſical Accounts of them) do not really differ from their *Abſolutes*, but have only a diſtinction of Reaſon with a Foundation for it in the thing. For indeed Relation, as ſuch, expreſſes not *Eſſe Simpliciter*, but only *Eſſe ad*, the being in order to ſomething, according to that of the Schools, *Relativa illa eſſe, quorum totum eſſe eſt ad aliud ſe habere.* And if two Circles for inſtance are at once in Nature, as they would be equal or unequal, ſo 'tis immediately

ately by themſelves and their own proper Entities that they are ſo. The Relation of Equality or Inequality that is between them does not really differ from the Circles themſelves, nor adds any thing to them that is really diſtinct from them. And ſo if after one Circle is made another be produced, the Relation that reſults between them upon the Production of the ſecond Circle, and which was not till then, ſuperinduces no real Alteration or Novelty of being upon the firſt, ſince it retains both the ſame *Figure* and the ſame *Dimenſion*, and is upon all Mathematical Conſiderations the very ſame afterwards that it was before. And therefore the Relation of Equality which *de novo* accrues to it, can be no other than the very Circle it ſelf with the Connotation of the Coexiſtence of another Circle of the ſame ſize. For let but theſe two Things be, that is, I mean, let but two ſuch Circles coexiſt, tho' we ſhould mentally ſeparate the Addition of all manner of Reality from them, nay tho' we ſhould ſuppoſe the Almighty Power of God ingaged on purpoſe to hinder any ſuch new Addition, yet theſe Circles would be equal, and have a kind of *Formal Unity* between them, and 'tis impoſſible for the Mind of Man to conceive otherwiſe. Which plainly ſhews that Relations do not add any New Reality to their Abſolutes, or the things ſaid to be related, but are only the things themſelves under a certain order of Conſideration as to one another.

9. Not as if the Formal Reaſon of Relation were a mere nothing, for then things could not be ſaid to be really related. But we are to conceive the Matter

Matter thus. * Relation (if our great Metaphyſitian well conſider the Nature of it) does indeed expreſs a certain real Form, and ſuch as Intrinſically denominates its proper Relative which it conſtitutes. But that Form is not any *Thing* or *Mode* really diſtinct from every Abſolute Form, but is in the Thing ſome Abſolute Form, not as abſolutely taken, but as reſpecting another, which the relative Denomination includes or connotes. So that *Likeneſs*, for inſtance, is a real Form exiſting in the Thing which it is denominated *like*. But yet it is not really diſtinct from *witneſs*, as to that which it puts in the Thing which is ſaid to be *like*, but only as to the Term which it connotes. And ſo *Likeneſs* in the Thing is not any thing elſe than the very *Witneſs* it ſelf as reſpecting another Witneſs, as of the ſame or like Nature. Which Accounts without running through all the Scholaſtick Spinoſities upon this Occaſion, may, I think be ſufficient for the clearing this Matter, as far as may reaſonably be expected in a thing of this Abſtruſity. For indeed I do not know in all Metaphyſicks a Point of nicer Conſideration.

* *See* Suarez *Metap. Tom.* 2. *Diſp.* 47. *Sect.* 2. *Num.* 22.

10. But not more *nice*, than *important*, eſpecially to the purpoſe in Hand. For if Relations do not in the Reality of the Thing differ from the Abſolute Natures ſuppoſed to be related, then the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas are nor really different from thoſe Ideas. And then ſince Eternal Truths are in the Reaſon and Formality of them no other than the Relations between the

the Divine Ideas, it will hence follow as the next Conſequence, that Eternal Truths have no real Entity in them diſtinct from the Divine Ideas, but, according to the Account premiſed, are only thoſe very Ideas themſelves as in a certain Order to one another. So that all that is *real* and *ſubſtantial* in Eternal Truths are thoſe very Divine Ideas whoſe Relations they are, and accordingly the Subſtance and Reality of Truth, and that of the Divine Ideas are indeed all one, and have the moſt perfect Identity between them, without any Diſtinction as between *thing* and *thing*.

11. And now we have carried our Diſcourſe thus far, that will unavoidably carry us farther. For as the Ideal Relations which formally conſtitute Eternal Truths are Identical with the Divine Ideas, ſo, as we have already ſhewn, theſe Divine Ideas are no leſs Identical with the Divine Eſſence. The Conſequence of which will be (and there needs no Logical fetch to draw it, ſo irreſiſtibly does it preſs upon us) that Eternal Truths muſt be reſolv'd into the Eſſence and Subſtance of God, as having a real Identity with it, ſince thoſe things that agree in a common Third muſt of Neceſſity agree among themſelves. For the Syllogiſm into which this Reaſoning reduces it ſelf is moſt plain and Categorical,

The Divine Ideas are really the ſame with the Divine Eſſence.
But Eternal Truths are really the ſame with the Divine Ideas.

There-

Therefore Eternal Truths are really the ſame with the Divine Eſſence.

12. The *Premiſes* of this Argument have been both of them already diſtinctly proved, and upon a due Conſideration of what has been ſaid concerning them, muſt needs appear unexceptionably clear. The Propoſition here moſt likely to ſtick with the generality of Readers (tho' againſt all the Form and Method of Art) will perhaps be the *Concluſion*. For that Truth ſhould be God, or of a Nature Conſubſtantial with the Divine, may perhaps upon the firſt hearing ſound ſomewhat paradoxically to an unmetaphyſical Ear. But to over-rule all the Reluctancies of a prejudic'd Imagination in this Caſe, let it be farther conſider'd that the Truths here ſpoken of are *Eternal* Truths, and can any thing be Eternal that is not God? They are alſo *Neceſſary* as well as Eternal. They cannot but be, and they cannot but be *what*, and *as* they are, becauſe as we have ſhewn before, they neceſſarily Reſult from the Divine Ideas, and 'tis upon this Neceſſity of their Reſultance, that their Eternity is founded. But then again, can any thing be Neceſſary that is not God? Thou that canſt not tell how to reconcile thy Thoughts, or thy Prepoſſeſſions rather, to the *Divinity* of *Truth*, before thou readeſt one Line farther pauſe a while upon theſe two Queſtions, interrogate, not thy *Imagination*, but thy pure *Reaſon* and *Intellect* about them, and by their Anſwer to theſe Queſtions, determine of the other.

13. But

13. But to repreſent this Conſideration a little more Copiouſly, if Truth be not (*in ſenſu identico* as we ſpeak) Coeſſential and Conſubſtantial with God, how comes it to be cloath'd with the glorious Enſigns of his Majeſty, to wear the inſeparable and diſtinguiſhing Characters of his Divinity, and to have ſo many of his peculiar and incommunicable Attributes? How comes it to be Neceſſary, Immutable, Eternal, Self-exiſtent, Immenſe, Omnipreſent, Increated, and Independent, and that not only upon all Conception and Underſtanding, but alſo upon all Will and Power, as alſo upon all the Works of the Creation, which either might never have been made, or might at any time be annihilated, without any Prejudice to the Being of Truth, as not being concern'd in the Natural and Actual Exiſtencies, but only in the Abſtract Eſſences or Ideas of things. For were there no ſuch thing as any real Circle or Triangle in Nature, it would ſtill be never the leſs true (as it actually was before theſe things had any ſuch Exiſtence) that their Abſtract Eſſences, or Ideal Reaſons would be determinate and invariable, and that ſuch and ſuch diſtinct Properties would belong to them. Which one Conſideration plainly convinces, that Truth is none of the Creatures of God, ſince it did exiſt before them, does not now depend on them, and would remain the ſelf-ſame Immutable Thing without them. But then I demand whence has it this Self-ſubſiſtance and Independency of Being? Whence its fix'd and unalterable Nature, ſuch as our Buſineſs is only to ſtudy and contemplate, and which accordingly we Acquieſce

quieſce in when we have once found, but can neither add any thing to, nor diminiſh any thing from it? How is it that it is preſent in all Places, and to all Minds, ſo as to be contemplated by them all at the ſame time, and conceiv'd after the ſame manner? How comes it to paſs that Exiſtence is eſſential to it, and inſeparable from it even in *Thought*, in ſo much that we cannot ſo much as *diſimagin* it, or by way of Fiction and Suppoſition remove it out of Being, but it ſtill returns upon us with a ſtrong and invincible *Spring*, ſince even the very Suppoſition that there is no Truth, is a Contradiction to it ſelf. How can ſuch Incommunicable Attributes of God as theſe agree to Truth, and how come they thus to meet and concenter in it, if it be any thing really different from the Divine Nature. Particularly it is a Queſtion obſtinately to be inſiſted upon, whence it ſhould have that unſhakable Firmneſs and Stability, that invincible Permanency, and as it were *Central* Stedfaſtneſs, that Neceſſity of Exiſtence, that utter Repugnance to not Being, but only becauſe it is really Coeſſential and Conſubſtantial with him whoſe Name is *Jehovah*, and who is Being it ſelf, to whom it is eſſential to exiſt, or rather whoſe very Eſſence is to Be.

14. But beſides how comes Truth to be *Perfective* of our *Minds?* That it is ſo, may well be ſuppoſed, our Underſtanding being then confeſſedly moſt perfect, when in the fulleſt Poſſeſſion of Truth, when it has the cleareſt and largeſt View of it. But does not the whole Perfection of the Mind conſiſt in its Union with God? Is not he

our

our only perfective and beatifying Object, and can any thing elſe but his Divine Subſtance be the Good of our Souls?

15. But not to perſue this Queſtion any farther, that which I more inſiſt upon is how Truth ſhould come to be a Perfection of the *Divine* Underſtanding. That it is ſo cannot be denied, Knowledge being an acknowledg'd Perfection of all Minds, and what is Knowledge but a clear Perception or View of Truth? It is Truth therefore that gives all the *Objective* Perfection that accrues by Knowledge. But now (and I pray conſider the Queſtion well before you anſwer it) can any thing be a Perfection to God that is not himſelf? Whatever Queſtion there may be concerning his being *our* only Good, yet I think the Infinity and Self-ſufficiency of his Being muſt of Neceſſity exclude the leaſt doubting Thought but that he is his *own*. For to him that has all Good in himſelf, nothing can be a Good but himſelf.

16. Well, but hold, as Truth is a Perfection of God's *Underſtanding*, ſo is it not alſo the Rule and Meaſure of his *Will*, which can be determin'd by nothing but what is Juſt, Reaſonable, and True? Is not the Will of God always directed by Wiſdom, and always conformable to Reaſon, Truth, and Order? But can any thing be a Rule or Meaſure to him that is not himſelf? Or does he conſult, follow, or conduct himſelf by any thing but what is really one with his own Divine Nature and Eſſence? And yet God conſults and follows *Truth*, and never acts but according to its Immutable Laws and Meaſures. It is not then really

distinguish'd from him, but Coessential and Consubstantial with him, and so in consulting Truth he consults his own Essence, even the Divine λόγος, the Eternal and increated Wisdom, the true Intelligible World of Light and Glory, *in whom are hid all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge*, the Ideas and Essences of things, the very Fulness of Being and Truth, who in the Beginning was with God, and was God, who is the joyous and ravishing Object of his Eternal Contemplation, and in whom even God himself has a *Beatifick* Vision. That substantial, but ineffable Word that is the coeternal Conception of the All-fruitful Mind, God of God, Light of Light, the true *Mirrour* of the Divinity, that from all Eternity lay in the Bosom of his Father, and represents to his intuitive View both himself and his whole Creation, who is the Light of the World, as well as the Wisdom of its Maker, and who said of himself incarnate, *I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life.*

17. But to press this Matter a little more distinctly. * God is the Cause of whatever is besides himself, or, whatever is, is either God or the Effect of God. This I take to be a clear Disjunction. Now upon this disjunctive Maxim I thus argue.

* *Quicquid est præter Deum, a Deo est.* Suarez. *Metap. Tom.* 2. *Disp.* 30. *Sect.* 14. *Num.* 3.

Whatever is not the Effect of God is God,
Necessary Truth is not the Effect of God,
Therefore Necessary Truth is God.

The

The Major Propoſition is virtually contain'd in the Maxim it ſelf, and conſequently is as true as that is. The only thing then to be proved here is, that neceſſary Truth is not the Effect of God. And that it is not, the many groſs Abſurdities which the contrary Suppoſition draws after it, will I think oblige him that conſiders them, to acknowledge.

18. For firſt, if neceſſary Truth be the Effect of God, then even by the very Suppoſition, it muſt be a *Neceſſary* Effect. And if it be a Neceſſary Effect, then it muſt have a Neceſſary Cauſe, that is, a Cauſe not only neceſſarily *Exiſting*, but neceſſarily *Cauſing*, or neceſſarily determin'd to act, and ſo God would be a neceſſary Agent, even *ad extra*. Which is utterly impoſſible, becauſe being infinitely perfect, and ſo fully ſufficient to himſelf, he cannot be under any Neceſſity of acting out of himſelf.

19. He would alſo be an *unintelligent* Agent. For if even neceſſary Truth be the Effect of God, then antecedently to the effecting of it there was no Truth, and conſequently no Knowledge, becauſe nothing knowable. And ſo God in the Production of Truth (if indeed he did produce it) muſt be ſuppoſed to act in the Dark, and without Intelligence to order even an intellectual Syſtem.

20. Again, If neceſſary Truth be the effect of God, then the Perfection of the Divine Underſtanding muſt be ſuppoſed to depend upon ſomething that is not God, nay, upon ſomething created by God, whereas on the contrary God is the true perfective and beatifick Object of his Creatures,

tures, ſufficient for them and himſelf too, being completely Happy in the ſole Contemplation of himſelf.

21. Again, If neceſſary Truth be the effect of God, 'twill follow, that God has conſtituted an Order of Realities which he has no Power nor Dominion over, not ſo much as to change or alter, much leſs to aboliſh. That he has made ſome things which he cannot unmake again, which will exiſt whether he will or no, and which owe their Being to him, without any farther dependence upon him. Beſides, that this will alſo immediately run us into that great Abſurdity (not to ſay Impiety) that there is ſomething neceſſary beſides God. A Conſequence which appear'd ſo intolerable to a certain Metaphyſical Writer, that he urges it as an Argument againſt the very being of any ſuch neceſſary Truths as concern the Ideas or Eſſences of things, not allowing ſuch Truths to be neceſſary, upon the pretence that then there would be ſomething neceſſary beſides God. Not conſidering that thoſe Truths are really one and the ſame with the Divine Subſtance, even as we have ſhewn the Ideas and Eſſences of things to be. Which one Conſideration puts by the whole Force of his Argument againſt the being of ſuch neceſſary Truths, tho' however it be ſufficiently concluſive of the Point now contended for, *viz.* that neceſſary Truth is not the effect of God. Becauſe, if it were (ſince what is the effect of God cannot be God, unleſs God could produce himſelf) 'tis plain there would be ſomething neceſſary beſides God.

Cogitat. Rational. de Deo. p. 296.

So

So that tho' this Argument does not at all conclude, and must be impertinently urg'd against the *Simple Being* of necessary Truth, yet it concludes most directly against its being the *Effect* of God.

22. But after all for Necessary Truth to be the Effect of God is a most Inconsistent Self-repugnant Notion, and such as immediately resolves into a Contradiction. For 'tis most certain that God being infinitely Happy in himself, must be a free Agent in the Production of whatever he produces out of himself, because he wants it not to complete his Happiness. Whatever therefore is necessary cannot be any Effect of his, and so on the other hand, whatever is an Effect of his cannot be Necessary. To say therefore that Necessary Truth is the Effect of God, is to say Inconsistencies, to say and unsay at once. These Considerations I think cannot fail to convince those that will duly weigh them, and can take the Force of them, that Necessary Truth is not the Effect of God. And since it is not, it remains by Virtue of the premised Disjunction that it can be no other than the very Substance and Essence of God himself.

23. But what, if after after all there be no *Necessary* Truth, but all Truth be of Divine Institution? So indeed it is pretended by a Great Man, who will have all Truth to be positively ordain'd and establish'd by God, to depend upon him as the *Supreme Legislator*, to be the Effect of his Will and Pleasure, and so to be Absolutely and Originally Arbitrary and Contingent. So that according to him, two and two might

Meditat. de Prima Philos. In respons. ad Object. Sect. Artic. 6. & 8.

not have been four, or the three Angles of a Triangle might not have been equal to two right ones, if God, as he might, had pleas'd so to Order and Decree it. A most monstrous Doctrin, and I think, by far, the most Absurd in the Notion of it, and the most Dangerous and Pernicious in the Consequence of it, of any that can be pickt out of the whole Body of *Carteſianiſm*. And such as for the fatal Aspect of it upon *Religion*, *Morality*, and even *Natural Science* it self, all those that apply themselves to the Study of that (otherwise upon many Accounts very Excellent) Philosophy, ought in the very Entrance to be caution'd, and even *Antidoted* against. And by the way, I cannot but wonder that the *Metaphyſical Author* before mention'd, who upon other Occasions is so Liberal of his Zeal against many of the Principles of this Philosopher, should yet consent and comply with him so far as he does in the very worst Principle that he has in his whole System.

24. But as to the Principle it self, as absurd as it is, let it be observ'd however in the first Place, that *Des Cartes* is not so absurd here as to deny our Disjunction, that whatever is, is either God, or the Effect of God. He only takes up with the false Part of it, that Truth is the Effect of God. So that if it appears, that Truth is not the Effect of God, we may without any other Opposition from him conclude that it is God, and 'tis in Reason to be presumed that he would have concluded so himself, if he had but consider'd the Matter so well as to have taken that part. Neither again is he so Absurd as to pretend that *Neceſſary* Truth is the Effect of God, but only that Truth at large is so, whence

whence the moſt that can be gather'd is, that according to him there is no ſuch thing as Neceſſary Truth. As indeed there is not. But then again, if it appears that there is Neceſſary Truth, there will be no Oppoſition here, neither againſt our concluding that it is not the Effect of God, and conſequently that it is God, as indeed whoever accknowledges the other will in Virtue of the Diſjunction find himſelf obliged to conclude.

25. Taking theſe Remarks with us for the ſervice they will do us in the iſſue of this Affair, let us beſtow a few Reflections upon this very ſingular *Doctrin* ſhall I call it, or *Amuſement* concerning the Poſitivity or Arbitrary conſtitution of Truth, which with ſo little Reaſon, and yet with ſo great Authority (things that do not always go together) aſſaults this part of our Theory. But if it meets with no worſe Aſſault, it will be like for ought I ſee to ſtand, and tho' I ſhould dread ſuch an *Adverſary*, yet I think there is no great danger from ſuch an *Argument*. For the Refutation of which ſome of thoſe things which have been already offer'd are here alſo very applicable, which accordingly before I proceed to any other Conſiderations, I ſhall juſt glance over. As firſt, Truth is a Perfection of the Divine *Underſtanding*, but then if it be alſo the Arbitrary Production of his Will (beſides that his Underſtanding will be ſuppoſed againſt all Order to derive all its Perfection from his Will, whereas the latter according to our Conception is ſuppoſed rather to depend upon the former) it will alſo follow that ſomething produc'd by God is a Perfection to him, that he finds

Happineſs in a *Creature*, and ſo is not ſufficient to himſelf. Again, Truth as was obſerv'd before, is alſo a Meaſure to the Divine *Will*, but if it be the *Meaſure* of the Divine Will, how can it be the *Effect* of it, or if we ſuppoſe it to be the Effect of it, then again, is not ſomething a Meaſure to God that is produced by him, and conſequently that is not himſelf? Again, if Truth depends upon the Will and Pleaſure of God as the Arbitrary Conſtitution of it, then antecedently to this Conſtitution there was no Truth, and conſequently no Knowledge. And ſo we muſt ſuppoſe God (at leaſt *in ſigno rationis*) as an unintelligent Being, and alſo in the Production of Truth acting as an unintelligent Agent.

26. But farther, if Truth be, as this Great Man will have it, the Effect of the Divine *Legiſlation* or Conſtitution, then ſince the Decrees or Conſtitutions of God, even according to him, are free, God might have choſen whether he would have made any ſuch Conſtitution or no, conſequently whether there ſhould have been any Truth or no. 'Tis poſſible then that there might not have been any ſuch thing as Truth, and ſince without Truth there can be no Knowledge, 'tis poſſible again, that there might have been no Knowledge, and conſequently 'tis poſſible upon this Suppoſition (a moſt horrid Conſequence, and ſuch as I dread to draw, but that the worſt Conſequences muſt ſometimes be drawn to ſhew the Abſurdity of the Principles from whence they flow) that God might actually have been without any Knowledge or Underſtanding. Whereas 'tis moſt certain, that not only

ly Existence, but all other Perfection is essential to God, and particularly * Knowledge among the rest. And since it is so, we may hence draw an Argument backward for the *Necessity* of Truth against this supposed Arbitrary Decree for the Existence of it, since it is impossible that Knowledge should be any more Necessary than Truth, the Object of it is. And 'tis a most wonderful thing to me, that he that makes Existence essential to God upon the Consideration of his Infinite Perfection, so as upon that to lay the Ground of one of his Arguments for his actual Being, and whose very Notion of God is, that he is a Being *Absolutely Perfect*, should yet so far forget himself (for I suppose him not to be aware of the Consequence, as expressing upon all Occasions most honourable Thoughts of the Supreme Being) as to lay down a Principle which makes it possible for him to have been without one of the greatest Perfections in the World.

* *Divina scientia Formaliter est de Essentia ipsius Dei.* Suarez *Metap. Tom.* 2. *Disput.* 30. *Sect.* 15. *Num.* 14.

27. But what if it should actually rob him of it? For if Truth be of God's free Constitution then as it might not have existed, so when it does, it must be confess'd to exist after the manner of a *Contingent* Being, as other Creatures do. But is not Knowledge properly so call'd, of *Necessaries*, of things that cannot possibly be otherwise than they are? You'll say perhaps, that so neither can these Truths, supposing God's Decree for their Existence. But if this Decree be *free* as is supposed, why may it not be for a certain time, after the Expiration of which these Truths were Calculated

only for that time, may like *Almanacks* be out-dated. Or if becauſe this Decree is free, you will (*gratis*) ſuppoſe it to be for a Perpetuity, and ſo will make Truth to be a kind of a *Perpetual Almanack*, yet ſtill it muſt be allow'd to be abſolutely and ſimply Contingent, however Hypothetically neceſſary, and whether things in their own abſolute Natures indeterminate and mutable, and only fix'd and made neceſſary by a poſitive Order or Decree may be proper Objects of Knowledge ſtrictly ſo call'd, may bear a reaſonable Diſpute, and deſerves Conſideration. In the mean while ſhould it be demanded how God comes to know that ſuch Truths are in being, I know no other Anſwer that can be given upon this *Hypotheſis*, but becauſe he has decreed their Exiſtence, and he knows that his Decrees are always effectual. But then I demand, is this Truth alſo the Effect of his Will, *viz.* that his Will is always Effectual? No, that cannot be, ſince this muſt be pre-ſuppoſed to all ſuch Effects, as the general Reaſon why his Will effects any thing, there being no other way of proving this Conſequence, ſuch a Truth is becauſe God has decreed it, but by this General Principle that God's Will is always Effectual. And it muſt be in Virtue of this univerſal Principle that God ſees that ſuch Truths do exiſt upon his decreeing that they ſhould. But then this Truth at leaſt which is Antecedent to all the effects of God's Will cannot be it ſelf the effect of it. So that even upon this very Notion of the Arbitrary Poſition of Truth, ſuppoſe it to be as Arbitrary as you pleaſe, here will be ſtill a Propoſition of an univerſal and

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independent Verity, and that prevents all Conſtitution about it. So Repugnant is this Hypotheſis of the Poſitivity of Truth with it ſelf.

28. But farther to expoſe the Abſurdity of it, it is to be conſider'd, that as it threatens an Eclips to that pure Light in which there is no Darkneſs at all, I mean indangers the depriving God of *his* Knowledge, ſo it utterly ruins and undermines *ours*, it being impoſſible that upon this Suppoſition there ſhould be any ſuch thing as *Science*, or at leaſt that *we* ſhould have any juſt Ground to pretend to it. For beſides, that according to this Notion, all Metaphyſical, Mathematical, or Moral Truths, ſuppoſing any ſuch, (which I muſt tell you is upon this Principle a very bold and precarious Suppoſition) would have at moſt but a Hypothetical Neceſſity, ſuch as depends upon the Will of their great Legiſlator, which whether ſufficient to lay a Foundation for Science, may, as I noted before, admit of reaſonable Queſtion, I ſay, beſides this, ſince theſe Truths might not have been at all, or things might have been quite otherwiſe than they are, if Truth be from the Arbitrary Poſition and Conſtitution of God, how can I know whether he has *de facto* (for indeed upon this Hypotheſis all Truth will be matter of *Fact*, and Philoſophy will be but another ſort of *Hiſtory*) conſtituted any Truths or no, and ſince theſe Truths are ſuppoſed to have no other Being but what they have by Divine Conſtitution, how conſequently can I know whether there *be* indeed any Truths or no, (for to preſume that there are Truths, as *Des Cartes* does, and then to reſolve them

them into the Will of God as their Ground is but to beg the Queſtion) or if there be, how can I know which they are, or on what ſide of the Contradiction they lie, or how do I know but that they may be Calculated only for a certain Seaſon, or Term of Years, with the Period of which they may expire, or for certain Places, as *Almanacks* are for this or that *Meridian?* 'Tis certain that God may abſolutely ſpeaking change them if he pleaſes, as depending intirely upon his Will, and how do I know that he has not already done it, or that he will not hereafter do it. Unleſs you will ſuppoſe that he has obliged himſelf to the contrary. But then this being matter of pure Will and Pleaſure too, how ſhall I know that? 'Tis impoſſible I ſhould know any of theſe things except it be by *Revelation*, and even then too, I could not be properly ſaid to *know* ſuch or ſuch Truths, but only to *believe* them, and ſo my pretended *Science* would really be turn'd into *Faith.*

29. For after all, I could never be able to demonſtrate any one of theſe Truths to another, how firmly ſoever I might be perſuaded of them my ſelf, ſince all our Demonſtration proceeds upon ſome neceſſary Connexion or Dependence that is in the Nature of the thing it ſelf, which is here ſuppoſed to be none. 'Tis plain then that upon this Hypotheſis the moſt expert Mathematician in the World will not be able to demonſtrate one Propoſition in all *Euclid.* And where we can have no *Demonſtration*, it ſurpaſſes my Underſtanding to Comprehend how we can have any *Science*, that being as our Common Logick tells us, the Effect

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of Demonſtration. But then is it not a thing aſtoniſhingly Strange and Surprizing, that a Man ſo mathematically Diſpoſed, and that has made ſuch great Improvements in Geometry, ſhould advance a Propoſition that ſo directly tends to the Ruin even of his own beloved and admired *Science*? But it ſeems the Arts may have ſome Enemies beſides the *Ignorant*.

30. And yet this is not the worſt of it, for it undermines alſo the Foundations of *Morality* and *Religion*, as well as of Natural Science, and ſo ſhakes the whole Frame of the Intellectual World, which is a ſad Conſideration. For if all Truth be by poſitive Order and Conſtitution, then where are the Antecedent Reaſons and Differences of Good and Evil, where is the Intrinſick Beauty of Virtue, or where is the Intrinſick Deformity of Vice, and then what Excellency or Advantage has the *Moral* beyond that of the *Ritual* or Ceremonial, or any other poſitive Law of God? Indeed upon this Principle there is no ſuch thing as a *Moral* Law, all the Diſtinction that is in things being, not from the Nature of the things themſelves, but from mere poſitive Order and Conſtitution, which as it ſuppoſes all things to have been Indifferent before, ſo it leaves them ſo far indifferent and alike afterwards, as that no one ſuppoſed Action has any greater Moral Excellency than another. Becauſe indeed none of them have any at all, the whole difference of Actions as to Good or Evil, being purely from Will and Inſtitution, which immediately runs us into the very Dregs of *Libertiniſm*, and is a very fair ſtep towards *Atheiſm* it ſelf.

31. But

31. But beſides, as this Hypotheſis moſt plainly overthrows the *Morality* of Good and Evil, ſo it makes it very uncertain whether there be any thing ſo much as *Poſitively* Good or Evil, or no, or what it is. For if Truth be a mere poſitive Eſtabliſhment, then as there might have been no ſuch Eſtabliſhment, and conſequently no Good nor Evil, ſo how am I ſure that there is any? You'l ſay perhaps (for I know not what elſe can be pretended) from the *Scripture*, wherein God has made a difference between things, by Commanding ſome, and by forbidding others. True, but if all Truth be Poſitive, how ſhall I know, or how ſhall I prove the Scripture to be of Divine Authority; nay, how ſhall I be aſſured that there is any ſuch thing as Scripture in the World? For in order to this I muſt reaſon upon certain Principles, and if thoſe very Principles are no other than poſitive Truths, how ſhall I know that they are *put?* Beſides, will it not be a Circle to prove poſitive Truths by Scripture, and then again to prove Scripture by poſitive Truths? But indeed poſitive Truths cannot prove it, becauſe they want to be proved themſelves, ſince if they are no other than Poſitive, the Queſtion will ſtill return, how do I know that they are *Put?* So that this way I can neither *know* any thing, nor *prove* any thing.

32. But admitting (what this way can never be proved) the Poſition of certain Truths, yet if there are no other but what are Poſitive, it may perhaps ſtill be a Queſtion, how there can be a Foundation for ſuch a Diſtinction as *Good* and *Evil* in Actions. For Poſitive Good and Evil does

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ſuppoſe Moral, and if there be no Moral Good or Evil, there ſeems to be no room for any Poſitive. For every Poſitive Law obliges in the Force of a Moral one, and the Evil of tranſgreſſing againſt any Poſitive Law in any particular Inſtance, reſolves into ſome general Law of a Moral Obligation, ſuch as that *God is to be obey'd in whatever he Commands*, or the like, or elſe every Eye will not be able to ſee where even the *Poſitive* Evil of it ſhould lie. And indeed if nothing be Antecedently Evil in it ſelf, how any thing ſhould be *made* ſo, is not very eaſy to be conceiv'd. But this Argument I leave to farther and better Conſideration.

33. After all, is it not a moſt horrible Conſideration, and ſuch as would almoſt turn the Courſe of a Man's Blood as it Circulates in his Veins, to think that according to this Hypotheſis the whole Syſtem I will not ſay of *Metaphyſicks* or *Geometry*, but even of *Ethicks* it ſelf, might have been intirely tranſpoſed, ſo that the very *Reverſe* of it might have been true, that even the Love of God might have been a Vice, and the Hatred of him a Virtue, *&c?* That thus it might have been in the preſent Suppoſition is plain. And how am I ſure upon the ſame Principle, but that it is ſo, or at leaſt, but that one time or other it may be ſo? God has an Abſolute Dominion over all his Works, and therefore if the Practical Truths of Morality and Religion be of his pure making, he may if he pleaſe unmake and aboliſh them again, as he did the *Ritual Law* of the *Jews*. And is it not to be fear'd that he will, if there be no other Good or

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Excellency in them but what is *Positive?* At least what Ground have I to assure me that he will not? But even the Supposition of these things is dreadful, for they are such hard Consequences that they even hurt ones Hands in the drawing of them. Besides they are endless too, and my Pen would even *wear* under my Hands, if I should persue this Monstrous Doctrin through all the Absurdities and Mischiefs that its Fruitful Womb is pregnant with. Only to complete its Character, give me leave in fine to Remark how Inconsistent it is with the Author's own Principles. For I think he cannot have a greater Adversary than himself.

34. And because this is done already so well to my Hands, I shall here think it sufficient to set before my Reader what *F. Daniel* the Jesuit, one of the finest Wits of this Age, and the very Acutest *Anti-Cartesian* that I know of, reflects upon this Occasion. *I remember*, says he, *to have read in this Author a Proposition which appear'd to me to be pleasant enough. Namely, that God can change the Essences of things. That those Propositions which we call Necessary are not true, but because God will have them so. So that if God had will'd, as he might have done, that two and three should not have been five, this Proposition that two and three are five, would now be false. When* Des Cartes *advances this Paradox he pretends great Respect and Submission for the Omnipotence of God. And is even Angry with the other Philosophers, so as to accuse them almost of Blasphemy, because they dare to say, that God cannot make*

Voyage du Monde de Des Cartes. *Tom.* 1. *p.* 86.

make that two and three ſhould not be five. Nevertheleſs by tracing Des Cartes *a little one well perceives, that 'tis not altogether through Devotion that he maintains this Theſis, but becauſe this Abſurd Propoſition is evidently to be concluded from ſome Points of his Doctrin. To admit a Propoſition ſo hard as this, by Conſtraint, and as a Concluſion which plainly follows from a Principle which he had laid down, this would not have been for his Reputation, and might have diſguſted People. And therefore he choſe rather to prevent us, to fetch the leap himſelf, and to be the firſt that wonder'd that the Philoſophers ſhould be ſo bold as thus to limit the Omnipotence of God. I ſhall not at preſent examin the Abſurdity of this Doctrin*, &c. *But keeping to the Subject I am now upon, I ſay, that tho' all that I have advanc'd againſt this Method, were falſe, and that tho' all the Arguments wherewith he has been aſſaulted in the World, were null, yet this only Paradox intirely Overthrows him, and that upon the Suppoſition of its being true, it is impoſſible for him to give us one Rule of Truth. For if it be true, that the Truth of Neceſſary Propoſitions depends ſo upon God, that he might have made that thoſe which paſs for Neceſſarily true ſhould have been falſe, he might have made that theſe two ſhould have been falſe, That which I clearly conceive is true. To be a Deceiver is an Imperfection. And if God might have made it to be thus, who has told* Des Cartes, *that he has not done ſo? What reaſon has he to believe it rather than the contrary? Has God reveal'd it to him? Upon this Principle I ſhall doubt of theſe two Propoſitions, not only as a Sceptick, but ſeriouſly and in good earneſt. So theſe two Rules of Truth, ceaſe to be Rules of Truth. Let him*

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now then come to me with his pretty Propoſition, I think, therefore I am, without being a Sceptick, I ſhall not admit of it. Why? Why becauſe I do not know whether God from all Eternity has will'd that it ſhould be true or falſe, &c.

35. Whether, or how the *Carteſians* have anſwer'd this I do not ſo well know, as that it is not to be anſwer'd to any Satisfaction. And 'tis likely they have been wiſe enough with all their Zeal for their Maſter, not to hazard themſelves in the Defence of ſo deſperate and unmaintainable a Breach. Becauſe I find no more concerning this Matter in the Second Part of the Voyage, but only this ſhort running Stricture, *Thoſe Eſſences of things which God can change in making, for Inſtance, that a Triangle ſhould not have three ſides, that two and three ſhould not be five*, &c. *are Paradoxes which only the Eſteem which People otherwiſe have for the Wit of* M. Des Cartes *hinders from being thought Extravagances.* And indeed as well as I love *Des Cartes*, I cannot but ſide here with the *Ariſtotelian* againſt him.

Suite du Voyage du Monde de Des Cartes. *p.* 98.

26. But this is the Cenſure of an *Adverſary*. Let us ſee how much more kindly he is uſed by his *Friends*. For this Strange Notion of his concerning the poſitive Legiſlation or Conſtitution of Truth does ſo rudely ſhock the natural Senſe of Mankind that it cannot find Admiſſion, even where the reſt of his Philoſophy for the main does, but ſtands thus Exploded and Condemn'd by one of his own Diſciples, and as I think by far the moſt conſiderable of

of them. *Certainly*, says he, *if Eternal Truths and Laws did depend upon God, if they had been establish'd by the Free Will of the Creator, in a Word, if the Reason which we consult were not Necessary and Independent, it appears evident to me that there would be no true Science, and that one might easily be mistaken in affirming that the Arithmetick or Geometry of the Chinese is like ours. For in fine, if it were not absolutely Necessary that two times four should make Eight, or that the three Angles of a Triangle should be equal to two right ones, what Proof could we have that these kind of Truths were not like those which are not receiv'd but in some certain Universities, or that last only for a certain time? Do we see clearly that God cannot cease to Will what he has Will'd with a Will intirely free and indifferent? Or rather, do we see clearly that God could not Will certain Things for a certain Time, for a certain Place, for certain Persons, or for certain kinds of Beings, supposing, as some will have it, that he was absolutely Free and Indifferent in that Will? For my part, I cannot conceive any Necessity in Indifference, I cannot reconcile together two things so opposite to each other.*

De la Recherche de la Verite. *Tom.* 2. *P* 431.

However, continues he, *I am willing to suppose that Men see clearly, that God by an absolutely indifferent Will has establish'd Eternal Truths and Laws for all Times, and for all Places, and that at present they are Immutable by his Decree. But where do they see this Decree? Has God created any Representative Being of this Decree? Will they say that this Decree is a Modification of their Souls? They see this Decree clearly, for it seems they have learnt by it, that immu-*

tability is made ſure to Eternal Truths and Laws. But where do they ſee it? Certainly unleſs they ſee it in God, they ſee it not at all. For this Decree can only be in God, and they cannot ſee it but where it is. Philoſophers then can be certain of nothing, unleſs they conſult God, and unleſs God anſwer them. 'Tis to no purpoſe for them to clamour upon this. They muſt yield, or be ſilent.

But after all this Decree is an Imagination without any Ground. When we think upon Order, on Eternal Laws and Truths, we inquire not Naturally into their Cauſe, for indeed they have none. We ſee not clearly the Neceſſity of this Decree, we do not preſently ſo much as think of it. We perceive on the contrary by a ſimple View and with Evidence that the Nature of Numbers and of Intelligible Ideas is Immutable, Neceſſary, Independent. We ſee clearly that it is abſolutely Neceſſary that two times four ſhould be Eight, and that the Square of the Diagonal of a Square ſlould be the double to that Square. If any doubt of the abſolute Neceſſity of theſe Truths, 'tis becauſe they turn away their Eyes from their Light, becauſe they reaſon upon a falſe Principle, and becauſe they ſeek elſewhere than in theſe Truths, what is their Nature, their Immutability, their Independence. So that the Decree of the Immutability of theſe Truths is a Fiction of the Mind, which ſuppoſing that it ſees not in the Wiſdom of God what it really perceives therein, and knowing that God is the Cauſe of all Things, thinks it ſelf obliged to fancy a Decree to make ſure an Immutability to thoſe Truths, which it cannot but acknowledge to be Immutable. But the Suppoſition is falſe, &c.

Again

Again continues the same Excellent Pen, *If Order and the Eternal Laws were not immutable by the Necessity of their Nature, the clearest and the strongest Proofs of Religion would in my Opinion be destroy'd in their Principle, as well as Liberty and the most certain Sciences. For it is evident that the Christian Religion which proposes to us Jesus Christ as a Mediator and Reparator supposes the Corruption of Nature by Original Sin. But now what Proof can we have of this Corruption? The Flesh combats against the Mind, you will say, it subdues and inslaves it. Very true. But this is no Disorder, will a Libertine say. It is God's Pleasure, he has so order'd it. He is Master of his Decrees, he puts what Order he pleases among his Creatures. How shall one prove to him that 'tis a Disorder that the Mind should be Subject to the Body, if one has not a clear Idea of Order, and of its Necessity. And if one does not know that God himself is obliged to follow it by the Necessary Love which he bears to himself? Besides, if this Order depends upon a free Decree of God, we shall still be obliged to have recourse to God to be inform'd of it. We must consult God in spite of the Aversion which some of the Learned have to have recourse to him. We must submit to this Truth that we have need of God to be instructed. But this Free Decree which has caused Order, is a Fiction of the Mind, for the Reasons I have already alleged*, &c.

37. I thought it convenient to shew what Apprehensions these two very considerable Authors of each side have of this *Cartesian* Notion of the *Positivity* of Truth, and to offer them to the Consideration of my Reader in Conjunction with my own, that so by this various manner of attacking

it he may the better see, as in a different Light, what an Absurd Principle it is, and what monstrous Consequences it has for its Retinue. But after all utterly to silence and overthrow it beyond all possibility of Defence, let it be recollected that we have proved the Necessary and Immutable Nature of Truth in a more direct way of reasoning than by arguing from the bad Consequences of the contrary Supposition. For we have shewn that Eternal Truths do necessarily result from the Divine Ideas, as also that they are in all Reality the same with those Ideas, and consequently they must be as Necessary, as Immutable, and as Independent as those Ideas are. Whose Independence we have also distinctly shewn, besides that which may immediately be infer'd from, or rather is virtually included in their real Identity and Consubstantiality with the Divine Nature, which also has been distinctly shewn. So that the Absolute Necessity and Independency of Eternal Truths is every way secured and the *Cartesian* Decree for their Existence on all sides most effectually shut out.

38. But what have these Eternal Truths then no manner of Dependence upon the Mind of God? Yes without doubt they have, and for the more exact Comprehending of this whole Matter, 'tis necessary we should distinguish *how*. Which according to the Principles already laid down, is not very difficult to do. For the Mind of God may be consider'd under a double Formality, either as it is an intelligible Nature or Essence, variously exhibitive of things, and having the Ideas of them, according as it is differently Imitable or Participa-

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ble by them, or as an Intellectual or Intelligent Principle, or rather *pure Act* of Intelligence or Underſtanding, The former perhaps a *Platoniſt* would call (tho' I know no ſuch formal Diſtinction in *Plato*) νῶς νοητὸς, in alluſion to *Philo*'s κόσμος νοητὸς, and the latter he might as aptly diſtinguiſh by the Term of νῶς νοερὸς or νοητικὸς. Whereof the Counterpart in *Engliſh* may conveniently be expreſs'd by Mind Intelligible and Mind Intelligent, or Mind Exhibitive, and Mind Conceptive. Now to apply this very uſeful, and therefore carefully to be regarded Diſtinction, eternal Truths do indeed depend upon the Mind of God as Intelligible or Exhibitive, becauſe we conceive them as neceſſarily reſulting from the Divine Ideality. And ſo alſo does the Simple Truth of Contingent Beings, which are ſo far * true as they are conformable to their Ideas or Intelligible Meaſures. In which Senſe we are to underſtand that School Maxim (it being in no other Senſe Intelligible) that the Truth of things is their Conformity with the Divine Intellect meaning the Intellect of God as *Intelligible* or *Exhibitive*. But Eternal Truths do not depend upon the Mnd of God as *Intelligent* or *Conceptive*. For that does not make its Object, but ſuppoſes it, nor are things true becauſe God conceives them ſo, but on the contrary he conceives them ſo becauſe they are antecedently ſo in their own Natures.

* *That is, I mean* Specifically *true. For I ſpeak not here of that Truth which is the Paſſion of* Ens (*properly call'd Tranſcendental) but of that which belongs to* Tale Ens. *The former conſiſting in its Abſolute Intelligibility, as was noted before, the latter in its Ideal Conformity. Which Diſtinction tho' not taken notice of, as I remember in our common Metaphyſicks, is yet for the Prevention of Confuſion in this Matter very carefully to be heeded.*

tures. And 'tis this Argument or Conformity between the Natures of things and his manner of conceiving them, that makes his Conception true, as indeed all Truth of the Subject depends upon that of the Object. So that the Mind of God as *Conceptive* may be said rather to depend upon Eternal Truths, than Eternal Truths to have any dependence upon that. Nor do they depend upon the Mind of God as *Decretory* or Volent as *Des Cartes* will have it, but only upon the Mind of God as Intelligible or Exhibitive, or in other Words, not upon the *Will* or *Conception* of God, but only upon his *Ideality*. For their Dependence must be no other than what is consistent with their Absolute Necessity and Immutability.

39. And probably 'twas the want of the Consideration of this or some such Distinction that might occasion *Des Cartes*, with all the Keenness of his Wit, to blunder so horribly in the stating the Dependence of Eternal Truths. He saw it was necessary in the General, that these Truths should some way or other depend upon the Mind of God (for otherwise where will you lay the Ground of them?) But then, it may be, not considering this *Mind* purely as an Intelligible Essence having in it the Ideas of things according to the Degrees and Ways of its Immutability, but only under the double Formality of Conceptive and Volent, and not being able to digest a Notion so utterly absurd and unintelligible as that Truth should depend upon any Mind, tho' even the Divine as *Conceptive*, that is, that it should depend upon that which presupposes it, he chose perhaps rather to make it depend

depend upon the Mind of God as *Volent*, and ſo reſolv'd all Truths into the Poſitive Will and Conſtitution of God, conſidering them as ſo many Laws or Ordinances arbitrarily enacted and eſtabliſh'd by him as the Supreme Legiſlator. Which tho' not altogether ſo abſurd as the other (by reaſon of that peculiar Influence and Efficacy that is in Will or Power, which is not in Conception or Underſtanding as ſuch) yet from the Conſideration of the many intolerable Conſequences that attend it, may, I think appear, abſurd enough to deſerve the foregoing Reflections, if not a heavier Cenſure.

40. And I believe it does ſo to moſt Men, it is ſo againſt the Voice of that Common Reaſon that ſpeaks in them; and thoſe Genuin Thoughts which naturally ariſes in their Minds upon the very firſt View of ſome Metaphyſical and Mathematical Truths, in which we ſee nothing Poſitive or Arbitrary, nothing but what is abſolutely Neceſſary and Immutable. So that it can be nothing but the perſuance of a Syſtem, the ſerving an Hypotheſis, or the reverence of ſome great Authority, or the Prepoſſeſſions of Education, or ſome *Libertine* Deſign, or ſome ſuch Prejudice or other that ſhall incline Men to believe them to be the Creatures of Will and Power, and to owe their (*Original* I muſt not ſay, becauſe the Decree that makes them is ſuppoſed to be Eternal, but) *Exiſtence* to any Inſtitution or Eſtabliſhment whatſoever. It is, it ſeems, a Doctrin that will not down even with all the *Carteſians*, as great a Reverence as they otherwiſe juſtly have for their *Maſter*. And as for others I do not know any that hold it, unleſs it be

the Metaphyſical Author before mention'd, and ſome certain Divines who talk as if God did not Will things, becauſe they are Good or Juſt in themſelves, but that things are therefore Good and Juſt, becauſe God Wills them. Which indeed if not Formally, yet in the very very next Conſequence will reſolve at leaſt all Moral Truths into the Will and Conſtitution of God. Which alſo ſeems to be aim'd at by thoſe *Libertines* who ſhall make all things Indifferent in their own Natures, and to receive their firſt Difference by *Laws* and *Conſtitutions*, whereas on the contrary God herein follows the Order of Nature, and Accommodates his Laws to the Antecedent Reaſons and Diſtinctions of things, commanding us thoſe things that are in their own Nature Good, and forbidding us thoſe things that are in their own Nature Evil, according to that of the *Pſalmiſt*, *Thy Righteouſneſs is an everlaſting Righteouſneſs, and thy Law is the Truth*, Pſal. 119. ver. 142. And to talk otherwiſe is to talk as if Men were delirous, or in their Sleep, or as if they took a Pride in confronting Reaſon and Senſe, and affected to amuſe the World with Paradoxes and Singularities. But tho' there have been here and there ſome Men of this humour, and perhaps will never be wanting as long as Men have *Paſſions* as well as *Underſtandings*, yet ſtill Man is a Reaſonable Creature, and as long as he is ſo, there is no great Reaſon to fear that ſo *Anti-logical* a Principle, as that of the *Poſitivity* of *Truth*, will ever come to be the Doctrin of any intire School or Univerſity, much leſs to be a common and prevailing Opinion in the World. And after all there is great Reaſon to queſtion,

queſtion, whatever may be pretended in the Courſe of a Syſtem, whether any Man yet did ever ſeriouſly and fully believe it, at leaſt when he was in the actual Conſideration of certain particular Truths. Nor can it eaſily ſink into my Imagination, that ſo great a Mathematician as the Author of this Amuſing Principle, after he had by the exacteſt Rules and Methods of Art, and with the cleareſt Evidence, demonſtrated ſeveral Geometrical Truths, that is, ſhewn them to be *neceſſarily* ſo, and that they could not poſſibly be otherwiſe, ſhould yet at the ſame time ſeriouſly think them to be of a Nature wholely Poſitive, and to have no firmer a Foundation than the mere Arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of God, in a Word, to be as much a *Creature* as himſelf. But however that be, this in the mean while is more certain, that as the Notion bids Defiance to all Religion and Science, ſo it is generally diſapproved and rejected by thoſe who are Friends to either. And to this purpoſe we have it lately remark'd by a great and learned Author, that *tho' we can very eaſily apprehend that an Infinite Power can both create and Annihilate Beings at Pleaſure, yet we cannot apprehend that God does change the Eſſences of things*, &c. To which I add, nor that he *can* change them.

Expoſition of the 39. Articles, p. 320.

41. But now what is there that God cannot change but *Himſelf*, or what is there abſolutely Neceſſary and Immutable beſides him? It is time then now to recollect our Disjunction, which even *Des Cartes* himſelf, as was before Remark'd, was not ſo Abſurd as to deny, tho' 'twas his unhappineſs

neſs to take up with the wrong ſide of it. This Divines and Philoſophers generally decline. And in ſo doing they do well. But then let them have a care of falling into a worſe Abſurdity. As they are againſt the Poſitive, Arbitrary, and Alterable Nature of Truth, ſo let them have a care how they make any thing Neceſſary and Immutable that is not God. Let them be ſo far Conſiſtent with themſelves as to keep within the Compaſs of the Disjunction, and as they juſtly decline that part of it which makes Truth the effect of God's free and arbitrarious Conſtitution, ſo let them be ſo ingenuous as to confeſs the other, which makes it to be really Coeſſential with his Nature, and not be ſo peculiarly Abſurd and beyond all Meaſure Extravagant, as to ſet up ſomething as the Object of Contemplation and Science, which is neither *God* nor the *Effect* of God.

42. And indeed there is no other way of avoiding the *Carteſian* Abſurdity. For if Truth be not God, then of Neceſſity it muſt be the Effect of God, and ſo of an Arbitrary and Mutable Nature. But this by the generality of Writers is thought an abſurd Notion, and againſt common Senſe. And accordingly they will not allow of it. Very Good. But then unleſs they proceed, and acknowledge Truth to have a real Identity with the Divine Eſſence they cannot help relapſing into the ſame or worſe Abſurdities. For, whoever ſays, that Truth is not God, muſt be obliged to ſay, that it is Arbitrary and Contingent, unleſs he will run into the Extravagance of allowing ſomething abſolutely Neceſſary and Immutable that is not God. But

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it being moſt evident that there is nothing Neceſſary or Immutable that is not God, if Truth be not God, then 'tis plain that it cannot be Neceſſary (which preſently runs us into the *Carteſian* Abſurdity of the Arbitrary Poſition of Truth) or if it be Neceſſary, then 'tis as plain on the other ſide, that it muſt be Identified with the Divine Eſſence.

43. The ſhort is, Truth muſt be either God, or the Effect of God, there being nothing Conceivable out of the Sphere of this Disjunction. If it be not God, then it muſt be the Effect of God, and then *Des Cartes*'s Account of it is right when he reſolves it into the Poſitive Order of the Divine Will. But if it be not the Effect of God (as the Abſurdities conſequent from that Principle demonſtrate, and as I preſume will be generally granted) then I think the Conſequence will neceſſarily be, that it muſt be Identified with the Divine Nature. One or the other of theſe it muſt certainly be. For is there any Medium? That would be the moſt wild Suppoſition of all. He that ſhall ſay that Truth is the Effect of God, however miſtaken in his Propoſition, is yet however conſiſtent with himſelf in what he aſſerts. But to ſay that 'tis not the Effect of God, and yet that it is not God neither, is all over Inconſiſtent and Unmaintainable, ſince by Virtue of the Disjunction (which no conſidering Man can Queſtion) the Denial of the former part ought to infer the Poſition of the latter. The Competition then will wholly lie between the *Carteſian* Account of Truth that makes it the Poſitive Effect of God's Will, and

and that which Identifies it with his Nature. For as for any middle Hypotheſis, it paſſes all Comprehenſion to conceive any ſuch thing. And therefore ſince we have ſhewn the *Carteſian* Account that makes Truth the Effect of God's *Will* to be falſe, it follows that that which Identifies it with his *Nature* is indeed the only true Account of it. Which whoever denies cannot with any Conſiſtency oppoſe the *Carteſian*. Upon which I cannot but mightily wonder that the *Carteſian* Account of Truth ſhould be ſo much oppoſed and ſo generally diſliked as it is, and yet that the other ſhould be no more Eſpouſed and Incouraged.

44. And yet neither Incouragement does it want, if the Authority of St. *Auſtin* and ſome of the beſt Scholaſtick and Metaphiſical Writers can give any. As for St. *Auſtin*, to reckon the Hypotheſis of the Identity of Truth with the Divine Eſſence among his *Opinions*, would be but a very ſparing and reſerved Allegation of a great Authority. For certainly never was any Man more intirely poſſeſs'd, more thoroughly imbued with any Notion, than that both devout and (for his time) Metaphyſical *Father* was with this. It enters into the Syſtem of his Thoughts, and ſeems rivetted and ingrain'd as it were into his very Soul. It is the Pulſe that beats almoſt in every Vein of his Writings, in ſo much that he can hardly mention the Name of *Truth* without caſting a *Glory* round about it, and joyning with it ſome Divine Character or other (generally that of Incommutable) that either proclaims, or at leaſt inſinuates it to be God. 'Tis true indeed he may not formally

mally and directly ſet himſelf to the Proof of this Notion in a rational Method, as we have now done, (the Genius of that Age being not much for *Theory*, but contenting it ſelf oftentimes to deliver great Concluſions without their Principles) but he was full of it, and always overflowing with it, and thought he could never Inculcate it enough. Thoſe that are acquainted with St. *Auſtin* muſt be wanting in their Memory or Obſervance, if they know not this to be true. But however for the ſake of thoſe who are not, I ſhall give a Taſte of his Sentiment in a few Inſtances.

Et dicebant veritas & veritas, & multi eam dicebant mihi, & nuſquam erat in eis, ſed falſa loquebantur, non de te tantum qui veri veritas es, &c. *O veritas, veritas quam intimi etiam tunc medullæ animi mei ſuſpirabant tibi, cum te illi ſonarent mihi frequenter & Multipliciter voce ſola & libris multis & ingentibus. Et illa erant Fercula in quibus mihi eſurienti te, inferebantur pro te Sol & Luna*, &c. *At ego te ipſam, te veritas, in qua non eſt Commutatio nec momenti Obumbratio, eſuriebam & ſitiebam*, &c. Confeſ. Lib. 3. Cap. 6.

Again, ſays he, *Et Lex tua veritas, & veritas Tu.* Confeſ. Lib. 4. Cap. 10

Again, *Errores & falſæ Opiniones vitam contaminant ſi rationalis mens ipſa vitioſa eſt. Qualis in me tunc erat neſciente alio lumine illam illuſtrandam eſſe ut ſit particeps veritatis, quia non eſt ipſa Natura veritatis. Quoniam tu illuminabis lucernam meam Domine Deus meus*, &c. *Es enim tu lumen verum*, &c. Confeſ. Lib. 4. Cap. 15.

Again,

Confeſ. Lib. 5. Cap. 3

Again, *Et multa vera de Creatura dicunt, & veritatem Creaturæ Artificem non pie quærunt*, &c. *Mendacia in te conferentes qui veritas es*, &c.

Confeſ. Lib. 7. Cap. 10.

Again, *O æterna veritas, & vera Charitas, & Chara æternitas. Tu es Deus meus, tibi ſuſpiro die ac nocte. Et cum te primum cognovi, tu aſſumpſiſti me. Ut viderem eſſe quod viderem, & nondum me eſſe qui viderem. Et reverberaſti infirmitatem aſpectus mei, radians in me vehementer, & contremui amore & horrore, & inveni longe me eſſe a te in regione diſſimilitudinis, tanquam audirem vocem tuam de excelſo, cibus ſum grandium, creſce & manducabis me*, &c. *Et dixi nunquid nihil eſt veritas, quoniam neq; per finita, neq; per infinita locorum ſpacia diffuſa eſt? Et clamaſti de longinquo, imo vero ego ſum qui ſum.*

Confeſ. Lib. 7. Cap. 17.

Again, *Quærens unde approbarem pulchritudinem corporum ſive cæleſtium ſive terreſtrium, & quid mihi præſto eſſet integre de mutabilibus judicanti & dicenti, hoc ita eſſe debet, illud non ita. Hoc ergo quærens unde judicarem cum ita judicarem, inveneram incommutabilem & veram veritatis æternitatem ſupra mentem meam commutabilem*, &c.

Confeſ. Lib. 9. Cap. 10.

Again, *Colloquebamur ergo ſoli valde dulciter*, &c. *Et quærebamus inter nos apud præſentem veritatem, quod tu es, qualis futura eſſet vita æterna ſanctorum*, &c. *Et adhuc aſcendebamus interius cogitando & loquendo te, & mirando opera tua, & venimus in mentes noſtras, & tranſcendimus eas, ut attingeremus regionem ubertatis indeficientis, ubi paſcis*

paſcis Iſrael in æternum veritatis pabulo, & ubi vita ſapientia eſt, per quam fiunt omnia iſta & quæ fuerunt, & quæ futura ſunt, &c.

Again, *Beata vita eſt Gaudium de veritate. Hoc eſt enim gaudium de te qui veritas es, Deus illuminatio mea*, &c. Confeſ. Lib. 10. Cap. 23.

Again, *Ex quo didici te, non ſum oblitus tui, ubi enim inveni veritatem, ibi inveni Deum meum ipſam veritatem*, &c. Cap. 24.

Again, *Ubiq; veritas* (ſpeaking of God) *præſides omnibus conſulentibus te, ſimulq; reſpondes omnibus etiam diverſa conſulentibus. Liquide tu reſpondes, ſed non liquide omnes audiunt.* Cap. 26.

Again, *Tu es veritas ſuper omnia præſidens, at ego per avaritiam meam non amittere te volui, ſed volui tecum poſſidere Mendacium*, &c. Cap. 41.

Again, *Intus utiq; mihi, intus in domicilio cogitationis. Nec Hebræa, nec Græca, nec Latina, nec Barbara veritas ſine oris & linguæ Organis, ſine ſtrepitu ſyllabarum diceret, verum dicit*, &c. *Te veritas rogo, te Deus meus, rogo parce peccatis meis*, &c. Confeſ. Lib. 11. Cap. 3.

Again, *O Veritas lumen Cordis mei, non tenebræ meæ loquantur mihi. Defluxi ad iſta & obſcuratus ſum, ſed hinc, etiam hinc adamavi te. Erravi & recordatus ſum tui. Audivi vocem tuam poſt me ut redire, & vix audivi propter Tumultus peccatorum. Et nunc ecce redeo æſtuans & anhe-* Confeſ. Lib. 12. Cap. 10.

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lans ad fontem tuum. Nemo me prohibeat, hunc bibam, & tunc vivam.

Cap. 25. Again, *Attende judex optime Deus, ipsa veritas, attende quid dicam Contradictori huic, attende, coram te enim dico*, &c. *Si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, & ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi quæso id videmus? Nec ego utiq; in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa quæ supra mentes nostras est incommutabili veritate.*

Cap. 30. Again, *In hac diversitate sententiarum verarum Concordiam pariat ipsa veritas, & Deus noster miseriatur nostri*, &c.

Confes. Lib. 13. Cap. 29. Again, *O Domine, nonne ista Scriptura tua vera est, quoniam tu verax, & veritas edidisti eam?*

Lib. de Ordine. Cap. 4. Again, *Nec enim altus Apollo est, qui in speluncis, in montibus, in nemoribus nidore Thuris pecudumq; Calamitate concitatus implet insanos, sed alius profecto est, alius ille altus veridicus, atq; ipsa (quid enim verbis ambiam) veritas; cujus vates sunt quicunq; possunt esse sapientes.*

Cap. 8. Again, *Quid aliud est Dei Facies, quam ipsa cui suspiramus, & cui nos amatæ mundos pulchrosq; reddimus, veritas?*

Soliloq. Lib. 1. Cap. 1. Again, *Te invoco Deus veritas, in quo, & a quo, & per quem vera sunt quæ vera sunt omnia*, &c. *Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo, & a quo, & per quem intelligibiliter lucent, quæ intelligibiliter lucent omnia.*

Again,

Again, *Si dicam vitam esse quandam beatam, candemq; sempiternam, quo nos Deo duce, id est ipsa veritate*, &c. De Magistro. cap. 8.

Again, *Tunc est animus sapientissimus, cum veritatem quæ semper eodem modo est intuetur, eiq; immobilis inhæret Divino amore conjunctus. Et illa omnium quæ quoquo modo sunt summe maximeq; est.* De Immortal. Animæ. cap. 11.

Again, *Si nulla essentia in quantum essentia est, aliquid habet contrarium, multo minus habet contrarium prima illa essentia quæ dicitur veritas.* Cap. 12.

Again, *Nec invenitur aliquid quod inter summam vitam, quæ sapientia & veritas est incommutabilis, & id quod ultimum vivificatur, id est corpus, nisi vivificans anima.* Cap. 15.

Again, *Non studio inanis Gloriæ, sed Divino amore veritatis accensi*, &c. *Fieri non potest, quadam Divina Providentia ut religiosis animis seipsos & Deum suum, id est veritatem, pie, caste, ac diligenter quærentibus, inveniendi Facultas desit.* De Quantitate Animæ. cap. 14.

Again, *Pergit in Deum, id est in ipsam Contemplationem veritatis, & illud propter quod tantum laboratum est, altissimum & secretissimum præmium. Sed hæc actio, id est appetitio intelligendi ea quæ vere summeq; sunt, sumus aspectus est animæ, quo perfectionem, meliorem, rectioremq; non habet.* Cap. 33.

Again, *Divine ac singulariter in Ecclesia Catholica traditur, nullam* Cap. 34.

Creaturam colendam esse animæ, sed ipsum tantummodo rerum quæ sunt omnium Creatorem, id est incommutabilem veritatem, &c.

Cap. 36. Again, Speaking of the Soul, *Qualis post hoc corpus futura sit, cum & pœna mortis necessario manere debeat, manente peccato, & virtuti pietatiq; sit Deus ipse, id est veritas ipsa, Præmium.*

De Lib. Arbitrio. Lib. 2. Cap. 9. Again, *Num aliam putas esse sapientiam nisi veritatem, in qua cernitur & tenetur summum bonum*, &c. *Nemo enim beatus est, nisi summo bono, quod in ea veritate quam sapientiam vocamus, cernitur & tenetur.*

Cap. 15. Again, *Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Quam tuam concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse, ut hoc demonstrarem. Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est. Si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est.*

De vera Religione. cap. 11. Again, *Si quæritur quis instituerit corpus, ille quæratur, qui est omnium speciosissimus. Omnis enim species ab illo est. Quis est autem hic, nisi unus Deus, una veritas*, &c.

Cap. 30. and 31. Again, most expressly, *Hæc autem Lex omnium artium cum sit omnino incommutabilis, mens vero Humana cui talem Legem videre concessum est, mutabilitatem pati possit erroris, satis apparet supra mentem nostram esse legem, quæ veritas dicitur. Nec jam illud ambigendum est, incommutabilem naturam, quæ supra rationalem animam sit Deum esse.*

Again,

Again, In moſt plain and direct Terms, *Particeps veritatis poteſt eſſe anima humana, ipſa autem veritas Deus eſt incommutabilis ſupra illam.* De Geneſi contra Manich. Lib. 2. Cap. 16.

Again, *Veritas lumenq; animæ rationalis non niſi Deus eſt.* Epiſt. 3d. ad Volus.

Again, *Fieri homines cives alterius civitatis, cujus Rex veritas, cujus lex Charitas, cujus modus æternitas.* Epiſt. 5. ad Marcel.

Again, *A quocunq; verum dicitur, illo donante dicitur, qui eſt ipſa veritas.* Epiſt. 28. ad Hieron.

Again, *Qui didicerit Deum non diſtendi aut diffundi per locos neq; finitos neq; infinitos, quaſi in aliqua parte Major neq; in aliqua Minor, ſed totum ubiq; eſſe præſentem, ſicut veritatem, cujus nemo ſobrie dicit partem eſſe in iſto loco, & partem in illo, quoniam veritas utiq; Deus eſt.* Epiſt. 56. ad. Dioſcorum.

Theſe few Places out of the Abundance which I preſume I might produce (for I go no farther than the Marks of my Pencil lead me) I here lay together, and without any Diſcanting or Paraphraſing upon them, offer them to the View and Conſideration of my Reader, who I doubt not will be ſufficiently convinced by them how intimate and familiar this Notion of the *Divinity* of *Truth* was with this Great Father, how it went as a common Ingredient into the Syſtem of his Thoughts, and with what a brightneſs of Evidence it ſtruck, and with what a ſtrong hold it poſſeſs'd his Mind. So that while others deify'd Truth only by their Love, he openly confeſs'd its Divinity, and paid it the Homage of his Underſtanding.

45. I might now farther ſhew this to be the Doctrin of the *Schools*, and of ſome Eminent Writers in the Rational and Contemplative way, but that I have dwelt ſo long upon the Authority of St. *Auſtin*, that I am afraid the inſiſting upon any more would too much oppreſs the Patience of my Reader, which I fear I ſufficiently imploy with my own Thoughts, ſo that I need not farther tire it with the recital of other Mens. I ſhall therefore now preſume upon his good leave to conclude the *Divine Nature* of Truth, with this ſhort conſequential Remark upon it, (referring the farther Proſecution of it to the ſecond part of this Theory) that God is the immediate Object of our Science and Contemplation, ſince Truth moſt confeſſedly is ſo, that *Divinity* is a larger Study than is ordinarily preſumed, and that thoſe that have God leaſt in their Thoughts, do yet really think upon him oftner than perhaps they are aware of, as ſeeing all things in his Divine Ideas, even that *Book* of *Light* St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks of, and wherein he makes wicked Men to behold the Immutable Rules of Morality.

De Trin. Lib. 14. Cap. 15.

46. But to go on. By the ſame Principles as we have prov'd the general Divinity of Truth, we are alſo farther led to conclude, that it belongs to the Diſtinction, and conſtitutes the Character of the Second Perſon in the Bleſſed Trinity. For if, as we have ſhewn, Truth be really Identical with the Divine Ideas, then as it follows, that in reality it is of a Nature Coeſſential with the Divine, becauſe of the real Identity of thoſe Ideas with the Divine

Divine Nature, ſo alſo does it no leſs coherently follow, that it is the ſame in effect with the Son of God, the Eternal and Subſtantial *Word* of the Father, and that becauſe of the proportional Identity of the Divine *Ideas* with the Eternal *Word*, as was obſerv'd before. And here I meet with the ſame good *Father* again conſenting with me, and Authorizing me in this Concluſion, as well as in the other. For which purpoſe I could eaſily gather together a Cloud of Teſtimonies, ſo plentifully are his Writings fraught with them, but in Conſideration of the Trouble I have already given my Reader in this kind, I ſhall burthen his Patience only with this ſingle, but very expreſs Paſſage, *Veritas immortalis eſt, veritas incommutabilis eſt, veritas illud verbum eſt de quo dicitur, in Principio erat verbum, & verbum erat apud Deum, & Deus erat verbum.* In Pſal. 123. Tho' indeed there is no need of any Authority from St. *Auſtin*, or any body elſe for the Confirmation of this, ſince the Divine Perſon we ſpeak of, himſelf tells us in expreſs Words, that he is the *Way, the Truth and the Life.* The Way that makes us Good, the Truth that makes us Wiſe, and the Life that makes us Happy.

47. There are yet two Things more to be noted in this our more explicit Account of the Nature of neceſſary and eternal Truths, for the better Illuſtration and more full Comprehenſion of it. The firſt of which is, that theſe are the Truths that are the true and proper Objects of all our Contemplation and Science, the Certainty and Immutability of which require the like Neceſſity and

immutable ſteaddineſs in its Object. For to *know* is to perceive a thing to be neceſſarily as well as determinately ſo, and that it cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe, as to *demonſtrate* a thing is to ſhew and make out this Neceſſity. And therefore the Object of my Science muſt be Neceſſary and Unchangeable, ſince otherwiſe that Knowledge whereby I know it to be ſo might be falſe, and ſo I could neither be certain of what I know my ſelf, nor give any Demonſtration of it to another. And herein I think the Maſters of Reaſon and Science are generally agreed, it being a common Maxim among them, that *Scientia eſt de neceſſariis & eodem modo ſe habentibus.* Nor is it at all ſtrange to find them agreeing ſo much, where they can diſpute ſo little. I only wonder that for the ſame Reaſon they are not as much agreed concerning the next thing to be obſerv'd, it being, beſides what other Grounds it has in the Principles of Reaſon, a very certain and immediate Conſequence of the former.

48. And that is, that as theſe Neceſſary and Eternal Truths are the Truths that are the proper Objects of our Contemplation and Science, ſo likewiſe theſe are the Truths that are moſt perfective of our Underſtandings, or that they are theſe Truths in the Knowledge of which the Perfection of our Underſtandings does chiefly conſiſt. The Ground of this is laid already, and ſo much at leaſt may be built upon it. For if theſe neceſſary Truths are confeſſedly the Objects of Science, then they muſt add as much to the *Objective*, as Science does to the *Formal* Perfection of the Underſtanding.

That

That is, they muſt perfect the Underſtanding in the ſame Proportion by way of *Object*, as Science does by way of *Form* or *Habit*. And conſequently ſince Science is the moſt perfect Intellectual Habit, it muſt needs follow, that theſe Truths about which it is imploy'd, and which give the Underſtanding this moſt perfect Form, muſt be the Objects that are moſt perfective of it. And if this raiſes the Excellency and Reputation of the *Rational Studies* beyond ſome other Things which the Humour of certain Men (whoſe Abilities lie rather in Force of Imagination and Strength of Memory than in any clear Intellectual ſight of Truth) has been pleas'd without any Principle or Foundation in Reaſon to Vote, and ſet up for *Learning* and Knowledge, I cannot help it. The Conſequence is very clear, and I wonder more Men do not ſee it, as well as St. *Auſtin*, who ſeems to have had a good View of it, when he ſay, *Tunc eſt animus ſapientiſſimus cum veritatem quæ ſemper eodem modo eſt, intuetur, eiq; immobilis inhæret conjunctus.* As alſo again, when he ſays, *Hæc actio, id eſt Appetitio intelligendi ea quæ vere ſummeq; ſunt, ſummus aſpectus eſt Animæ, quo perfectiorem, meliorem, rectioremq; non habet.* And indeed wherein ſhould the Intellectual Perfection or Accompliſhment of a Rational Creature lie, but in thoſe things which perfect his *Reaſon* the nobleſt Faculty of his Mind, and improve his *Science* the moſt perfect *Form* of that moſt noble Faculty. Men may ſet an Arbitrary Value upon Things, and by

De immortal. Animæ. cap. 11. *Divino amore*

De Quantitate Animæ. cap. 33.

the Preſcriptions of Cuſtom or Stamp of Authority make ſome kinds of Knowledge *precious*, as they do ſome ſort of *Stones*, but when all's done that theſe Meaſures can do, what are Languages, Hiſtories, or any other Matters of Fact, to clearneſs of Thought, exactneſs of Judgment, and a diſtinct and inlarg'd View of thoſe ſtanding and ſettled Relations, Dependencies and Coherencies, which Things Eternally and Immutably have with one another in the vaſt and immenſe Syſtem of the Intelligible World. Theſe are the Truths which God himſelf eternally Contemplates, and for the Contemplation of which our Reaſons and Underſtandings were given us, and which are moſt worthy of our ſtudy, and which give the greateſt Perfection to our Underſtandings when known, and that becauſe the Knowledge of them is true *Science*, the moſt perfect of the Intellectual Habits, and than which nothing, except the *Love* of God, can more exalt the Dignity or Excellence of a reaſonable Nature. And therefore St. *Auſtin* adds very well, *Divino amore conjunctus*. For then indeed is the Soul of Man arrived to the Accompliſhment of her Nature, and in the very Height of her Exaltation, when her Moral Perfection accompanies her Intellectual, and when to the *Contemplation* of the Eternal *Truth*, ſhe joins the *Love* of the Eternal *Good*.

49. But what if we ſhould carry our Concluſion higher, will not the Foundation bear it? For we have ſhewn that theſe Eternal Truths are Coeſſential with God, and as upon that Account they muſt needs be Perfective of our Minds, ſince God

is our true Intellectual Good, so for the same Reason they must be the *only* Objects that are Perfective of them, since God again is our only Intellectual Good. That he is the only true Good and Beatifick Object of our Minds, and that we cannot become either more Perfect, or more Happy in any kind or degree, but by our Union with, or Possession of him, I think is most clear and certain, since as our Minds were made for him, as the Object both of their Contemplation and their Love, so 'tis he only that acts in and upon them, and gives them all those Modifications wherein all the accessory Perfection or Happiness of their Being can possibly be supposed to consist. Whence it follows, that as these Truths could not be any Perfection of our Understandings, if they were not really the same with the Divine Essence, (which again, by the way most convincingly ptoves, that they are not in the Reality of the thing different from it) so upon the Supposition that they are indeed the same with it, they must be the only Intelligible Objects that are truly Perfective of them. And indeed this is no more than what the Reason and Proportion of the thing seems to require, that as *Necessary Good* is the only Good that is morally Perfective of the *Will*, so *Necessary Truth* should be the only Truth that is intelligibly Perfective of the *Understanding*. 'Tis true, indeed there may be a great many Contingent Truths which a Man may be concern'd to know, because of some Interest which he has that depends upon it, which may be so considerable as to make the Knowledge even of such a Truth of more

more *Conſequence* to him than the Comprehenſion of the moſt noble Theorem in any of the Sciences. As for Inſtance, it was of nearer Conſequence to *Archimedes* to know that the City *Syracuſe* was taking by *Marcellus*, than to demonſtrate the Propoſition which he was about. But how the Knowledge of ſuch a pure Matter of Fact, however neceſſary to his Safety, could be ſaid to be any real Improvement, or Acceſſion of Perfection to his Mind, ſo that he might juſtly ſet any greater Value upon his Underſtanding, or think himſelf at all the Wiſer Man for it, he muſt have a head very happily turn'd that can conceive, or ſo much as think Intelligible. And indeed tho' we may here have the *publick Cry* of the World againſt us, which places the Knowledge of ſuch things among the greateſt Intellectual Accompliſhments, yet certainly we have the *Inward Sentiment* of Human Nature very much on our ſide. For ſure never any Man thought it any Reproach or Diſparagement to his Underſtanding not to know that the Clock had ſtruck Twelve, or that he was at all the Wiſer or more Intellectually improved when he did. And tho' ſome Truths of *Fact* may be in Point of Intereſt more concerning than this (and it may happen in ſome Junctures, that this may be as concerning as moſt) yet as to any real Perfection or Improvement that accrues to the *Underſtanding* by the Knowledge of them, they are all I think of the ſame Value and Conſideration. And were it not for that ſervile regard we pay to Cuſtom, Authority, and the Opinions of Men, no body would be any more aſhamed to ask how many

many Wounds *Cæsar* had given him in the Senate, than to ask whether the Clock had struck Twelve, as supposing the Knowledge or the Ignorance of such things to be equally indifferent as to the real Perfection or Imperfection of their Understandings.

50. I shall now conclude this Section with a few brief Reflections upon *Monsieur Regis* his way of stating the Nature of Eternal Truths. *Monsieur Regis* is a very eminent *Cartesian*, that has reduced *Des Cartes*'s Philosophy into a Method, and has given us a just Systematical Course of it, and indeed in many places, especially in his *Physicks*, has considerably improved it and refined upon it. But my Concern at present lies in his *Metaphysicks*, where he has a Chapter concerning Eternal Truths, which he states in a way very different from his Master, and it may be from all the World besides, but withal, I think as absurd as it is singular and peculiar. Indeed I have hardly met with any thing more gross and confused than the Account which this otherwise very great Man gives us of *Eternal Truths*. It is such as would scarce deserve any Reflection, were it not for the Moment of the thing concerning which it treats, and the Authority of the Person from whom it comes. Upon which Considerations it may be worth while to take a short View of it, which of it self would be sufficient to expose it.

After some previous, but not well consider'd Remarks upon the Equivocation and Division of Truth, he begins his Account most unhappily, telling us, that there remains now only to treat of that Truth, *Tom. 1. p. 177.*

Truth which consists in things which do not exist but in the Understanding, and which we commonly call Eternal Truths. But what, is Eternal Truth then a mere *Ens rationis*, does it *exist* only in the Understanding? But what then will become of all *Sciences*, whose Objects according to this will be a mere *non Ens*? Or does he mean that Eternal Truths do *consist* purely in Thought? But then this is a plain confusion of objective with subjective Truth.

Which latter seems to be at once his meaning and his oversight by his next Remark, which is, that these Truths are nothing else but certain Manners whereby the Soul conceives the Objects of her Ideas; where, to pass over the Impropriety of conceiving the Objects of her Ideas, since the Ideas themselves are the immediate Objects of all Conception, he plainly transfers that to the Truth of the *Thing*, which belongs only to the Truth of the *Understanding*.

Upon this he reduces Eternal Truths to these three general Kinds. Numerick Truths, Geometrick Truths, and Metaphysical Truths. But are there then no Eternal Truths in *Morality*, and is there no such Science as that of *Ethicks*?

But he goes on, and tells us, that these Geometrick, Numerick, and Metaphysical Truths are composed of two Parts, whereof the one holds the Place of the Matter, and the other of the Form. The matter of these Truths consists in Substances and Modes, and the Form in the Action whereby the Soul considers these Substances, and these Modes after a certain Manner. As for Example, Extension and three sides are the Matter of a Geometrick Triangle, and the Action

ction whereby the Soul conſiders theſe three Sides as exiſting in the Extenſion, is the Form of it, *&c.* From whence, ſays he, it follows, that all Numerick, Geometrick, and Metaphyſical Truths being formally conſider'd cannot exiſt but in the Soul which conceives them, but that being conſider'd according to their firſt Matter they exiſt actually out of the Soul. Well, we will allow him in the general that there may be that in Eternal Truths which anſwers to *Matter* and *Form* (as according to us the matter of Eternal Truths are the Divine Ideas themſelves, the Form that mutual Order or Habitude which they have to one another) but then they muſt be both within the Compaſs of the *Object*, and they muſt be both *Eternal*, as I think is evident. And for this reaſon I can neither allow of *his* Matter, nor of *his* Form. For his Matter wants the latter Qualification as conſiſting (as he afterwards explains himſelf) in created Beings, which can never be the Matter of what is Eternal. And his Form is as Defective in the former, being out of the compaſs of the *Object*, as conſiſting in the *Action* whereby the Soul conſiders, *&c.* So that here again is a ſtrange confuſed mixture of Truth of the Object with that of the Subject. Eternal Truth is certainly Truth of the Object, and the nobleſt Species of that kind, and how then does he place any part of it in the Action of the Mind, which ſuppoſes all, and which can never have the Nature of an Object, but only when the Mind reflects upon its own Actions, and then indeed 'tis the Reflection of the Mind that is properly the Action, ſo that the Action is always diſtinct from the Object. And conſequently

ſequently that Truth which is the Object (as Eternal Truth moſt certainly is, being the Object of all the Sciences) cannot poſſibly conſiſt in the Action. And why then does he ſay that theſe Eternal Truths formally conſider'd cannot exiſt but in the Soul which conceives them? For are theſe Truths the Creatures, or the Objects of my Underſtanding, do I *make*, or do I only *Contemplate* that Nature which I find antecedently in them? If I make them, why can I not alter them, or unmake them? And how come all Underſtandings to make them alike, *&c.* But why does he ſay *in the Soul which conceives them?* Methinks it ſhould be always, and actually true, that Right Angles are equal, whether I think of them or no, nor ſhould this Truth depend upon my being aſleep or awake. Or if they begin to have that Relation of Equality, only when I think of them, how then are ſuch Truths *Eternal?*

After another Remark upon this (which I paſs over, becauſe I do not well underſtand the Deſign of it, or at leaſt how it ſerves his Deſign) he gives us a Definition of Eternal Truths, comprizing at once, as he ſays, both their Matter and their Form, in theſe Words, *That they conſiſt in the Subſtances which God has created, ſo far as the Soul conſiders thoſe Subſtances after a certain manner, and compares them according to the different Relations which they have one with another.* A very pleaſant Definition of Eternal Truths, where the Form, that is the *Difference*, is out of the thing defined, as being in the Action wherewith the Soul conſiders, *&c.* and where both Matter and

Form

Form are neither of them Eternal. And yet this he calls a Definition, and a Definition of Eternal Truths. Strange how Ingenious and Philoſophical Men do ſometimes forget themſelves, and even the Principles and Elements of their own Art!

He proceeds now to open to us the great Secret and Myſtery of this whole Buſineſs, and lets us know that after all there are no ſuch things as Eternal Truths, as indeed according to his Principles, and even his very Definition of them, there are not. And ſo much he plainly confeſſes after theſe his broad Inſinuations of it. For ſays he according to this Definition (and ſure a very hopeful one it is) Numerick, Geometrick, and Metaphyſical Truths cannot be Eternal, neither according to their Matter, nor according to their Form. Not according to their Matter, becauſe their Matter is nothing elſe but the Subſtances which God has produced, and it has been proved that the Subſtances which God has produced cannot be Eternal. Nor yet according to their Form. For ſince the Form of theſe Truths is nothing elſe but the Action whereby the Soul conſiders Subſtances after a certain manner, if the Subſtances are not Eternal, neither can this Action of the Soul be Eternal. It remains then ſays he, that Numerick, Geometrick, and Metaphyſical Truths are not Eternal, but that they are only Immutable, in as much as Subſtances may be always compared together, and that God has Will'd that all Souls ſhould be determined to conceive the ſame Truth, whenever they ſhall compare them after the ſame man-

manner. He has Will'd for Example that they ſhould be determin'd to conceive this Truth, *Two*, when they ſhall compare one Unit with another. That they ſhould be determin'd to conceive a *Triangle*, when they ſhall conſider Extenſion as bounded with three ſides. And in fine that they ſhould be determin'd to conceive a *Cauſe* (*which* refers to Metaphyſical Truth) when they ſhall conſider one Subject ſo far forth as it produces another. Which he ſays ſhews that the Immutability even of thoſe Truths which we call Eternal, is not Abſolute, but Dependent.

And now he has clear'd the Matter. And an admirable Account without doubt it is, if one could but underſtand it. But let us ſee what we can do with it. That the Truths he ſpeaks of cannot be Eternal according to his Definition of them is readily granted, and he does well at length to confeſs it. But why then does he pretend to define Eternal Truths by a Definition, which in the Reſult of it makes them not to be Eternal? But that there are Eternal Truths, tho' not according to his Definition, the foregoing Conſiderations do abundantly ſhew. And 'tis what is witneſs'd by the common Natural Senſe of Mankind, and ſuppoſed by all the Sciences.

As for his Diſtinction between *Eternal* and *Immutable*, I do not underſtand it in the preſent Caſe. For whatever is in its own intrinſick Nature Immutable, as upon the former Conſiderations ſome Truths appear to be, muſt alſo be Eternal.

But he ſays they are not Eternal but only Immutable in as much as Subſtances may be always com-

compared together, &c. But those Substances whatever they be that may always be compared together, must as we have shewn be Eternal, since things that are not cannot be compared, or be capable of any Property or Affection.

But he says, that God has Will'd that all Souls should be determined to conceive the same Truth whenever they shall compare these Substances after the same manner. But in the first place, how does he know what God has *Will'd?* Or how *can* he know, unless it should please God to reveal it to him? 'Tis not a little strange methinks that Men that are so much against our seeing Eternal Truths in God, should yet pretend to have such an intimate Knowledge of his *Decrees*, whereof he has made no Revelation, and which therefore if they see at all they must see in him.

But admitting him to know that God has Will'd this, yet then it seems even according to himself the thing which God Wills here is the *Action*, not the *Object*. For 'tis that all Souls should be determin'd to *conceive* the same Truth, *&c.* And so the Object may be Eternal and Independent notwithstanding the Dependency of the Action upon the Will of God. So that after all, this seems not against the Eternity of Truth of the Object, but only against that of the Subject, which he has our leave to suppose as *Temporary* as he pleases, tho' I know not what Ground he has to fasten, even that sort of Truth upon any such *Decree*. Nor does it conclude against the Eternity of that *universally*. For I suppose whatever he thinks of Souls being determined by the Will of God in time to the

Conception of the ſame Truths, yet he will not deny that God himſelf eternally conceives them, or rather conceives them in his own Eternity. Which muſt alſo in the Conſequence of it prove thoſe Truths to be Eternal, ſince Eternal Truth of the *Subject* ſuppoſes, and therefore cannot be without that of the *Object*.

But perhaps after all, the thing that he confuſely drives at by all this heap of Amuſement, is that *Scholaſtick Expedient* before mention'd, that reſolves Propoſitions of Eternal Truth into the conditional Connexion of the Subject with the Predicate, ſuch as implies the actual Exiſtence of neither, but only that if one be, the other will be too, or that if a thing be at all, it will be ſo. But then at leaſt the intire Conditional muſt be *actually* and *abſolutely* put to make the Propoſition Intelligible or Demonſtrable, and conſequently muſt be Eternal, and ſo alſo muſt be the Subject whereof it is affirm'd, according to the Tenour of what we have diſcours'd at large upon this Occaſion. Wherein this Plea (if this be what he aims at, as it ſeems, and as it muſt, if he means any thing to the purpoſe) has been I think ſufficiently diſabled from doing him any farther Service here. And therefore even upon this Suppoſition he concludes without any *Ground*, that the Immutability of thoſe Truths which we call Eternal is not Abſolute but Dependent. But according to the direct and litteral Senſe of his own Premiſes moſt *Impertinently*, ſince, as I remark'd before, that they conclude againſt the Eternity, ſo I may now add, that they conclude againſt the Independency only of *Subjective*

tive Truth. Which is quite beſides the Queſtion.

In fine, this ingenious Gentleman tells us (for which Remark I think there was no great Occaſion) that this Idea of Eternal Truths is very different from that which certain Philoſophers have of them, *&c.* And herein I own he is much in the right, tho' ſomewhat ſhort in the Account of his *Singularity*, For inſtead of *certain* he might have ſaid *moſt*, if not *all*. And as he is the moſt ſingular in his Notion of any that I know of, ſo is he alſo the moſt Abſurd, even beyond his Great Maſter. For he owns the Doctrin of Eternal Truths, tho' with the ſtrange Suppoſition of their poſitive Dependence upon the Will and Decree of God, whereas this his over-zealous Diſciple after having pretended to ſtate their Nature, at length gives ſuch an Account of them as utterly overthrows them, tho' the laſt Conſideration he uſes to that Purpoſe about God's Willing that Souls ſhould be determin'd to conceive, *&c.* in the direct Senſe of it overthrows another ſort of Truth than what was in the Queſtion. So every way Inconſiſtent is this great Philoſopher with himſelf. And one would wonder that a Man of his Acuteneſs could fall into ſuch a Maze of Intanglement and Abſurdity, but that it ſeems to be a Fate upon thoſe that ſet themſelves to oppoſe or corrupt the Eternal and Conſubſtantial Truth of God, his Divine and Coeſſential *Word*, not to have the Light of it for their Direction. *Why perſecuteſt thou me? It is hard for thee to kick againſt the Pricks.* Men may wink, or they may ſpurn againſt the Sun, but they cannot

put out its Light. And in this Caſe eſpecially will that ſaying be found moſt remarkably true, *magna eſt veritas, & prævalebit.*

Sect. IV.

Concerning the Place or Region of Truth, with ſome farther Conſiderations concerning the Ground and Foundation that Eternal Truths have in the Intelligible World.

1. WE have given a large and full Anſwer to that great Queſtion that inquires, *what is Truth.* And if now the Beauty and Grandeur of its Character beget a curioſity to know the Seat of its Reſidence, and it be demanded in the Language of the *Eaſtern* Eloquence, *Job* 28. 12. *But where ſhall Wiſdom be found, and where is the Place of Underſtanding?* Tho' in the foregoing Principles we have rather prevented this Queſtion than laid a Ground for its Reſolution, yet let him that asks it, direct his Inquiry to the right Oracle. Let him ask Truth it ſelf where ſhe is. But let him ask with the paſſionate Fervency of the Sacred Shepherds, *Cant.* 1. 7. *Tell me*, O thou whom my Soul *loveth where thou feedeſt*, &c. and ſhe will tell him, that tho' ſhe is conſulted with more Advantage and with better Succeſs in one Place than in another, and holds forth her Oracles, and gives her Anſwers chiefly in Solitudes and Retreats, yet that ſhe

ſhe is indeed *every where*, and may any where in ſome Meaſure be both *Contemplated* and *ſeen*. She will tell him, that if he climb up into Heaven ſhe is there, and that if he go down to Hell, ſhe is there alſo. And that if he take the Wings of the Morning, and remain in the uttermoſt parts of the Sea, even there alſo he ſhall meet with her, and can never go out of her *Sphere*, whoſe Center is every where, and whoſe Circumference is no where. She will tell him in fine, that ſhe is preſent in all *Places*, as well as to all *Times*, that no part of the Univerſe can be excluded from her Light, that ſhe ſends forth her Rays when thoſe of the Sun are with-drawn, and where they never arrive, nay, that ſhe ſhines even in the *Darkneſs*, tho' ſhe be not Comprehended by it.

2. More particularly ſhe will tell him (for ſhe is not ſhy of being found out, or ſtudious of Concealment) that ſhe is where the *Divine Ideas* are, the Eternal, and Immutable, Reaſons and Eſſences of Things, in the *Intelligible World*, that World of true Light and Glory, of the moſt ſubſtantial Being and Reality, where all things actually and intirely are, without either Poſſibility or Succeſſion (for there is nothing *Poſſible* in the Intelligible World, all is *pure Act* there) and where Death has no Power, and Time makes no Change. Here it is that Truth dwells, in this immortal and unchangeable Region; This is her native Country, her genuin and proper Soil, where ſhe has a fixed and ſteddy Abode, an undiſturb'd and never failing Reſidence. This is the τὸ πεδίον τ ἀληθείας, that *Field of Truth* ſo much celebrated by ſome, that

Regio ubertatis indeficientis, St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks of, where God, as he ſays, *feeds his* Iſrael *to all Eternity with the Food of Truth.* Where Truth is the Aliment, *and where the Life is Wiſdom.*

Confeſ. Lib. 9. Cap. 10.

3. She will be yet more particular in her Accounts if thou art ſo in thy Inquiries, and will tell thee that ſhe is in *God*, and that he eternally Contemplates and loves her, and rejoyces in her ever charming, and never fading Beauty. And if this does not ſatisfy, ſhe will farther tell thee, that ſhe is in * *thy ſelf*, becauſe of the intimate Union thy Soul has with its Creator, that ſhe keeps an Oracle within thy own Breaſt, and that inſtead of hunting after her among *Books* (which for the moſt part is ſeeking the Living among the Dead) thou needſt but enter into thy ſelf to conſult her, and receive her Anſwer. For the *Word is nigh thee*, and thou carrieſt thy Divine Maſter and Teacher, *Truth*, within thy own Boſom, as unmindful as thou art of thy ſelf, and her, while ſhe teaches thee in the * *School of the Breaſt*, even that eternal and univerſal Reaſon that ſhines upon all Minds with a pure ſteddy and uniform Light, gives to all Men the ſame common Anſwers, and inſtructs them while they think they teach themſelves, or learn from others, by whoſe Participation they are Rational and Intelligent, and in whoſe inward Light they ſee and underſtand whatever they know, even the increated Word and Wiſdom of God,

* *Crede veritati, Clamat & in te Seſe habitare.* St. Auſt. *Soliloq. Lib. 2. Cap. 19.*

* *Docente te Magiſtro intimo in Scholâ pectoris.* St. Auſt. *Confeſ. Lib. 9. Cap. 9.*

God, whom the Father only poſſeſſes intirely, but who Communicates it ſelf to all his Intelligent Creatures according to their reſpective Meaſures and Capacities, and whoſe *Delight is to be with the Sons of Men*, Prov. 8.

4. And upon this Ground proceeds what St. *Auſtin* ſo frequently inculcates concerning both the *Interiority*, and the *Community* of Truth. The former of which he intimates when he ſays, *De univerſis autem quæ intelligimus non loquentem qui perſonat foris, ſed intus ipſi menti præſidentem conſulimus veritatem, verbis fortaſſe ut conſulamus admoniti. Ille autem qui conſulitur docet, qui in interior, homine habitare dictus eſt Chriſtus, id eſt, incommutabilis Dei, virtus* (I ſuppoſe it ſhould be *veritas*) *atq; ſempiterna ſapientia. Quam quidem omnis rationalis anima conſulit, ſed tantum cuiq; panditur, quantum capere propter propriam ſive malam, ſive bonam voluntatem poteſt.* De Magiſtro. Cap. 11.

Again, *De his autem quæ intelliguntur, interiorem veritatem ratione conſulimus*, &c. Ibid. Cap. 12.

Again, *Cum vero de iis agitur quæ mente conſpicimus, id eſt, intellectu & ratione, ea quidem loquimur quæ præſentia contuemur in illa interiore luce veritatis, qua ipſe qui dicitur homo interior illuſtratur & fruitur.* Again, *Sic ergo quærere oportuit, ut tuæ ſeſe vires habeant ad audiendum illum intus Magiſtrum*, &c. Again, *Quiſquis autem cernere poteſt, intus eſt diſcipulus veritatis*, &c. Cap. 13. Again, *Utrum vera dicta ſint, apud ſemetipſos conſiderant, interiorem ſcilicet illam veritatem pro viribus intuentes.* Cap. 14.

Which interior Truth he there alſo calls *ſecretum illud*

illud Oraculum, alluding to thoſe Anſwers, ſaid to be given in the Heathen Temples by their pretended Deities.

5. As for the *Community* of Truth I ſhall mention only one Place, but one that gives ſuch an incomparably noble Deſcription of the Notion, that I ſhall not be ſo Ill-natur'd as to deny the Pleaſure of it to my *Engliſh* Reader. Indeed I know not whether St. *Auſtin* has upon any occaſion expreſs'd himſelf more finely. He takes his riſe in this high flight of Oratory from thoſe Words in St. *John*, *And the Truth ſhall make you free.* Upon which ſays he, The Soul enjoys nothing with Liberty, but what it enjoys with Security. But no body is ſecure in thoſe Goods which he may loſe againſt his Will. But Truth and Wiſdom are not ſo to be loſt. " For 'tis not poſſible for any one " to be locally ſeparated from it, but that which " is call'd a Separation from Truth and Wiſdom, " is a perverſe Will whereby inferiour Objects are " belov'd. But no body Wills any thing againſt " his Will. We have then what we may all en- " joy, equally and in common. There are in her " no Straitneſſes, no Defects. She receives all her " Lovers not at all envying one another, and is " Common to them all, and Chaſte to every one " of them. Here no one ſays to another ſtand off " that I alſo may have Acceſs, remove thy Hands " that I alſo may embrace. All hang upon her, " all touch her. Her Meat is not at all divided " into pieces, thou drinkeſt nothing from her that " I alſo cannot. For thou doſt not incloſe any " thing

De Lib. Arbitrio. lib. 2. cap. 13. and 14.

" thing to thy ſelf out of her Communion, but
" what thou takeſt from her remains alſo to me
" intire. I do not expect to receive from thee,
" that whereby thou art inſpired, that ſo I may be
" inſpired by it. For nothing of hers is at any
" time appropriated to any one or ſome, but ſhe
" is at once intirely Common to all. There is not
" therefore ſo much Reſemblance between thoſe
" things which we touch, taſte, or ſmell, and
" Truth, as there is between what we hear and
" ſee. Becauſe, that alſo, every Word is heard
" intire by all who hear it, and at once intire by
" every one of them. And ſo alſo every Species
" which is preſented to the Eye, is at once ſeen as
" much by one as by another. But even theſe
" things reſemble her at a very great Diſtance.
" For neither does any Word ſound all intire at
" once, becauſe it is ſtretch'd out and continued
" with the parts of Time, and one part of it ſounds
" firſt, and another afterwards. And every viſi-
" ble Species has a kind of local Extent, nor is
" every where intire. And indeed all theſe things
" are taken away from us againſt our Wills, and
" we are hinder'd by certain Straitneſſes from the
" free Enjoyment of them. For if the Song of a
" ſweet ſinger could laſt for ever, and the Muſical
" Tribe ſhould throng together to hear him, they
" would ſtraiten themſelves, and the more there
" were of them, the more they would contend for
" Places, that every one might be neareſt to him
" that ſung, and yet in hearing they would be able
" to faſten upon nothing ſo as to make it remain
" with them, but would be only touch'd all with fly-

" ing

" ing ſounds. And if I had a mind to behold this " Sun, and could indure to do it with a fix'd and " obſtinate View, yet it would leave me when it " ſets, and would be intercepted from me by the " Veil of a Cloud, with many other Impediments " whereby againſt my Will I ſhould loſe the Plea- " ſure of ſeeing him. But as for the Beauty of " Truth and Wiſdom, ſuppoſing only a perſeve- " ring Will to enjoy it, this neither in the greateſt " preſs and throng of Hearers ſecludes more com- " ers, nor does it paſs with Time, nor go from " Place to Place, nor is it intercepted by the Night, " nor eclips'd by the Shade. Let all that love her " in the whole World turn themſelves to her, and " ſhe is next to them all, and everlaſting to them " all. She is in no Place, and yet is wanting no " where. She admoniſhes without, and teaches " within, and changes all that behold her for the " better, and is by none chang'd for the worſe. " No one judges of her, and yet no one judges " well without her, *&c.*

6. And let not any now be ſo vainly nice as to deſpiſe things for being *Common*, ſince the Greateſt Excellencies have alſo the Greateſt Community, nothing being ſo Common as thoſe two moſt charming and pleaſant Objects, *Light* and *Truth*. And yet as Common and as Acceſſible as the latter of them is, as brightly as ſhe ſhines, and as loudly as ſhe ſometimes ſpeaks (for *does not Wiſdom cry, and Underſtanding put forth her Voice?*) Prov. 8. She is not to be conſulted to any great purpoſe, nor ſeen with any Clearneſs, nor heard with any Diſtinctneſs without the Application of an attentive and

and recollected Mind; nor will that do alone, the ſtudious Head muſt alſo bring with it a pure Heart, and a well rectified Spirit. For every irregular Paſſion, or vicious Habit is a *Prejudice*, and every Prejudice is a Veil over the Face of Truth, or rather a *Beam* in the Eye of him that beholds it. He that Contemplates Truth with an ill-temper'd and morally indiſpoſed Mind weighs in an unequal Ballance, and if his Ballance be wrong, how can his Meaſure be true? Viciouſneſs not only proceeds from Ignorance, but alſo cauſes it (every Luſt being a Cloud betwixt us and our Intellectual Sun) and ſo on the contrary, Purity of Heart and Life, not only proceeds from Light and Knowledge, but is alſo Productive of it, and that in ſo high a Meaſure, and in ſo ſimple and direct a Method, that, were it not for offending the Men of Art with the Paradoxical Air of the Expreſſion, I could almoſt ſay that *Ethics* is the beſt *Logic*. For beſides, that the Morality of the Will does even Naturally aſſiſt and clear the Eye of the Underſtanding, for the Contemplation of Truth, that Eternal Wiſdom that became incarnate in a Virgin's Womb, delights to dwell and ſhine in pure and virgin Hearts, ſo that in this regard alſo that of our Saviour will be in great meaſure true, that *if thy Eye be ſingle thy whole Body alſo ſhall be full of Light.*

7. Not but that there are alſo certain Rational Laws and Meaſures to be obſerv'd in the conſulting of Truth, both to direct us how to find it, and alſo to certify us of the Succeſs of our Enquiry, that which the Moderns expreſs by the *Criterian of Truth*. Which things were I to write a Syſtem

ſtem of Logick, I ſhould perhaps conſider as the ſecond general Parts of it. And I could wiſh that ſome one or other, whoſe Parts, Health and Leiſure would better ſerve him for ſuch an Undertaking, than his that deſires it, would give us a Logical *Deſcant* upon that Double *Ground*. For indeed theſe Laws and Meaſures for the conſulting of Truth is the very thing which we would moſt diſtinctly mean by what we call *Logick*, whoſe End, Intention and Uſe is to direct and facilitate our enquiry after *Truth*, and to teach us ſo to employ our Rational Faculties in that difficult and important Search, that we may not embrace *Error* inſtead of it. A thing certainly of great and noble Conſideration, and that ought to be our ſtudy all our lives long, and not to make a part only of our *Elementary* Inſtitution, as the manner is, and which falls ſo directly under the Conſideration of the preſent *Theory*, that were it not partly attempted in our Vulgar Syſtems, and ſo happily at length perform'd in that admirable one of the *Reſearch* of *Truth*, it might be thought a Neceſſary and Indiſpenſable part of it. But the Conſideration of that truly great Work may excuſe me from entring here upon this Undertaking, the releaſe from which leaves me no more to ſay of *Truth*, unleſs it be to conclude this Section and Chapter, with a Reflexion or two farther concerning the Ground and Foundation that it has in the *Intelligible World*.

8. The Wiſe Man when he tells us of the *Houſe of Wiſdom*, forgets not the *Pillars* upon which it is built. And as

Prov. 9.

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it would be very ſtrange if ſuch an Immenſe and Magnificent Structure as that of Truth, ſhould be as a *Caſtle* in the *Air*, without a Foundation, ſo it might deſerve a Queſtion, if the formal Conſideration of it ſhould be omitted in this *Theory*. I ſay formal Conſideration, for as to the Foundation of it what it is we have upon occaſion again and again intimated, only for Method and Orders ſake, it may not be unexpedient more expreſly to retouch what has been already ſo often inſinuated.

9. The *Figure* of a Houſe or Building is a very Natural and lively Image of Truth, which for the order and harmonious Arrangement of the whole, and the ſettled Dependencies and Coherences of one part with another is not unlike a great and goodly Syſtem or Structure, wherein ſome parts are Fundamental and lie next the Ground, which are reſembled by *Firſt Principles*, to which nothing is preſuppoſed as more evident, and which accordingly are *Indemonſtrable*, and others that reſt and rely upon thoſe Fundamental Parts, which are in Proportion anſwer'd by thoſe *Concluſions* which depend upon, or to ſpeak more *Mechanically*, are *ſupported* by thoſe immediate and indemonſtrable Principles.

10. But have we not here then the Ground of Truth? Yes, the partial and *immediate* Ground. For thoſe Principles will be the next Ground and Foundation of ſuch Truths as are Concluſions. But the Queſtion is, what is the common and ultimate Ground to both? Some ſuch there muſt be. For the Syſtem of Truth is a moſt vaſt and weigh-

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ty Syſtem, full of Order and Beauty, as becomes the *Houſe of Wiſdoms own building*, the true Temple of the myſtick *Solomon*, and withal ſo firm and immovable that we cannot conceive any Poſſibility of its being ſo much as ſhaken. But now ſomething muſt be the Ground that ſupports ſuch a Weight, and that ſtays it in ſuch a ſtable and immutable Reſt. Indeed Truth being of the Divine Eſſence. and ſo conſequently in the Reality of the thing the ſame with it, under that *Material* Conſideration cannot be properly ſaid to have any Ground, but is really a Ground and Foundation to it ſelf, even as that *Self-centring* Eſſence is. But yet however, as one Attribute of God does in Order of Reaſon and Conception depend upon another as the Ground of it, in which Senſe his *Immenſity* for Inſtance, is the Rational Ground of his *local Immutability*, and that becauſe tho' materially yet not formally the ſame with God, as being only inadequate Conceptions of him; in like manner it may be ſaid of Truth, that being not formally the ſame with God, but only materially (for tho' we make Truth to be really Divine in its Nature, yet to ſay that Truth is God, is not a true Propoſition *in ſenſu Formali*, but only *in ſenſu Identico*) it may notwithſtanding the real Divinity of its Nature be founded at leaſt upon a Rational Ground, even as the Attributes of God are, and as every thing that is not *Formally* God muſt be.

11. But what then is the Ground and Foundation of Truth, or what are the *Pillars* upon which *Wiſdom has built her Houſe?* Why truly they

they are no other than the Divine *Ideas*, thoſe Eternal and Immutable Reaſons or Eſſences of Things we have ſo largely diſcours'd of. Theſe are the Pillars of Truth, the very Foundations of the Intellectual World. And moſt firm, ſtable, and invincible Pillars they are, fit for ſuch a mighty weight to reſt upon, able to ſuſtain ſuch an immutable and immoveable Fabrick, and ſuch as no *Sampſon* can overthrow. But if *per impoſſibile* we could once ſuppoſe theſe everlaſting Pillars to fail, theſe *Foundations* to be *out of Courſe*, the whole Syſtem of Truth as immenſe and as magnificent as it is, muſt of neceſſity fall with them, and that for the Reaſons already ſpecified. And accordingly thoſe that would have that Auguſt Fabrick ſtand ſecure, muſt be careful to maintain theſe its Pillars, which whoever endeavours to ſubvert takes as direct and as effectual a way to undermine Truth, as *Sampſon* did to overthrow the Houſe of the *Philiſtians*, when he ſet his full ſtrength againſt the main Pillars that ſupported it.

12. But neither would the Ruin, as great as it is, ſtop here. For as theſe Divine Ideas uphold the vaſt and weighty Fabrick of *Truth*, ſo alſo are they the no leſs Fundamental Pillars of all *Theory* and *Science*, which cannot ſtand without their Support. For beſides that this is an immediate Conſequence of the Former, ſince (as has been already noted) if there be no Truth there can be no Science, it may farther be conſider'd that Science is of neceſſary and immutable Things, ſuch as have a ſteddy, uniform and invariable Nature.

Theſe

Theſe ſtable and permanent Realities are the Objects of our Knowledge, as they ſhou'd be alſo of our Love. But now there being nothing of this Character in this ſenſible World, the Scheme or *Faſhion* of which, as the Apoſtle expreſſes it, *paſſes away*, 1 Cor. 7. or to ſpeak more Philoſophically, tho' not ſo elegantly, wherein all things are contingent, corruptible, and in perpetual Flux, 'tis plain that Science cannot have theſe Natural Things, either for its *Object*, or for its *Ground*, and therefore muſt be founded upon their Eternal and Immutable Eſſences, or Ideas in the Intelligible World, or elſe 'tis as plain, that it will have nothing to bottom upon, and conſequently that there is indeed no Science at all. The Intereſt therefore of Science as well as that of Truth is imbarqu'd in, and muſt accordingly take its Fate with the *Ideal Hypotheſis*, which Principle whoever ſhall give up will never be able to defend it againſt any *Sceptical* Opponent that knows how to uſe an Advantage when he has it. And accordingly this is aſſigned as one of the Reaſons why *Plato* aſſerted Ideas, namely, that he might maintain the *Science* of things. Which indeed otherwiſe is neither Acquaintable nor Conceivable, ſince as on the one Hand, 'tis confeſs'd that the Objects of Science are neceſſary and immutable, ſo on the other 'tis as plain, that things are not Neceſſary or Immutable in their Natural, but only in their Ideal or Intelligible Eſſences.

13. And of this, even *Ariſtotle* himſelf in the midſt of his *Anti-Platonick* Zeal, ſeems to have had at leaſt a confuſe View, and in effect to acknowledge

knowledge the Ideal Hypotheſis as the Ground of Science, if the Learned * Author of the *Intellectual Syſtem* reports him rightly from the fourth of his Metaphyſicks, where diſcourſing againſt the *Scepticks*, he firſt ſhews the Ground of their Opinion to have been this, that they made Singulars and Senſibles exiſting in External Nature to be the only Objects of Science. In Oppoſition to which, he acquaints them with another Order of Things of a more ſteddy and immutable Eſſence. The Original of theſe Mens Miſtake, ſays he (according to Account of the formentioned Author) was this, becauſe Truth is to be lookt for in things, and they conceiv'd the only things to be Senſibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate Nature. Wherefore they perceiving all the Nature of Senſibles to be Moveable, or in perpetual Flux and Mutation, ſince nothing can poſſibly be verified or conſtantly affirm'd concerning that which is not the ſame, but Changeable, concluded that there could be no Truth at all, nor certainty of Science. Thoſe things which are the only Objects of it never continuing the ſame. But ſays he, we would have theſe Men therefore to know that there is another kind of Eſſence of Things beſides that of Senſibles, to which belongs neither Motion, nor Corruption, nor any Generation at all.

* Dr. *Cudw.*

14. That which I reflect here, upon the Occaſion of this Remarkable Teſtimoy is, that *Ariſtotle* does not deny the *Conſequence* of the *Sceptick*'s Argument. On the contrary he ſeems to

allow that if Senſibles are indeed the only things, or if there are not beſides them certain ſteddy and immutable Eſſences, there can be neither Science nor Certainty. But he denies his *Minor* Propoſition, and tells him, that he goes upon a wrong Hypotheſis, in ſuppoſing that there are no other Eſſences of things, but what are in Senſibles, in Oppoſition to which he maintains, that there are other Eſſences of things which are Immovable, Incorruptible, and Ingenerable. Which as it is a plain Confeſſion of the Eternal Eſſences or Ideas of Things, ſo is it a no leſs plain Implication of the Neceſſity of that Hypotheſis for the Foundation and Eſtabliſhment of Science, not otherwiſe to be maintain'd but upon that Ground; which whoever takes away, does, you ſee, even in the Senſe of *Ariſtotle*, betray the Cauſe of Science into the Hands of the *Scepticks*.

15. But then if both Truth and Science reſolve into the Divine Ideas as their Ground and Foundation, without which they cannot ſubſiſt, let me once more remind my Reader to conſider whether this does not neceſſarily lead him by a ſhort and ſure thread to the Exiſtence of a God, nay whether it will not even compel him to the Acknowledgment and Confeſſion of that Great and All-glorious Excellence. For is it not plain, that as Science depends upon Neceſſary and Eternal Truths, and thoſe Truths upon Eternal Eſſences, or Ideas, ſo theſe Ideas muſt have their Foundation in an Eternal Mind? Such an Eternal Mind therefore there muſt be, and as certain it is that there is ſo, as that there are any ſuch things as

Truth

Truth or *Science*. Nor will the Certainty or Demonſtration of any particular Truth be found to equal this. For the Demonſtration of other Truths is but the Evidence of the Connexion that ſuch a Concluſion has with ſuch a particular Principle, or ſelf-evident Truth, whereas the Certainty of a God here is the very ſame with the Certainty of Truth and Science in the general, ſince without him there could neither be one nor the other. For if there were no God, there could be no Ideas, and if no Ideas, there could be no Eternal Truths, and if no Eternal Truths, there could be no Science. If therefore there were no God, 'tis utterly impoſſible that any thing ſhould be *True*, or that any thing ſhould be *Intelligible*. There would be neither Object nor Light whereby to ſee it, but an univerſal Night, Darkneſs and Emptineſs would Reign over all, ſince as Science depends upon Eternal Truths, ſo Eternal Truths depend upon Ideas, and Ideas upon God, who centers in himſelf, and is the Bound of our Intellectual Progreſs. Him therefore we muſt acknowledge as the Great Baſis and Ground of all Truth and Science, as the very inmoſt ſtay and *central* Support of the whole Intellectual World. To whom as the immovable Foundation of Truth, yea as Truth it ſelf, be all Glory and Adoration from every Creature that has Reaſon and Underſtanding, for ever, *Amen*.

16. And this I ſhould think a very good Concluſion of this Section; but that there is a certain Difficulty, which tho' not likely to fall under the Conſideration of many Readers, may yet peahaps

deſerve to be here conſider'd and clear'd. God we ſay is the laſt Ground and Foundation of the Intelligible World, and conſequently of Truth, which does ſo depend upon him, that without him there would be none. On the other ſide it ſeems as neceſſary that the Being of God ſhould alſo be founded upon Truth, or elſe how ſhall it be proved that there is one. But then will not this lead us about in a Circle, as deriving that Truth from God, which yet we preſuppoſe to him? *Des Cartes* as clear a Writer as he is, and as diſtinctly as he lays his Thoughts, ſeems yet intangled in a Confuſion very like this, tho' upon a different Occaſion. He makes the Certainty and Truth of all Science to depend upon the Knowledge of God (as we do hear Truth it ſelf upon the Being of God) ſo that till he be known, nothing elſe can with any Certainty. Which indeed is in great Meaſure true as to that Certainty, we have of Senſible Objects, as was noted before. And if that had been the only Certainty which he had made dependent upon the Knowledge of God, his Procedure had run clear. But he extends this Dependence to all Certainty, deriving it all from the Knowledge of God, ſo as not to allow an *Atheiſt* to have any. And yet he very gravely demonſtrates the Being of God *a priori* from Rational Premiſes or Principles, *viz.* the Conſiderations taken from his Idea, which Arguments are ſo many Metaphyſical Truths, whereof he that uſes them muſt be ſuppoſed to be certain. In which Procedure he ſeems plainly to preſuppoſe, that Certainty and Truth of Science to the Knowledge of God,

God, which yet he formally derives from it and ſuſpends upon it. And what is this but to put the very ſame thing both before and after, and to make it hang and depend upon it ſelf? Which ſeems to make a Figure ſo like what we call a *Circle*, that I ſhould think it no deſirable Undertaking to be bound to diſtinguiſh it from it. But a little Diſtinction will ſerve to ſhew that this is not our Caſe at preſent. 'Tis true indeed that as we found Truth upon the Being of God, ſo we cannot deny but that the Being of God muſt be alſo founded upon Truth, and ſo far indeed we ſeem to make as round a Figure as *Des Cartes*. But that which hinders it from being ſo, is, that this is done not in the ſame (as in his Caſe) but in different Reſpects. For when Truth is founded upon the Being of God as the Ground of it, this is to be taken *quoad ſe*, or as to the Reality of the Thing it ſelf, meaning that if there were no God, 'tis impoſſible there ſhould be any Truth, as reſulting from the Divine Ideality. But now, when the Being of God is founded upon Truth, as when by any Metaphyſical Argument we prove that there is a God, this is to be underſtood only *quoad nos*, or as to our Knowledge or Conviction, in as much as we derive our *Knowledge* and *Certainty* of his Being from the Conſideration of certain Truths or Reaſons that convince and aſſure us of it. Which carries no Abſurdity in it. For tho' Truth, as to the *Thing*, depends upon the Being of God, and ſo cannot in that Reſpect be preſuppoſed to it, yet nothing hinders but that as to *us* the Being of God ſhould be founded upon

Truth, ſo that we could not be able to come to the Knowledge, or to have any Certainty of it, but from the Conſideration of, and in the Light of ſome Truths, or if you pleaſe, otherwiſe thus. Tho' we may be certain of ſome Truths before we are certain of the Being of God, thoſe ſuppoſe whereby we prove his Being, yet as to the Reality of the thing it ſelf, all Truth may ſo depend upon God, and have its Foundation in his Ideality, that if there were no God there could not be that Truth which we ſuppoſe. But then for Truth in the Nature of the thing to be conſequential (*Formally* I mean) to the Being of God, and yet as to our Knowledge or Certainty of it to go before it, is neither Circle nor Contradiction.

But yet however ſince upon the Principles of this Theory, Truth is ſuppoſed to be the ſame with God according to a real Identity, and ſince God is proved by Truth, will not this be to prove the ſame thing by it ſelf? No, not in the inconvenient Senſe intended in that way of ſpeaking. For tho' here be a real Identity, yet here is alſo a Formal Diſtinction, Truth not being *Formally* the ſame with God, as has been noted already. But now there is no more Abſurdity in proving the ſame by the ſame, if by the ſame be meant only Really, not Formally the ſame, than in proving one Attribute of God by another, as his Eternity, ſuppoſe, from the Neceſſity or Immutability of his Being, which tho' really the ſame, yet being of a diſtinct Formality, are allow'd in all Rational Diſcourſes about them

to

to be consider'd and used as if really distinct, as to any Consequence from one to the other. So that here is no Confusion in the Account given of these things, which by this seeming Intanglement, appear the more clear and consistent, and will I hope, the more they are consider'd.

CHAP. VII.

The Notion and Distinction of Essence and Existence briefly Stated and Explain'd upon Ideal Principles.

1. THERE is hardly any thing of more nice and delicate Consideration in it self, or upon which Metaphysical and Scholastick Pens have bestow'd more Exquisite Subtilty, and yet after all have left more Intricate and Confused, than the Notion of *Essence* and *Existence*, and the Distinction that is between them. The main Ground and Occasion of which Intanglement I take to be their Considering Essence and Existence with Relation to one and the self-same thing, as the two Metaphysical Degrees of it, and as it were different parts whereof it consists (for *de Essentia & Existentia* is one of the Metaphysical *Compositions*) whereas so far as these are any ways distinct from one another, they will be found to belong to different things. I say, so far as they are *Distinct*. For I pretend not to deny but that

there is alſo an Eſſence in the thing that Exiſts, as alſo on the other ſide there is Exiſtence belonging to every thing that has an Eſſence. But then I ſay, that *ſo* conſider'd they are not at all diſtinct. This is not *that* Eſſence which ſhould be diſtinguiſh'd from Exiſtence. And 'tis the making this otherwiſe neceſſary Diſtinction where it ſhould not and cannot be, which has bred ſo great Confuſion and Perplexity in this Matter. Which yet upon the Principles of our Ideal Syſtem we deſpair not to clear and rectify.

2. It would require too much Detail, and would withal make this *Theory* too Rough and Thorny for the Pleaſure and Entertainment that I deſign both my ſelf and my Reader in it, ſhould I undertake fully to lay open the School-Account of this Matter, and unravel it through all its Abſtruſities. I ſhall therefore only repreſent ſo much of it as may ſerve to ſet it in a Viſible Light, with ſuch proper Reflections upon it, and Amendments of it, as the Perſuance of this Theory ſhall lead me to. The Courſe of which has been ſo long driving at, and preparing the Way for the intended Notion of theſe Things, as will I hope much leſſen both the Difficulty and the ſurprize of it.

3. The School-Account of this Matter, as far as I underſtand it, or can make it Intelligible (which out of their Terms is not very eaſy to do) I take in ſhort to be this. They conſidering that Exiſtence is not Eſſential to a Ceature, or that a Creature has not Being from it ſelf, and ſo conſequently is not neceſſarily or always in Being,

ing, but may ſometimes not be, and yet notwithſtanding this that it is always Intelligible (for ſo a Circle is always an Intelligible Thing whether there be really any Circle in Nature or no) took occaſion from hence to diſtinguiſh, that in the Creature which is at all times Intelligible, from that which in ſome time actually is, and ſo probably upon this Ground raiſed the Diſtinction of *Eſſence* and *Exiſtence*. By the *Eſſence* of a Thing, meaning that in the Thing whereby it is primarily *Intelligible* or Conceivable, as in ſuch a certain Degree or Order of Being. Or that whereby it is *Defined*. And this they otherwiſe call the Quiddity, Formal Reaſon or Nature of a Thing. By the *Exiſtence* of a Thing, that whereby it becomes a real and actual Being in the World. And this latter they look upon as a kind of Acceſſory Form to the other, or as the Metaphyſical Act and Compliment of it, with reſpect to which the other is by them conceiv'd as a ſort of *Potential* Being. And thus, as Intelligibly and as Compendiouſly as I can expreſs it, they diſtinguiſh the Eſſence of a Thing from its Exiſtence. Not that they ſuppoſe this Diſtinction to be real (for they pretend not but that in the Thing they are one and the ſame) but only *Rational*, or by way of Abſtraction, with a Foundation or Occaſion for it in the Thing, which as I ſaid before I take to be the conſtant Intelligibility as conſider'd with the Contingent Being of the Creature.

4. Now I am moſt free to own the indiſpenſable *Neceſſity* of this Diſtinction. For beſides

ſides that a Creature is Intelligible when it does not exiſt, whereby it appears that Exiſtence is out of the Eſſence of a Creature, we have different Conceptions of them, and different Things are ſaid or Predicated of them, and one is conceiv'd as a Super-acceſſion to the other. And beſides 'tis a Diſtinction very neceſſary to the rendring an Intelligible Account of the *Sciences*, which abſtracting from the Exiſtence proceed wholly upon the Eſſences of Things, the two great and diſtinct Queſtions of *Quid ſit* and *An ſit* are founded upon it, and, in fine, there is no Thinking or Speaking Intelligibly without it. There can be therefore no Reaſonable Demur concerning the Neceſſity of the Diſtinction. The great Difficulty is rightly to fix and apply it, and the great *Queſtion* is whether it be indeed rightly fix'd and applied.

5. And (if I may have Liberty to expreſs my Thoughts when they diſagree with thoſe of ſo many Men, ſo every way beyond my ſelf) to me it ſeems a very clear Caſe, that it is not. They conſider Eſſence, as in the Thing that Exiſts, and accordingly ſay that is not really diſtinguiſh'd from it, and no doubt but that there is an Eſſence of the Thing, or that every Thing that exiſts has an Eſſence or Nature whereby it formally is what it is, and is diſtinguiſhable from other Beings. So far therefore they are right. But then *that* Eſſence, tho' diſtinct from that of other Beings, is not at all diſtinct from the Exiſtence of the ſame Being. And yet this is that Eſſence which they diſtinguiſh from it.

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The Queſtion then is, whether that Eſſence which is in the Thing that is ſaid to exiſt be the Eſſence that is to be diſtinguiſh'd from its Exiſtence. To which, I anſwer no. For *that* Eſſence, or Eſſence conſider'd as in the Thing that exiſts, is the very ſame with its Exiſtence, and does not at all differ from it, not ſo much as *Rationally*. For Eſſence ſo conſider'd is a Creature of God, and accordingly has a true Entative Act, a Reality or Actuality of Being, in Oppoſition to what is only *Poſſible*. 'Tis in the very Notion of it *quid extra nihil*, as they ſpeak, a real ſomething. 'Tis in one Word an *Actual Eſſence*. But now Actual Eſſence is the very ſame with Exiſtence, not only in the Nature, but in the very Notion of the Thing.

6. But may not Eſſence be Abſtracted from Exiſtence, or conſider'd without it, and conſequently as *Formally* diſtinct from it? Yes no doubt but that it may, and muſt. But not *that* Eſſence which is in the Thing that exiſts, which even Formally and Preciſely taken is an Actual Being, as diſtinguiſh'd from that which is *Potential* only, and ſo is the very ſame with its Exiſtence, as implying all that we can poſſibly underſtand by it. And yet this is the Eſſence which in the School-Account is diſtinguiſh'd from it, which is the thing that makes that Account ſo very confuſed and perplex'd. For on the one ſide 'tis moſt evident that the Notion of Eſſence and Exiſtence are two very different Notions, and conſequently that the Eſſence of a Thing ought to be conſider'd as diſtinct from its Ex-

Exiſtence, and yet on the other ſide 'tis no leſs evident, that the Eſſence that is in the Thing ſuppoſed to exiſt is not all diſtinct from the Exiſtence of it, but the very ſelf-ſame *Formal* Thing with it.

7. To unwind our ſelves from this Intanglement, that is, I mean, that we may neither deny ſo neceſſary a Diſtinction as that of Eſſence and Exiſtence, nor yet apply it ſo, as to make a Diſtinction where there is indeed none, there is no other way that I can think of but ſo to adjuſt the Matter, that Eſſence and Exiſtence, when conſider'd as diſtinct, may not be refer'd to the ſame, but to different Things. I mean that Eſſence as diſtinguiſh'd from Exiſtence ſhould not be underſtood of that Eſſence which is in the Thing that exiſts, but of ſome other. And ſo much the very Foundation of the Diſtinction requires. For if the Eſſence of a Thing be Intelligible when the Thing does not exiſt (as moſt certainly it is, or elſe there is no Natural Science) this plainly ſhews that the Eſſence of the Thing, that is the *Intelligible* Eſſence, is really one Thing, and that the Exiſtence of it is another. And conſequently that this Intelligible Eſſence is not that Eſſence which is in the Thing that exiſts, ſince, as it has been ſhewn, that is not *another* from its Exiſtence, but the very *ſame*. As you will find it to be, if you Abſtract and Refine upon it never ſo long, unleſs you Refine it to nothing, and make it a mere *Ens in potentia*. But then it will be no longer, what we ſuppoſe it, an Eſſence in the *Thing*, nor indeed any Eſſence at all.

8. Be-

8. Beſides, that Eſſence of a Thing which is Intelligible without its Exiſtence, and which therefore we diſtinguiſh from it, is a Neceſſary, Eternal and Immutable Thing, and ſuch as is neither Generable nor Corruptible. For when a Thing is Created or Generated, 'tis not *this* Eſſence of it that is either Created or Generated, becauſe it was before. And ſo when a Thing is either Corrupted or Annihilated, 'tis not again *this* Eſſence of it that undergoes either of thoſe Fates, becauſe it remains after, and indeed always continues the ſame Invariable Thing in all Changes and Viciſſitudes. And accordingly *this* Eſſence is the ſteddy Object of Contemplation and Science, and 'tis concerning *this* Eſſence that Propoſitions of Eternal Truth are verified. But now the Eſſence that is in the Thing ſuppoſed to have an actual Exiſtence in Nature, *this* Eſſence (as being the very ſame Thing with that Exiſtence) is on the contrary a Contingent, Temporary, Mutable Thing. Such as was once by the Word of the Divine Power created out of nothing, and may, for any Self-ſtability of its own to the contrary, be reduced to the ſame Nothing again, and at preſent ſerves to carry on the changeable and paſſing *Scene* of the World, as being the common Subject of all the Generations and Corruptions that are in it. From which Oppoſition of Characters it is plain that this Eſſence of a Thing which is in the Thing that exiſts cannot be that Intelligible Eſſence which is diſtinguiſh'd from its Exiſtence.

9. But

9. But can then the Eſſence of a Thing be out of the Thing whoſe Eſſence it is? Not indeed that Eſſence which is in the Thing, or rather is the very Thing that exiſts, and is all one, as I ſaid, with its Being or Exiſtence (for to be without this Eſſence would be the ſame as not to be at all) but its *Intelligible Eſſence* may, and muſt, ſince this Eſſence is always Intelligible whether the Thing exiſts or no. But are there then two Eſſences belonging to a Thing? There is indeed but one Eſſence of a Thing that is *Conſtitutive*, which is enough to ſalve that Metaphyſical Principle which makes *Unity* an Adequate and Convertible Paſſion of Being. But then, beſides this Eſſence *Conſtitutive* there may and muſt be alſo an Eſſence *Repreſentative* which in a very true and proper Senſe is ſaid to be the *Eſſence* of ſuch a Thing, for as much as it repreſents it truly to our Thoughts, and is *Intelligibly*, that is to all Purpoſes of Conception or Underſtanding, what the other is, ſo that we may be ſaid rightly to underſtand that other, in Underſtanding this. And indeed 'tis the want of this Diſtinction of *Eſſence Conſtitutive* and *Eſſence Repreſentative* that has, as I conceive, ſo ſnarl'd and perplex'd this Queſtion of *Eſſence* and *Exiſtence* as 'tis commonly ſtated in the way of the Schools, who in diſtinguiſhing the one from the other, ſay all thoſe Things of *Eſſence Conſtitutive* which are true only of *Eſſence Repreſentative*, or Intelligible.

10. By

10. By this time I presume the discerning Reader cannot but be Apprehensive what kind of *Essences* they are which I drive at. So that should I now speak out more plainly, that the *Essences* of Things as they are Contradistinguish'd to their *Existences* are no other than the Divine Ideas, those *Rationes rerum incommutabiles* which St. *Austin* so frequently speaks of, it will be no surprize to him. For in this Conclusion we do but persue our Theory, wherein the Train has been so long laid for it, that it cannot be besides Expectation that we here take up with it. And indeed, considering the Reason and the Necessity of the Thing it self, how can we possibly do otherwise? For 1. The Distinction of *Essence* and *Existence* is a Necessary Distinction, and therefore there must be some *Essences* of Things that are distinct from their *Existence*. 2. Those *Essences* which are in the Things existing are not distinct from the *Existence* of those Things, and therefore those *Essences* which *are* distinct from it, are not the *Essences* that are *in* the Things that exist. They must therefore be *out* of them. But what then can these be but the Divine Ideas? For 1. Again, These Divine Ideas are most apparently distinct from the *Existences* of Thing. 2. These Divine Ideas as distinct as they are from these Things do yet most fully represent the Natures of them, and so are *Intelligibly* the very Things themselves, and accordingly may to all Purposes of Conception (which is all that need be regarded in this Matter) be most truly said to be the Forms,

Reasons,

Reaſons, or *Eſſences* of thoſe Things. 3. Theſe Ideas have alſo all thoſe Characterizing Properties that belong to, and are commonly ſaid of the *Eſſences* of Things. As that they are Neceſſary, Eternal, Immutable (ſo as not to be changed even by God himſelf) Ingenerable, Incorruptible, that Propoſitions of eternal Truth are verified of them, and that they are the only Objects of Contemplation and Science, which is ſaid to abſtract from the *Exiſtences*, and to conſider only the *Eſſences* of Things, that is, thoſe Ideas of them which eternally ſhine forth in the Mind of God, and from his Mind to ours.

11. And becauſe they do ſo, whenever we conſider the *Eſſences* of Things purely in themſelves, as abſtract from their *Exiſtence*, and accordingly diſtinguiſh them from it, becauſe we can conſider them without it, or independently of it, and ſo form certain Propoſitions of a ſtanding and perpetual Verity concerning them, to the Truth of which the *Exiſtence* of the Things is altogether Indifferent and Accidental, they are then the *Divine Ideas* that are at leaſt the Confuſe Objects of our Thoughts. Wherein as we find the Intelligible Nature, or Ideal Reaſon of thoſe Things, without any Neceſſary Implication of or Connexion with their *Exiſtence* (the Ideas in God having no Neceſſary Relation to any Thing actually out of him) ſo we can well conſider one without the other, and when we do ſo, 'tis then that we are ſaid by way of Metaphyſical Abſtraction to conceive the *Eſſences* of Things, becauſe indeed we do conceive that which

which Intelligibly is ſo. For theſe are the *Rationes rerum* as St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks, and the Schools after him, who by uſing the Word *Ratio* to expreſs the Eſſence of a Thing as diſtinct from its *Exiſtence*, do by the way confuſely imply, that the *Eſſence* of a Thing ſo abſtractly conſider'd is the ſame with its *Idea*, eſpecially ſince they apply the ſame Word again to ſignify the Ideas of Things in God, calling them *Rationes æternæ*, even as St. *Auſtin* alſo does, who ſpeaking of the Divine Ideas expreſly ſays, that they are *Rationes rerum ſtabiles atq; æternæ quæ in Divina intelligentia continentur*. And ſo accordingly elſewhere, when he ſpeaks of the Reaſon of a Circle, and ſays, *Quid tam æternum quam Circuli Ratio*, by the Reaſon of a Circle here what can he be preſumed to mean other than the Idea of a Circle? For what other Reaſon of a Circle is there that can be ſaid to be *Eternal?* And indeed as the Idea of a Circle may not only truly, but even Emphatically be ſaid to be the Reaſon of it, as expreſſing all that is Intelligible in it, ſo 'tis the only Reaſon of it that is diſtinct from its Exiſtence.

Lib. Octogint. trium Quæſt. 46.

Lib. de Immort. Animæ. Cap. 4.

12. By the Reaſon then or *Eſſence* of a Circle preciſely conſider'd, and as diſtinct from its Natural *Exiſtence* (as moſt certainly it is when we ſay with St. *Auſtin* that it is *Eternal*) muſt be underſtood the Idea of a Circle. And

ſo in all other Things, whenever we conſider their *Eſſences* as diſtinct from their *Exiſtence*, or affirm any Propoſitions of eternal Truth concerning them, or ſay even that they themſelves are Eternal, by the *Eſſences* of Things we are I conceive then to underſtand, if we will be Intelligible to our ſelves or others, the *Ideas* of thoſe Things, thoſe *Eſſences* wherein God himſelf view'd them, even before they had any *Exiſtence*, and whereby his Works were known to him, and preſent with him from everlaſting. When Things were only Poſſible he ſaw them in theſe their *Eſſences*, and now they exiſt he continues to ſee them in the ſame *Eſſences*. But not as *exiſting*. For he does not find *Exiſtence* in their Idea, *Exiſtence* does not belong to *this* their *Eſſence*, that is, he does not ſee in their Idea, that it is neceſſary there ſhould be any Being out of himſelf anſwerable to any of thoſe Ideas which are within himſelf. He knows they are Poſſible, becauſe he has the Ideas of them, but that *de facto* there are any ſuch Beings, this he knows by conſulting, not his *Ideas*, but the Efficacious *Decrees* of his *Will*. However as to the Things themſelves that exiſt, theſe he ſtill ſees as he always did in the Intelligible or Repreſentative *Eſſences*, even the Ideas of them which he has in himſelf, and which are as Eternal and immutable as himſelf, and that indeed becauſe they are himſelf.

13. For,

13. For, once more, these are those *Essences* of Things which we say are Eternal, and such as God himself cannot change, and that because in changing them he would change his own Immutable self with whom they are Coessential. Which if the Great *Metaphysician* had as well consider'd as he does most other Matters, he would not have thought the Absolute Destruction of the *Essences* of Things a necessary Illation from that of their *Existences*, so as to raise that fore-mention'd Question upon it concerning the Abolition of Eternal Truths. For which Objection according to our way of stating the *Essences* of Things there plainly appears to be no Occasion. For tho' as we not only grant but earnestly contend, eternal Truths do depend upon the *Essences* of Things, so that a Total, Absolute and Universal Destruction of *Essences* (such as he must be supposed to mean to make his Objection pertinent) would be accompanied with the intire subversion of eternal Truths, yet there is no pretence for such a Consequence from the Destruction of *Essences* according to a certain, partial, and respective Sense only. Which is yet the most that can ever come to be a real Case. For tho' the Destruction of the *Existences* of Things does unavoidably infer the like Annihilation of their *Constitutive Essences*, and that because these their *Essences* are the same with their *Existences*, and so are nothing without them,

yet this cannot reach or make any Change in their *Ideal* or *Repreſentative Eſſences*, which being ſecure from all manner of Deficiency, tho' the other ſhould fail, eternal Truths (as not built upon them) would not be concern'd in their Ruine. *Suarez* indeed endeavours to ſalve the Matter another way, *viz.* by the Independence of Propoſitions of eternal Truth upon the Reality of any *Eſſences* (whereof we have already given an Account) but the true and only Satisfactory Anſwer is, that tho' theſe Conſtitutive *Eſſences* of Things ſhould be ſuppoſed to fail with their *Exiſtences*, there are yet other *Eſſences* of Things for eternal Truths to rely upon, of a more Stable, and indeed Indefectible Nature. The ſame in effect with that Anſwer which *Ariſtotle* upon a like occaſion is ſaid to have given to the *Scepticks*.

14. And ſo much concerning the Notion of *Eſſence* according to the Abſtract and Formal Conſideration of it. Proceed we now to that of *Exiſtence*, to the Account whereof we have prepared a very ready and eaſie Acceſs. For having before ſhewn that the Eſſence of a thing is diſtinct from its Exiſtence, cannot be underſtood of its *Conſtitutive* Eſſence, becauſe that falls under the very ſame formal Conſideration with its Exiſtence, we have now ſufficient Warrant to ſay (becauſe we ſay no more than what has been already proved) that the *Exiſtence* of a Thing is no other than the very

ry Conſtitutive *Eſſence* of a Thing, even that Reality or Actuality of Being or Eſſence which it has, in Oppoſition to a State of Potentiality only, or *non Entity*. And becauſe this Reality of Being in Creatures is out of God, and becauſe 'tis in them only, that this Diſtinction of *Eſſence* and *Exiſtence* has properly any Place, therefore it is that *Exiſtence* more ſtrictly taken may be ſaid to be the Being of Things out of God, in Oppoſition to that *Ideal* way of Being which they have in him. Which well agrees with that Etymology, which as *Suarez* obſerves is by ſome School-men given of *Exiſtence*, as if it imported the ſame as the *Extra-ſiſtence* of a Thing. By which Originary Account of *Exiſtence* as a State of Being out of God they ſeem to *imply*, and if they would follow their own hint would be led to *acknowledge*, that by that *Eſſence* of a Thing which they Contradiſtinguiſh to this Exiſtence, ſhould be underſtood the Ideal State of Being which it has *in* God. So then upon the whole according to this way of ſtating the Nature of theſe Things, when we conſider the Ideas of Things, or Things as they are in Idea (as we commonly ſay) then we conſider Things according to their *Eſſence*, and when we conſider that Reality, or Actuality of Being which they have in Nature, then we conſider them according to their *Exiſtence*. So

Diſput. 31. *Sect.* 9.

that in ſhort, the *Eſſence* of Things will be found to differ as much from their *Exiſtence*, as the Idea of a Thing in God differs from that Reality which anſwers to it out of God. And if this makes a real difference between *Eſſence* and *Exiſtence* as they are diſtinguiſh'd from each other, 'tis no more than what ſome School-men have thought neceſſary to hold, tho' upon *their* Principles not without great Abſurdity and Confuſion.

15. Theſe Meaſures will help us to underſtand among other Things) a conſiderable Notion in Philoſophy relating to the Subject we are now upon, which, tho' glanc'd at already, I ſhall endeavour to ſet in a more viſible Light. It is a common Maxim with the Modern as well as with the School-Philoſophers, that *Exiſtence is not eſſential to a Creature.* Which no doubt is a great Truth if rightly underſtood. But how is Exiſtence not Eſſential to a Creature ? What does this mean ? You'll ſay that it does not belong to the Eſſence of it that it ſhould actually and really be. But to what Eſſence ? What, not to its *Conſtitutive* Eſſence, that Eſſence whereof the Thing conſiſts, and by which it is what it is ? This is not to be underſtood. For this Eſſence as I ſaid before has an Entative Act, and is the Work of God's creative Efficiency, which muſt needs be terminated to Exiſtence, as *Suarez* expreſſes it, and as according to him

Diſput. 31. Sect. 16. Num. 10.

him all Eficiency is, becauſe it puts a Thing in actual Being, *Extra Cauſas*, and therefore 'tis impoſſible that Exiſtence ſhould not belong to *this* Eſſence, unleſs we could ſuppoſe that a Thing could be and not be at the ſame time. Exiſtence therefore muſt be allow'd to be of the Eſſence of a Creature as conſtituted in act, ſince this Eſſence is a real Something, and Eſſence without Exiſtence is a mere Nothing. But when Exiſtence is denied to be of the Eſſence of a Creature, the Eſſence of a Creature muſt be taken for its Ideal or Intelligible Eſſence. And indeed to this *Eſſence* of a Creature *Exiſtence* does not belong. Not that this is ſo to be underſtood as if this Intelligible *Eſſence* could be without its *own proper Exiſtence*, (for that's as much impoſſible as the other, and for the ſame Reaſon, becauſe it is a real Being, not to ſay the moſt real of all Realities) but that it may be without the *Eſſence* or *Exiſtence* (for I here make no difference between them) of the *Creature*, there being nothing in this *Eſſence*, as being an Idea in God, that carries any neceſſary Connexion with any thing out of him, or that imports any Neceſſity that any ſuch Thing there ſhould be. And accordingly when I Contemplate the Idea or Intelligible *Eſſence* of any Creature, ſuppoſe that of a Circle or a Square, I find in it only a certain kind of Being, which I conſider as an Objective Reality, but whether there be actu-

ally in Nature any thing anſwerable to it, that I can never know from its *Idea*, tho' I conſult it never ſo attentively. And that becauſe this Idea ſhews to me only what is contained in its ſelf, whereof the *Exiſtence* of the Creature makes no part. So then to ſay that the *Exiſtence* of a Creature is not of the *Eſſence* of it will more clearly and diſtinctly expreſs'd reſolve into this (which I think bears a very conceivable Senſe) that tho' the *Exiſtence* of a Creature is inſeparable from its *Conſtitutive*, yet it may be ſeparated from its *Intelligible Eſſence*. Which as I remark'd before, is the moſt preſumable Ground of the whole Diſtinction of *Eſſence* and *Exiſtence*, the occaſion of which is rightly taken *from* the Creature (in whom alone *Exiſtence*, is diſtinguiſhable from *Eſſence*) tho' the Diſtinction it ſelf be not rightly applied *to* it, as the foregoing Conſiderations do I think abundantly ſhew.

16. And thus I have accounted for one of the moſt eminent Diſtinctions of Metaphyſicks upon the Principles of Ideas or Intelligible *Eſſences*, which gives yet a farther Confirmation to the Reality of thoſe *Eſſences*, and accordingly of that Intelligible World which conſiſts of them. But if now after all upon the Diſtinction of *Eſſence* and *Exiſtence* you ſhould ſubtilize ſo far, as admitting our Proofs of theſe *Eſſences* to require one for their *Exiſtence*, to this I anſwer in ſhort, that tho' we conſider the Intelligible *Eſſences* of things in God

God as distinct from *Existence*, yet not from their own *Existence*, but only from the *Existence* of Things *ad extra*. For *Essence*, as distinct as it is from Existence, is neither abstrahible nor deniable of Existence *Absolutely* (for as I said before Essence without Existence is a mere nothing) but only of Existence *secundum quid*, or according to a *Partial Respect*. The Essences of Things are indeed Intelligible without the Existence of those Things in Nature (which is the Ground of the Distinction between Essence and Existence) but as for Essences that are *Absolutely* without Existence, they are very Unintelligible *Abstractions*, and it must be a very *Romantick* System that shall be built upon *such* Essences, tho' lest there should not be Philosophers for all Absurdities, *Suarez* tells us of some, that talk after that manner, which he justly Censures as Ridiculous, and altogether Unintelligible. *Disput.* 31. *Sect.* 12. *Num.* 5.

17. But as much a *Romance* as this our System may seem, the *Essences* however upon which it proceed are not of so Phantastick a kind. They are indeed distinct from the *Existences* of Things, and (as we have shewn) are the only Essences that are so. But then 'tis from the Existence of Things *without*, for they are not distinct, nor can be abstracted from, much less denied of their *own* proper Existence. Which is not to abstract from Existence *Simply*, but only as to a certain *Respect*.

And

And accordingly in the ſame Proportion when *Science* is ſaid (as it commonly is) to abſtract from the *Exiſtence*, and to conſider only the *Eſſences* of Things, this ought not to be underſtood of an Abſolute, but only of a reſpective or limited Abſtraction. We not only grant, but plead that Science does abſtract from the Exiſtence of Things in *Nature*, and conſiders only the *Eſſences* of them, but then this is ſo far from excluding, that it the more ſtrongly infers the real Exiſtence of thoſe Intelligible Eſſences *elſewhere*, ſince otherwiſe Science would be of that which Abſolutely is not, the plain Conſequence of which would be no better nor worſe than that there would be no ſuch thing as Science in the World.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Beauty of the Intelligible World, and the Happineſs of thoſe that have their Converſation in it. With ſome concluding Reflections upon the Advantages of a Retired and Contemplative Life.

1. WE have ſeen the *Strength*, let us now conſider the *Beauty* of the Intelligible World. Beauty is moſt Charming and Raviſhing wherever it appears, whether in Figures, or in Sounds, or in Diſcourſe, or in a well-proportion'd Face, or in a Picture. Whether it be in Things Natural, or in Things Artificial. Be the Materials never ſo Good, nothing pleaſes without it, and be they never ſo Vile and Mean, every thing pleaſes with it, and there cannot be a more ſenſible Argument of a ſtupid and inſenſible Spirit than not to be affected with its Charms. But of all Beauties the *largeſt* are moſt commanding, and tho' there be what we call a *Prettineſs* in little Things, a certain Agreement ariſing either from the greater Proportion they bear to our narrow Faculties, or the greater Diffi-

Difficulty we conceive in the Formation of them (a Conſideration that really holds only in the Things of *Art*, tho' confuſely applied alſo to thoſe of *Nature*) yet 'tis the Greatneſs of a Beautiful Work that gives it an Air of Majeſty, the moſt diffuſe Proſpect are moſt Entertaining, and we lay aſide our pretty *Globes* for the Pleaſure of Contemplating a Beautiful *World*.

2. The Natural World has its Name from *Beauty* and *Ornament*, and indeed it is a Syſtem fair enough to deſerve it, and ſuch as we ſhould find a moſt exquiſite Piece of Geometrick Architecture, if we could take an intire View of it, and the Vaſtneſs of the whole did not hinder us from judging of the Proportion of the Parts. The *Roman Orator* gives us a very Noble Scene of its Beauty, which he paints forth in moſt lively and well temper'd Colours, but far inferiour to thoſe of the *Rain-Bow*, one glancing View of which would make one pitty the Unhappineſs of the Blind, more than all the Flouriſh of his fine Harangue. And yet the World is now in a degenerate State. The Creation has undergone the Blaſt of a Curſe. Which has tarniſh'd its Glory, and Subjected it to Vanity, and perhaps the Decays of Time too that Mortal Enemy to the Fair, however it muſt be preſumed that we ſee it not now in that Bloom and Perfection of Beauty which it had in its

De Naturâ Deorum. Lib. 2.

firſt

firſt Production, when the Morning Stars ſang together, and all the Sons of God ſhouted for Joy. And yet if we had ſeen it then, we had ſeen but a *Copy*, an *Extract*, the higheſt Commendation of whoſe Beauty was its near Conformity to its *Ideal Pattern*. And how Beautiful then muſt that *Original* World be!

3. Its Beauty is truly *Divine*. For 'tis the Beauty of him that is the Brightneſs of his Father's Glory, and the expreſs Image of his Perſon. Who is fairer than the Children of Men, whoſe Lips are full of Grace, and the Arrows of whoſe Love are very ſharp. 'Tis the Beauty of him in whom the Eternal Father is well pleaſed, of him who is the Joy of Angels, and the Heaven of the Bleſſed, and to whom the inamour'd Church in the Song of Songs confeſſes a Love that was ſtrong as Death, and ſuch as many Waters could not quench, and whom ſhe Celebrates as *altogether lovely*. 'Tis the Beauty of him that makes the Seraphin burn with Divine Flames, that kindles a Fire in Heaven, and that came to kindle the ſame upon Earth, a Fire that overcomes the hardeſt, warms the coldeſt, and thaws the moſt Frozen Hearts. A Beauty it is which the moſt *inlighten'd* Spirits cannot reſiſt, nay that prevails moſt over the moſt Illuminated and Intelligent. For 'tis a Beauty purely *Intellectual*, the Beauty of Truth, of Order, of Reaſon, of Proportion, and of

of Wiſdom, even that Wiſdom which diſpoſes all Things ſweetly in Number, weight and Meaſure, and which is ſaid to be more Beautiful than the Sun, and above the Order of the Stars, and which being compared with Light is found before it. 'Tis in fine the only *Beauty* that is not *Vain*, that quenches the Thirſt which it raiſes, ſatisfies as well as inflames, for 'tis the Beauty of him who is Beauty it ſelf, and whoſe Viſion is truly *Beatifick*.

4. Very Excellent Things might be ſpoken of thee, if in the dazling ſplendour of thy Light we knew what to ſay, O thou City of God. For thou art that Glorious *Jeruſalem*, whoſe Foundations are upon the Holy Hills, the everlaſting Mountains, the immovable Rocks, even the Eternal Eſſences and immutable Ideas of Things, which feareſt no Death, and which ſuffereſt no Change, which knoweſt no * Night, and which needeſt no Candle, which haſt God himſelf for thy Sun, and the Light of the Lamb for thy Glory, in whom is the *Myſtick Sea* of *Glaſs*, the *Intellectual Ocean*, the vaſt lucid *Mirrour* of the Divinity, in which all Things are repreſented as in a Multiform *Scene*, who art all built of pure Gold, but clear as Chryſtal, and the Garniture of whoſe Walls are Pearls, and all manner of precious Stones. And yet as rich as thy Furniture is, thy

* *Alluding to the Characters of the Holy City.* Rev. 21.

thy *Gates* ſtand always *open*, free to all Comers. For thy Immovable Wealth needs no Guard, the Exchequer of Light and Truth is ſecure againſt all Thieviſh Attempts, and the Treaſures of Wiſdom, tho' common to all, can yet be rifled or carried away by none.

5. In the Intelligible World is true Eſſence and Being ſays *Plotinus*. 'Tis indeed the pureſt Entity, and the moſt ſolid and ſubſtantial Reality, without the leaſt Participation or Poſſibility of not being. *The Darkneſs* of *nothing* can never ſit upon the Face of this *Deep*, for all is Being, all is Eſſence, all is pure Act and Life here, and the Intelligible Sun ſhines with a Light in which there is no Darkneſs at all. Here are the τὰ ὄντα the Things that are, and that truly and chiefly are, *quæ vere ſummeq; ſunt*, as St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks and that becauſe they neceſſarily and immutably are, and cannot either not be, or be otherwiſe. Here live, flouriſh and ſhine thoſe bright and unperiſhing Realities whereof the Things of this World are but the Image, the Reflection, the Shadow, the *Echo*. For every thing here is ſo far fair as it reſembles its Intelligible Pattern, according to that of *Ficinus* concerning corporeal Beauty, that 'tis only a Bodies carrying in it a more expreſs Similitude or Reſemblance

Ἐν τῷ κοσμῷ τῷ νοητῷ ἡ ἀληθινὴ Οὐσία. Ennead. 4 Lib. 1.

De quant. Animæ. Cap. 33

In his Comment upon the 6 Book of the 1 Enead. *of* Plotinus.

of

of its Idea. *Pulchritudo in corporibus eſt expreſſior Ideæ ſimilitudo.* But in the Intelligible World are the Original Forms of all that Beauty in Bodies which ſtrikes the Eyes, wounds the Heart, and raviſhes the Affections of the gazing Spectatour, and fills his Mind with a thouſand Paſſions. And if the Tranſcripts can do ſo much, what would the fair Originals do, how ſtrong, but how bright and chaſte a Flame would they kindle? But here alſo is the Fair and more than *Elyſian Field* of *Truth*, entertaining the Eye with various and unbounded Proſpects, and with the richeſt *Scenes* of Wonder ſufficient to employ an Eternal Contemplation. The *Field* of *Truth!* Whoſe lucid Springs for ever riſe, and for ever flow to Water the Myſtical *Eden*, the Intellectual Garden of the Lord. Where alſo the renown'd *Tree* of *Wiſdom* and Knowledge takes a deep Root, and ſpreads her Fruitful Branches, but caſts no *Shade* with her ſhining and tranſparent Leaves. For all is Light here, and all is Perfection here. No Monſters, no Irregularities, no Defects, but every thing as we ſay Mathematically exact, in the very Juſtice of Order and Proportion. And all without Decay, no Variableneſs or Shadow of turning, no Death, nor Corruption, but a perpetual Spring of Beauty, a never ceaſing Bloom of Light and Glory in theſe Incorruptible Regions, the only World that wears not with Time, and whoſe *Faſhion paſſes not away.*

6. Hap-

6. Happy are they who dwell in thy ſerene and ſhining Regions, where God feeds his *Iſrael* with the true Food of Angels, the *Manna* of Truth. Where Truth is the Aliment, and where the Life is Wiſdom, even that Wiſdom, as St. *Auſtin* ſays, by whom all Things were made. *Confeſ. Lib.* 9. *C.* 10. Who drink at the Fountain-head of Ideal Light, and ſit under the Tree of Knowledge, and freely eat of its Delicious, and not forbidden Fruits, and taſte them Freſh and Fragrant, and in their Native and Genuin Reliſh, and are wiſe without Books, and Learned without Study. Who are admitted within the Veil, and ſee the faireſt Objects in the beſt and moſt Anvantagious Light. Who view Truth *Naked*, and Contemplate, not through a Glaſs darkly, but immediately and at hand, the Eternal Ideas, and immutable Reaſons of Things, the everlaſting Schemes of Arts and Sciences, the Original Syſtems of Philoſophy, the neceſſary and unchangeable Laws of Good and Evil, true Living and Subſtantial *Morality*, and who ſee Beauty, Order, and Proportion in their higheſt *Refinements*, in the very Formal Reaſons and Eſſences of them. Upon whom the Intelligible Sun goes not down, and from whom his Glorious Light is never eclips'd, who dwell with *Prudence*, and converſe with *Wiſdom*, even that Wiſdom which is the Brightneſs of the everlaſting Light, the unſpotted Mirrour of the

Power of God, and the Image of his Goodneſs. The *Arabian* Queen thought the Servants of *Solomon* Happy for the Opportunity they had of hearing his wiſe Diſcourſes. *Happy are thy Men, and happy are theſe thy Servants, which ſtand continually before thee, and hear thy Wiſdom,* 2 Chron. 9. But a Greater than *Solomon* is here, even the Eternal and Subſtantial Word and Wiſdom of God, who inſpired that Wiſe King with all his Extraordinary Endowments, and who in all Ages entring into Holy Souls, makes them Friends of God and Prophets. And how happy then are they, who in his Divine Light ſee and enjoy Light! *Pſal.* 65. Yea, *Bleſſed is the Man whom thou chuſeſt O Lord, and receiveſt unto thee. He ſhall dwell in thy Court, and ſhall be ſatisfied with the Pleaſures of thy Houſe, even of thy Holy Temple.* * Where their Virtue is to love what they ſee, and their Happineſs is to have what they love.

* *Una ibi & tota virtus eſt amare quod videas, & ſumma Felicitas habere quod amas. St.* Auſt.

7. *Plotinus*, who has ſaid ſo much concerning the *Intelligible World*, forgot not the Happy State of thoſe that live in it. Of which he gives us this Deſcription. It is a Life of Eaſe that they live there, for Truth is their Parent, their Nurſe, their Subſtance, and their Nouriſhment. And they ſee all Things, not thoſe Things which are Subject to Generation, but which are in Eſſence, and themſelves

Ennead. 5. *Lib.* 8. *Cap.* 4.

ſelves in others. For all Things are there Tranſparent. Nothing is there dark, nothing is there * Opake, but every one is there Conſpicuous to every one, even to the very inſide, and throughout. For all is † thorough-light there. Every one has all Things in himſelf, and again, ſees all Things in another. So that all Things are every where, and all is all, and every Thing all, and the Splendor infinite. For every Thing is there Great. Since even what is Little, is there Great. The Sun there is all the Stars, and every Star again is the Sun, and all Things. But every Thing is more eminently ſome certain diſtinct Thing, and yet all Things are to be ſeen in every Thing, *&c.* He adds afterwards among other Characters of the happy Life that they live in this World, that there is neither *Wearineſs*, nor *Satiety* in the Viſion of the Things that they ſee there. As indeed it is impoſſible that there ſhould. For all Toil or *Wearineſs* is from the Infirmity of the Faculty, as *Satiety* is from ſome Deficiency in the Object, whereby it ſuffices not, either for the Fulneſs, or, for the Continuance of its Entertainment. But now where the Faculty is in a State of perfect Vigour and Activity, and the Object is ſo infinitely various, there is no room either for the one or for the other. The Contemplation of Truth does not *cloy* us, as very Mortals as we are, even

* Ἀντίτυπον.

† Φῶς γὰρ φωτί. *Light anſwers to Light.*

in this Life. *Weary* us indeed it does, but that is only through the Defect of thoſe volatile and diſſipable Spirits which ſerve the Soul in her Intellectual Functions. 'Tis not that ſhe her ſelf is weary, but becauſe her Frail Companion tires, and cannot keep pace with her, that ſhe is forc'd to intermit her moſt pleaſing Contemplations, and for a while to repoſe her ſelf. But in the other State when her Vehicle ſhall be refined into an impaſſible Conſiſtence, and ſhall put on the *Temper* of Immortality, ſhe ſhall then be ſtrong and luſty as an Eagle, and be able to behold the bright Sun of Truth with an *unwearied*, as well as *unſatiated* Eye. As the Diviner *Virgil* Sings of St. *John*.

Vida. Chriſtiad. Lib. 4.

Qualis ubi alta petens terris aufertur ab imis
Alituum Regina, vagas ſpaciata per auras
Dat plauſum gyro, atq; in nubila conditur alis.
Ætherea jamq; illa plaga levis inſtat, & acrem
Intendens aciem criniti Lumina Solis
Suſpicit, obtutuq; oculos fixa hæret acuto.

8. This indeed is the beſt *Theory* of the *Intelligible World*, and they the moſt Happy Theoriſts, to whom the ſhining and all-glorious Scenes of it ſhall be thus clearly, and thus continually laid open. But happy next are they who at a Remoter diſtance from this Region of Glory, and in this dark Valley

ley and Shadow of Ignorance and Death, do yet turn their inamour'd Eyes towards the true Fountain of Light, and receive his Beams, tho' as they pass with *Refraction* through a Cloud, and view and review the Splendor of his Beauty, tho' it be through a Glass darkly. Those *Wise Lovers* of Truth I mean, who considering that Wisdom is the Principle thing, and how much better she is than Rubies, and all the Treasures of the Earth, that besides the present Pleasures and Satisfactions of her Communications, she gives even *Life* to those that have it, and that Fools dye for want of it, withdraw from the amusing and distracting Noise of a busy World, and while others are crossing the Perillous Seas for more Perillous Wealth, or ambitiously climbing the slippery heights of Honour and Greatness, to stand there a while with more Envy, and fall thence with more Contempt, or mudling on in the little Affairs of a lower and more innocent, perhaps, but not less ingaged Life, or else passing away their time in Sloath and Idleness, and because it does not so pass fast enough (nothing being so tedious as doing nothing) contriving, it may be, Wicked Pleasures and Diversions to make it quicken its pace, and so sinning for want of having something better to do, I say happy they who while others are thus *impertinently* or *wickedly* imploy'd, addict and devote themselves to the Study and Contemplation of those great and

uſeful Things which ſerve to clear the Head, and purify the Heart, not making Proviſion for the Fleſh, nor regarding the *Bodily Life* any farther than is neceſſary to promote and improve that of the *Spirit*, whoſe Nouriſhment is Truth, and whoſe Life is Wiſdom.

9. For indeed, Truth is the Food and Nouriſhment of the Soul that gives it Life, Strength, and Growth, that inlarges its Powers, and perfects its Nature. And accordingly Wiſdom is ſaid to have furniſh'd her Table, and is brought in inviting Men to eat of her Bread and to drink of her Wine, *Prov.* 9. And there is in every Man a Natural Hunger for this Food, and a Natural Thirſt for this Intellectual Wine, and ſuch as can never be ſatisfied in this Life, wherein they that eat of this Food ſhall yet be Hungry, and they that drink of this Wine, ſhall yet be Thirſty. Nay, the more they eat and drink, the more vehemently they hunger and thirſt. All Men as Naturally deſire to know as they do to be Happy, and perhaps the very ſame Weight that carries them to the one, inclines them alſo to the other. For indeed what is Happineſs but the clear Contemplation, and open Viſion of the *Firſt Truth*? And this Natural Hunger and Thirſt that Man has after Truth, ſhews how agreeable an Aliment it is to his Nature, and how truly Perfective it is of his Being. For all Natural Hunger is only after proper and convenient Food. They

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are falſe Appetites and vicious Reliſhes, contracted either by Cuſtom, or proceeding from Diſtemper, that carry Men to unwholeſom Diet. Truth then is the true Food and natural *Diet* of the Soul. But then this is to be underſtood only of *Ideal* Truth, of Neceſſary, Eternal and immutable Truth, that Truth which is the proper Object of *Theory* and *Science*, the Truth of the Intelligible World, and whoſe Nature is Coeſſential with the Divine. For 'tis God only that can be the Good of our Souls, and conſequently that Truth only which is Coeſſential with him, can be truly Perfective of them. This is the true Intellectual Food, of ſuch Truth conſiſts the *Feaſt* of *Wiſdom*. As for Opinions, Fables, Fancies, Probabilities, and Appearances, they are thoſe Phantaſtick Viands, thoſe *Dreams* of Eating and Drinking, that cheat and delude the hungry and thirſty Soul. And as for Truth, of *Fact*, Languages, Hiſtories, *&c.* they are thoſe dry heartleſs and inſipid Meats that afford her no wholſome, or kindly Nouriſhment. 'Tis the Ideal Truth only that is her ſolid and ſubſtantial Food, the true *Manna* wherewith God feeds his *Iſrael*, the Living Bread that comes down from Heaven. And accordingly the ſame Eternal Word and Wiſdom of God, that ſays, he is the *Truth*, ſays alſo, that he is the *Bread* of Life. And truly whatever Arbitrary Value the Fancies of Men, or Cuſtoms of the World may ſet upon ſome

other kinds of Diet, the natural Hunger of the Soul ſtill craves after, and will never be ſatisfied but with this living *Bread*. Which indeed is the very ſame Ideal Wiſdom, that the Wiſe King ſo ſolemnly pray'd for, when he ſaid, *Give me Wiſdom that ſitteth by thy Throne*. Even the Eternal Wiſdom, the Word that was with God, and that was afterwards with Men, and who is the *True Light* that lightens every Man that comes into the World.

10. Not but that there is an Order and a Meaſure to be obſerved in the ſearch and ſtudy, even of *Ideal Truth*. For tho' all Ideal Truth according to the Principles of this our Syſtem, be in it ſelf truly amiable and perfective of the Mind that Contemplates and perceives it, and ſo in it ſelf abſolutely conſider'd moſt worthy of our ſtudious Application, yet as ſome of theſe Truths have a nearer Relation to our Intereſt than others, ſo ſome may be more concerning and important as to us than others, and accordingly are more Principally to be regarded by us. In which reſpect (that is taking the relative into the Account with the abſolute Value) *Spiritual* Wiſdom will appear to be the Beſt Wiſdom, and he to be moſt Wiſe, who is *wiſe unto Salvation*. And indeed conſidering the Narrowneſs of our Faculties, the ſhortneſs of human Life, with other Circumſtances of our Condition in this World, perhaps the juſteſt and moſt accountable Meaſure of our Speculative Inquiries would be to

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apply our ſelves at preſent to theſe *Ideal Contemplations* no farther than as they ſome way or other conduce to the regulation of our Paſſions, and the Moral Conduct and Government of our Lives. Which Meaſure, as on the one hand it excludes all Vain Curioſity, ſo on the other it leaves ſufficient room for the Employment and Exerciſe of our Rational Faculties in the ſtudy of the Sciences, which as they give us clear Views, and juſt Apprehenſions of things, as they diſcover to us the Nature of God and of his Works, as they acquaint us with our own Ignorance and reduce us to a right Underſtanding of our ſelves, as they raiſe our Thoughts above the World, and wean our Affections from the Love of ſenſible Objects, will be found to have ſo Friendly an Aſpect upon Morality and Religion that they need not be ſtudied any farther than as they befriend the intereſts of them.

11. For theſe Reaſons and with theſe Limitations, *Happy the Contemplative Man.* The World envies him not, but rather pitties him as a Melancholy forlorn Creature, becauſe he partakes not in their Joys, nor reliſhes their Pleaſures, but he has Meat to eat that they know not of, even that Meat upon which Angels feed, the ſolid and ſubſtantial *Bread* of *Truth.* The greateſt Pleaſure we have is the Pleaſure of our Thoughts, and Experience will tell thoſe that know how to uſe them, that that which gives our Souls the moſt delicate

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touch, the moſt refined *Senſation*, is the quiet and ſilent Contemplation, and the clear and diſtinct View of Truth. When Wiſdom enters into the Heart, and Knowledge is pleaſant to the Soul, then is the true *Intellectual Feaſt*. This is that Light that is ſo very truly ſweet, this that Sun which the Eyes find ſo much Pleaſure in beholding. And to wonder, for the Viſion of it hereafter ſhall be truly and fully *Beatifick*, and how then can it be otherwiſe here than at leaſt extremely Joyous and Pleaſant? Some Men have ſcarce any Notion of any other Pleaſure than what is ſenſual, either in this World or in the next, and to ſuch indeed it muſt needs be a ſtrange Amuſement to hear talk of the Pleaſures of a *Contemplative Life*. But thoſe that remember that they are Men, and conſider what it is that makes them ſo, muſt needs allow the Pre-eminence of Pleaſure to Rational and Intellectual Enjoyments, and conſequently that as the Contemplative is the moſt Rational, ſo it muſt needs be of all others the moſt Pleaſant and Happy way of living. *Bleſſed is the Man that heareth me*, ſays Wiſdom, *watching daily at my Gates, waiting at the Poſts of my Door.*

12. It muſt indeed be confeſs'd that our Views of Truth are very Confuſe and Imperfect in this Life. We are here like the Camp of *Iſrael* under the Cloud, as we paſs through the Sea of this World. And tho' it be a Cloud of *Glory*, yet the Glory as it ſhines to us through,

through, ſo is it much abated by the Cloud. We ſee as at a great Diſtance, and our Medium is groſs, and our Sight is very Weak, and yet ſuch is the Divine Beauty of Truth that it appears lovely and charming notwithſtanding all theſe Diſadvantages. So Glorious a Sun cannot but ſhine bright at any diſtance, the fartheſt Projection of its Light is Chearing, and the very *Breakings* of its Day affect our Eyes with a Delight beyond all the Scenes of worldly Grandure, or ſenſible Beauty. And how then ſhall we be raviſh'd with his Meridian and Unclouded Splendor, when we ſhall ſee Truth as ſhe is, and converſe intimately with Wiſdom, and *enter* into the *Light* as well as into the *Joy* of our Lord! In the mean time we are happy in his remoter Communications, thoſe obſcurer Diſcoveries of Truth, thoſe broken Glimpſes of Ideal Light which ſhine forth upon Contemplative Minds even in this Life, which indeed would hardly deſerve that Name, were it not for the Pleaſure of *Contemplation*.

13. For this the great Advantage, next to a Healthy Body, and a pure and well-temper'd Spirit, is Solitude and Retreat. Our Faculties are but narrow at beſt, and therefore we had need have at leaſt the free and intire Uſe of them. But now as the Affairs of Life directly employ and divide our Thoughts, ſo the Noiſe of the World, and the Ingagements of Converſation ſtrike hard upon our Senſes, and

and thereby in Virtue of the Laws of Union between Soul and Body, make very lively Impreſſions upon the Mind, and ſo fill and diſtract its Capacity, that it cannot attend to the Things we have in Conſideration with that Unity and Recollection of Thought that is neceſſary to the clear and diſtinct View of Truth, which in this Senſe alſo muſt be ſeen with a *ſingle* Eye.

14. When our Attention is much ingaged in any Contemplation we find by Experience that we do not mind what paſſes without, whence we may clearly and moſt conſequentially argue that whenever we do mind outward Paſſages (as in Converſation 'tis almoſt impoſſible not to do) our Attention cannot be much ingaged upon the Things that we think of. As indeed how ſhould it, ſince what ſtrikes our Senſes, imploys our Thoughts, and what imploys our Thoughts muſt (conſidering the Finiteneſs of our Capacity) at the ſame time *divert* them. Indeed were our Minds infinite, or had we ſuch Power over our Bodies as to be able at Pleaſure to ſtop the Communication of their ſenſible Impreſſions, Company would then be no Divertiſement or Diſtraction to us. But ſince neither of theſe Privileges belong to our preſent Nature, not only Company but any thing that ſtrikes upon our Senſes muſt needs give us Trouble and Diſturbance in our ſeverer Contemplations. The leaſt *Noiſe* will do it, as I have found by Experience in the

the Compoſition of this Work, wherein the very buzzing of a Fly has been very troubleſome to me. Nay, even the ſoft ſtrokes of *Light*, as fine and as delicate as they are, tho' they ſpread a pleaſing gaity through our Minds, and ſo ſeem to quicken and inliven our Thoughts, do yet really trouble and diſperſe them. Whence that Practice of ſome of darkning the Room when they ſtudy. And indeed would *Health* allow it, Students are the only Men that have a Warrant from *Reaſon* to invert the Courſe of Nature by turning Day into Night, and Night into Day. For our Conceptions of Things are never ſo Clear and Conſiſtent as in the Dark, and none think ſo ſtrongly as the *Blind*. 'Tis true indeed all this ſhews the Weakneſs of our Natures, and the great Dependence that the Soul has upon the Body, but ſince it is ſo, and we cannot help it, all that we have to do is to have regard to our Compoſition in the Management of our ſelves, and to endeavour to ſupply our inward Defects with outward Advantages.

15. The Reaſon and Advantage of Solitude is founded upon the Infirmity of our Minds, which cannot find Truth without Attention, nor attend without Quietneſs. And as there are degrees in this Intellectual Indiſpoſition, ſo Solitude becomes more neceſſary for ſome than others. 'Tis hear as in *Morality*. Some Minds there are of ſuch a ſtrong and clean Conſtitution as to converſe in the World without

out being much corrupted or infected by it, whereas others for the neceſſary Security of their Innocence are forc'd to *retire*, to conſult their Safety by flight, and when they cannot fairly maintain the Field, to make as honourable a *Retreat* as they can. And ſo in like Proportion ſome receive not the ſame Impreſſions, and conſequently not the ſame Diſturbance from Company, as others, or if they do can better bear it. But yet however ſome Diſturbance and ſome Diſadvantage they muſt have, and if they can think ſo well in the noiſe and hurry of a Converſable Life, 'tis certain they would think much better without it, in a State of Solitude and Retirement, where they have the full Liberty, and free Uſe of their Thoughts, and all is Quiet and Serene about them. And provided it be ſo *in* them too, that is, that their Paſſions are ſtill and ſilent, and their Spirits calm and ſedate (for otherwiſe a Man were as good be in a Croud, as alone and out of Temper) I do not know a greater Advantage for the Contemplation and Viſion of Truth, that a thoughtful Soul can have in this World. Wherein if there be any thing that raiſes my Envy, 'tis the Happineſs of thoſe who enjoy the real Benefit of that Retreat, whereof my Unhappineſs permits me little more than the *Name* and the *Deſire*.

16. The Advantages of *Converſation* I know are mightily talkt of, and I confeſs it has this double Advantage. 1. that it gives a Brightneſs

neſs to our Manners, and poliſhes our Behaviour. 2. That it lets us into the Knowledge of the *World*. Tho' yet as to the latter of theſe, Solitude will be found to be as neceſſary as Converſation, if not more. A little keeping Company will acquaint a Man with all that is worth knowing in the World, if he has a great deal of Privacy and Leiſure to reflect upon what paſſes Abroad, whereas all the Converſation in the World will leave a Man as ignorant of Human Nature as it found him, if he has not ſome Solitary Intervals wherein to think over with himſelf what he ſees and hears Abroad. For 'tis not ſeeing a great deal of the World, but reflecting well upon what one ſees of it, that makes even a *Worldly Wiſe* Man. Beſides, that after all, Men are made ſo generally alike, and take the riſe of their Motions ſo much from the ſame Springs, that to know Human Nature, the beſt and moſt direct way is to know *ones ſelf*. And to inſtruct us in this kind of Knowledge I know no School like that of *Solitude*. For ſure to know ones ſelf, one muſt converſe much with ones ſelf.

Te cum habita, ut noris quam ſit tibi curta ſupellex.

17. But ſhould the Advantage in theſe Reſpects lie on the ſide of Converſation, yet this makes nothing againſt the Preference of Solitude for the purpoſes of a *thinking* and Contempla-

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tive Life. Converſation teaches us to Converſe, and by its frequent Rencounters files off the Roughneſs of our Humour, ſmooths and poliſhes our Temper, gives a Grace and an Air to our Addreſs, and ſo accompliſhes our outward Behaviour. True. But 'tis private Reflection and Meditation that inlightens our *Interiour*, rectifies our Judgments, and gives us clear and diſtinct, correct and exact Apprehenſions of Things. Converſation cannot do it. For we then think and ſpeak in a hurry, and as few have Temper enough to talk calmly, ſo none have Light and Penetration enough to talk always cloſely upon ſo ſhort Views of Things, and ſuch a broken and tranſient Conſideration of the Subject as upon ſuch occaſions is ordinarily allow'd. Beſides this, People grow warm and out of Humour, or they are interrupted, or they are ſurprized, or they are overlaid with a Multitude of Things, and ſometimes of Speakers too, or they are impoſed upon by the Preſence and ingaging Air of thoſe they talk with, by the turns of their Wit, by the Inſinuations of their Addreſs, by the Happineſs or Fluency of their Expreſſion, nay ſometimes even by their *own* Fluency, which by the eaſy Birth of their Thoughts, and the ſmooth dreſs wherein they are cloath'd, is apt to make them belive that they are true and ſolid. To which after all we may add a certain vain *Æmulation* that attend theſe Oral Congreſſes, which too often makes Men more concern'd for Victory than

than for Truth, and accordingly prompts them to talk plauſibly rather than juſtly, and to manage their Diſcourſe ſo as may rather ſerve to *acquit* themſelves, than to diſcover that Truth which they pretend to be in the ſearch of. By which means it is that Converſation turns to ſo little an Account, and that after abundance of Amuſements, and a great deal of *Learned* chat, (the only reſpect wherein it differs from ordinary Goſſiping) nothing is clear'd, but things are left in the ſame Perplexity wherein they were found, if not more intangled, and the Company very gravely breaks up without being much the Wiſer for what has ſo confuſely paſs'd. And to convince any unprejudiced Man of this, let him but retire after he has been at one of theſe *Philoſophical Tranſactions*, and quietly repaſs over in his Thoughts what has been there diſcours'd, and he will be even amazed at the ſtrange Confuſion and Diſorder of it, will wonder how ſuch ſlight and ſuperficial Appearances of Truth could poſſibly impoſe upon him, and even the beſt of it will ſeem to him as little better than the wild Ramblings of a *Dream*.

18. But then this ſhews that 'tis in a State of Solitude that we are truly and thoroughly *awake*, and have our Thoughts moſt our own, moſt clear and conſiſtent. Becauſe we judge of what paſſes in Converſation by our private Reflections, even as we do of the confuſe Imaginations of the *Night* by the more clear and

distinct Conceptions of the *Day*. When we are in the Ingagements of Company we have not the full command or use of our Reason, and are in some Measure out of the right State of our Minds, we breath a thick Air, and seek Truth in a Mist, and even when we happen to meet her do hardly know her. But when we are alone, then we *come to our selves*, and then if we seek for Truth with due Care and Attention, we find it, because it is in our selves. Noise disturbs, Company amuses, and Business distracts, but in a State of Solitude and Retreat, all Impediments are removed from the Soul, except that inseparable one of the *Body*, and so she may put forth her Faculties to the utmost stretch, and imploy them within the whole Sphere of their present Activity. She may consult the Oracle of Truth with Freedom, and distinctly hear the Answers which she returns, till the Improvements of Wisdom and Goodness steal on like the dawning Light. He then that aims at Breeding and Accomplishment, let him use frequent Conversation, and be much Abroad, but he that would find Truth and solid Wisdom, let him retire (for the *Depth says it is not in me, and the Sea, the troubled Sea, says it is not in me*, Job 28.) and converse with himself in Silence and Obscurity. Or if he must needs have some other Company, let it be the *Dead*, and not the *Living*. And what Truths with these Advantages he cannot find, he must be content to defer his Knowledge of, and wait

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in a patient Ignorance for, till the Scenes of the Intelligible World ſhall fully open, and the Veil that parts between us ſhall be taken away, that we may enter into the *Excellent* Glory and Brightneſs of Truth, and Mortality may be ſwallow'd up of *Life* and *Light*.

19. And thus as far as the ſlender Meaſure of my Underſtanding and the Difficulty of my great Subject will give me leave, I have finiſh'd the Abſolute Part of this Syſtem, containing an Account of the *Intelligible World* purely as in it ſelf conſider'd. What remains is to conſider it in its Relative Capacity, as it is the real and immediate Object of *Human Underſtanding*, of which this latter part is intended to be a profeſs'd Account, upon the Principles already laid in the former. My deſign in the whole being briefly comprehended in that two-fold Remark of the Scholiaſt upon *Ariſtotle*'s Ethicks, *In Deo quoad Eſſentiam omnia ſunt æquivalenter, in eodem velut in ſpeculo omnia cognoſcuntur excellenter.* This I take as it were for my Text. The firſt part of which I have largely treated of, and by God's Aſſiſtance brought to a Concluſion. Whether I ſhall proceed farther or no depends upon my Health, Leiſure, and other Contingencies. However, I have laid the Grounds, and if I do not, perhaps ſome body elſe of better Abilities, and that has more Health and Opportunity to uſe them, may be induced to build upon them,

Schol. upon the 4th Chap. of the 1ſt Book.

and complete the Syſtem, which having diſcover'd a World of Light, is next to ſhew that we ſee by it.

In the mean time may the Father of Lights and Eternal Fountain of Wiſdom, the Immortal and only Wiſe God, ſhine forth upon our Minds with the Beams of his Divine Glory in this Valley of Darkneſs, and amidſt the infinite by-ways of Errour and Falſhood, lead us into the ſtrait and ſingle, however unfrequented Path of Truth. For the finding of which may he grant us *Light*, and when we have found it, *Humility*.

POSTSCRIPT.

Concerning the Distinction of Formaliter *and* Eminenter, *as applied to the manner of the Perfections of Things being in* GOD.

THo' the frequent Use and Familiarity of Things makes them seem easy to us, yet upon farther Reflection we shall find that some of the most uncommon Difficulties are to met with in explaining the most common Things. The Distinction of *Formaliter* and *Eminenter* is a very common, as well as necessary Distinction, and also frequently applied to the Concern in Hand, but perhaps not so exactly conceiv'd, as ordinarily used.

The Occasion of this Distinction is chiefly taken from the Doctrin of *Causality*, wherein it is a most assured Maxim, that whatever is in the Effect must be contain'd some way or other in its Cause, since whatever is in the Effect is *from* the Cause, and what is from it must be some way or other *in* it, it being impossible that the Cause should communicate to the Effect what in no manner of way it has in it self.

But then when upon comparing of some Causes with their Effects there appears to be such a Disproportion between them (upon

which Account such Causes are called *Equivocal*) that the Effect cannot be said to be in the Cause after the same manner as it is in it self, this has made Men look out after another way, and accordingly put them upon the Distinction of a two-fold manner of an Effects being contain'd in its Cause, *viz.* either in the way of *Formality*, or in the way of *Eminence*.

By an Effects being contain'd *Formally* in its Cause the Authors of this Distinction seem to intend no other than the Effects being of the same Nature with the Cause. Which Cause is accordingly then said to be *Univocal*. In which there is no great Difficulty, neither as to their *Meaning*, nor as to the *thing*. But now what they mean by the Counterpart of the Distinction, when they say that the Effect is contain'd in the Cause *Eminently*, is not so easy to apprehend.

Suarez tells us, that to contain Eminently is to have such a Perfection of a Superiour Reason which virtually contains whatsoever is in the inferiour Perfection. Which indeed well explains the *Word*, but leaves the *thing* as Obscure as it was before. But then to make it plainer, he farther tells us, that this cannot be better explain'd by us than in order to Causality, or the Effect. And for this he Instances in the Perfections of the Creatures, which according to him are said to be *Eminently* in God, in as much as he is able

Dispur. 30. Sect. 1. Num. 10.

able by his ſole Eminent Virtue or Power to Communicate thoſe Perfections to them.

But then ſhould it be demanded why or how God is able to communicate them, muſt not the Anſwer at leaſt in part be, becauſe he ſo contains them? But then God's Ability to communicate ſuch Perfections to the Creature preſuppoſes his containing them in himſelf as the Reaſon and Foundation of it, and if ſo, then it appears plainly that theſe are things of a Conſideration too formally diſtinct, to be juſtly defined or explain'd one by the other.

The Excellent Metaphyſician ſeems aware of this. And therefore ſays he, not that formally ſpeaking to be able to produce things is eminently to contain them. For we rationally diſtinguiſh theſe things, and think this cauſal way of ſpeaking to be true, becauſe he eminently contains them, therefore he is able to produce them. But ſays he, we explain this Continency by order to the Effect, becauſe we cannot do it more clearly and commodiouſly. Which in effect ſeems to confeſs the unexactneſs of the Account, and that they take up with it only for want of a better.

Suppoſe then the Principles of our Ideal Philoſophy ſhould for once at this dead Draught help out the Metaphyſicks of the School. For would it not be a more *clear* and *commodious* Account of any Creature, or created Perfections being eminently in God, to ſay, that tho' the very thing it ſelf be not formally in him, yet that there is ſomething,

or ſome Degree of Being or Perfection in his Super-excellent Nature, which Intelligibly or to all Purpoſes of Conception or Underſtanding anſwers to it, and is ſo eſſentially Expreſſive or Repreſentative of it, as to ſerve him for an Intelligible Form, both for the Knowledge, and for the Production of that Creature. So that if this Almighty Cauſe ſhall will to produce a Creature according to it, it ſhall be that very Creature whoſe Perfection he is ſaid thus to contain, and no other. And which is therefore ſaid to be contain'd in his Infinite Eſſence, becauſe it has its Intelligible Equivalent there, which is the *Reaſon* wherein it is known, and was the *Exemplar* whereby it was made.

But then becauſe that Degree of Being in God which is ſuppoſed thus to anſwer to ſuch a Perfection in the Creature is however in him far more Excellent than that, or any other Perfection is or can be in the Creature, this fills up another Senſe of this Diſtinction, whereby it is alſo intended that the Perfections of the Creature are in God after a more *excellent* Manner (for elſe it would be Formally, and not Eminently) than they are in the Creatures themſelves. And ſo indeed upon this Suppoſition it plainly is, and neceſſarily muſt be. And that becauſe the Perfections of the Creature as they are in God are really of his Divine Eſſence, according to that of St. *Auſtin*, *That which was made, is in him Life.* And it is impoſſible that what is in God,

God, however imitable *ad extra*, ſhould yet be perfectly equall'd by any thing out of him, becauſe of the vaſt Diſproportion between Finite and Infinite.

And thus God in this way is rightly ſaid to contain the Perfections of things in himſelf, and that too after a more eminent or excellent Manner, becauſe he has that in himſelf which Intelligibly anſwers to them. Some Illuſtration whereof we have in *Numbers*, and in the Metaphyſical *Degrees* of *Being* among Creatures, where the Superiour contains the Inferiour, as the Rational ſuppoſe the Senſitive Life, and that perhaps too by way of Excellency. Upon which we may raiſe our Apprehenſion to conceive in ſome meaſure how it is alſo *in Divinis*. But as to the very preciſe manner of the thing, my preſent Light does not ſerve me to unfold it, and perhaps it is not to be reach'd by any force of Human Thought in this Life.

But however we have here Light enough to ſee in the General, that ſo it muſt needs be, and the Men whom I am now concern'd with do not deny it. On the contrary they hold the *Imitability* of the Divine Nature *ad extra* as well as I, and that there is ſomething in God that is Repreſentative of his Creatures, and which accordingly they make to be the *Idea* of thoſe Creatures. But then what I contend for at preſent is, that this is that very *Eminenter* which they hunt after, that *Eminential Continency* of things which they ſo expreſly,

expreſly, and yet ſo indeterminately aſcribe to God. Who I think may in a very conceivable Senſe be ſaid to contain thoſe Perfections eminently whereof the Degrees of his own Eſſential Perfection are Repreſentative, and to which they Intelligibly Correſpond, and conſequently ſo to contain the Perfections of his Creatures, becauſe of thoſe *Theſauri rerum Intelligibilium*, which as St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks are in the Wiſdom of God, and have in them the incommutable Reaſons of the things that are made by it. In which reſpect (to borrow another very Emphatical Expreſſion from the ſame Father) he may be ſaid to be *Sinus Naturæ in ſeipſo continens omnia*, tho' not in the Senſe which is there intended by thoſe Words.

De Civ. Dei. l. 11. c. 10.

Ibid. l. 4. c. 12.

But before I end the Conſideration of this Diſtinction, I think fit to take notice of another which the Schools make in the Application of it. They diſtinguiſh two ſorts of Perfections in things. Some which they call *Simpliciter*, *Simplices*, which are pure Perfections, as involving no Imperfection in them. And others which they call Perfections only *ſecundum quid*, as not being ſimply ſo, but only in a certain Reſpect. Now as to the former ſort, theſe they ſay are in God *Formally*, but as to the latter, they ſay they are in God only *Eminently*.

But I do not ſo well underſtand the Neceſſity of this latter Diſtinction as of the other; as very much queſtioning the Truth of the Suppoſition

position upon which it seems to be founded, *viz.* that there are any such pure Perfections in Creatures, that involve no Imperfection in them, at least as to their formal Conception. And consequently I think it may deserve to be consider'd, whether the Eminential way of containing them be not more worthy of the Divine Nature. For 'tis one thing to talk of such and such Perfections (as suppose Life or Wisdom) absolutely in themselves, and another to talk of such Perfections in Creatures. As for such Perfections in themselves, as there is no doubt but that all Perfections are in God, so no doubt but that they may be said to be *formally* in him. But as for such Perfections in the Creature I know not whether they can be said (upon the Account of that Essential Imperfection which they may include) to be in God *Formally*, in the Scholastick Sense of that Term when applied to an Effect being in its Cause, signifying that it is of the very same Nature, Kind, or Species with it. Because perhaps there is nothing in God so strictly univocal with what is in the Creature. But if by *Formally* they mean only some Proportional or Intelligible Resemblance, then I would propose it to be consider'd, whether their *Formally* will not resolve into our *Eminently*.

Soli Deo Gloria.

ER-

ERRATA.

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The great faultiness of the Impression makes me request the Reader for his own ease as well as out of Justice to me, to have continual recourse to this Correction as he reads the Book, or rather once for all to adjust it by it. And I must further acquaint him that there is one Place which by reason of the great Confusion of the Mistake, I think fit here to rectify by it self. It is p. 63. l. 9. where the Sense should run thus. *I say when they speak thus, especially if they allege Arguments from Reason and the Nature of things to defend it (as 'tis to be supposed they will, or else what they say deserves no regard) 'tis plain that they advance*, &c.

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